large quantities of ammunition and some guns, and fled in the direction of Koshu. When the Japanese reached. Asan toward the morning of the 30th, they found the trenches deserted.

A short, sharp campaign followed in northern Korea, ending in the practical annihilation of the bulk of the Chinese army at Ping-Yang, September 15 and 16. It appears that on August 15 a Chinese army of about 5,000, having traversed the province of Ping-Yang (also called PhongYang) from the north, crossed the Tai-Tong river, and occupied Chung-Hwa, on the frontier of the province of Hwang-Hai, the Japanese retiring before them with some loss. Being reinforced by their main army, about 13,000 strong, they fought an indecisive battle with the Japanese on August 16. They then massed all their available forces, about 20,000, in Hwang-Ju, near the mouth of the TaiTong river, and Sing-Chuen. In the meantime the Japanese had used their efficient navy to hurry troops to Chemulpo, whence they were marched northward to Pong-San. A column was also landed at the mouth of the Tai-Tong, on the south side of the river, while a third column marched across from Gen-San (Won-San). These three divisions struck the Chinese simultaneously on September 5 and 6. The troops from Chemulpo struck the Chinese centre at Chung-Hwa; those from Gen-San, the left flank at Sing-Chuen; and the detachment from the mouth of the Tai-Tong, the right flank at Hwang-Ju. The Chinese were forced back in confusion upon PingYang, where they were again attacked on September 15-6 by the three converging columns of the Japanese, and signally defeated. The battle was a splendid example of flank attacks skilfully carried out. Throughout the whole of Saturday, September 15, the Pong-San or centre column. of the Japanese engaged the Chinese fire, gaining some advanced positions, and enabling the flanking columns to form a cordon around the Chinese. At about three o'clock on Sunday morning, a combined and admirably timed attack was made. The Chinese defenses in the rear were weak, and the Celestials were thrown into a panic. In half an hour the positions at Ping-Yang were in possession of the Japanese. The Chinese loss is put at over 2,000 killed, and about 12,000 prisoners, with large stores of war material, while the victors lost only the amazingly small number of 11 officers and 154 men killed, 30 officers and 521 men wounded, and 40 men missing.

This battle left the Japanese masters of Korea, and

although a Japanese division marching from Fusan to Seoul, in the south, is said to have been attacked by dissatisfied Koreans, the fight at Ping-Yang has practically decided the campaign in the peninsula.

The Battle of the Yalu.-Important as was the fight at Ping-Yang, it has attracted less attention from foreign observers than the brilliant naval victory of September 17 in the bay of Korea, near the mouth of the Yalu river. This is the first great fight at sea between really modern menof-war with their complicated machinery, heavy armor, and heavy and rapid-firing guns; and it abounds in useful lessons to students of naval construction and tactics.

On the afternoon of Sunday, September 16, a fleet of twelve ironclads and cruisers, with torpedo boats, belonging to the northern squadron of the Chinese navy, under command of Admiral Ting, arrived at the mouth of the Yalu river, convoying steam transports carrying, it is said, 7.000 troops to reinforce the army in northern Korea. These troops were successfully landed on the 17th, but only at the cost of an engagement which has seriously crippled the Chinese navy, and given the Japanese ready entrance into the gulf of Pe-Chi-Li. A fleet of eleven Japanese menof-war, with torpedo boats, under Admiral Ito, attacked the Chinese squadron on the 17th, and, after five hours' fighting, succeeded, without the loss of a single ship, in sinking four of the Chinese men-of-war, burning three others, and putting the rest to flight westward toward Port Arthur. The Chinese lost heavily, particularly in officers; and eight Englishmen perished with the ships. The Japanese loss is put at 40 killed and 160 wounded. The Chinese vessels reported sunk are the Lai-Yuen, Ching-Yuen, Yang-Wai, and Tshao-Yong, while the KingYuen, Ping-Yuen, and Ting-Yuen were burned. On the Japanese side the Matsushima (flagship), Akagi, and Hiyei were the most seriously damaged, the first named alone being obliged to leave the station for repairs.

The battle began about one o'clock in the afternoon, and lasted until about six. The Chinese endeavored to come to close quarters, but were unable to do so, owing to the superior speed of the Japanese ships, which manoeuvred admirably, keeping at a distance in order to avoid the fire of the enemy's heavy guns, and doing great execution. with their long-range, quick-firing guns.

This battle is the first engagement which affords any data enabling us to measure the effectiveness of the different types of modern men-of-war. The fight of the light

armored Peruvian ship Huascar against the British vessels Shah and Amethyst in 1877, showed only the superiority of armor as against "wooden walls;" while the sinking of the Blanco Encalada in Caldera harbor, Chile, in April, 1891, by a torpedo, showed nothing as to the possibility of resisting torpedo attacks. The battle of the Yalu, however, points to some definite and important conclusions:

1. It shows the supreme importance of superior mobility and manoeuvring power, the value of swift, but strongly-armed cruisers when pitted against heavily-armored battleships. The Japanese fleet was inferior in tonnage, and in weight of armor and armament to the Chinese fleet, but had the advantage of superior speed and mobility. It is significant that some of the most effective work in the battle was done by the Yoshino, an unarmored ship and one of the fastest cruisers in the world. This vessel is one of the latest additions to the Japanese navy, and was built by Sir William Armstrong. At her trial she developed over 15,000 horse-power and a speed of over 23 knots. Her armament consists entirely of rapid-firing guns, hamely four 6-inch, eight 4.7-inch, and twenty-two 3-pounders.

2. Quick-firing guns, such as constitute the so-called secondary batteries, may be made the engines of the most deadly destruction, even if not quite superior to heavy guns of larger calibre, but of less speedy manipulation.

3. The battle also showed the advantage of fighting "bows on as compared with turning broadsides to the enemy. The Japanese ships did some of their most effective work while rushing straight toward the foe. In this way they presented a much smaller target for attack than if they turned their broadsides, while the enemy's shots were rendered largely ineffective by the angle at which they struck.

4. The battle also demonstrated the advantage of superior intelligence and fighting strain. From time immemorial the Chinese have shown but little aptitude for maritime life and adventure. To them the sea has been little more than "the end of the land," while to the Japanese it has been an incentive to enterprise. The two nations in their contrast admirably illustrate the influence of sea-power on national life. The Japanese have not only bought modern ships, like the Chinese, but have built them themselves, and learned how to use them.

In a word, the teaching of the engagement seems indisputably in favor of swift, handy cruisers, powerfully armed, especially with quick-firing guns, and with armament so arranged that a heavy fire can be directed fore and aft, as well as abeam.

It must, however, be borne in mind that further data are necessary before armored battleships can be condemned as inferior to cruisers. Their efficiency for defensive purposes is not yet called in question; and in regard to their value in open battle, we must remember that in the Yalu fight the Chinese fleet was neither well handled nor well supplied with ammunition, the torpedo service was not adequately tested, nor was ramming done at any stage of the engagement. But while the value of heavily armored ships may still be admitted, it is also clear that their effectiveness can be immeasurably increased by increasing their speed, manoeuvring power, and re

sources for rapid, raking fire, by supplementing them with cruisers having these qualifications, and by adding a well-equipped torpedo

service.

The Rival Fleets.-The following tables, showing the vessels of both navies, with some particulars as to their character and strength, may be useful to those who are following the campaign with studious interest. The similarity in the names of Chinese ships is one source of the confusion in the press accounts of the struggle.

Those marked with an asterisk are called armored ships, but not in the usual sense of the term, for there is no armored deck, and no armor against end-on fire. In addition to the above, there are two paddle dispatch vessels of 1,000 to 1,500 tons' displacement, and 1,000 to 1,500 horse-power; also three gunboats of 100 to 875 tons, and of low speed.

The naval strength of China is composed of the following: battle-ships, 5; port defense vessels, 9; cruisers, 56; torpedo boats of all classes, 43. The fleet is divided into the North Coast, Foo-Chow, Shanghai, and Canton squadrons or flotillas.

*. Battleships; b, coast-defense ships; **, armored gunboat; c, cruiser; a, gun vessel; t c., torpedo cruiser.

Besides the above serviceable vessels there are eleven gunboats of 325 to 440 tons' displacement, named with Greek letters of the alphabet; thirteen of 100 to 850 tons' displacement; and six floating batteries, each with three twelveton Armstrong guns in a wooden fixed turret for river service.

The Invasion of China.-As a result of the temporary disablement of the Chinese navy, which is repairing at Port Arthur, Japan has every facility for the unobstructed landing of troops on Chinese soil, while her ships find ready entrance into the bay of Pe-Chi-Li itself, whose waters they are now patrolling. While the details of the movements immediately following the victories of PingYang and the Yalu up to the end of September are not fully known at this writing, the plan of campaign appears to comprise an invasion of Chinese territory in two distinct movements. One is by land, by way of Wi-Ju northward in the direction of Moukden, a city lying 100 miles northwest of Wi-Ju. The capture of this town would be a serious blow to the prestige of the Chinese emperor. It is the sacred city of the Manchu dynasty, containing the ancestral tombs and reputed enormous treas