as an arbitrator. As it is no part of a naval officer's function to act as arbitrator in such a case without express instructions from his government, and as Rear-Admiral Benham was not known to have asked such instructions, it soon became evident either that Da Gama's conference with him had been misreported, that the readiness for peace had been exaggerated, or that the proposals in that direction had been plainly impracticable. The incident, however, was indicative

of the waning strength of the naval revolt.

Admiral Benham's Action.- Much more significant in its international bearings was RearAdmiral Benham's vigorous action on January 29, upholding the rights of the merchant marine of the United States against warships of a socalled government to which belligerent rights had not been accorded. Captain Picking, previously in command after Admiral Stanton's recall,

had ended one controversy on the subject by raising the United States flag over a few lighters which Da Gama had prohibited from landing at a certain point, under which. protection the lighters continued unmolested.

On January 27, three American barks gave notice of their intention to go to certain piers. The next day

Da Gama informed Rear-Admiral Benham that if the three vessels attempted this, he would fire on them. The reply was to the effect that the vessels would be protected in going where their captains wished. Early in the morning of January 29, when five insurgent vessels had taken threatening position near the three barks, all the United States warships got under way and cleared their decks for action, while the Detroit, with guns shotted and the gun-captains standing with lock-strings in hand, ranged in between the insurgent vessels. The insurgents fired muskets at a small boat carrying a line from one of the American vessels. The Detroit responded with a small one-pound shot, which struck under the insurgent's bow.

Vol. 4.-5.

After the insurgent had fired a broadside gun over the American barks, the Detroit returned the fire with a musket, and then steaming by, hailed the insurgent commander with threat if he fired again to return his fire, and, if necessary, to sink his vessel. The insurgent vessels made no further contest, and the three American barks proceeded to their chosen positions-Admiral da Gama giving notice of a formal protest against the action. of the United States. The government at Washington telegraphed its unqualified approval of the vigorous and judicious action of the United States squadron. This approval was echoed by the American people. As to the foreign naval commanders in Rio harbor, the French commander, at the end of the incident, sent congratulations to the American admiral; and the Austrian commander had cleared his decks for action when he saw the Detroit in motion toward the rebel fleet.

It is not known that the action in this case, or the principle which it asserts, has been officially questioned by any government, or adversely criticised by any expert in international law. The principle is, that until an insurgent movement or force has been officially acknowledged as a belligerent, it has no status which gives it the right to decide what is or is not contraband of war, so long as the cargoes in question are under the flag of a recognized national government. While Rear-Admiral Benham effectively protected American rights on this principle, he did not in the slightest degree interfere with the military or naval operations of either side. Though there is a lack of exact precedents for all the peculiarities of this case, there are plentiful official assertions of the cardinal principle which was here applied. One, specially notable, is in Secretary Hamilton Fish's letter to the Haytian minister in regard to the rights of the Haytian insurgents and their vessels (see in Wharton's Digest).

Probably the only departure from former custom which can be alleged in this case-aside from the fact that the United States stood practically alone in refusing to recognize any blockade of the port of Rio that was not actually efficient-is that the rebels, not being recognized as a belligerent power, were summarily menaced as those who were entering on an act of piracy like that of any unauthorized vessel seizing property conveyed on the high seas under the protection of a national flag. To this allegation touching a detail, the reply would probably be: 1, that the vigorous action taken was fully justified by the

aggravating policy in outrage of national rights which the insurgents had asserted and in repeated instances had pursued to a degree more or less developed, and in this case verging toward actual piracy; 2, That summary action was the only protection possible in such a case as this, in which rights would have been exposed to loss without recourse if the appeal in their behalf had at a later date been made to rebels without a national exchequer for re-imbursement, or if the appeal had been postponed for adjudication against a power not recognized in the family of nations. In other words, the detail questioned in this case is essential to any application of the cardinal principle that rebels unrecognized as belligerents cannot claim belligerent rights, and it is upheld by the same considerations.

It is however to be noted that the approval of the action at Rio, is far from an assertion that all rebel forces unrecognized as belligerents are to be considered as committing an act of piracy in every belligerent action. against a neutral government. All that is asserted is, that such rebel forces entering on such acts do so at their own risk. They cannot claim for their cruisers any right to search or stop vessels or to seize or injure persons or property under a neutral flag. Should their cruisers do such acts it rests entirely with the power whose privileges they thus invade whether to destroy them as absolute pirates, or, on considerations of justice or of policy special to an actual case, to waive this extreme right, treating their action either as pardonable mistake or as even justified by remarkable circumstances. It is neces

sarily involved that a neutral nation whose rights have been thus invaded cannot be held to destroy the offenders as pirates, under any obligation to the general security of commerce.

The Presidential Election.-On March 1 an interesting and hopeful event diversified the dire and tedious page of recent Brazilian history-the first popular presidential election ever held in the republic. It seems to have been conducted peacefully and without military pressure or governmental interference. The government wisely decreed the cessation of martial law three days before the election. Peixotto, obeying the constitution, did not present himself as a candidate. Though Brazil has had two presidents, the first, Marshal Deodoro da Fonseca, was chosen by the assembly which on the downfall of the empire framed the new constitution; and the

second, General Floriano Peixotto, was vice-president when Fonseca was forced to resign his office in November, 1891 (Vol. 1, p. 564), and so became his successor.

A true historical estimate of Peixotto's character and administration is scarcely possible to us whose view of facts is liable to distortion by partisan rumors and by conjectures telegraphed as news. Moreover the South American standards of political judgment are foreign to our thought. The general accusation of "militarism was to be expected in his case, and may easily have been true. A republicanism still raw in its emergence from imperialism may naturally have trusted rather in the sword of the warrior than in that of Justice, whose swordarm is hampered by the scales that she must always bear. But the charge which was used as the pretext for rebellion-that Peixotto had acted and surely would act with a prime view to continuing himself in power as practically a dictator, has not thus far been found true. He has indeed set the constitution in abeyance under martial law; but what else would any other ruler on earth have done, in the streets of whose capital rebel emissaries were lurking, while rebel artillery thundered at its gates? When the insurgent pressure weakened, then the constitution was reverently recalled to its due activity. There are recent rumors of his purpose to assume dictatorial power as the head of the army. When he does this it will be our time for judgment.

The election is by direct suffrage, for which there is an educational qualification, and by majority vote. Returns cannot be collected from distant parts of the republic in less than forty days; but after two or three weeks it was generally conceded that the result of the voting on March 1 was known, as there seems to have been only one prominent candidate for the presidency, and the majorities as far as known have been very large. Accordingly it is announced that Dr. Prudente de Moraes has been chosen president, and Dr. Manuel Victorino Pereira, vicepresident. It appears that the election was not held in one or two southern states now largely under rebel control. The count will be officially completed when the congress meets in May; and the presidential term will begin on November 15. The total vote in the city of Rio de Janeiro (7 districts missing) was-president, Moraes 5,507; General Sobre 262; vice-president, Pereira 2,398; General Peixotto 671. It is possible, and by many is deemed desirable, that, by Peixotto's resignation, the new

president's term should begin soon after the congress meets in May; since Moraes is already the vice-president of the senate, and is thus the constitutional successor in case the president resigns. The new officials are both civilians, free therefore from the prejudice which would necessarily attach to a military or a naval officer in view. of the dismal contest at Rio which has recently closed. They are reported to be acceptable not only to many of the imperialist faction, who now see that the restoration of the empire is impossible, but also to numerous recent adherents of the insurgent cause; and it is said that they were openly favored by Peixotto's government. If these reports are true the situation certainly brightens with renewed hope of the prosperity which cannot come except through order, peace, and liberty under law.

DR. PRUDENTE DE MORAES, president-elect, was born about 1844, of an old and eminent family in the state of Sao Paulo, of which he was governor for one term, and then its representative in the imperial parliament. He was educated for the law, and practiced his profession with distinction in his native state. He early became an avowed Republican. His notably gentle disposition has always made him widely popular; he has had experience in public affairs, and has gained general confidence by his integrity, sagacity, energy, and enlightened statesmanship.

DR. MANUEL VICTORINO PEREIRA, vice-president-elect, was born in Bahia, of a well known family; and was in the faculty of the medical college in that city when the republican revolution of 1890 summoned him into politics. He was elected to the senate, in which body he has rendered honorable service.

Hostilities at Rio Ended.--Since the beginning of February the naval revolt in Rio harbor had been giving signs of collapse. The action of the United States squadron had emphasized the lack of any foreign sympathy which could give effective aid to the rebel cause; and the tranquil election of a president favored by Peixotto had shown the popular adherence to the government, while giving assurance of the retiring from power of the man who had been to the insurgents a chief offense. Also, the rebel resources, financial and military, were near exhaustion. The revolt ended March 12. On the previous day the government had formally notified the representatives of foreign powers that a general attack on the insurgent vessels and batteries would begin at the expiration of forty-eight hours. The harbor forts had been newly armed with powerful guns, and nine government vessels were reported outside the harbor. The insurgent naval force at last was overmatched. The noisy play of war was to end.