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' forty days '), 18–21, 23 (second part), 24; viii. 1, 2 (first part), 3 (second part), 4, 5, 13 (first part), 14-19; ix. 1-17, 28, 29; X. I (first part), 2–7, 20, 22, 23, 31, 32 ; xi. 10–27, 31, 32 ; xii. 4 (second part), 5; xiii. 6, 11 (second part), 12 (first part) ; xvi. I (first part), 3, 15, 16; xvii. (except verse 17); xix. 29; xxi. 1 (second part), 2 (second part), 3-5; xxiii. (except verse 1); xxv. 7-17 (except the end of verse 11), 19, 20, 26 (second part) xxvi. 34, 35; xxviii. 1-9; xxx. 22 (first part).

All these passages belong to the document described in the Chart as the ‘Priestly Codex.' If they are read together it will soon be seen that they are all of the same character and often stand in marked contrast with the other passages of Genesis. These other passages are some of them the work of later editors and interpolators, but the greater part of them belong to the sets of * Early Narratives' assigned in the Chart to the * Yahvist'and the 'Elohist,' respectively. These two sets of Early Narratives’are often inextricably fused together, but sometimes they stand apart. Characteristic samples of the Yahvist's work are found in the second Creation story, contained in Gen. ii. and iii., the story of the Tower of Babel, in Gen. xi., and the story of Sodom and Gomorrah. A very characteristic specimen of the Elohist's work is to be found in the stories of the intended sacrifice of Isaac and the ejection of Hagar and Ishmael in Gen. xxi. and xxii.

Students who desire to follow up the subject should read Kuenen’s ‘Religion of Israel,' 3 vols.; Wellhausen's Prolegomena to the History of Israel'; Kuenen's 'Hexateuch'; Fripp's 'Composition of the Book of Genesis'; Robertson Smith's ‘Bible in the Jewish Church'; and Driver's Introduction to the Old Testament.' Readers of German should not fail to consult Stade's 'Geschichte des Volkes Israel.'



THERE are at the present time encouraging signs of a tendency to transfer theological controversy from the rather barren plains of historical research to the more fruitful fields of philosophical speculation. There is a growing interest in the Philosophy rather than in the History of Religion. And of the Philosophy of Religion the central point is the existence and nature of God. The Christian dogmas about the nature of the Deity will, therefore, be the central point of discussion for the philosophic theologian, whether critic or defender of the orthodox faith. And of these dogmas perhaps the most vital, and certainly the most in need of philosophic consideration is the doctrine of the Trinity.

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There are signs,' says Dr. Illingworth, one of the most recent writers on the subject, ‘that the doctrine of the Trinity is again likely to become the battle-ground that it has so often been before in Christian history ;-the battle-ground on which the contention for the faith will have, for the time, to be carried on. The doctrine has certainly, on the face of it, many difficulties and obscurities. And of all others it seems most in need of a philosophic consideration as to what meaning it can have for us, and how far it is a necessary conclusion from certain other beliefs.

An argument on these lines would try to show how the doctrine helped us to conceive of God, how it enabled us to reconcile different characteristics in him, which seem otherwise irreconcilable, and which are nevertheless equally demanded by the religious consciousness and agreed upon by all Theists.

And it is such an argument which is in fact attempted by orthodox apologists. Briefly stated the argument runs thus :

All Theists are agreed that if we are to

believe in God at all, we must think of him as perfectly good, perfectly wise, and per

, fectly powerful. But perfection on all its sides implies, if the word is to have any meaning for us, relation to others. On the other hand, we cannot conceive of the Deity as in any way dependent on his creatures, we cannot think of him as less perfect by himself without them. We are driven, then, if we are to think of God as perfect and yet absolute in himself— both necessary, if we are to think of him at all—to conceive of relations within the Godhead, a Divine Society, of which the doctrine of the Trinity is the expression. We may turn to Dr. Illingworth for a statement of this argument :

'There has always been a double difficulty,' he writes! 'one metaphysical and the other moral, in conceiving the absoluteness of God. A person is primarily and essentially a self-conscious subject; and if we are to think of God as personal, he too must be, metaphysically speaking, a subject. But a subject means a subject

1 The Doctrine of the Trinity, p. 136, et seq.

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of experience, one who undergoes experience, or for whom experience exists, and therefore implies as his correlative an object or objects of experience. And the metaphysician is compelled to ask, what can this object be, in the case of God ? For if we suppose the universe to be this object, we must either regard God as dependent for his realization upon something which is other than himself : and in that case, his absoluteness vanishes : he ceases to be God: or we must view the universe as a mode of himself, in a way that leads to Pantheism, in which personality is lost. We are driven, therefore, to the conclusion that, if there be an absolute, eternal subject, he must have a correspondingly absolute object, an eternal experience, if his proper absoluteness is to be maintained.' And the doctrine of the Trinity comes to satisfy this necessity of theological thought. 'For, like the telescopic discovery of a star which mathematical calculations have already prophesied, it was a revelation at once of the possibility and the reality of

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