JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. WINDING-UP.--The contributions of past members are divisible among all the creditors, as well those whose debts were contracted after as before the contributory had transferred his shares: (Re The Accidental Marine Insurance Company, 22 L. T. Rep. N.S. 291. V.C. S.) This has since been confirmed by the Court of Appeal. RAILWAY-LIABILITY OF - Negligence OF ANOTHER COMPANY OVER WHOSE LINE IT RUNS. -A railway company having given a ticket to a passenger for conveyance between two places, the latter part of the journey being performed over the line of another company over which it had running powers, and a collision causing injury to the passenger having occurred on this part of the journey owing to the negligence of the latter company, and without any negligence on the part of the company contracting with the passenger, it was held, on the authority of the Great Western Railway Company v. Blake, 7 L. T. Rep. N. S. 94, and Burton v. The North Eastern Railway Company, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 795, that the company from whom the passenger obtained the ticket was liable for the injuries occasioned to him by the negligence of the other company over whose line it had running powers: (Thomas r. The Rhymney Railway Company, 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 297. Q.B.) LIABILITY OF RAILWAYS-LUGGAGE.-If a passenger allows his servant to carry a portmanteau in his own personal luggage, the servant taking and paying for his ticket, and the owner going by a later train, an action will not lie for the loss of the portmanteau: (Beecher v. The Great Eastern Railway Company, 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 299. Q. B.) INSURANCE-NATURE OF CONTRACT-FRAUD. A policy of insurance against fire is, in its nature, a contract of indemnity, and the insured is not entitled to recover more than such an amount as will indemnify him against the actual loss or damage sustained according to the real quantity and value of the goods at the time of the fire. An honest claim is not, under the condition against fraud, invalidated on account of error, or even some degree of exaggeration or over estimate; and in such a case the insured will be entitled to recover acording to the real value and the amount of actual loss sustained. But if the claim is wilfully and intentionally excessive that will amount to such fraud as will under the ordinary condition against fraudulent claims, invalidate the claim altogether and disentitle him to recover at all: (Chapman v. Pole, 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 306. Cockburn, C.J.) MERCANTILE LAW. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. (Before BOVILL, C.J., KEATING, SMITH, and BRETT, JJ.) COUCHMAN v. SILLAR AND ANOTHER. The cause of action arose from the following circumstances:---In June 1868 the plaintiff apprenticed his son to Messrs. Sillar and Bateman, who were general and colonial brokers, and paid a premium of 991. 19s. The term was for two years, and in the course of that time Mr. Sillar retired from the business, which was thenceforth carried on by Mr. Bateman. The plaintiff thereupon sued to recover damages upon the ground that the defendants, by dissolving partnership, had broken their covenant that they would jointly teach the plaintiff's son their business. The question raised by the court, upon demurrer, was whether, under these circumstances, the plaintiff was entitled to maintain his action. Garth, Q.C., appeared for the plaintiff. J. Brown, Q.C., for the defendants. The COURT held that the dissolution of partnership disabled the defendants from being able to perform their covenant, and therefore that the plaintiff could recover. ingly given for the plaintiff. Judgment was accord LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL, QUESTIONS FOR THE FINAL EXAMINATION. EASTER TERM, 1870.-SECOND DAY. Questions 36 to 40 inclusive. V. EQUITY AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS. 41. What is the statute which governs the present system of uses and trusts in land? and what is the short effect of it? 42. What classes of persons may institute suits for the administration of the estate of testators or intestates ? 43. In what cases does the wife's equity to a settlement arise? 44. Can a married woman dispose of her reversionary equitable interest? and has any, and what, change in the law in this respect been effected by recent legislation ? 45. What is the rule of courts of equity with regard to dealings between persons in confidential relations, such as attorney and client, trustee and cestui que trust? 46. State some of the cases in which courts of equity decree a dissolution of a partnership at the instance of one of the partners. 47. In suits for the specific performance of contracts for the sale and purchase of land, is the time fixed for the completion of the purchase considered material ? 48. Where property is limited to the separate use of an unmarried woman independently of any husband whom she may marry, and with a restraint on anticipation, and she marries, becomes a widow, and marries a second time, - can she dispose of such property before her first marriage, or while a widow, or during either of her marriages ? a third person for conspiracy,-the latter is acquitted. Can the two former, or either of them, be convicted? give the reasons for your answer. 73. In what cases can one person only be indicted for a conspiracy, and what averment is required? 74. Can an indictment for conspiracy be supported, although the object for which it was entered into be not effected? 75. What is a libel? and is it necessary in order to constitute a libel, that anything criminally or morally wrong should be imputed to the party libelled? 76. Can a libeller be prosecuted criminally as well as civilly, and why? 77. Is the truth of a libel a defence to a criminal prosecution? 78. Is an attorney liable to any, and what punishment for giving notice that criminal proceedings will be taken unless his client's demand be settled ? 79. State the nature of the offence of "champerty." 80. If on the sale of real or personal estate the solicitor of the vendor knowingly omits from the abstract of title any deed or instrument material to the title, of what offence is such solicitor guilty, and to what punishment would he be liable on conviction ? 81. Will ignorance of law in any, and what, case excuse a person who has committed an offence? 82. What persons are held in law to be incapable of committing crimes or excused in respect thereof ? 83. In what cases are married women protected from punishment for criminal offences, and in what are they not so protected? 84. What is the distinction between a principal in an offence, and an accessory? 85. What is an accessory before, and what an accessory after the fact? 49. If a married woman, entitled to property for her separate use, execute a bond or sign a promissory note, is her separate estate liable for GENTLEMEN WHO PASSED THE FINAL the debt? 50. If a settlement or will contain no power to sell or grant leases, and a sale or a lease be required, how would you proceed to obtain the requisite power? 51. Where a testator bequeaths property to A., and also bequeaths to B., something which belongs to A., on what terms can A. claim his legacy? 52. If a father makes a will bequeathing a legacy to a child, and afterwards settles a sum of money on the marriage of such child, and then dies, is the child entitled to the legacy? 53. When a cause is at issue how is the evidence taken ? 54. State in what cases proceedings in the Court of Chancery may be commenced by summons at chambers. 55. What is the effect of the enrolment of a decree with reference to a rehearing or appeal? VI. BANKRUPTCY AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS. EXAMINATION. Easter Term, 1870. Agar, Edward Larpent-Articled to G. Burges 56. Specify the several persons who are particularly exempted from the definition of the Curtis, William G. M. Wetherfield; J. P. May term "trader," under the Bankruptcy Act 1869. 57. Within what time after an act of bankruptcy must a petition for adjudication be presented? 58. Can a creditor holding security be a petitioning creditor, under any, and what terms? 59. By whom can a proof of debt be made? 60. What power has the court over any person known or suspected to have in his possession any of the estate or effects of a bankrupt? 61. When is a creditor in any bankruptcy, arrangement, or composition, to be guilty of a misdemeanour, and what punishment is he liable to? 62. Define the rights of a landlord for recovery of rent in case of the bankruptcy of his tenant. 63. What are the provisions regarding persons having privilege of Parliament under the present Bankruptcy Act? 64. In whom does the declaration of a dividend vest? 65. When may an order of discharge be applied for by a bankrupt? 66. What is the status of a bankrupt who has not obtained his order of discharge? 67. A settlement of property by a trader is void against trustee if settlor becomes bankrupt within two years after date of settlement, except in certain cases,-what are these cases ? 68. What are the first steps to be taken by a debtor desirous of arranging with his creditors by paying a composition? 69. What statement must a debtor produce to his creditors on a proposed liquidation by composition? MARAVILLA COCOA FOR BREAKFAST.-The Globe says: 70. For the purposes of composition in calculathe Taylor Brothers' Maravilla Cocoa has achieved ating a majority, how are creditors to be reckoned whose debts are under 101. P thorough success, and supersedes every other cocoa in the market. Entire solubility, a delicate aroma, and a rare concentration of the purest elements of nutrition, distinguish the Maravilla Cocoa above all others. For homeopaths and invalids we could not recommend a more agreeable or valuable beverage." Sold in packets only by all grocers. VII. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEEDINGS BEFORE MAGISTRATES. 71. Define a conspiracy. Davis, William Samuel-G. M. Salt Francis, Thomas Dunkin-H. D. Francis Hardwick, Alfred Fuller-R. Faithful; G. T. Shaft Hindle, Frederick George-C. Kendall Hubbard, Henry Seymour-C. F. Mayhew; F. Stanley Langdon, George Frederic Wellington-G. Nelson Marshall, William Henry-W. Marshall Neale, Walter William-R. Smith; T. Dewes Owen, Henry, B.C.L.-P. S. Coxe; C. Bischoff Peckham, Henry Robert-R. Peckham; R. Chandler Pyman, Henry Samuel-F. Jackson 72. Husband and wife are indicted together with Smith, Henry Oke-F.E. Smith (deceased); F. E. Smith JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES LAW JOURNAL. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. WINDING-UP.--The contributions of past members are divisible among all the creditors, as well those whose debts were contracted after as before the contributory had transferred his shares: (Re The Accidental Marine Insurance Company, 22 L. T. Rep. N.S. 291. V.C. S.) This has since been confirmed by the Court of Appeal. RAILWAY-LIABILITY OF NEGLIGENCE of ANOTHER COMPANY OVER WHOSE LINE IT RUNS. -A railway company having given a ticket to a passenger for conveyance between two places, the latter part of the journey being performed over the line of another company over which it had running powers, and a collision causing injury to the passenger having occurred on this part of the journey owing to the negligence of the latter company, and without any negligence on the part of the company contracting with the passenger, it was held, on the authority of the Great Western Railway Company v. Blake, 7 L. T. Rep. N. S. 94, and Buxton v. The North Eastern Railway Company, 18 L. T. Rep. N. S. 795, that the company from whom the passenger obtained the ticket was liable for the injuries occasioned to him by the negligence of the other company over whose line it had running powers: (Thomas v. The Rhymney Railway Company, 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 297. Q.B.) LIABILITY OF RAILWAYS-LUGGAGE.-If a passenger allows his servant to carry a portmanteau in his own personal luggage, the servant taking and paying for his ticket, and the owner going by a later train, an action will not lie for the loss of the portmanteau: (Beecher v. The Great Eastern Railway Company, 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 299. Q. B.) INSURANCE-NATURE OF CONTRACT-FRAUD. A policy of insurance against fire is, in its nature, a contract of indemnity, and the insured is not entitled to recover more than such an amount as will indemnify him against the actual loss or damage sustained according to the real quantity and value of the goods at the time of the fire. An honest claim is not, under the condition against fraud, invalidated on account of error, or even some degree of exaggeration or over estimate; and in such a case the insured will be entitled to recover acording to the real value and the amount of actual loss sustained. But if the claim is wilfully and intentionally excessive that will amount to such fraud as will under the ordinary condition against fraudulent claims, invalidate the claim altogether and disentitle him to recover at all: (Chapman v. Pole, 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 306. Cockburn, C.J.) MERCANTILE LAW. COURT OF COMMON PLEAS. (Before BOVILL, C.J., KEATING, SMITH, and BRETT, JJ.) COUCHMAN v. SILLAR AND ANOTHER. The cause of action arose from the following circumstances:-In June 1868 the plaintiff apprenticed his son to Messrs. Sillar and Bateman, who were general and colonial brokers, and paid a premium of 991. 19s. The term was for two years, and in the course of that time Mr. Sillar retired from the business, which was thenceforth carried on by Mr. Bateman. The plaintiff thereupon sued to recover damages upon the ground that the defendants, by dissolving partnership, had broken their covenant that they would jointly teach the plaintiff's son their business. The question raised by the court, upon demurrer, was whether, under these circumstances, the plaintiff was entitled to maintain his action. Garth, Q.C., appeared for the plaintiff. J. Brown, Q.C., for the defendants. The COURT held that the dissolution of partnership disabled the defendants from being able to perform their covenant, and therefore that the plaintiff could recover. Judgment was accordingly given for the plaintiff. MARAVILLA COCOA FOR BREAKFAST.-The Globe says: "Taylor Brothers' Maravilla Cocoa has achieved a thorough success, and supersedes every other cocoa in the market. Entire solubility, a delicate aroma, and a rare concentration of the purest elements of nutrition, distinguish the Maravilla Cocoa above all others. For homœopaths and invalids we could not recommend a more agreeable or valuable beverage." Sold in packets only by all grocers. LAW STUDENTS' JOURNAL, QUESTIONS FOR THE FINAL EXAMINATION. EASTER TERM, 1870.-SECOND DAY. IV. PRELIMINARY. Questions 36 to 40 inclusive. V. EQUITY AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS. 41. What is the statute which governs the present system of uses and trusts in land? and what is the short effect of it? 42. What classes of persons may institute suits for the administration of the estate of testators or intestates ? 43. In what cases does the wife's equity to a settlement arise? 44. Can a married woman dispose of her reversionary equitable interest? and has any, and what, change in the law in this respect been effected by recent legislation? 45. What is the rule of courts of equity with regard to dealings between persons in confidential relations, such as attorney and client, trustee and cestui que trust? 46. State some of the cases in which courts of equity decree a dissolution of a partnership at the instance of one of the partners. 47. In suits for the specific performance of contracts for the sale and purchase of land, is the time fixed for the completion of the purchase considered material? 48. Where property is limited to the separate use of an unmarried woman independently of any husband whom she may marry, and with a restraint on anticipation, and she marries, becomes a widow, and marries a second time, can she dispose of such property before her first marriage, or while a widow, or during either of her marriages? a third person for conspiracy,-the latter is acquitted. Can the two former, or either of them, be convicted? give the reasons for your answer. 73. In what cases can one person only be indicted for a conspiracy, and what averment is required ? 74. Can an indictment for conspiracy be supported, although the object for which it was entered into be not effected? 75. What is a libel? and is it necessary in order to constitute a libel, that anything criminally or morally wrong should be imputed to the party libelled? 76. Can a libeller be prosecuted criminally as well as civilly, and why? 77. Is the truth of a libel a defence to a criminal prosecution? 78. Is an attorney liable to any, and what punishment for giving notice that criminal proceedings will be taken unless his client's demand be settled? 79. State the nature of the offence of "champerty." 80. If on the sale of real or personal estate the solicitor of the vendor knowingly omits from the abstract of title any deed or instrument material to the title, of what offence is such solicitor guilty, and to what punishment would he be liable on conviction ? 81. Will ignorance of law in any, and what, case excuse a person who has committed an offence ? 82. What persons are held in law to be incapable of committing crimes or excused in respect thereof ? 83. In what cases are married women protected from punishment for criminal offences, and in what are they not so protected? in an offence, and an accessory? 84. What is the distinction between a principal 85. What is an accessory before, and what an accessory after the fact? 49. If a married woman, entitled to property for her separate use, execute a bond or sign a promissory note, is her separate estate liable for GENTLEMEN WHO PASSED THE FINAL the debt? 50. If a settlement or will contain no power to sell or grant leases, and a sale or a lease be required, how would you proceed to obtain the requisite power? 51. Where a testator bequeaths property to A., and also bequeaths to B., something which belongs to A., on what terms can A. claim his legacy? 52. If a father makes a will bequeathing a legacy to a child, and afterwards settles a sum of money on the marriage of such child, and then dies, is the child entitled to the legacy? 53. When a cause is at issue how is the evidence taken ? of Chancery may be commenced by summons at 54. State in what cases proceedings in the Court chambers. 55. What is the effect of the enrolment of a decree with reference to a rehearing or appeal? VI. BANKRUPTCY AND PRACTICE OF THE COURTS. 56. Specify the several persons who are particularly exempted from the definition of the term "trader," under the Bankruptcy Act 1869. 57. Within what time after an act of bankruptcy must a petition for adjudication be presented ? 58. Can a creditor holding security be a petitioning creditor, under any, and what terms? 59. By whom can a proof of debt be made? 60. What power has the court over any person known or suspected to have in his possession any of the estate or effects of a bankrupt? 61. When is a creditor in any bankruptcy, arrangement, or composition, to be guilty of a misdemeanour, and what punishment is he liable to? of rent in case of the bankruptcy of his tenant. 62. Define the rights of a landlord for recovery 63. What are the provisions regarding persons having privilege of Parliament under the present Bankruptcy Act? 64. In whom does the declaration of a dividend vest ? 65. When may an order of discharge be applied for by a bankrupt? not obtained his order of discharge ? 66. What is the status of a bankrupt who has 67. A settlement of property by a trader is void against trustee if settlor becomes bankrupt within two years after date of settlement, except in certain cases,-what are these cases ? 68. What are the first steps to be taken by a debtor desirous of arranging with his creditors by paying a composition? 69. What statement must a debtor produce to his creditors on a proposed liquidation by composition ? EXAMINATION. Easter Term, 1870. Davis, William Samuel-G. M. Salt Faulkner, John Joseph-W. Tomalin, jun. Richardson; J. Heelis Neale, Walter William-R. Smith; T. Dewes Norton, Edwin-J. H. Clifton; J. G. Hobbs Oerton, John Brawn-S. Wilkinson Ould, Hugh Henry-F. Parker Owen, Henry, B.C.L.-P. S. Coxe; C. Bischoff Peckham, Henry Robert-R. Peckham; R. Chandler Pennington, Rooke-M. B. Wood Phillips, Andrew Gibson-A. Phillips; O. A. Ullithorne Phillips, William Henry-T. Heath Potter, James-T. H. Newbold Proffitt, John-W. H. Duignan Pugh, William Augustus Richard-T. H. Chubb Pyman, Henry Samuel-F. Jackson Rooper, George Frederick-G. Rooper Shaw, Walter Hirst-S. F. Harrison Small peice, Humphry Percy-M. Smallpeice Smith, Colin Mackenzie-B. Wake Smith, Edward Thompson-J. Beaumont 72. Husband and wife are indicted together with Smith, Henry Oke-F. E. Smith (deceas 70. For the purposes of composition in calculating a majority, how are creditors to be reckoned whose debts are under 10%. ? VII. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEEDINGS BEFORE MAGISTRATES. 71. Define a conspiracy. Vaughan, Augustus Miles-G. C. Meynell understand, for the cases have been only partially Vining, Charles Portman-Messrs. Brittan; W. Brittan goods taken in execution, under a County Court Walker, Alfred Booth-H. Walker process, omits to claim damages, under the provisions of the 31st section of 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, Waller, Robert Pretyman-E. M. Beloe; W. G. Coul- he cannot maintain an action for such damages. ton; B. Hart Waller, William Thomas-W. H. Waller COUNTY COURTS. ERRATA —Norbert v. Hem, p. 521, line 17 from bottom, for "now," read "not;" line 9 from bottom, for **her," read "an.” BIRMINGHAM COUNTY COURT. (Before R. G. WELFORD, Esq., Judge., CADEY T. CADEY. Funeral arpenses-Husband's liability for wife, they living se arated, and a third person har taken the res, craibuitg, and forbidden the defendant to attend the funeral. The plaintiff sued the defendant for the cost of his wife's funeral. Defendant's wife lived apart from her husband under circumstances which justified such separation. and stayed with her daughter in Birmingham. Defendant, who resided in London, having been informed of his wife's death, made no arrangements for her funeral, which was carried out by her daughter and her husband, and was afterwards paid for by the plaintiff. In giving judgment. His HONOUR said the legal proposition as to the defendant's liability to pay the costs of his wife's funeral was not denied, and it was also admitted that the defendant had received a sum of 12., for which his wife had insured her life, a fact which might not affect in any way his liability. But it was objected to on his behalf, on the authority of the case, Bradshaw v. Beard, 31 L. J. 273. C.P. that a letter, written by the plain. tiff who was a son of the defendant, and his late wife, was such as to bar the plaintiff's right to recover from the defendant the cost pail for his wife's funeral. The only material part of the letter was the passage. "I will carry out all her (the wife's wishes, and insist upon it that you do not attend the funeral, otherwise I shall be under the painful necessity of showing you the door." It was not alleged that the defendant offered or even desired to attend his wife's funeral, and he appeared to have ac. quiesced in the plaintiff's expressed intention of excluding him from attendance at the cere mony. The strong feeling of the plaintiff in regard to his late mother's wishes was natural, though perhaps not discreetly expressed. But the question he had to determine was whether the intimation made to the defendant that he was not to be permitted to attend the funeral was sufficient to relieve him from his undoubted legal liability to pay for such funeral. He was of opinion that there was not. On the contrary, the case of Bradshaw v. Beard, was a strong one in favour of plaintiff's claim, for there it was found that the wife had not been driven away by her husband's conduct, and though the husband was living within a mile of the house wherein his wife died. the plaintiff, her brother, had not applied to the defendant to bury his wife. Here, then, were sufficient reasons for not calling on the defendant to perform his legal obligation of burying his deceased wife; and the mere fact of the plaintif having written to the defendant to say he would not be allowed to attend the funeral, which the defen lant in no way expressed any wish or inten. tion to do, did not affect the plaintiffs right to recover the fair costs of the funeral. He assessed these costs at 11, for which the plaintiff woali have a verliet, with costs, and granted an order for immediate payment, as the defen lant had aireally received the amount on the wife's life assurance. i | To that decision I adhere. Then in Vaughan v. HULL COUNTY COURT. In this case Mr. A. H. Wishaw, a Merchant at By Hearfield.-Did not know that in the course of shipment or discharge the bales often came from together, nor was he aware that they were broken up by the Dock Company to admit of their being stowed in their warehouses. They had strit orders not to do so, and if they did it was on their own responsibility. Re-examined-Had seen a ship discharged with care, without any bales being broken up. Mr. Thomas D. Simpson, foreman to the plaintiffs agent, remembered the arrival of the vessels, and noticed the condition of the hemp in each case. Several of the bales were broken up, which could not have occurred by accident. The bands with which the bales were bound were strong, and would have carried them to the farthest end of the world, if they had been used properly. Charles Coleman, tallyman, tallied for Mr. Wolff on the arrival of the Kelso, in June 186, when six half-ton bales were found to be loose. The Leo arrived on the 30th Sept. with twenty-four loose, and the Kelso again in Oct, with twentytwo loose. With those that were loose, and those all right, the number of bales specified in the bills of lading were made up. Hearfeld-Do you know the Dock Company break up these bales? i Hearfield.—Yes; but then the damage is at an end, for we say we were simply saving the Does Company the trouble of breaking them. Laughter Robert Bruce tallied on the arrival of the Draw on the 9th Nov., and found fourteen bales loose. Thomas Tomlinson took tally of the number of bales landed by the Apolio, and found twenty-two loose. Hearfeld submitted that no evidence had beer given to show that the hemp was not broken up when shipped. His HONOUR said he should consider it was until the captain was called to disprove it. Hearfield also relied on the fact that under the Bills of Lading Act the property in the hemp had passed to Mr. Wolff, and Mr. Wishaw could not sue. Po it said that this was not the effect of the Act; the Act did not affect the passing of the property at all. but merely gave certain rights to an assignee of the property. Heard then called Mr. Smith, foreman to Messrs. Wilson, who stated that bales of hemp were in the habit of coming to pieces, and that the bands were not strong. His HONOUR found a verdict for the plaintiff for the full amount claimed. Polit sail as the case had been fought last year he must apply for four days costs, which were granted. BANKRUPTCY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. BANKRUPTCY ACT 1969, s. 123 — PETITION UNDER NOTICE TO CREDITORS.-Where, under the 125th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1569, a petition has been presented and a resolution passed at a meeting of creditors, such resclution cannot be registered unless all the creditors have received notice of the meeting: (Ex parte Rogers, L. T. Rep. N. S. 253. Bank.) COMPOSITION-DEED INEQUALITY.-A debtor, with three of his creditors as sureties, executed a deed by which he covenanted to pay his creditors a composition of 4s. in the pound, and in consideration of three creditors incurring this liability, he assigned to them all his property absolutely. The deed contained also a release of the debtor by the creditors: Held, that this was a good deed within sect. 192 of the Bankruptcy Act 1961: Er parte Nicholson, 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 256. Ch.) Rollit opened the case by stating that, in the latter part of last year, the plaintiff shipped a large quantity of hemp on board the defendants steamers-Ke's, Les, Apollo, and Do-at St. Petersburg, for which clean bills of lading were signed by the captain, describing the hemp as packed in half bundles, and in good order and conAPPEAL COSTS-TAXATION -Notwithstanddition. On their arrival, however, at Hull, a large quantity was found to have been broken up for the ing the rule laid down by the Court of Appeal Parse of enabling more to be carried, the re in Chancery in Er parte Barnett, 19 L. T. Rep. packing of which cost the plaintiff at the rate of N. S. 406, that an appeal from an order made by 48. per ton, for which amount he sued. Having a registrar from a district court of bankruptcy, derived the advantage of carrying more hemp in one voyage, the defendants ought according to the When not acting as deputy for the commissioner, custom, to have recompensed the plaintiff the would not be entertained, an order made by a Interplea ler sitummonses-Particulars of demages damage he had sustained in consequence of the re- registrar acting in a matter referred to him by an order of the Lord Chancellor made in pursumaking of the hemp, which they had not done. Mr. H. H. Lee, clerk to Mr. Wolff, the plaintifance of the 130th section of the Bankruptcy Act agent at Hull. sail that on the landing of the 19. may be appealed from directly to the Court hemp a quantity of it was broken up, for which it of Appeal in Chancery. The Attorney and Solicost them 4s. per ton in remaking. Witness also citors Act 6 & 7 Vict. c. 73), has no application stated that the defendants collector was informed to the taxation by a registrar in bankruptcy, of the claim, and, on behalf of his employers, under the provisions of sects. 13 and 14 of the offered to give half the amount, which was refused. Bankruptcy Act 1861, of the bill of costs of the GREEN T. WAREHAM. BIPP E. WAREHAM. -30 & 31 Vict. c. 142-Rsies 174 and 175. His Honore gave the following judgment upon two interpleader actions, in which a question of some importance was involved:-In both these actions the plaintiffs sue for damages in respect of executions levied on goods claimed by them, which claime formed the subject-matter ses, and so far as I of interp solicitor acting in the matter of a bankrupt for the creditors' assignee. The limit of twelve months after delivery of the bill, within which an order to tax may be applied for as of course, fixed by that Act has, therefore, no relation to such bill of costs: (Ex parte Blair, re Mackle, 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 287. Ch.) DEED OF INSPECTORSHIP - BILL OF SALE — EVIDENCE.-By a deed of inspectorship a debtor covenanted with the inspectors to convey and assign to them all his estate and effects if they should by writing so require. The inspectors signed a notice requiring the debtor to make the conveyance and assignment to them, but took no further steps in the matter. A few days afterwards the debtor executed a bill of sale of his furniture to a creditor; the bill of sale contained the usual power of sale under which the creditor sold part of the furniture, and after satisfying his own debt out of the proceeds of sale, retained the balance thereof and also the rest of the furniture. The debtor afterwards became bankrupt. On a bill by the inspectors praying for a declaration that they were entitled to the balance of the proceeds of sale and to the rest of the furniture: Held, that the inspectors, not having shown any desire to perform their functions until proceedings with regard to the estate had commenced in the Court of Bankruptcy, this was not a case in which the Court of Chancery would exercise its discretionary concurrent jurisdiction, but that it would leave the matter to the Court of Bankruptcy: Held, also, that the covenant by the debtor in the inspectorship-deed to assign his property on demand did not vest any property in the inspectors, and that the demand for an assignment made by the inspectors did not render them the equitable owners of the property. The affidavit made on the registration of an inspectorship-deed is not sufficient evidence of the assent of the creditors: (Phillips v. Furber, 22 L. T. Rep. N. S. 288. M. R.) GOODS SENT BY ENGLISH MANUFACTURERS TO IRISH HOLDERS.-Although goods may be "sent on sale" by English manufacturers to Irish traders, where the words "or return" do not appear, and that no commission ever appeared by the account between the parties to have been paid, upon the bankruptcy of the trader the goods will not be given back to the manufacturer. (Re 22 L. T. Rep. Ñ. S. 310. Bank.) COURT OF BANKRUXTCY. (Before Mr. Registrar ROCHE.) Substituted service-Non-surrender. At the first meeting held at Basinghall-street, under an adjudication against this debtor, a point of some novelty arose. The debtor was described in the petition as of two residences, the act of bankruptcy being the nonpayment of the amount of a debtor's summons, and substituted service had been directed at one of the residences. The debtor's solicitor now stated that his client had never heard either of the debtor's summons or of the petition until he saw his name in the London Gazette; that he had never resided at the place where substituted service was directed to be made; and that, in fact, his residence was out of the jurisdiction of the court. At the sitting of the court the debtor appeared, but, upon a statement of the circumstances being made, he did not surrender; and the question arose, what should be done under existing circumstances? Mr. Registrar Roche directed affidavits to be filed in order that the whole of the facts might be laid before the court. CORRESPONDENCE OF THE PROFESSION. NOTE. This department of the LAW TIMES being open to free discussion on all professional topics, the Editor is not responsible for any opinions or statements contained in it.] ACTIONS FOR SLANDER-CHASTITY IMPUGNED. -Permit me as the author of a paper in a former volume of the Law Magazine on the subject to call your attention to a recent judicial condemnation of the state of the law as regards the consequences of impugning the chastity of a woman. That where no special damage accrues no action should lie, has been termed by (I believe) the late Lord Brougham "barbarous," and indeed the wonder to me is that a state of things remediable by a few words simply saying, "In all actions hereafter to be brought to recover damages for defamation of chastity, it shall not be necessary to prove special damage, but the jury shall assess the damages on proof of the words spoken," has so long continued. I had to advise the other day on the point, and most reluctantly to say there was no remedy. I append the report to which I refer. I hope you will devote a leader to the subject. Dixon v. Farnham and Wife. Mr. Justice LUSH said his opinion was there was no evidence of special damage as required by the law to maintain this action. The slander was no doubt an attack upon her reputation, but it was not a cause of action. It was a sad state of the law, and before nonsuiting the plaintiff he should like to take the opinion of the other judges. Willes admitted the cruel state of the law, but there was no hope for it. The case was then adjourned for the learned judge to take the opinion of the other judges before nonsuiting the plaintiff. W. READE, Jun. Ringwood, April 27. STATUTES.-In a review of Holland's Essays upon the Form of Law," in last Saturday's Athenaum, the reviewer says, "We may mention that in June last Mr. Gladstone, in answer to a question from Mr. Hadfield, stated that the first volume of a new edition of the Statutes, edited by Mr. Wood, and prepared by a committee at the request of Lord Cairns, would be published as soon as the committee had come to terms with the Treasury." Can you or any of your readers inform me if the above volume is or will be soon published? [We have no information on the subject.] INQUIRER. 1. TRANSFER OF SHARES BY MARRIED WOMAN.-B. (a married woman) is possessed of a share in a canal company which is registered in the books of the company in her name, and she is in the habit of receiving dividends upon the share, the warrants being made out in her name, under the Companies Act, the shares are personal property and may be disposed of according to a prescribed form of transfer, which has to be entered in the transfer books. B. desires to transfer her share to her husband A. Are two deeds of transfer necessary, to effect this, i.e. by A. and B. transferring to a trustee who retransfers to A., or can A. and B. transfer to A. by one deed? ALPHA. 2. MORTGAGE - RENT. -A. grants an underlease of certain premises to B. for twenty-one years, and then mortgages them to C. for the whole of a long term. A. pays the interest regularly and the mortgagee in noway interferes, and does not give B. any notice to pay the rent to him. B. has paid several quarters' rent to A., but now refuses to pay any more rent to A. What remedy has A. against B. It seems clear he cannot distrain and any action on the covenant to pay, or for use and occupa tion, would seem to be met, by B. showing that A. had assigned his interest to C. Has A. any remedy against B. to recover the rent, without troubling the mortgagee or using his name. H. C. M. 3. ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY MARRIED WOMEN. - Property of which A. and B. his wife were joint tenants, was mortgaged to C. The wife acknowledged the deed. The property has now been sold, and C. by the direc tion of A. and B. will convey to the purchaser. The balance of the purchase-money will be paid to A. and B. Would such a deed require further acknowledgment by the wife? The mortgage contained the usual proviso for redemption, power of sale, &c. Opinions of correspondents are desired. W. H. Answers. (Q. 130.) RATING OF RAILWAYS.-The real point in the question of "A Country Subscriber" seems to have escaped "Z. Y." He is right as to the rating of railways under the Local Government Act (21 & 22 Vict. c. 98), as by s. 55 of that Act (which by the way repeals s. 88 of the 11 & 12 Vict. c. 63) railways constructed under the powers of any Act of Parliament for public conveyance, shall be assessed at one fourth; so that a railway constructed, &c. (see North Eastern Railway Company v. Leadgate Local Board of Health, 22 L. T. Rep. N.S. 62), which passes through a district that has adopted that Act is to be assessed at the lower rate. But the question of "A Country Subscriber" refers to & 4 Will. 4, c. 90 (the Lighting and Watching Act). By ings, and property other than land, are to be rated and s. 33 of this Act, owners and occupiers of houses, buildpay a rate three times greater than owners and occupiers of land. Now, the question is, is a railway, in the meauing of this Act of Will. 4, to be considered as "land" or property other than land." I am inclined to think that "land" would be construed to mean land used for be liable to be rated at the full value: agricultural purposes, and therefore, a railway would (See Reg. v. Midland Railway Company, 25 L. J. 114; and Reg. v. Peto, 33 L. J. 235.) 46 C. (Q. 132.) RECEIPT IN PASSBOOK-STAMP.-The entries initialled by the cashier could not be admitted in evidence to prove the receipt by the company of the sums to which they refer, without a stamp for each entry: (See Wright v. Shawcross, 2 B. & Ald, 501.) They are not deposits with a banker, within the exemption of 16 & 17 Vict., c. 59. A receipt for the final balance duly stamped would be admissible as evidence that the payment was, according to the purport of the receipt, the final settlement of the original debt. Z. Y. COUNTY COURT PROCEDURE.-I wish to point out to you a glaring anomaly in the County Court practice, and that is, in actions of tort, where the plaintiff recovers less than 20., the judge has 3 power to deprive him of costs, and if even he allows the plaintiff costs, they are very insignificant; whereas, if the action was commenced in the Superior Court, if the plaintiff recovered 101., or even less, he would, by a certificate of the judge before whom the cause was tried, be entitled to full taxed costs; and if he recovered more than 101. he would get his costs without any certificate. The Judicature Commissioners might well, in their report, say, that the jurisdiction of the County Court in actions of tort was limited to 10%., for anyone who has a good cause of action, and has sustained damage to the extent of 101., is surely justified in the present state of the law in bringing his action in one of the Superior Courts. Another matter which requires remedying is the power of a judge in actions of contract, where less than 207. is recovered, of ordering payment by instalments, because, if an action is brought to recover 201. 14s. 6d., and a verdict is given for the plaintiff for that amount, the judge must order payment forthwith, if the plaintiff desire it; but the judge may, by giving a verdict for less than 20., order payment by instalments, which, in cases of a disputed account, the defendant generally gets the benefit of. Another cause of complaint is the way in which cases are entered for trial in the County Courts:-all sorts of actions for the same day, some undefended, some defended, some which last half a minute, and some which last the whole day. If County Court judges or registrars cannot order their courts so that barristers, attorneys, suitors, and witnesses may not have to wait from morning till night for their cases coming on, a short Act of Parliament will. A day ought to be specially fixed for the registrar to take undefended cases, and on which no other business should be taken, and another day for cases in which counsel or attorneys are engaged; and in towns where there is much bankruptcy business, a day might conveniently be set aside for bankruptcy and equity business. In consequence of the present practice, when attorneys arrive at the court they generally find their places filled by accountants, money lenders, Scotch drapers or tallymen, their table covered with enormous ledgers, which are rather difficult to remove. The provisions of sect. 2 of the 30 & 31 Vict. c. 142, ought to be applied to all claims and demands above 21. arising ex contractu, and I doubt not that when the extended jurisdiction is given to the County Courts this will be done. CONFESTIM. (Q. 133.) DUTIES ON CARRIAGES.-It is impossible to say that a cart occasionally used for purpose A, is solely used for purpose B. Probably, however, the commissioners would be inclined to overlook such au occasional user as is stated by "J. T. P." Z. Y. (Q. 134.) TRUST-POWER.-Such a question cannot be satisfactorily answered without a far more accurate statement of the facts. To whom did the lender give credit? Did he lend to the trustees personally, or did he lend on the faith of the power, and on an agreement that it should be exercised in his favour? In the latter case, did the fact of his so lending appear in any writing signed by the trustees? Z. Y. from ad valorem duties on settlements, but is chargeable (Q. 135.) SETTLEMENT.-The transfer deed is exempted with the duty to which the same may be liable under any more general description in the table of duties contained in the 13 & 14 Vict. c. 97. Strictly, a denoting stamp should be affixed, but nothing will be gained thereby, as the deed will not disclose the settlement, tered by the company. The stamp required is a 30s. and will become functum officio after it has been regisstamp, under the head "transfer.' The 28 and 29 Vict. c. 96, s. 1, relates to conveyances on sales, and has, therefore, no relation whatever to the matter in hand. The insertion of a nominal consideration does not constitute a sale, and any statement of such consideration merely indicates the clumsiness of the draftsman. had better be omitted, as it is quite unnecessary, and Z. Y. (Q. 136.) ADMINISTRATION.-This grant must be to the wife alone. I had a similar case some little time since, and the administratrix was described "as the wife of," &c. If reference be made to Coote on Prol 5th edit. (1866) p. 82, it will be found that administr can only be granted "to the husband of a sole |