mit." rage was prepared by the mortgagor's solicitor, usual foreclosure decree. OXFORD COUNTY COURT. (Before J. B. PARRY, Esq., Q.C., Judge.) stantaneous on the plaintiff's mare, which darted Gough, for the defendant, contended that the SKIPTON COUNTY COURT. Thursday, Oct. 13. (Before W. T. S. DANIEL, Esq., Q. C., Judge.) Action for refusing to produce agreement-Title. This action was brought to recover the sum of 131. 15s. and damages, for the unlawful detention and improper refusal to produce a certain agreement dated the 8th April 1866. The facts as detailed in the opening statement of Mr. Robinson were these: The agreement in question was made between James Nuttall of the one part, and the plaintiff, Robert Slater, of the other part, and was a demise by Nuttall to Slater of certain room and power in a mill at Barnoldswick, the property of Nuttall for a term of years, determinable after a certain period by either party on giving six months' notice to the other. The Candy, for the plaintiff, drew the judge's atten- agreement, after its execution, was, with Nuttall's tion to the words of the 12th section of the Act consent, taken possession of, and detained by referred to, "nothing herein contained shall affect Slater. Sometime in the year 1868, Slater, at the request of the solicitor of Thomber, who was a the right of any person to recover damages in respect of any injury he may have sustained in con- mortgagee of the mill with a power of sale, lent sequence of the use of a locomotive." Under that the agreement to the solicitor for the purpose of section he submitted the plaintiff was entitled to enabling him to prepare the conditions of sale, recover, as the evidence left no doubt of the fact preparatory to offering the mill for sale by auction that the accident was the immediate result of the under the powers of the mortgage deed, the solicitor promising Slater to return the agreesteam being turned on by the defendant's servants at the moment when the plaintiff's horsement to him when he had done with it for that purpose. He did not do so. The sale was on a level with the engine. took place, and the defendant became the purchaser of the mill, which was afterwards duly ments relating thereto delivered to him as conveyed to him, and the title-deeds and docupurchaser; amongst them being the agreement in question. His HONOUR, in nonsuiting the plaintiff, remarked that the accident was the natural consequence of the plaintiff's want of caution in driving by a locomotive which he must have known was on the point of being in motion, if not actually moving, without shouting to the men in charge, or putting up his hand as a signal. Candy reminded his Honour that, as in this case, the backs of the defendant's servants were turned to the plaintiff, his holding up his hand would have been useless. His HONOUR remarked that if that was so, it only showed how rash the plaintiff was in driving by; indeed his conduct was much like that of a man who should attempt to pass in front of a loaded cannon about to be fired. DAVIS v. HODGES AND ANOTHER. circumst. The defendant had no notice of the under which the agreement had come into the possession of Thomber's solicitor, or of his promise to return it. The interest in the afterwards duly determined by notice. Subseroom and power created by the agreement was quently the defendant distrained on the plaintiff's goods in the room for an alleged arrear of rent. The amount, &c. was disputed, and the plaintiff brought an action against the defendant for an excessive distress, which was tried at the last Leeds Assizes, and resulted in a verdict for the plaintiff with a considerable amount of damages. The plaintiff requiring the production of the agreement for the purpose of his action, and having Action in Superior Court undefended-Cross action ascertained that the defendant had it in his pos in County Court. This was an action in which the plaintiff, a Candy was counsel for the plaintiff. The facts were shortly these:-In Aug. 1869 of paying the claim, and thus virtually acknow- Traction engines on the highway-28 & 29 Vict. Candy submitted that it was clear he had a per- had to egot youm NO WOTH His HONOUR, however, was of opinion that the bra NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. County Court could not be used to overrule the BANKRUPTCY ARTICLES OF PART decisions of a Superior Court, which is what a CONSTRUCTION DEATH OF verdict for the plaintiff would amount to in this INTEREST OF HIS EXECUTORS IN case, and the plaintiff accordingly must be nonSHIP ASSETS-COURSE OF DI suited. NERS.-By one clause of pa was provided that on the 31 during the continuance of within eight weeks after a or balance-sheet of the ef Candy gave notice of appeal from the decision of the judge on the point of law raised in the case, namely, the plaintiff's right to bring a cross action, instead of defending the action brought against him in a Superior Court. debits, profits, losses, expenses, and charges of no deduction was to be made from the deceased COURT OF BANKRUPTCY. Tuesday, October 25. (Before Mr. Registrar BROUGHAM.) Re SUMPTER AND SHRIMPTON. Injunction-Common law rights of creditorsLiquidation. Doria, in reply, urged the court to continue the injunction, at least until after the day appointed for the first meeting of creditors, as the debtors then intended to make a proposal. Mr. Registrar BROUGHAM said that the creditors would have an opportunity of expressing their views at the meeting, and of determining whether the estate should be wound-up under liquidation before the petition for adjudication came on for Circumstances, and that'hearing. But, acting upon the decision in Er parte Dymond, re Williams, he should dissolve the junction with costs. BIRKENHEAD COUNTY COURT. Wednesday, Oct. 12. (Before J. W. HARDEN, Esq., Judge) Ex-parte QUIGGIN, re QUIGGIN. Bankruptcy Act, 1869, ss. 6, 7 § 71—Julita of court to annul an order of adjudication ches made under rule 65 on ex parte evidence. Held, that sect. 71 confers jurisdiction. Petitioning creditor's debt-Quare, if 2052 when debt is upon acceptances of debtor nut Act of bankruptcy-Proof of intent to drig, at the date of the act of bankruptcy. avoid creditors lies upon petitioning erest The jact of a debtor absenting himself cadles his wife, who was able and in the hall carrying on business, sufficient to regatire intent, although she was not providel riti means of paying debts, and whilst so conducti the business she had been obliged to rg creditor payment of his debt. The alleged bankrupt was a boot and she dealer in Chester-street, Birkenhead, and the question at issue was the validity of the adjace cation of bankruptcy which had been declared against him in consequence of his absenting in self from his place of business. The new differs from the old with respect to the proced necessary to an adjudication of bankruptcy. Fo merly, on the primi facie evidence of a dend 501. and of an act of bankruptcy, the debtor wai on an ex parte application adjudged a bankrup No notice of the adjudication was advertised in the Gazette for seven days, during which pred he had the opportunity of disputing its validity. Now it is otherwise, for on a petition in bank ruptcy being presented the court is required to be satisfied, primi facie that there are the requisites petitioning creditor's debt, and trading (where to an adjudication-namely, the act of bankruptcy, necessary). Thereupon the petition is answered, as it is technically termed that is, there is written upon it a notice calling upon the debtor to show cause within seven days why he should not be adjudicated bankrupt. If he appears within the time and satisfies the court of the in sufficiency of the requisites to an adjudication, the petition is dismissed. There are, Lowever, two exceptions to this rule-namely, where the house or otherwise absented himself; and in such debtor is alleged to have departed from his dwelling cases the 65th rule provides that the court may adjudicate the debtor bankrupt forthwith. In the present case the debtor came within these exceptions, and was upon an e. parte case a judicated bankrupt. Downham, on behalf of the alleged bankrupt, now appeared, on notice of motion, for the purpose of asking the court to annul the bankruptcy on the grounds that there was no sufficient debt due, and that no act of bankruptcy had been committed. Cotton, for the petitioning creditors, took excep tion to the jurisdiction of the court. He conterded that where an adjudication had taken place the court was functus officio, qui the adjudication, and the order of judication could only be annulled by appealing to the court in London. Were it otherwise, the court would be in the anomalous position of being called upon to rehear a case toties quoties as any fresh evidence turned up. Moreover, where it had solemnly adjudicated a man bankrupt in accordance, as it believed, with the law and the information it possessed at the time, and that adjudication had been made public by advertisement in the Gazette, with all its atten dant injuries to the debtor's credit, a grave question would arise how far, where it afterwards choses to ignore it own act and pronounce it illegal, it would be liable for damages. The new Act differed from previous ones, and conferred no jurisdiction to hear a disputed adjudication, but only a disputed petition, and for obvious reasons, as, the moment an adjudication took place and was advertised, all the mischief which attended bankruptcy had been effected, and it was only the court of appeal which could set the matter right. Downham, in reply, submitted that it was the inherent right of every court to review its own decisions, and that doctrine was laid down in Er parte Rerbonis' Trusts, where the present Lord Chancellor, when Vice-Chancellor, after having given a decision in a particular way, on finding it was at variance with the law, reheard the case and reversed his former decision. His HONOUR said he had some doubts upon the point, but having regard to sect. 71, which prorided for the court rev.ewing, rescinding, or vary ing its own orders, and to the fact that this adjudication had been made on es parte evidence, he should overrule the objection. He could conceive no grester injustice to a debtor than nader such circumstances to deny him the right of being heard; and, further, Le did not think a court of appeal should be invoked for the purpose of vary. ing the decision of an inferior court where that court had not had the opportunity of hearing both parties. Downham thereupon called the bankrupt to disprove the act of bankruptcy. He deposed that he closed his shop on the evening of the 19th Sept., and left Birkenhead to go to his wife's lodgings in Liverpool, where he arrived at six o'clock on the following morning. He left there at ten o'clock, and, missing the 'bus and feeling very ill, he went to his father's, where he remained ten days. He was ill during that period, but not confined to the house. He did not go to his shop, but, on the 21st Sept. sent over to Birkenhead to see if his wife was in the shop, and was informed by his messenger that his wife was there. He owed at the t me about 4001, and had something like that amount in assets. There were bills running at the time, and some were overdue. The wife was then called, and stated that she left her husband with his consent on the 1st Sept. on the understanding they were to live apart. She took with her a portion of the furniture. Her husband came to see her pretty regularly, but on the 19th Sept. he did not call. On the morning of the 20th he turned up at six o'clock, and left at ten to go to business. She was just recovering from her confinement, which had taken place on the 6th Sept. On the 20th Sept. she went to Birkenhead to see her husband, and found the shop closed, She also went on the 21st Sept., and, with keys she obtained from a friend, effected an entrance into the shop. She opened the shop, and was applied to by a creditor on that day for payment of a bill which her husband knew to be due; but being without sufficient means the creditor went unpaid. Her husband had left no instructions for her to carry on the business. The petitioning creditor was then called, and deposed that the debt due to him was secured by the acceptance of Mr. Quiggin, the alleged bankrupt, which acceptance was not due. Upon that evidence Downham contended, first, that the debt was insufficient; and secondly, that there had been no act of bankruptcy. With respect to the debt, he submitted that, according to the 6th section of the new Act, the debt must be a sum due at law or in equity, and that at law the petitioning creditor could not have recovered till the bill was due. He also referred to sect. 7, which provides that for the purpose of issuing a debtor's summons a debt sufficient to support a petition was requisite, and that by inference it would appear that for a petition such a debt only as could be recovered at law would be sufficient. He referred to the former Bankruptcy Acts, in which it was expressly provided that a debt, although not payable at the time of the act of bankruptcy, became due on the committal of the act of bankruptcy; and argued that as there was no provision of a like effect in the new Act, it must be inferred that it was intentionally omitted by the Legislature. As to the act of bankruptcy, he urged that it was requisite for the petitioning creditor to show that the alleged bankrupt absented himself with intent to defraud his creditors, and here he had failed; as no sane person could conclude that a man able to pay 20s. in the pound, who went on the spree for ten days, so went with an intent to avoid and delay his creditors. Cotton, in reply, contended that the debt of the creditor was due, although not payable, and that the mere taking of a bill was an agreement not to demand payment for a time; but the moment the debtor committed an act of bankruptcy, and thereby placed it beyond his reach to fulfil his part of the agreement, the right of the creditor to immediate payment revived, and therefore in equity it was clearly payable. He referred to the 77th rule, which expressly provided that a debt not payable when a debtor committed an act of bankruptcy was provable in bankruptcy; and, therefore, if provable in bankruptcy, it was equally so, after an act of bankruptcy, for the purpose of supporting a petition. On the question of the act of bankruptcy, he submitted that a trader who absented himself from his place of business, and left no provision for the payment of his debts, nor any information as to where he could be found, thereby committed an act of bankruptcy. The intent at the time of absenting himself must be gathered from the consequences, and so long as it was shown that creditors had been delayed, the law assumed that he must have foreseen the consequences of his own act. His HONOUR said that, although he had grave doubts as to the sufficiency of the debt, it was unnecessary, seeing that it hinged upon the question of the act of bankruptcy, for him to consider the point. With respect to the act of bankruptcy, the whole question turned upon the intent of the alleged bankrupt when he absented himself, and he had, after a careful consideration of the evidence, arrived at the conclusion that the petitioning creditor, upon whom the onus of proof lay, had not shown that there was the intent on the part of the bankrupt in absenting himself to delay or avoid his creditors. The adjudication would consequently be annulled. Cotton, on behalf of the petitioning creditor, and the receiver, Mr. Bolland, gave notice of appeal. LIVERPOOL COUNTY COURT. (Before Mr. Serjt. WHEELER, LL.D.) Bankruptcy Act 1869, s. 15.-Order and disposition clause. Held, the new Act differs from the old, and with respect to this provision is applicable only to traders, who, at the commencement of the bank ruptcy, were traders. Debtors, although made bankrupts as traders, if not so at the time they are parties to a transfer of their effects, do not come within the order and disposition clause, and with respect to property in their possession at the date of the act of bankruptcy, it does not pass to the creditors. The facts and arguments appear fully in the following judgment: His HONOUR said:-This was a motion on behalf of Mr. Barnett Cohen, of the City of London, furniture dealer, the grantee of a bill of sale from the bankrupt, dated the 19th Aug. last, asking the court to declare that the bankrupt at the commencement of the bankruptcy was not a trader within the meaning of the statute, and that notwithstanding such bankruptcy, the furniture and effects which at the time it commenced were in the dwelling-house, 16, Newstead-road, Liverpool, occupied by the bankrupt, continued the property of the bill of sale creditor, and that the creditors' trustee should be ordered to withdraw from the possession. Mr. Nordon appeared in support of the motion; Mr. Etty against it. The motion, it will be seen, assumes the validity of the bill of sale. That assumption may or may not be correct; but the only question before me is whether the goods were at the commencement of the bank ruptcy in the order and disposition of the bankrupt, being a trader, so as to make them part of his estate under the order and disposition clause in the present Bankruptcy Act. That clause, it will be remembered, applies only to traders, whereas the former law applied to all persons who became bankrupts, whether traders or non-traders. Mr. Etty contended that the finding of the court on the adjudication that the bankrupt was a trader concluded the question, and that it was not competent to the bill of sale creditor to asail that finding. Mr. Nordon, on the other hand, maintained that the finding could not bind the rights of creditors, not being the petitioning creditor, because such creditors were not present at the inquiry or entitled to take part in it, and that, therefore, the bill of sale creditor could not traverse the trading. I thought Mr. Nordon's view correct, and I therefore gave him leave, by cross-examination of the bankrupt and by direct testimony, if he thought fit to adduce it, to show that the bankrupt was not a trader. Mr. Nordon accordingly examined the bankrupt at some length, and the case then came again before me, and I am of opinion that the bankrupt was not a trader, within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act, and that, therefore, the order and disposition clause has no application to the case. Mr. Etty then contended that at the time of the making of the bill of sale the grantor had no property in the effects, his interest in them having been transferred to the grantee by a prior bill of sale dated 2nd August last, which prior bill of sale had the effect, as he said, of taking the goods out of the grantor, and that they had never reverted to him; and Mr. Etty further contended that the second bill of sale, even if the grantor had any power to make it, was invalid because made without consideration, the original consideration on which the first bill of sale was founded remaining unchanged; and further, because whilst the loan was pretended to be a loan for a fortnight only, and therefore to require to be renewed at the end of that time and so on from time to time, the real object of these successive renewals was on the part of the grantee to enable him to exact exorbitant payments in the way of interest, and on the part both of the grantor and grantee to evade the Act for the registration of bills of sale. The objection thus taken it will be observed, strikes at the root of the whole transaction, and in the one case would affect the existence, and in the other the validity, of the bill of sale in question. If that bill of sale were disposed of, and the creditor sought to fall back upon his original bill of sale, such original bill would be inoperative as against the trustee in bankruptcy, by reason of its non-registration, and of the time having elapsed within which it could be registered. But it appears to me that these questions are not before the court, and that they could not well be so, except at the instance of the trustee under the bankruptcy, and upon some action taken by him to impeach the validity of the bill of sale upon grounds irrespective of the order and disposition clause, and by a specific notice of motion directed to those points. If those questions were duly raised, they might be disposed of under the 72nd section, and the rights of all parties bound. The present motion is limited by the terms of the notice to the operation of the 15th section of the Bankruptcy Act. And as respects that section, I think that the bill of sale creditor is right in his contention, and I must therefore hold that the possession by the trustee by virtue of that clause cannot be upheld. There is one other point to which I must advert, and which, I confess, has impressed me so strongly that I have had some doubts whether I ought not to refuse the motion altogether. I allude to the course taken by the bill of sale creditor, as I gather from the affidavits in court, in enforcing his alleged rights. The trustee by the receiver was in possession of the dwelling house, the tenant-right of which was in the bankrupt at the time of adjudication, but no longer. Notwithstanding this, the bill of sale creditor, who ought at So. once to have come to the court to ask for the relief for which he now asks, instead of taking this course, broke into the premises, as it would seem, and upon the possession of the receiver, the officer of the court, and forcibly possessed himself of the goods, so far as he had physically power to do This proceeding was clearly a serious contempt of court, and I am not sure that I ought not so to visit it. On any future similar occasion I shall certainly commit the party. My order under the circumstances will be that the trustee should be entitled within a week, if so advised, to redeem the mortgage, because the bill of sale is really nothing more than a security for money lent, the amount due to be ascertained, in case of dispute, by the registrar. And in the event of the trustee failing to redeem, or electing not to do so, within the period limited, I direct that he withdraw from any possession taken or held under the order and disposition clause of the 15th section of the Bankruptcy Act. The trustee will take his costs out of the estate. I shall give no costs to the applicant, by reason of the course which he had thought fit to pursue. directed his Honour's attention to the affidavits in In regard to the question of costs, Nordon the case, with the view of having the costs of the application granted. His HONOUR said that his refusal to grant costs to Mr. Nordon's client was founded upon the impression derived from the discussion and the affidavits, that, in point of fact, the applicant had notice that the man was in possession by the court; that, nevertheless, he demanded possession, and ultimately forced his way into the place. If that were so, he (his Honour) considered it such a gross contempt of court that it was absolutely necessary-even for the safety of the public-that notice should be taken of it by the court. If Mr. Nordon, however, proved the contrary, then his comments on the case would fall to the ground, and his order as to costs would, of course, be varied. Nordon assured his Honour that if his client had known that the house was in the possession of the court he would not for a moment have thought of interfering with it; and even if he had thought of it, he (Mr. Nordon) would certainly not not have allowed him to do so. He assured his Honour that there was nothing further from the thoughts of his client than to interfere with the authority of the court, for in all his transactions he had been most careful to avoid this. If the man in possession had told his client that he was there on behalf of the court, he would not have attempted to have taken the course that he did, but he did not do this. His HONOUR said that it was only proper that notice should be given. Nordon said that if Mr. Vine, the trustee, had given them notice, that course would not have been adopted. They had not the remotest notion that the property was in possession of the trustee. broke in knew that the premises were in possesEtty said he was instructed that the man who sion of the court. His HONOUR said if he did it was a gross contempt of court, and in the interests of the public he (his Honour) was bound to notice it in the way he had, for if he did not do so they might come to actual fighting to obtain possession, and that must be prevented. The case was then adjourned, Mr. Etty remarking that he would produce an affidavit to the effect that the applicant had received notice that the place was in the possession of the officer of the court before he (the applicant) forced his way into the premises. being unable to find the persons, he was not in a Subsequently, Mr. Etty attended, and said that, position to file the affidavit then, but would do so on a future day. Nordon produced an affidavit to + the applicant had not received not: Re ALEXANDER JOHN TOBIAS. This was an adjourned public examination of the bankrupt, a cotton broker in Liverpool: Bushby appeared for the National Bank and also for Holland, the trustee, and Forshaw for the bankrupt. CORRESPONDENCE OF THE PROFESSION. NOTE.-This department of the Law TIMES being open to LONDON UNIVERSITY.-There is no absolute answers to two-thirds in number is the lowest that will be accepted, The total number of marks The accounts showed unsecured debts 31401. and given in all the subjects is 2800. A candidate other liabilities 19291., against assets 981. must obtain at least 2000 to be entitled to an exhibition or prize; all persons obtaining over 1600 are ranked in the honours division; those obtaining between 1000 and 1200 in the first division; all other passed finding themselves in the second division. Marks are allowed at the rate of 100 per hour; 600 for mathematics, 400 for Latin, and 300 for each of the other six subjects; total, 2300. The above information, so far as relates to the number of marks awarded, is obtained from a private cirenlar issued from the University, which came into the hands of a gentleman who is a graduate of the University in two branches. The information so far as relates to the proportion of questions necessary to be answered, is gathered from universal report. Bushby stated that although the trustee had reported he was satisfied with the bankrupt's discovery of his estate, he was instructed by his clients, the National Bank, to bring before the court certain transactions which involved so great a breach of commercial morality as to warrant the court in directing a prosecution. He said that in justice to the trustee he would read his report, which in substance set forth that the bankrupt had been fully examined upon his accounts, and so far as he had been able to inform himself there had been no concealment of property, but in the course of the examination it had been elicited that in his transactions with the National Bank he was open to observation. These transactions con. sisted in his giving certain guarantees, in consideration of an advance of cash, that the cotton comprised in such guarantees should be applied in repayment of, such advance; but instead thereof he had failed in respect of some of the guarantees to apply the whole of the proceeds; and at the time of his failure, although there were but four guarantees unclosed, and the proceeds of those guarantees had been paid to the bank, it was in consideration of the old guarantees in part, and left on those unclosed a balance of 20001, due to the bank. Upon those facts he felt it incumbent upon him to submit the bankrupt to a public examination, and thereupon to take the opinion of the court whether a criminal prosecution ought not to be instituted. He did not quarrel with the trustee as to the superficial character of his inquiries, but he did think that this was a case which required further investigation. Mr. Bolland said that as trustee his duty was to realise the estate, and to satisfy himself that the bankrupt had discovered and surrendered the whole of his property; and if in the course of the investigation necessary for that purpose an offence against the bankruptcy law was shown to have been committed by the bank. rupt, it was his duty to so report to the court. Here a searching inquiry had taken place, for which the assets in the estate would far from compensate, and in the absence of any information on the part of any creditor he had no hesitation in stating that, although the bankrupt might be morally culpable, there had been no case shown for a criminal prosecution. His HONOUR, after hearing Mr. Forshaw, said he was of opinion that where a creditor showed prima facie ground for a public examination into matters which it was not peculiary the province of the trustee to investigate, such examination should be allowed. In the present case Mr. Bushby had established such a case, and might call the bankrupt. A short examination was then proceeded with, but, being incomplete, an adjournment was taken to the 17th Nov. A DEFECT IN THE BANKRUPTCY LAW.-An unexpected defect in the bankruptcy law appears to have been discovered. A correspondent of the Times states that one of the registrars of the London Bankruptcy Court has decided "that upon payment of a debt into court within the period limited by the summons, the proceedings are satisfied, and the creditor is not entitled to costs." This decision, as is very correctly pointed out, will certainly diminish somewhat the utility of a trader-debtor summons, which is the only effective substitute in the Act for the old penalty of imprisonment for debt. Creditors who know they will not get their costs will be tempted to resort to some other mode of procedure, so that many bankruptcies will not occur so soon as they ought; and creditors who prefer losing their costs in their anxiety not to lose more will have to pay a fine which there is no motive for inflicting. So far as it operates the regulation will favour the debtor and injure the creditor. We may hope that some good ground will be found for reversing the judgment on appeal, so that the roundabout process of a legislative amendment of the law may not be needed. The costs ought certainly, in all strictness, to be considered a part of the debt; but it is quite possible the point may have been overlooked, as the framers of the Act might only have in view the natural completion of the proceedings in bankruptcy. T. S. risters, like the dead crow in the farmer's field. I TEZRARCH CLUTTERBUCK V. SIMMONDS AND ANOTHERReferring to a report in the Law Times of 8th Oct. 1870, p. 410. The statement made by Mr. Stallard was not on oath. No one was sworn in the case but the plaintiff. I was jointly employed by Mr. Stallard and his client, a Mr. Davis, and I have com pelled the latter to pay, and, in doing so, I included the bill of costs of Mr. Clutterbuck in my particalars, though the latter gentleman had not actually received the account. The statement of Mr. Rea that he had a full answer to the case if it had been tried upon its merits, is prejudicial to me. I went to court upon that occasion specially prepared with counsel to try the case upon its merits, and Mr. Rea took good care to make a technical objection that his client, my co-defendant, had not had s signed bill delivered to him, thus preventing the plaintiff from trying the case on its merits; but query, if I was to sue my co-defendant Hodgkiss, whether I could recover, having charged the bill to Davis, whom I sued for 1901, and recovered 1101. Myself and Mr. Hodgkiss jointly employed Mr. Clutterbuck. I was anxious the latter should be paid. Mr. Hodgkiss appeared as a witness against me when my case against Davis was heard, and on oath stated that he considered himself jointly liable with me to Mr. Clutterbuck. Warwick, 26th Oct. 1870. ROBERT SIMMONDS. NOTES AND QUERIES ON POINTS OF PRACTICE. NOTICE -We must remind our correspondents that this column is not open to questions involving points of law such as a solicitor should be consulted upon. Queries will be excluded which go beyond our limits. writers are sent, not necessarily for publication, but as a guarantee for bona fides. Queries. 96. ADMINISTRATION NEXT OF KIN. - A. is one of the sureties in an administration bond; the division of the estate is postponed through infancy for over twenty years after the date of the bond. In the mean time A. dies, and his executors insert the usual statutory advertisement and distribute his assets. In case of the administrator for whom A. was surety having made away with parts of the property, could the next of kin when of age recover from A.'s estate? Answers. H. THE BAR AND THE SOLICITORS.-Now that the lawyers are returning to the legal hive to renew the labours, which, I think, distinguish Englishmen pre-eminently from men of other nations, I trust it may be allowed me to draw attention in your columns to the present position inter se of the bar and the solicitors. The higher branch of our profession is a noble and generous calling, awaken ing the best feelings of heart and mind, and barristers, conscious of the illustrious bequests of Erskine and Mansfield, do their best even with empty pockets to sustain the dignity of their cloth; but how are they oppressed by the quixotic parlia mentary tinkerings of late years, and with the exaggerated notions of etiquette which in the old Tory days was provided and intelligently enforced, quite as much for the public advantage and the benefit of the individual barrister as for the outward seeming and tinsel emblazonment of his profession. The tendency of recent legislation has been to form the County Courts into tribunals of very extensive jurisdiction, and as the solicitors almost exclusively advocate in them, the barristers, N.B.-None are inserted unless the name and address of the who are advocates by profession, are compelled to stand by with folded arms and see the causes which, a few years ago, would have brought them honour and emolument at Westminster and on circuit, fought out by men having received only a technical education, whose offices are already full of legitimate business. The solicitors, by engaging as advocates in important causes do work which is alien to their branch of the profession, and which is only allowed to fall into their hands through the lethargy of the Bar, as I have reason to know that many solicitors would welcome a change which would give barristers pre-audience in the County Courts in actions and suits of importance. A short time ago I was present in a County Court in the midland counties, and found two solicitors dividing almost the entire business, and contesting claims varying in amount, but two of which were over 451. I think, Sir, that some who do me the honour of reading this letter will agree with me that the two branches of the legal profession, the Bar and the Solicitors, have functions so entirely distinct that it is difficult to understand what more right a solicitor has to come into court and advocate claims of 50l. (equity suits involving 500l. are triable in the County Court) than a barrister has to carry on a Chancery suit or arrange the sale of an estate. One thing or the other, either let barristers have pre-audience in the County Courts in claims over, say, 101., or else let the benchers of the several Inns of Court declare it will not be a breach of etiquette for barristers, as they are already competent by law, to advise personally with clients, and act generally as con(Q. 88.) ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-LIEN ON PAPERS. veyancing solicitors. Advising personally with A solicitor who has withdrawn from a suit need not clients was common at the Bar in the olden times, attend the hearing unless subpoenaed. The client can and attorneys and solicitors came into existence, obtain by an order the use of any papers which his late long after the Bar was a recognised profession, as solicitor may have in his possession relative to the suit agents in small suits. Barristers are nowadays or action, subject, and without prejudice, however, to much less independent than solicitors-who have his (the solicitor's) lien upon them. But the rule would the law of the land to guide them by reason of vary according as the solicitor was justified or not in withdrawing. In Walker v. Beanland, Law TIMES, vol. xli etiquette, which depends so much upon the whims No. 1238, p. 153, the plaintiff becoming unscrupulous, of the leaders that it is a "lex non scripta" most and having deceived his solicitor, the solicitor with difficult to understand. I know a most scandalous drew, and declined to prosecute the suit any further. instance of a barrister of Gray's Inn who ad- and delivered his bill of costs, which the plaintiff refused ministers estates, sells property, and does other to pay. The solicitor then applied for and obtained an order from the Master of the Rolls for the taxation work for lay clients, and yet the authorities of his thereof. A motion was subsequently made on behalf of inn cannot or will not interfere. At Lincoln's Inn the plaintiff that his late solicitor might be ordered to such conduct would meet with censure, and pro- give up all the papers in his possession relating to the bably disbarment. The system of etiquette should suit, to the then present solicitors of the plaintiff. The either be authorised and rigidly enforced by a Vice-Chancellor made the order for the delivery of general tribunal, such as the Court of Queen's dertaking to hold them without prejudice to the lien of the papers upon the then solictors of the plaintiff, un Bench, or else should be pronounced a sham only the former solicitor; to prosecute the suit with due intended as a bugbear to frighten sucking bar-diligence, and to return them undefaced within ten (Q.78.) DIVORCE.-Z. Y., in his answer to this question, says, "When the absolute decree is pronounced the woman may at once marry, subject to such right of appeal as is provided by the Divorce Amendment Act 1868." This seems to require explanation. It is diff cult to conceive how a marriage can take place subject to a right of appeal. Mr. Browne, in his Divorce Prac tice, p. 262, 2nd edit., says, "As the decree absolute may be appealed from as well as the decree nisi (Lan tour v. Lantour, 33 L. J. 89, P. M. & A.), and as it is a decision of the court within 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, ss. 55, 56, it seems clear that parties whose marriage has been dissolved may not marry again until the period limited for appealing against the decree absolute has expired." W. H. W. (Q.86). FOWLS DAMAGING GARDEN.-"Querist" will find the information he desires in the Law Times of 28th Mar. 1868, and also in the Justice of the Peace of 11th April 1868, p. 239. HENRY REID. A J. T. L. DESCENT - (Q. 95.) PURCHASER BROOM'S LEGAL MAXIMS.-Looking at the decisions on this point, Mr. Broom is right. In Wms. on Real Prop. B. p. 443, 7th edit., "N." will see Mr. Joshua Williams's views thereon, which have been supported by Vice-Chancellor Shadwell, in Cooper v. France, 19 L. J., N. S. 313, Ch. 14 Jur. 214. See also Lord St. Leonards on the New Real Property Statutes, 256, 2nd edit.; and Smith on Real and Personal Property, 337, pt. 3, T. 1, ch. 1, s. 3. L. M. ALFORD. "but "N" is andoubtedly right in his conclusion and A. should be substitued for B. in the paper, by the operation of the new Act, B. must be deemed the purchaser." Quoted from Broom's Maxims. If B. as the heir of A. (who died seised) never entered the land before his death, the next heir of A, would be entitled, the maxim (before the new Act) being seising facit stipitem. LAW LIBRARY. R.H. days after the hearing. His Honour refused the plain- to find how large a number of men were doing The new volume contains many important statutes which Mr. Paterson has annotated with more than his usual care. LAW SOCIETIES. SOCIAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION. (Continued from page 413.) REPRESSION OF CRIME. The chair was taken in this section by the Hon. Arthur Kinnaird, M.P., at a quarter to twelve o'clock. There was a good attendance, and amongst those present were Mr. Dalrymple, M.P., the Archdeacon of Lindisfarne, Mr. Serjeant Cox, Mr. Baker, Col. Ratcliffe, Mr. Marshall, Mr. Herbert Safford, Mr. James Hall, Mr. T. Robins, and others. Habitual Criminals. The special question for discussion was, "In what manner may the provisions of the Habitual Criminals Act and its administration be improved? Mr. Baker, in the course of his paper, said: Some dissatisfaction has been expressed in the last twelve months, that though the Habitual Criminals Act is passed, it has produced very little effect. The intention of the Act was to put those who had for a second time yielded to the temptation of committing crime hors de combat, from continuing criminal habits; and I have no doubt that where the police are willing and effective (and that is nearly everywhere in England), this will be carried out without injury, nay, without inconvenience to the supervised men, so long as they live steadily and honestly, yet so effectually that few will return to criminal habits, and these will be so hampered as to be able to do little harm. Need I here contradict the old fallacy that, men watched by the police could never get employment, and were thus "hunted back to crime ?" I can only say that since the passing of the Penal Servitude Act 1864, which realised the supervision of the ticket-of-leave men, I have had from time to time returns of all those who belonged to my county, and have found up to about twelve months ago, nearly three-fifths in steady work, their masters knowing their antecedents. I much wish that I could persuade any magistrate here to ask the chief constable of his county for the return of all the ticket-of-leave men under his surveillance, and to inquire into their employment and character. He would probably be surprised Mr. William Oakley, who has been nineteen years governor of the Somerset County Prison, at Taunton, and who was formerly for seven years superintendent in the Essex County Police, at the head-quarter station, and unanimously elected successor of Rear-Admiral Sir W. Carroll, as Chief of the Police at Bath, in 1849, contributed a paper on the same subject, and it was read by Mr. Herbert Safford. Various suggestions for the improvement of the Habitual Criminals Acts were made. First, Mr. Oakley contended that provision should be made for efficient supervision by a higher class of police officers, with adequate remuneration, throughout the kingdom; secondly, that there should be provision for uniformity of action throughout the kingdom; thirdly, the establishment of rules, under the Prisons Act 1865, for photographing every prisoner on committal, whether for trial or summarily, in all cases within the schedule of the present Act, and for making photography a means of preventing crime, as well as detecting criminals; fourth y, provi sion for payment out of one fund only, either the consolidated fund, the same as the contribution for maintenance of convicted prisoners in prisons, or the ordinary funds for the prisons; fifthly, provision for circulating photographs and descriptions amongst police stations, in localities where it is suspected persons may probably have been; sixthly, reconsideration of sect. 11, in respect to proof of former convictions against persons charged as receivers; seventhly, amendment of error in sect. 16, relating to industrial schools; and above and before all, such an administration of the recent Acts for promotion of educa tion, as to bring every neglected Arab, and vagrant child within the care of the State, and to teach all to labour for honest subsistence, instead of leaving them as heretofore, to become criminal in the natural course of things, and a burden on the State for the costs of repeated prosecution, as criminals; eighthly, the ensuring such a system of prison discipline which, while it aims at deterring from crime even the worst and most hardened offenders, shall temper discipline with in a prisoner's conduct; and, lastly, the prohumanity, and produce a permanent improvement viding employment, or the establishment of a refuge for prisoners, who, on their discharge from prison, are willing to work. Something, Mr. Oakley observed, was now done under sect. 42 of the Prisons Act 1865, and by Discharged Pri soners Aid Societies, but not to the extent he indicated in 1853. Mr. Edwin Hill also contributed a paper, but on account of his presence being required in another section, it was read by Mr. Safford. Mr. Hill states that following the London Police Act of 1828, there have been 132 subsequent Acts, which directly or indirectly concern the duties of the police. After referring to the enormous expense of the police, the magistracy, the prisons, &c., he maintains that the success by no means corresponds with the magnitude of the means. The Metropolitan Commissioner, with 8883 men, exclusive of the city police, costing annually in pay alone, 571,0641., still asks for more men. In Mr. Hill's opinion, we might, by giving our efforts a different direction, have saved much of our money, and obtained incomparably greater results. We should have reflected that every habitual criminal requires a house or lodging, together with the means of turning his booty into cash; also, that the "flash" house, the school for young thieves, and the burglarious instrument maker, appear to be necessities of the class; and hence that in a town where no house owner would tolerate a thief or "flash" house keeper as a tenant-where no dealer would buy property offered under suspicious circumstances, and no pawnbroker lend money upon it a class of persons living by plunder could never obtain a footing. As things are, since, whilst the thieves are many and migratory, the house-owners and others who knowingly harbour them, and the vile traffickers in their booty, are few comparatively, and more sensitive to the terrors of the law, why not strike hard at them? as in a place infested by wasps, the people do not satisfy themselves by crushing the noxious insects one at a time, but seek out and destroy the nests. To accomplish the suppression of the harbourers and bootymongers requires more vigorous legislation than we now have, and a searching revision of the rules of evidence, these last allowing almost any childish subtlety or quibbling distinction to defeat the clear intention of the law. Ex. gr. A boy thief was found to have stolen a piece of copper, but an attempt to detect the receiver by sending the boy with the copper to complete the transac tion failed, because the law held that the virtual recovery of the copper took away its character of stolen goods. A man deceived a banker into opening him a credit for 2001., and drew cheques upon it. Being prosecuted for obtaining the money by his false pretences to the banker, the court held that the cheques which obtained the money were not false, and he was acquitted, &c. The promoters of the Act suggested provisions calculated to meet the legal difficulties in carrying out the foregoing views, but in the committees of the Lords Commons their suggested clauses were so enfe |