cause and filed a brief for plaintiff in | 91 U. S. 29, 34, 23 L. ed. 196, 199; error: The United States has the right to protect its property from spoliation by punitive statutes. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. ed. 579; Van Allen v. Assessors (Churchill v. Utica) 3 Wall. 573, 583, 18 L. ed. 229, 234; California v. Central R. Co. 127 U. S. 1, 39, 40, 32 L. ed. 150, 157, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 153, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1073; Luxton V. North River Bridge Co. 153 U. S. 525, 529, 38 L. ed. 808, 810, 14 Sup. Ct. Rep. 891; The Lake Monroe (Re United States) 250 U. S. 246, 63 L. ed. 962, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 460; Chesapeake & D. Canal Co. v. United States, 250 U. S. 123, 126, 63 L. ed. 889, 892, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 407; Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U. S. 24, 33, 51 L. ed. 351, 356, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 233; United States v. Fox, 95 U. S. 670, 24 L. ed. 538; United States v. Hall, 98 U. S. 343, 25 L. ed. 180; United States Grain Corp. v. Phillips, 261 U. S. 106, 67 L. ed. 552, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 283; Farmers' & M. Nat. Bank v. Dearing, high seas by the master and engineer of an Emergency Fleet Corporation ship, bound for Rio de Janeiro, the court has declared (opinion by Taft, Ch. J.) that the act was evidently intended to protect this particular corporation, of which the United States was the sole stockholder; the opinion quoting in full § 35 of the act and no question as to its constitutionality having been raised. United States v. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94, 67 L. ed. 149, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 39. Easton v. Iowa, 188 U. S. 220, 229-232, 47 L. ed. 452, 456, 457, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 288, 12 Am. Crim. Rep. 522; Wardell v. Union P. R. Co. 103 U. S. 651, 659, 26 L. ed. 509, 512, 7 Mor. Min. Rep. 144. The phrase, "to defraud the United States," covers any impairing, obstructing, or defeating the lawful function of any department of the government by corrupt means. Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. 462, 479, 480, 54 L. ed. 569, 577, 578, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 249, 17 Ann. Cas. 1112; United States v. Barnow, 239 U. S. 74, 78-80, 60 L. ed. 155, 157, 158, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 19; United States v. Plyler, 222 U. S. 15, 56 L. ed. 70, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; Re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 39 L. ed. 1092, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900; Belvin v. United States, 171 C. C. A. 281, 260 Fed. 455. Mr. John W. Dodge submitted the cause for defendant in error: The government of the United States is one of enumerated and delegated powers, and there are no common-law offenses against the United States. tion of this corporation; and that the Act of October 23, 1918 (chap. 194), was an indication of such a reason. United States v. Strang, 254 U. S. 491, 65 L. ed. 368, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165. The government's contention, in a case before the passage of the 1918 Act, that, under another section of the Penal Code, an employee of the Panama Railroad Company, which was entirely owned by the United States, had conspired to defraud the United States by means of While not a criminal case, but rather sales of tobacco to the company, was a claim against a corporation in which overruled on the theory that, by engagthe United States held all the stock, ing in commercial business, the United United States Grain Corp. v. Phillips, States had abandoned its soverign ca261 U. S. 106, 67 L. ed. 552, 43 Sup. Ct. pacity. Salas v. United States, 148 C. Rep. 283, sheds some light on the court's C. A. 440, 234 Fed. 842. But, in conattitude in reference to such a corpora- struing the same section, a district court tion. A naval officer who sought to re- has sustained a conviction of employees cover a fee for bringing gold from Bul- (at Hog island) of a subagent of the garia was not permitted to have the ben- Emergency Fleet Corporation for conefit of a regulation authorizing such fees, spiracy to defraud by padding a pay the court holding that he was not en-roll, on the ground that, as the work was titled to charge for this service, inasmuch as the gold was, in substance, the property of the United States. In sustaining a demurrer to an indictment under another statute, charging an inspector of the Emergency Fleet Corporation with acting unlawfully as an agent of the United States, the court has declared (McReynolds, J.) that the fact that an agent of a corporation could not legally contract for the stockholders was apparently one reason for the organiza really done for the United States, which owned at least a majority of the stock of the corporation and supplied its funds, the fraud diminished the funds of the United States (United States v. Carlin, 259 Fed. 904); and another district court has similarly sustained an indictment charging conspiracy by inducing the same corporation to execute a contract and advance money thereon (United States v. Union Timber Products Co. 259 Fed. 907). United States v. Britton, 108 U. S. 199, 27 L. ed. 698, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 531; Salas v. United States, 148 C. C. A. 440, 234 Fed. 842; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 27 L. ed. 290, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 601; Martin v. Hunter, 1 Wheat. 326, 4 L. ed. 102; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 551, 23 L. ed. 591; Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. 401, 15 L. ed. 699; Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. 611, 19 L. ed. 522; Collector v. Day (Buffington v. Day) 11 Wall. 124, 20 L. ed. 125. The Constitution leaves to Congress a large discretion as to the means that may be employed in executing a given power. Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames) 188 U. S. 354, 47 L. ed. 500, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 321, 13 Am. Crim. Rep. 561. There being no ambiguity in the meaning of the words of the statute, and the legislature having attempted to define what constitutes crime, if, in so attempting to define a crime, Congress has exceeded its authority, the courts cannot restrict and limit an unambiguous definition of a crime by limiting and restricting the words of the statute. United States v. Wiltberger, 5 Wheat. 76-95, 5 L. ed. 37-42; H. Hackfeld & Co. v. United States, 197 U. S. 442-450, 49 L. ed. 826-829, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 456; Cherokee Tobacco (Bondinot v. United States) 11 Wall. 616-624, 20 L. ed. 227230; Texas v. Chiles, 21 Wall. 488, 22 L. ed. 650; United States v. Steffens, 100 U. S. 82-99, 25 L. ed. 550-553; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270-306, 29 L. ed. 185-198, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 903, 962; Burton v. United States, 202 U. S. 377, 378, 50 L. ed. 1069, 1070, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 688, 6 Ann. Cas. 362; United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385-402, 18 L. ed. 830-834; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678-707, 30 L. ed. 766-773, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 656, 763; United States v. Fox, 95 U. S. 670, 672, 24 L. ed. 538-540; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. ed. 563; United States v. Harris, 106 U. S. 629, 641, 27 L. ed. 290-295, 1 Sup. Ct. Rep. 601. Under the wording of the statute, Congress cannot go to the extent of providing legislation to prevent a fraud against any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder. Williams v. Fears, 179 U. S. 270-278, 45 L. ed. 186-190, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 128; Employers' Liability Cases (Howard v. Illinois C. R. Co.) 207 U. S. 463-541, 52 Led. 297-326, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 141; Keller v. United States, 213 U. S. 138 151, 53 L. ed. 737-742, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 470, 16 Ann. Caз. 1066; United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214, 23 L. ed. 563; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U. S. 678, 30 L. ed. 766, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 656, 763; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U. S. 270, 304, 305, 29 L. ed. 185, 197, 198, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 903, 962; Illinois C. R. Co. v. McKendree, 203 U. S. 514, 51 L. ed. 298, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 153; James v. Bowman, 190 U. S. 127-142, 47 L. ed. 979-984, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 678. Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: This is an indictment in three counts. The first charges a conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States by making and presenting for payment a fraudulent claim against the United States Emergency Fleet Corporation, a corporation formed under the laws of the District of Columbia, of which the United States owned all the stock. The second count charges a like conspiracy to obtain the payment of fraudulent claims against the same corporation. The third count charges a conspiracy to defraud the United States. All the counts are based upon the same facts, and the first two are brought under the Act of October 23, 1918, chap. 194, 40 Stat. at L. 1015, Comp. Stat. § 10,199, Fed. Stat. Anno. Supp. 1919, p. 291, amending 8 35 of the Criminal Code, and, [17] taken with § 37, making it a crime to conspire to present for, or to obtain, payment of a fraudulent claim against "any corporation in which the United States of America is a stockholder." The third count is based upon § 37 of the Criminal Code, Act of March 4, 1909, chap. 321, 35 Stat. at L. 1088, Comp. Stat. § 10,201, 7 Fed. Stat. Anno. 2d ed. p. 534, punishing conspiracy "to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose." A demurrer to all the counts was sustained by the district court on the grounds that the Act of 1918 must be taken literally, as embracing any corporation in which the United States owned a single share of stock, and, so construed, went beyond the power of Congress; and that under United States v. Strang, 254 U. S. 491, 65 L. ed. 368, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165, the fraud alleged was not a fraud upon the United States. Taking up first the Act of 1918, it was enacted after Congress, contemplating the possibility of the war that ensued, had authorized the formation of the Fleet Corporation under laws deriving their authority from earlier statutes of [19] AMERICAN RAILWAY EXPRESS COMPANY, Petitioner, V. LUCIUS P. LEVEE. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 19-22.) the United States. We are not informed, are of opinion that it was within the whether at that time the United States words of § 37, "defraud the United owned stock in corporations other than States in any manner," and that on this, the instrumentalities created with ref- as on the other point, the decision below erence to the needs of that war, but we was wrong. Haas v. Henkel, 216 U. S. cannot doubt that the act was passed 479, 480, 54 L. ed. 577, 578, 30 Sup. Ct. with a special view to them. United Rep. 249, 17 Ann. Cas. 1112; United States v. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94, 101, States v. Barnow, 239 U. S. 74, 79, 60 L. 102, 67 L. ed. 149, 153, 43 Sup. Ct. ed. 155, 157, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 19. Rep. 39. The United States can proJudgment reversed. tect its property by criminal laws, and its constitutional power would not be affected if it saw fit to create a corporation of its own for purposes of the government, under laws emanating directly or indirectly from itself, and turned the property over to its creature. The creator would not be subordinated to its own machinery. That is the case before us. If the law in terms dealt only with the Emergency Fleet Corporation it would be beyond question. See United States Grain Corp. v. Phillips, 261 U. S. 106, 113, 67 L. ed. 552, 555, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 283. It is said, however, that the words "any corporation in which [18] the United States is a stockholder" are too clear to be cut down. Butts v. Merchants & M. Transp. Co. 230 U. S. 126, 136, 137, 57 L. ed. 1422, 1426, 1427, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 964. But against the cases that decline to limit the generality of words in order to save the constitutionality of an act are many others that imply a limit, and, when the circumstances permit, the latter course will be adopted. Language as absolute as that before us was limited in The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. 166, 172, 56 L. ed. 390, 391, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 310: "Any sponges taken from the waters of the Gulf of Mexico or Straits of Florida." See Texas v. Eastern Tex as R. Co. 258 U. S. 204, 217, 66 L. ed. 566, 572, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281. We are of opinion that the Act of 1918 should be construed to refer only to corporations like the Fleet Corporation, that are instrumentalities of the government, and in which, for that reason, it owns stock. In United States v. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94, 67 L. ed. 149, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 39, the present objection was not raised by counsel or by the court. Certiorari to what court addressed. 1. Although an attempt is made to review a decision of a state court in the supreme court of the state, if the jurisdicthe state Constitution, a writ of certiorari tion is declined, being discretionary under from the Supreme Court of the United States to review the state judgment should be addressed to the highest court in which the case was actually decided, and the mere fact that the supreme court expressed its opinion on the merits is immaterial. Certiorari when time for seeking begins to run. 2. The time for applying to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ to review a judgment of a state court runs from the time jurisdiction is refused from the date of the decision review of by the state supreme court, rather than which is sought. Conflict of laws limitation of liability bility in an interstate bill of lading is not 3. A stipulation for a limitation of liaaffected by a rule of the state where the failure to deliver the property occurs, placing the burden on the carrier of showing that the loss was caused by accidental or uncontrollable events in order to secure the benefit of the exemption. [For other cases, see Commerce, I. c, 2, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1918 Supp.] Note.-On certiorari to state courtssee notes to Bruce v. Tobin, 62 L. ed. U. S. 123 and Andrews v. Virginian R. Co. 63 L. ed. U. S. 236. As to the third count, while it is true that the corporation is not the United States (United States v. Strang, 254 U. S. 491, 65 L. ed. 368, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165), the contemplated fraud upon the corporation, if successful, would have resulted directly in a pecuniary loss to the United States, and even more immediately would have impaired the efficiency of its very important instrument. We 257, On effect of Carmack Amendment upon state regulations as to stipulations limiting liability of a common carrier for the loss of, or damage to, goodssee notes to Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Miller, 50 L.R.A. (N.S.) 819, and Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) Conflict of laws - effect of local prac tice. 4. The law of the United States cannot be evaded by forms of local practice. [For other cases, see Courts, VII. c, 13, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] va Carriers limitation of liability lidity under law of United States. 5. A stipulation in an interstate bill of lading for limitation of liability is effective under the law of the United States unless facts are shown taking the case out of the protection of the contract. [For other cases, see Carriers, II. b, 3, in D1. gest Sup. Ct. 1918 Supp.] [No. 54.] U. S. 612, 60 L. ed. 825, L.R.A.1917A, 197, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410; Georgia, F. & A. R. Co. v. Blish Mill. Co. 241 U. S. 190, 60 L. ed. 948, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 541; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 327, 60 L. ed. 1026, L.R.A.1917A, 265, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 555; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. C. C. Whitnack Produce Co. 258 U. S. 369, 66 L. ed. 665, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 328. The shipment being interstate, the meaning and effect of the express receipt, and the rights of the parties thereunder, must be interpreted and determined by the Federal law, rules, and Argued October 8, 1923. Decided October decisions, and not by the laws, rules, or 22, 1923. N WRIT of Certiorari to the Court of Appeal, First Circuit, of the State of Louisiana, to review a judgment in favor of plaintiff in an action brought to recover damages for breach of a carriage contract. Reversed. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Arthur A. Moreno argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Hunter C. Leake, H. S. Marx, and A. M. Hartung, filed a brief for petitioner: The application for the writ of certiorari was presented within the proper time. Coe v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 237 U. S. 416, 59 L. ed. 1028, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625; Grays Harbor Logging Co. v. Coats-Fordney Logging Co. (Washington ex rel. Grays Harbor Logging Co. v. Superior Ct.) 243 U. S. 251, 256, 257, 61 L. ed. 702, 705, 706, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 295; Bruce v. Tobin, 245 U. S. 18, 19, 62 L. ed. 123, 124, 38 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7; Prudential Ins. Co. v. Cheek, 252 U. S. 567, 64 L. ed. 719, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 343. The writ of certiorari was properly directed to the court of appeal, first circuit, state of Louisiana. Murff v. Murff, 50 La. Ann. 998, 23 So. 965; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Crovo, 220 U. S. 364, 55 L. ed. 498, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 399; Norfolk & S. Turnp. Co. v. Virginia, 225 U. S. 264, 56 L. ed. 1082, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 828. The case presents a Federal question. Adams Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, 507, 508, 57 L. ed. 314, 320, 321, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 257, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 148; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Robinson, 233 U. S. 173, 180, 58 L. ed. 901, 905, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 556; Charleston & W. C. R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co. 237 U. S. 597, 59 L. ed. 1137, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 333; Southern Exp. Co. v. Byers, 240 decisions of the state of Louisiana. Texas & P. R. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242, 245, 50 L. ed. 1011, 1013, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 628; Illinois C. R. Co. v. Henderson Elevator Co. 226 U. S. 441, 57 L. ed. 290, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 176; Adams 57 L. ed. 314, 44 L.R.A.(N.S.) 257, 33 Exp. Co. v. Croninger, 226 U. S. 491, Sup. Ct. Rep. 148; Kansas City Southern. R. Co. v. Carl, 227 U. S. 639, 57 L. ed. 683, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 391; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. Harriman, 227 U. S. 657, 57 L. ed. 690, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 397; Boston & M. R. Co. v. Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, 58 L. ed. 868, L.R.A.1915B, 450, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 526, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 593; George N. Pierce Co. v. Wells, F. & Co. 236 U. S. 278, 59 L. ed. 576, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 351; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Esteve Bros. & Co. 256 U. S. 566, 65 L. ed. 1094, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 584; Cineinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Rankin, 241 U. S. 319, 326-328, 60 L. ed. 1022, 1025, 1026, L.R.A.1917A, 265, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 555; Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Harold, 241 U. S. 371, 378, 60 L. ed. 1050, 1054, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 665; Southern Exp. Co. v. Byers, 240 U. S. 612, 614, 60 L. ed. 825, 827, L.R.A.1917A, 197, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410; Galveston, H. & S. A. R. Co. v. Woodbury, 254 U. S. 357, 360, 65 L. ed. 301, 303, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114; Tardos v. Chicago, St. L. & N. Ó. R. Co. 35 La. Ann. 15; Borneman v. New Orleans, M. & C. R. Co. 145 La. 150, 81 So. 882; Charleston & W. C. R. Co. v. Varnville Furniture Co. 237 U. S. 597, 59 L. ed. 1137, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 715, Ann. Cas. 1916D, 333; Chicago & N. W. R. Co. v. C. C. Whitnack Produce Co. supra; Moore v. Duncan, 150 C. C. A. 534, 237 Fed. 780; D'Utassy v. Barrett, 219 N. Y. 420, 5 A.L.R. 979, 114 N. E. 786; American R. Exp. Co. v. Lindenburg, 257 U. S. 627, 66 L. ed. 404, 42 Sup. Ct. Rep. 52; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. McWhirter, 229 U. S. 265, 274, 57 L. ed. 1179, 1185, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 858; Toledo, St. L. & W. R. Co. v. | Mr. Charles T. Wortham argued the cause and filed a brief for respondent: The carrier has the burden of alleging and proving what became of the goods which went into its custody. Lehman, S. & Co. v. Morgan's L. & T. R. & S. S. Co. 115 La. 1, 70 L.R.A. 562, 112 Am. St. Rep. 259, 38 So. 873, 5 Ann. Cas. 818; Simms v. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. 122 La. 268, 47 So. 602; Na tional Rice Mill. Co. v. New Orleans & N. E. R. Co. 132 La. 615, 61 So. 708, Ann. Cas. 1914D, 1099. The amount of damages recoverable in case of loss is to be limited by contract between the parties, and the consideration for the limitation is the reduced rate charge. Union P. R. Co. v. Burke, 255 U. S. 317, 65 L. ed. 656, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 283. The carrier cannot knowingly or actively violate its contract of safe carriage and delivery, and then claim the protection of the limited-liability clause. He cannot affirmatively repudiate his contract and then claim its benefits. This is placed on the grounds of good conscience and public policy. Adams Exp. Co. v. Mellichamp, Ann. Cas. 1913D, 990, note; 4 R. C. L. p. 743, § 251; 10 C. J. p. 184; Georgia S. & F. R. Co. v. Johnson, 121 Ga. 233, 48 S. E. 807; Fessler v. Detroit Taxicab Transfer Co. 204 Mich. 694, 5 A.L.R. 983, 171 N. W. 360; The New England, 110 Fed. 415, 10 Am. Neg. Rep. 388; Adams Exp. Co. v. Berry & W. Co. 35 App. D. C. 208, 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 309; Southern Exp. Co. v. Gutman, 6 Ky. L. Rep. 654 (abstract); Gillespie v. Platt, 19 Misc. 43, 42 N. Y. Supp. 876; Wilson v. Canadian Development Co. 33 Can. S. C. 442. it from the consequences of any affirmative acts of wrongdoing. 4 R. C. L. p. 793, § 251; Donlon v. Southern P. Co. 12 Ann. Cas. 1132, note; Adams Exp. Co. v. Berry & W. Co. 31 L.R.A. (N.S.) 309 and note, 35 App. D. C. 208; Central of Georgia R. Co. v. Chicago Portrait Co. 122 Ga. 11, 106 Exp. Co. v. Mellichamp, Ann. Cas. Am. St. Rep. 87, 49 S. E. 727; Adams 1913D, 990, note; McKahan v. American Exp. Co. 209 Mass. 270, 35 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1046, 95 N. E. 785, Ann. Cas. 1912B, 612; D'Utassy v. Barrett, 219 N. Y. 420, 5 A.L.R. 979, 114 N. E. 786; Fessler v. Detroit Taxicab & Transfer Co. 5 A.L.R. 983, note p. 986. The stipulation regarding value docs not prevent the shipper from recovering full value. 4 R. C. L. p. 793, § 251; Donlon v. Southern P. Co. 12 Ann. Cas. 1133, note; Gillespie v. Platt, 19 Misc. 43, 42 N. Y. Supp. 876; Texas & P. R. Co. v. Mugg, 202 U. S. 242, 50 L. ed. 1011, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 628; Union P. R. Co. v. Burke, 255 U. S. 319, 65 L. ed. 658, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 283. Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court: [20] This is a suit brought by the respondent in a court of Louisiana to recover the actual value of a trunk and its contents, weighing 100 pounds or less, delivered to the petitioner for carriage from Madisonville, Texas, to Thibodaux, Louisiana, but not delivered by the latter. The plaintiff's petition set forth the receipt given by the company, which was in the usual form approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and by which, "in consideration of the rate charged for carrying said property, which is dependent upon the value thereof and is based upon an agreed valuation of not exceeding $50 for any shipment of 100 pounds or less . . . the shipper agrees that the company shall not be liable in any event for more than $50 for any shipment of 100 pounds or less;" with other language to the same When no Federal question is involved, effect. At the trial the defendant relied and there is no purpose to evade a Fed-upon this limitation of its liability. But eral issue, the decision of the state court will be accepted, whether right or wrong. Nickel v. Cole, 256 U. S. 223, 224, 65 L. ed. 904, 905, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 467; Petrie v. Nampa & M. Irrig. Dist. 248 U. S. 154, 63 L. ed. 178, 39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 25. While the limited-liability clause protects the carrier in case of loss by negligence or passive acts, it cannot relieve the court, following article 2754 of the Revised Civil Code of Louisiana, held that the burden was on the carrier to "prove that [the] loss or damage had been occasioned by accidental and uncontrollable events," and gave the plaintiff judgment for $863.75 and interest. The court of appeal took the same view, and said that failure to make that proof was equivalent to an admission of con |