R. Co. 186 Pa. 235, 40 Atl. 491; First The act is void because it is an unrea- 111, 292; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 28 L. ed. 1145, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 735; Missouri v. Lewis (Bowman v. Lewis) 101 U. S. 22, 25 L. ed. 989; Eldridge v. Trezevant, 160 U. S. 452, 40 L. ed. 490, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 345; Kentucky R. Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 321, 29 L. ed. 414, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 123, 24 L. ed. 77; Missouri P. R. Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 520, 29 L. ed. 465, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110; Amoskeag Sav. Bank v. Purdy, 231 U. S. 373, 58 L. ed. 274, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 114; Clement Nat. Bank v. Vermont, 231 U. S. 120, 58 L. ed. 147, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 31; Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Kentucky, Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Hot Springs, 85 Ark. 509, 16 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1035, 109 S. W. 293; Western Oil Ref. Co. v. Lipscomb, 244 U. S. 346, 61 L. ed. 1181, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 623; Raymond v. Chicago Traction Co. 207 U. S. 20, 52 L. ed. 78, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 7, 12 Ann. Cas. 757. Mr. William T. Hammock argued the cause, and, with Mr. J. S. Utley, Attor-217 U. S. 443, 54 L. ed. 832, 30 Sup. Ct. ney General of Arkansas, and Messrs. John L. Carter, J. S. Abercrombie, and Miss Darden Moose, filed a brief for appellees: In the exercise of her police power the state, as a sovereign, may impose upon individuals and corporations such reasonable rules and regulations as are necessary for adjustment and administration of her taxing systems. Without this inherent police power no government could administer its laws, either civil or criminal; and such police power, as an attribute of sovereignty, like the taxing power, extends to all things not prohibited by the Constitution. Davies v. Hot Springs, 141 Ark. 521, The act is not void for uncertainty. 82 S. W. 196. The act does not contravene § 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and § 8 of article 2 of the state Constitution, as alleged. Ballard v. Hunter, 204 U. S. 241, 51 L. ed. 461, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 261, affirming 74 Ark. 174, 85 S. W. 252; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714, 733, 24 L. ed. 565, 572; Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 28 L. ed. 232, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. Rep. 532; National Safe Deposit Co. v Stead, 232 U. S. 58, 58 L. ed. 504, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 209; Merchants' & M. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461, 42 L. ed. 236, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829; Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260, 57 L. ed. 212, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 27, Ann. Cas. 1914B, 71; Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U. S. 571, 24 L. ed. 1017. The act is within the legitimate sphere of legislative power. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. State, 99 Ark. 1, 136 S. W. 938; Butler v. Fourche Drainage Dist. 99 Ark. 100, 137 S. W. 251; Merwin v. Fussell, 93 Ark. 336, 124 S. W. 1021; McClure v. Topf, 112 Ark. 342, 166 S. W. 174; Ouachita County v. Rumph, 43 Ark. 527; State v. Ashley, 1 Ark. 513; Pulaski County v. Irvin, 4 Ark. 473; Cooley, Const. Lim. 6th ed. 587; Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U. S. 491, 25 L. ed. 558; Picard v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. 130 U. S. 641, Tennessee, V. & G. R. Co. 130 U. S. 641, 32 L. ed. 1052, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 640; Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U. S. 592, 43 L. ed. 823, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553; Cooley, Taxn. 2d ed. 5; Clark v. Kansas City, 176 U. S. 119, 44 L. ed. 397, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284; Missouri, K. & T. R. Co. v. May, 194 U. S. 267, 48 L. ed. 971, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 638; Williams V. Arkansas, 217 U. S. 79, 54 L. ed. 673, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 493, 18 Ann. Cas. 865, affirming 85 Ark. 470, 26 L.R.A. (N.S.) 482, 122 Am. St. Rep. 47, 108 S. W. 838; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 139, 24 L. ed. 89; McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, 53 L. ed. 315, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 206, affirming 81 Ark. 304, 126 Am. St. Rep. 1037, 98 S. W. 729, 11 Ann. Cas. 72; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383, affirming 14 Utah, 71, 37 L.R.A. 103, 46 Pac. 756; Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703, 28 264 U. S. Appellant is a corporation, and is not within the provisions of § 18 of article 2 of the state Constitution, nor of § 2 of article 4 and § 1 of the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution. L. ed. 1145, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 730; Powell, 236, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829; Cribbs v. v. Pennsylvania, 127 U. S. 678, 32 L. ed. Benedict, 64 Ark. 570, 44 S. W. 707. 253, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1257; Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 346, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 232, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 6; Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96, 32 L. ed. 352, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 238, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 28; Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U. S. 322, 53 L. ed. 530, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370, 15 Ann. Cas. 645, aff'g 81 Ark. 519, 126 Am. St. Rep. 1047, 100 S. W. 407, 1199; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U. S. 350, 59 L. ed. 265, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 99, affirming 106 Ark. 321, 152 S. W. 110; Barbier v. Connoly, 113 U. S. 27, 28 L. ed. 923, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 357. Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Hot Springs, 85 Ark. 514, 16 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1035, 109 S. W. 293; Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. State, 86 Ark. 423, 111 S. W. 456; St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. v. Levee Dist. 103 Ark. 127, 145 S. W. 892; State ex rel. Moose v. Southern Sand & Material Co. 113 Ark. 159, 167 S. W. 854; Pembina Consol. Silver Min. & Mill. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181, 31 L. ed. 650, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 24, 8 Sup. Ct. of Rep. 737; Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281; Western Turf. Asso. v. Greenberg, 204 U. S. 359, 51 L. ed. 520, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 384. The act does not contravene § 5 article 16 of the state Constitution, as alleged. Ex parte Byles, 93 Ark. 612, 37 L.R.A. (N.S.) 774, 126 S. W. 94; Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 289; St. Louis S. W. R. Co. v. State, 106 Ark. 312, 152 S. W. 110, affirmed in 235 U. S. 365, 59 L. ed. 272, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 99; State v. Handlin, 100 Ark. 175, 139 S. W. 1112; Ft. Smith v. Scruggs, 70 Ark. 549, 58 L.R.A. 921, 91 Am. St. Rep. 100, 69 S. W. 679; Rogers v. Hennepin County, 240 U. S. 184, 60 L. ed. 594, 36 Sup. Ct. Rep. 265; Gulf, C. & S. F. R. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. 150, 41 L. ed. 666, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 255; Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. R. Co. v. Kentucky, 115 Ú. S. 321, 29 L. ed. 414, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57; Merchants' & M. Nat. Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461, 42 L. ed. 236, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 829; Bell's Gap R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U. S. 232, 33 L. ed. 892, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 533; Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 165 U. S. 228, 41 L. ed. 697, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 305; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594: Billings v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 97, 47 L. ed. 400, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 272; American Sugar Ref. Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U. S. 95, 45 L. ed. 105, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 43; Cook v. Marshall Ft. Smith v. Scruggs, 70 Ark. 549, 58 County, 196 U. S. 274, 49 L. ed. 476, 25 L.R.A. 921, 91 Am. St. Rep. 100, 69 S. W. Sup. Ct. Rep. 233; American Steel & 679; Askren v. Continental Oil Co. 252 Wire Co. v. Speed, 192 U. S. 500, 48 L. U. S. 444, 64 L. ed. 654, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. ed. 538, 24 Sup. Ct. Rep. 365; Armour 355; Bowman v. Continental Oil Co. 256 Packing Co. v. Lacy, 200 U. S. 226, 50 U. S. 642, 65 L. ed. 1139, 41 Sup. Ct. L. ed. 451, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 232; Pacific Rep. 606. Appellant is not unlawfully discriminated against because it is, in the operation of motor vehicles upon the highways of the state, subjected to a tax upon gasolene consumed in such vehicles, while persons using other vehicles upon the highways of the state are not so taxed. State v. Handlin, 100 Ark. 175, 139 S. W. 1112; Ft. Smith v. Scruggs, 70 Ark. 549, 58 L.R.A. 921, 91 Am. St. Rep. 100, 69 S. W. 679; Ex parte Byles, 93 Ark. 612, 37 L.R.A.(N.S.) 774, 126 Ś. W. 94; Helena v. Dunlap, 102 Árk. 131, 143 S.. W. 138; United States ex rel. Atty. Gen. v. Delaware & H. Co. 213 U. S. 366, 407, 408, 53 L. ed. 836, 847, 848, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 527; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 123, 24 L. ed. 83. Exp. Co. v. Seibert, 142 U. S. 339, 35 Appellant, in the payment of such gasolene tax, is not discriminated against within the meaning of § 18 of article 2 of the state Constitution, because persons buy gasolene outside of the state, for use on highways, and avoid payment of the tax. Mr. Justice Brandeis delivered the Sup. Ct. Rep. 250; Home Ins. Co. v. New opinion of the court: A statute of Arkansas provides that Sup. Ct. Rep. 593; Giozza v. Tiernan, one who sells gasolene to be used by the 148 U. S. 657, 37 L. ed. 599, 13 Sup. Ct. purchaser in motor vehicles on highways Rep. 721; Merchants' & M. Nat. Bank of the state "shall collect from such V. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461, 42 L. ed.purchaser in addition to the usual also, the power to tax the privilege of carrying on that business), is not prevented by the due process clause from imposing the incidental burden. charge therefor, the sum of one cent fact that, since the judgment was entered in the trial court, all uncertainty has been removed by the decision of the highest court of the state in Standard Oil Co. v. Brodie, 153 Ark. 114, 239 S. W. 753. There the act was construed as requiring sellers to collect and pay the tax only on such gasolene as they have reason to believe purchasers from them will use in motors on the highways. Affirmed. [140] WILLIAM HENRY PACKARD, Appt., V. JOAB H. BANTON, as District Attorney in and for the County of New York, and Charles D. Newton, as Attorney General for the State of New York. (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 140–145.) Courts jurisdiction - amount in dis [139] The claim that the act violates the due process clause rests upon the argument that the tax levied is a privilege tax for the use of the highways by the purchasers; that the seller is required to pay the tax laid on the purchasers; that, unlike those cases where a bank is required to pay taxes assessed against stockholders or depositors (Citizens Nat. Bank v. Kentucky, 217 U. S. 443, 54 L. ed. 832, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 532; Clement Nat. Bank v. Vermont, 231 U. S. 120, 58 L. ed. 147, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 31), the 1. The value of the prevention of the seller is not afforded the means of re-enforcement of a statute which would maimbursing himself; and that, moreover, the mere process of collecting the tax from the purchaser, and making monthly reports and payments, subjects the seller to an appreciable expense. A short answer to this argument is that the seller is directed to collect the tax from the purchaser when he makes the sale; and that a state which has, under its constitution, power to regulate the business of selling gasolene (and doubtless, 1 In the district court the plaintiff challenged the validity of the law also under the state Constitution. But, after the appeal was taken, the statute was upheld by the highest court of the state in Standard Oil Co. v. Brodie, 153 Ark. 114, 239 S. W. 753. So that question is not before us. In this court, it was argued that the statute violates the equal protection clause. As the contention was not made below, it is not considered. That the remedy at law was not adequate is conceded. terially lower the profits of a business and otherwise injure it determines the amount in dispute, for the purpose of determining Note. As to amount necessary to give United States Supreme Court jurisdiction-see notes to Schunk v. Moline, M. & S. Co. 37 L. ed. U. S. 256; and Commercial Bank v. Buckingham, 12 L. ed. U. S. 169. On injunction to restrain prosecution of criminal or quasi criminal naturesee notes to Crighto v. Dahmer, 21 L.R.A. 84; Hall v. Dunn, 25 L.R.A. (N.S.) 193; Denton v. McDonald, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 453; Alexander v. Elkins, L.R.A.1916C, 263; and Dobbins v. Los Angeles, 49 L. ed. U. S. 169. As to constitutional equality of privileges, immunities, and protection generally-see note to Louisville Safety Vault & T. Co. v. Louisville & N. R. Co. 14 L.R.A. 579. 264 U. S. whether or not it is within the jurisdiction of the court. [For other cases, see Courts, I. b, 2, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908.] Injunction tions against criminal prosecujurisdiction. 2. Although a court of equity is generally without jurisdiction to restrain threatened criminal proceedings, yet such jurisdiction exists to restrain criminal proceedings under unconstitutional enactments, when the prevention of such prosecutions is essential to the safeguarding of rights of property. [For other cases, see Injunction, 83-85, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908; 17-20, in 1918 Supp. : 23, in 1923 Supp.] Constitutionality of statutes requiring | Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co. 92 N. I. In general. The constitutionality or validity of statutes or ordinances requiring owners or operators of automobiles for hire to furnish indemnity bonds or carry insurance for the protection of persons who might be injured or killed in the operation or by the defective construction of such vehicles has been upheld in the following cases: United States.-Nolen v. Riechman, 225 Fed. 812; Lutz v. New Orleans, 235 Fed. 978, affirmed in 150 C. C. A. 654, 237 Fed. 1018; PACKARD V. BANTON. Arkansas.-Willis v. Ft. Smith, 121 Pac. 348. New Jersey-West v. Asbury Park, 89 N. J. L. 402, 99 Atl. 190; Gillard v. J. L. 141, 104 Atl. 707. New York.-Public Service Commission v. Booth, 170 App. Div. 590, P.U.R. 1916A, 955, 156 N. Y. Supp. 140, affirming order 155 N. Y. Supp. 568; Donnalla v. Enright, 195 N. Y. Supp. 217; People v. Martin, 203 App. Div. 423, 197 N. Y. Supp. 28. Pennsylvania. Philadelphia Jitney Asso. v. Blankenburg, 24 Pa. Dist. R. Tennessee. Memphis v. State, 133 Tenn. 83, L.R.A.1916B, 1151, P.U.R. 1916A, 825, 179 S. W. 631, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1056; Memphis Street R. Co. v. Rapid Transit Co. 133 Tenn. 99, L.R.A. 1916B, 1143, P.U.R.1916A, 834, 179 S. W. 635, Ann. Cas. 1917C, 1045. 1000. - Texas.-Ex parte Sullivan, 77 Tex. Crim. Rep. 72, P.U.R.1915E, 441, 178 S. W. 537; Ex parte Bogle, 78 Tex. Crim. Rep. 1, 179 S. W. 1193; Auto Transit Co. v. Ft. Worth, Tex. Civ. App. P.U.R.1916C, 565, 182 S. W. 685; Greene v. San Antonio, Tex. Civ. App. —, 178 S. W. 6; Dallas v. Gill, Tex. Civ. App., 199 S. W. 1144, later appeal in Tex. Civ. App., P.U.R.1919C, 700, 209 S. W. 209, writ of error dismissed in 252 U. S. 588, 64 L. ed. 730, 40 Sup. Ct. Rep. 343; Ex parte Parr, 82 Tex. Crim. Rep. 525, 200 S. W. 404; Craddock v. San Antonio, Tex. Civ. App. —, 198 S. W. 634. Washington.-Allen v. Bellingham, 95 Wash. 12, 163 Pac. 18; State v. Ferry Line Auto Bus Co. 93 Wash. 614, 161 Pac. 467; State v. Seattle Taxicab & Transfer Co. 90 Wash. 416, 156 Pac. 837; Hadfield v. Lundin, 98 Wash. 657, L.R.A. 1918B, 909, 168 Pac. 516, Ann. Cas. 1918C, 942; Puget Sound Traction Light & P. Co. v. Grassmeyer, 102 Wash. 482, L.R.A.1918F, 469, 173 Pac. 504; State ex rel. Case v. Howell, 85 Wash. 294, 147 Pac. 1159, Ann. Cas. 1916A, 1231. West Virginia.-Ex parte Dickey, 70 W. Va. 576, L.R.A.1915F, 840, P.U.R. 1915E, 93, 85 S. E. 781. The requirement of an indemnity bond from jitney operators was held not to be confiscatory of their property, in Lutz v. New Orleans, 235 Fed. 978, affirmed in 150 C. C. A. 654, 237 Fed. 1018, supra. In Com. v. Theberge, supra, it was VICHIGAN Constitutional law equal protection |ation is not unconstitutional, as depriving 3. A statute requiring operators of [For other cases, see Constitutional Law, IV. a, 5, in Digest Sup. Ct. 1908; III. b, 6, in 1918 Supp.; IV. b, 5, in 1923 Supp.) held that a town which had accepted al operator and a solvent surety corpora statute authorizing the licensing by cities tion, conditioned that the principal and towns of motor vehicles carrying should pay all legal damages for inpassengers for hire might adopt a by- juries to person or property resulting law providing that a bond should be fur- from the negligence or wilful act of the nished by jitney operators who ran their owner or operator of a motor bus, was vehicles through the town, but who did authorized under the general police pownot solicit trade, or take on or let offers with which the charter vested the passengers within the town. The court board of commissioners of the city, as says: "One purpose of the statute, if not the main one, was the protection from injury of persons properly using the public ways; and the legislature well may have considered that one frequent and serious cause of danger is the reckless or careless automobilist rushing through country towns. The town did not exceed the power given to it by the statute in adopting the regulation in question." In Gillard v. Manufacturers Casualty Ins. Co. supra, the court held that a statute entitled, "An Act Concerning Auto Busses, Commonly Called Jitneys, and Their Operation in Cities," did not offend against an article of the state Constitution which provides that every law shall embrace but one object, which shall be expressed in the title, as the title of the act was concerned with the operation of jitneys; and as this was the object of the law, the conditions prescribed, such as filing an insurance policy for the benefit of an injured person, were germane to the subject of its oper ation. well as under the provisions in the charter vesting the commissioners with power to regulate the use of vehicles; and the fact that taxicabs and other rent cars, and street railroads were not required to furnish such indemnity did not make the ordinance obnoxious to the provisions of article 1, § 3, of the state Constitution, providing that "all freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men, is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments or privileges, but in consideration of public services." II. As discriminatory class legislation. An ordinance or statute requiring jitney drivers to carry insurance or furnish bonds, conditioned for the payment of any judgment recovered against the operators of such jitney busses for death or injury caused in the operation or by the defective construction of such vehicles, is not invalid as discriminatory class legislation, or as denying to jitneybus operators the equal protection of the law, because not made to apply to street cars, taxicabs, or other motor vehicles used and kept for hire. Georgia. Hazleton v. Atlanta, 144 Ga. 775, 87 S. E. 1043. In the reported case PACKARD V. BANTON) the court held that a statute requiring all operators of motor vehicles United States. - Nolen v. Riechman, for hire, except street cars and motor 225 Fed. 812; PACKARD V. BANTON; Lutz vehicles subject to the Public Service v. New Orleans, 235 Fed. 978, affirmed Commission Law, to file a personal bond in 150 C. C. A. 654, 237 Fed. 1018. with sureties, or a policy of insurance, Arkansas.-Willis v. Ft. Smith, 121 or a corporate surety bond, conditioned Ark. 606, 182 S. W. 275. for the payment of any judgment recovered against such operator for death or injury caused in the operation or by the defective construction of the car, was 92, 138 N. E. 269. not unreasonable and arbitrary because confined to operators in cities of the first class. See also, on same point, People v. Kastings, 307 Ill. 92, 138 N. E. 269. In Auto Transit Co. v. Ft. Worth, Tex. Civ. App. —, P.U.R.1916C, 565, 182 S. W. 685, supra, the court held that an ordinance requirng the owners or opera Illinois.-People v. Kastings, 307 Ill. Iowa.-Huston V. Des Moines, 176 Iowa, 455, 156 N. W. 883. New Jersey-West v. Asbury Park, 89 N. J. L. 402, 99 Atl. 190. New York. People v. Martin, 203 App. Div. 423, 197 N. Y. Supp. 28. Pennsylvania. Philadelphia Jitney Asso. v. Blankenburg, 24 Pa. Dist. B. tors of "jitney-busses" to furnish an in- 1000. 598 Memphis v. State, 133 264 U. S. |