from Senfe the Existence and Reality of Things temporal: But this Affent of the Mind to the Evidence of Senfe never made any Man wicked or worldly-minded: For, if it did, no Man would ever be righteous; for the best Man that ever was in the World had his Knowledge of external Things from the Evidence of Senfe. But, when Sense ftirs the Defires and Affections of the Heart, then it becomes a Principle of Action, and a fierce Combatant for the World against the Powers of Faith. If we remember what was faid of the wicked Man with regard to his Faith and Perfwafion about divine Truths, we shall find how exactly the righteous Man is in the fame Cafe in refpect to fenfible Things: As the wicked Man has the Knowledge of Faith, but nothing religious, fo has the righteous Man all the Knowledge of Sense, but nothing fenfual: The Difference therefore between a fenfual Man and a righteous Man does not confift in this, that one knows most of fenfible Things, and the other most of divine Things, for this in both Cafes may be, and often is false; but it lies in this, that one pursues the Objects of Senfe, the other the Objects of Faith,

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To trace this Parallel between Senfe and Faith a little farther may give us perhaps a true Conception of the Nature of Faith, the Thing we feek after. Let us confider then how the Cafe ftands between Senfe and Faith, Things prefent and Things to come, between Senfuality and Religion. The Defires which God has planted in our Nature are the Springs of Action; and we always propofe the obtaining fome End, which is the Object of fome Desire, in every thing we do. It is evident then, that, where there is nothing to move and incite our Defires, we must be unconcerned and inactive. All Objects of our Defires are first Objects of the Understanding, according to the known Saying of the Poet, ignoti nulla Cupido. But there are many Objects of the Mind which are never Objects of the Paffions; for the Mind must not only apprehend the Thing, but likewife apprehend it as a real Thing, and as having the Relation of Good or Evil to a Man, before it can have any Effect upon our Inclinations. From this Account it is plain, that to make a Man perform the Actions either of Religion or of common Life, his Defires, which are the Springs of Action, must be moved; And fince nothing can move the Defires,

which is not first the Object of the Understanding, he must have the Knowledge of the Things of this Life, and of Religion, and confider them under the Notion of Good or Evil with respect to himself.

Now the Enjoyment of the Things of this World is the Business and Employment of the fenfual Man: The good Things of Futurity and another Life are the religious Man's Care and Concern. As the Objects are of different Kinds, fo the Means of obtaining the Knowledge of the Objects are likewife different. Things present are represented to our Minds by every Sense; the Things of Futurity by no Senfe: And in this fingle Point lies the great Advantage which the World has over Religion. The World has as many Ways of making itself familiar to us, as we have Senses: Religion has only the dark Glimpse of Futurity, such as Reason, in its prefent feeble and low Condition, can discover. The only Thing then that is wanting to fet Religion upon as good a Foot as the World, and to make it able to bear up against the Impreffions of Senfe, is a certain Principle of Knowledge with respect to the Objects of Religion: For, could we as evidently poffefs ourselves of the Reality of the Things of another Life,

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Life, as we are poffeffed of the Reality of the Things of this, there would be no more Competition between Senfe and Religion, than there is Comparison between the Things of this Life and of Eternity. To fupply this Darkness of our Knowledge in Religion is the very End and Defign of Revelation: For, could we as plainly difcern the good Things of Futurity, as we fee and feel the good Things prefent, there would be no more Want of Revelation to make us acquainted with the other World, than there is to make us acquainted with this. Now, as Senfe is evidently to be distinguished into a Principle of Knowledge, and a Principle of Action, fo is Faith likewife. We never esteem a Man to be fenfual or worldly-minded, merely because Senfe has furnished him with a comprehenfive Knowledge of fenfible Ob jects So neither is a Man to be accounted a religious Man, because of that Faith which flows from Revelation, confidered merely as a Principle of religious Knowledge. This Diftinction between Senfe as a Principle of Knowledge, and a Principle of Action, may be seen in any or in every Inftance. An honeft Man knows the Ufe and Value of Riches, as well as a Thief. "Tis not therefore the Knowledge of the Object, but the immoderate Defire of it, that makes the Difference :

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ference; And one Man may be juftly hanged for ftealing five Pounds, and another be very innocent who had feen and examined the Value of the Mines of Peru. In Religion the Cafe is just the fame; Faith, as long as it continues to be a mere Object of the Mind, is no Principle of Religion; and one is no more a religious Man, for knowing the Articles of Religion, than he is a fenfual Man for walking with his Eyes open and feeing the World. An unbelieving Heart is the fame Thing in Faith, that an Antipathy is in Senfe, and fuppofes us rather to hate than not to know our Duty. Many Men are ruined by the Love of Wine and strong Liquors. Stop but the Paffage to the Heart, and these Objects lofe all their Force and Power, and a Man fees the Wine sparkle with less Concern than he fees the Moon fhine. And this is the Cafe of all those who have a natural Averfion to ftrong Drinks, which is no uncommon Cafe. This Averfion affects Sense only as 'tis a Principle of Action, and leaves it free as 'tis the Principle of Knowledge: And in like Manner, the unbelieving Heart deftroys that Faith which is the Life and Principle of Religion, though it may not, perhaps, disturb the Objects of Faith which have their Refidence in another Place.

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