I have therefore followed him in the indifferent use of either expreffion. For the reafon of his calling our ideas of God's moral attributes INADEQUATE, is, because he denies that goodness and juftice in God, and goodness and justice amongst Men, are the fame IN KIND. But if not the fame in kind, we can have NO IDEA of them; because we have no idea of any other kind of goodness and juftice.

He lays down thefe three Propofitions.

1. That, by METAPHYSICS, or by reasoning a priori, we can gain no knowledge of God at all.

2. That our knowledge of his Attributes are to be acquired only by a contemplation on his WORKs, or by the reafoning a pofteriori.

3. That in this way, we can only arrive at the knowledge of his NATURAL Attributes, not of his

MORAL.

"It is from the CONSTITUTION OF THE WORLD ' ALONE (fays his Lordship) and from the ftate of "mankind in it, that we can acquire any ideas of the "divine attributes, or a right to affirm any thing "about them "."

"The knowledge of the Creator is, on many ac"counts, neceffary to fuch a creature as man: and therefore we are made able to arrive by a proper "exercise of our mental faculties, from a knowledge "of God's works to a knowledge of his existence, and e" of that infinite POWER and WISDOM which are de"monftrated to us in them. OUR KNOWLEDGE d " CONCERNING GOD GOES NO FURTHER

66

"Artificial Theology connects by very problema"tical reafoning a priori, MORAL ATTRIBUTES, fuch ❝as we conceive them, and fuch as they are relatively to us, with the phyfical attributes of God; "tho' there be no fufficient foundation for this pro

c Vol. v. p. 331.

d Vol. iv. p. 86.

"ceeding,

"ceeding, nay, tho' the phenomena are in feveral "cafes repugnant."

Having thus affured us that the ideas of God's moral attributes are to be got by no confequential reafoning at all, either a priori or a poftericri, the two only ways we have to knowledge; He rightly concludes, that if Man hath fuch ideas, they were not FOUND but INVENTED by him. And therefore, that nothing might be wanting to the full dilucidation of this curious point, he acquaints us who were the Authors of the FICTION, and how ftrangely the thing came about.

"Some of the Philofophers (fays his Lordship) "having been led by a more full and accurate con"templation of Nature to the knowledge of a fu"preme felf-exiftent Being of infinite power and wifdom, and the first Caufe of all things, were not " contented with this degree of knowledge. They MADE A SYSTEM of God's MORAL as well as phy. “fital ATTRIBUTES, BY WHICH TO ACCOUNT FOR "THE PROCEEDINGS OF HIS PROVIDENCE f."

66

Thefe Philofophers then, it seems, invented the fyftem of God's moral attributes, in order to account for the difficulties arifing from the view of God's moral government. If the World till now had been fo dull as to have no conception of these Attributes; his Lordship's Philofophers, we fee, made amends; who were to quick witted to conceive, and fo fharp fighted to find out, the obliquities of a crooked line before they had got any idea of a ftraight one. just to this, neither more nor lefs, does his Lordhip's obfervation amount, that they made a Syftem of God's moral attributes, by which to account for the proceedings of his Providence. 'Till now, none of us could conceive how any doubts concerning moral Government could arife but on the previous ideas of

• Vol, v. p. 316.

f Vol. iv. p. 48.

For

the

the moral attributes of the Governor. This invention of his Lordship's old Philofophers puts me in mind. of an ingenious Modern, the curious SANCHO PANCHA; who, as his hiftorian tells us, was very inquifitive to difcover the author of that very useful invention we call SLEEP: for, with this worthy Magiftrate, Sleep and good Cheer were the FIRST PHILOSOPHY. Now the things fought after by Sancho and his Lordship, were at no great diftance; for if Sleeping began when men firft fhut their eyes, it is certain the idea of God's Goodness appeared as foon as ever they opened them.

Dr. Clarke's Demonftration of the moral attributes a priori, I fhall leave, as his Lordfhip is pleafed to do, in all it's force. If the Doctor's followers think their Master's honour concerned, where his arguments are not, they have a large field and a fafe to fhew their prowess. I rather chule to undertake the NOBLE PHILOSOPHER on his own terms, without any other arms than the arguments a pofteriori. For he is fuch a Champion for the good Caufe, that he not only appoints his Adverfaries the Field, but prefcribes to them the ufe of their weapons.

But his Lordship, like other great men, is not ea fily approached; and when he is, not always fit to be feen. You catch his FIRST PHILOSOPHY, as But-ler's Hero did Ariftotle's FIRST MATTER, undreffed, and without a rag of form; however flaunting and fluttering in FRAGMENTS. To fpeak plainly, his Lordship's entire neglect or ignorance of Method betrays him into endlets repetitions: and, in thefe, whether for want of precifion in his ideas, propriety in his terms, or art in his compofition, the queftion is perpetually changing; and rarely without being newcovered by an equivocal expreffion. If you add to this, the perpetual contradictions into which he falls, either by defect of memory, excefs of paffion, or diftrels of argument, you will allow it to be no eafy

matter

matter to take him fairly, to know him fully, and to reprefent him to the best advantage: in none of which offices would I be willingly defective. Indeed, when you have done this, the business is over; and his Lordship's reafoning generally confutes itself, . When I reflect upon what this hath coft me, the reading over two or three bulky volumes to get poffeffion of a fingie argument; which now you think you hold, and then again you lofe; which meets you full when you leaft expect it; and flips away from you the very moment it promifes to do moft: when, I fay, I reflect upon all this, I cannot but lament the hard luck of the English CLERGY, who, tho' apparently leaft fit, as being made Parties; certainly the leaft concerned as there is nothing that can impofe on a Scholar, tho' a great deal that may mislead the People, are likely to be the men moft engaged with his Lordship in this controverfy. Time was, when if a Writer had a difpofition to feek objections against Religion, tho' he found them hardly, and urged them heavily, yet he would digeft his thoughts, and methodize his reafoning. The Clergy had then nothing to do but to answer him, if they found themfelves able. But fince this flovenly custom (as Lord SHAFTSBURY calls it) has got amongst our Free-thinkers, of taking their phyfic in public, of throwing about their loose and crude indigeftions under the name of FRAGMENTS, things which in their very name imply not fo much the want, as the exclufion of all form, the Advocate of Religion has had a fine time of it: he must work them into confiftence, he must mould them into shape, before he can safely lay hold of them himself, or prefent them handfomely to the Public. But thefe Gentlemen have provided that a Clergyman fhould never be idle. All, he had of old to attend, was the faving the fouls of thofe committed to his care. He must now begin his work a great deal higher; he must firft convince his flock

that

that they have fouls to be faved. And the spite of all is, that at the fame time his kind mafters have doubled his task, they appear very well difpofed to leffen his wages.

We have obferved, that the DENIAL of God's moral attributes is the great barrier against Religion in general: but it is more efpecially ferviceable in his Lordship's idiofyncratic terrors; the terrors of a future State. To thefe we owe his famous book of FRAGMENTS, compofed occafionally, and taken as an extemporaneous cordial, each stronger than the other, to fupport himself under his frequent paroxyfms. For, fet the moral attributes afide, and we can neither form any judgment of the end of man, nor of the nature of God's government. All our knowledge will be confined to our present ftate and condition. It is by the moral attributes, we learn, that man was made for happiness; and that God's difpenfation to us here is but part of a general fyftem: This naturally extends our views to, and terminates our knowledge in, Futurity.

The fate of all Religion therefore being included in the queftion of God's moral attributes, I hold it of much importance to prove against his Lordship, that MEN MAY ACQUIRE ADEQUATE IDEAS OF THEM in the fame way, and with equal certainty, in which they acquire the knowledge of God's natural attri butes: And the knowledge of these latter his Lordfhip deduces from its original in the following words.

"All our knowledge of God (fays he) is derived "from his works. Every part of the immenfe Uni"verfe, and the order and harmony of the Whole, "are not only conformable to our ideas or notions "of WISDOM and POWER, but thefe ideas and no

& One of his Lordship's Corollaries therefore from the Propofition of no moral attributes, is this, "Our Knowledge concerning "God goes no further than for the neceffary ufe of human life." Vol. iv. p. 486.

"tions

9