examination is made to determine whether cumulative punishments for the two offenses are constitutionally permissible, it is necessary, following our practice of avoiding constitutional decisions where possible, to determine whether Congress intended to subject the defendant to multiple penalties for the single criminal transaction in which he engaged. Jeffers v. United States, 432 U. S. 137, 155 (1977). Indeed, the Government concedes that "there remains at least a possibility that Congress, although constitutionally free to impose additional penalties for violation of 18 U. S. C. § 924 (c) in a case like the present one, has otherwise disclosed its intention not to do so." Brief for United States 11. We believe that several tools of statutory construction applied to the statutes "in a case like the present one"-where the Government relied on the same proofs to support the convictions under both statutes require the conclusion that Congress cannot be said to

the life of any person" and not the word "assaults." United States v. Beasley, 438 F. 2d 1279 (CA6 1971); United States v. Rizzo, 409 F. 2d 400 (CA7 1969). See United States v. Coulter, 474 F. 2d 1004 (CA9 1973). Although we have never authoritatively construed § 2113 (d), we have implicitly given it the same gloss as the Government. Prince v. United States, 352 U. S. 322, 329 n. 11 (1957). We now expressly adopt this reading of the statute. As Judge McCree observed in Beasley: "[The language of § 2113 (d)] clearly requires the commission of something more than the elements of the offense described in § 2113 (a). Subsection (a) punishes an attempt to take 'from the person or presence of another any . . . thing of value . . . in the . . . custody . . . of any bank . . .' when that taking is done by force and violence, or by intimidation.' Force and violence is the traditional language of assault, and something more than an assault must be present to authorize the additional five year penalty under § 2113 (d).

". . . In order to give lawful meaning to Congress' enactment of the aggravating elements in 18 U. S. C. § 2113 (d), the phrase 'by the use of a dangerous weapon or device' must be read, regardless of punctuation, as modifying both the assault provision and the putting in jeopardy provision." 438 F. 2d, at 1283-1284 (concurring in part and dissenting in part).

have authorized the imposition of the additional penalty of § 924 (c) for commission of bank robbery with firearms already subject to enhanced punishment under § 2113 (d). Cf. Gore v. United States, supra.

III

First is the legislative history of § 924 (c). That provision, which was enacted as part of the Gun Control Act of 1968, was not included in the original Gun Control bill, but was offered as an amendment on the House floor by Representative Poff. 114 Cong. Rec. 22231 (1968). In his statement immediately following his introduction of the amendment, Representative Poff observed:

"For the sake of legislative history, it should be noted that my substitute is not intended to apply to title 18, sections 111, 112, or 113 which already define the penalties for the use of a firearm in assaulting officials, with sections 2113 or 2114 concerning armed robberies of the mail or banks, with section 2231 concerning armed assaults upon process servers or with chapter 44 which defines other firearm felonies." Id., at 22232.

8

This statement is clearly probative of a legislative judgment that the purpose of § 924 (c) is already served whenever the substantive federal offense provides enhanced punishment for use of a dangerous weapon. Although these remarks are of course not dispositive of the issue of § 924 (c)'s reach, they are certainly entitled to weight, coming as they do from the provision's sponsor. This is especially so because Represent

Because the provision was passed on the same day it was introduced on the House floor, it is the subject of no legislative hearings or committee reports.

Title 18 U. S. C. §§ 111, 112, and 2231 provide for an increased maximum penalty where a "deadly or dangerous weapon" is used to commit the substantive offense. Title 18 U. S. C. §§ 113 (c) and 2114 enhance the punishment available for commission of the substantive offense when the defendant employs a "dangerous weapon."

ative Poff's explanation of the scope of his amendment is in complete accord with, and gives full play to, the deterrence rationale of § 924 (c). United States v. Eagle, 539 F. 2d, at 1172. Subsequent events in the Senate and the Conference Committee pertaining to the statute buttress our conclusion that Congress' view of the proper scope of § 924 (c) was that expressed by Representative Poff. Shortly after the House adopted the Poff amendment, the Senate passed an amendment to the Gun Control Act, introduced by Senator Dominick, that also provided for increased punishment whenever a firearm was used to commit a federal offense. 114 Cong. Rec. 27142 (1968). According to the analysis of its sponsor, the Senate amendment, contrary to Mr. Poff's view of § 924 (c), would have permitted the imposition of an enhanced sentence for the use of a firearm in the commission of any federal crime, even where allowance was already made in the provisions of the substantive offense for augmented punishment where a dangerous weapon is used. Id., at 27143. A Conference Committee, with minor changes, subsequently adopted the Poff version of § 924 (c) in preference to the Dominick amendment. H. R. Conf. Rep. No. 1956, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., 31-32 (1968).

9

Second, to construe the statute to allow the additional sentence authorized by § 924 (c) to be pyramided upon a sentence already enhanced under § 2113 (d) would violate the established rule of construction that "ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity." United States v. Bass, 404 U. S. 336, 347 (1971);

"The prohibitions on suspended sentences and probation were made applicable only to second and subsequent convictions, and restrictions on concurrent sentences were eliminated. Title II of the Omnibus Crime Control Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 1889, amended § 924 (c) by reimposing the restriction that no sentence under that section could be served concurrently with any term imposed for the underlying felony. The amendment also reduced the minimum mandatory sentence of imprisonment for repeat offenders from five to two years.

Rewis v. United States, 401 U. S. 808, 812 (1971). See Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U. S. 275, 284-285 (1978). The legislative history of § 924 (c) is of course sparse, yet what there is-particularly Representative Poff's statement and the Committee rejection of the Dominick amendment-points in the direction of a congressional view that the section was intended to be unavailable in prosecutions for violations of § 2113 (d). Even where the relevant legislative history was not nearly so favorable to the defendant as this, this Court has steadfastly insisted that "doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into multiple offenses." Bell v. United States, 349 U. S. 81, 84 (1955); Ladner v. United States, 358 U. S. 169 (1958). See Prince v. United States, 352 U. S. 322 (1957). As we said in Ladner: "This policy of lenity means that the Court will not interpret a federal criminal statute so as to increase the penalty that it places on an individual when such an interpretation can be based on no more than a guess as to what Congress intended." 358 U. S., at 178. If we have something "more than a guess" in this case, that something-Representative Poff's commentary and the Conference Committee's rejection of the Dominick amendment-is incremental knowledge that redounds to petitioners' benefit, not the Government's.

Finally, our result is supported by the principle that gives precedence to the terms of the more specific statute where a general statute and a specific statute speak to the same concern, even if the general provision was enacted later. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 475, 489-490 (1973). Cf. 2A C. Sands, Sutherland, Statutory Construction § 51.05 (4th ed. 1973). This guide to statutory construction has special cogency where a court is called upon to determine the extent of the punishment to which a criminal defendant is subject for his transgressions. In this context, the principle is a corollary of the rule of lenity, an outgrowth of our reluctance to increase or multiply punishments absent a clear and definite legislative

REHNQUIST, J., dissenting

435 U.S.

directive. Indeed, at one time, the Government was not insensitive to these concerns respecting the availability of the additional penalty under § 924 (c). In 1971, the Department of Justice found the interpretive preference for specific criminal statutes over general criminal statutes of itself sufficient reason to advise all United States Attorneys not to prosecute a defendant under § 924 (c) (1) where the substantive statute the defendant was charged with violating already "provid[ed] for increased penalties where a firearm is used in the commission of the offense." 19 U. S. Attys. Bull. 63 (U. S. Dept. of Justice, 1971).

Obviously, the Government has since changed its view of the relationship between §§ 924 (c) and 2113 (d). We think its original view was the better view of the congressional understanding as to the proper interaction between the two statutes. Accordingly, we hold that in a prosecution growing out of a single transaction of bank robbery with firearms, a defendant may not be sentenced under both § 2113 (d) and § 924 (c). The cases are therefore reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, dissenting.

It is so ordered.

I am unable to agree with the Court's conclusion in this litigation that petitioners, upon being convicted and sentenced under 18 U. S. C. § 2113 (d) for armed robbery, could not have their sentence enhanced pursuant to the provisions of 18 U. S. C. § 924 (c), which provides that when a defendant uses a firearm in the commission of a felony, he "shall, in addition to the punishment provided for the commission of such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for not less than one year nor more than ten years." The plain language of the statutes involved certainly confers this sentencing authority upon the District Court. The Court chooses to avoid this