consequence of the defection of Labienus; but we do not hear of that event until about January 18th (304. 1). Pompey left the city on January 17th; and it is quite impossible that the envoys could have returned from the second mission at that time. Even Holzapfel (p. 224) allows that Dio Cassius has made a mistake in this. As to the other objection Holzapfel holds that in chapter 4 Dio is following an inferior authority, while in chapter 5 he is following a good authority (i.e. Livy). But this is somewhat arbitrary. We think rather that there were only two missions altogether, and that Dio has not been solicitous to inquire into and reproduce the exact sequence of events, but is merely stating the motives which were generally influencing Pompey about this time. For example, it certainly does seem as if Pompey and the mass of the senators were not working quite harmoniously, and that Dio is probably right in laying stress on the fear that was fairly widespread, especially among the Senators, that Pompey might once again come to an agreement with Caesar to their detriment. This will account for the earnest desire of Caesar, until Pompey actually left Italy, to have an interview with him. But we think that at this time Pompey had no desire of forming any sort of coalition with Caesar: he was too conscious that he would now be very much the inferior partner. So he never gave any indication of any such desire; and hence it is that Cicero never hints at any such possible treachery on the part of Pompey, or alludes at all to this desire of Caesar for a conference with him.

There is no hint in Caesar of there having been three embassies. Holzapfel supposes that Caesar (B.C. i. 8 and 9) has mixed up the first and second. But why should he? No doubt Caesar is not at all accurate in many of his statements as regards events at this time; but we can often see some reason for the several misrepresentations. Cicero, too, gives no hint of any earlier embassy of Lucius

1 Evidence of this is Pompey's threat when leaving the city that he would consider anyone who did not follow him as an enemy (Plut. Pomp. 61; Dio Cass. xli. 6. 2: cp. Cicero Att. ix. 10. 2 (365), quae (minae) denique omnibus qui remansissent), and his not waiting for the meeting of the Senators at Capna on January 25th (311. 3).

It is possible that Pompey may have told the envoys to say to Caesar that he had adopted the course he did adopt in respect to Caesar's consulship from regard to the best interests of the State, and with no idea whatever of putting any slight on Caesar personally; and that if Caesar felt aggrieved with him he should not visit it on his country in such a serious manner as by making war upon it. This was quite an honourable statement, designed to make clear that Pompey had no personal animosity against Caesar; but on this statement Caesar may have chosen to lay undue stress, with an added insinuation that Pompey was endeavouring to treat with him individually apart from the Senate. But Pompey had no such intention. He was sensible that the issue must be fought out sooner or later (Att. vii. 4. 2 (295); 8. 4 (299)). It was

Caesar who was trying to dissociate
Pompey from the Senate.

3 For example, (1) he represents himself (B.C. i. 7 and S. 1) as making his ap peal to his soldiers to direct their arms against the State at Ravenna before the die was cast,' and not at Ariminum, where they were in a measure committed. (2) He represents the tribunes as having been subjected to personal violence before they left Rome (B.C. i. 7. 2, Novum in remp. introductum exemplum queritur ut tribunicia intercessio armis notaretur atque opprimeretur: yet cp. Cicero, 301. 2, nulla vi expuisi). (3) He represents the senatorial demand in the final embassy they sent on January 25th in reference to the evacuation of the Italian towns which he had occupied (310. 1, ut de iis oppidis quae extra suam provinciam occupavisset praesidia deduceret: cp. 312. 3, ut removeat praesidia ex iis locis quae occupavit) as a demand that he should evacuate Ariminum only; desirous, as would seem, that posterity should think that he had taken no other place except Ariminum until the negotiations had finally broken down. (4) He represents at one time that the consuls left Rome when the senatus consultum ultimum

Caesar and Roscius than that from which they returned on January 23rd, 'with preposterous demands' (308. 2). So we are inclined to think that it is not the contemporaneous Caesar and Cicero who are in error, but that it is Dio, who wrote three centuries later, who has been inaccurate as to the exact course of the events; and that the ordinary idea is the right one that there were only two embassies, viz., those which Holzapfel regards as the second and third. He seems to be right as to the dates which he assigns to these embassies.

III. THE FORCES AT CORFINIUM AND ITS NEIGHBOURHOOD.

BOTH Caesar and Pompey are virtually at one as to the total number of cohorts in this region. In Ep. 322 Pompey says that Vibullius had 14, Hirrus 5, and Domitius 12: that is, the sum-total was 31. In B. C. i. 15. 4, Caesar says that Vibullius took over the cohorts which Lentulus Spinther brought away with him from Asculum, and united them with the forces which had been recruited for Pompey in Picenum, and with 6 cohorts which Hirrus had at Camerinum. Caesar says (§ 5) that the total forces under Vibullius, including the forces under Hirrus, were 13, and that Domitius had 'about' 20 (§ 7). That would make a total of 33.

In Ep. 331.1, Pompey says, Quod veritus sum factum est ut Domitius implicaretur et neque ipse satis firmus esset ad castra facienda quod meas xix (i.e. the 14 of Vibullius added to the 5 of Hirrus) et suas xii cohortis tribus in oppidis distributas haberet—nam partim Albae, partim Sulmone conlocavit. This entirely agrees with his statement in Ep. 322. Pompey naturally regarded as 'his own '3 the forces taken over by his officer Vibullius, and also the forces of Hirrus, which appear to have at the time when Pompey wrote 331 (viz. February 17th) ranged themselves under the command of Vibullius (cp. Caesar 1. c.). Naturally Pompey would state the division of the forces of his own party with greater accuracy than Caesar, especially as Pompey was writing at the time of the operations, Caesar three or four years later.

Caesar knew approximately the sum-total of the forces which were opposed to him in the district, viz. 'a little more than 30 cohorts' (i. 17. 2, amplius xxx). They were exactly 31 (cp. Cicero, Ep. 322); but he made the error of supposing that the forces of Vibullius after Hirrus had joined him were only 13 cohorts, whereas Vibullius had

was passed (B.C. i. 6. 7); at another time that they and Pompey did so after the fall of Auximum (i. 14. 1, 3), which did not occur until January 28th at the earliestneither of which is true. It was well known in ancient times that Caesar did not always state facts correctly in his Commentaries. Asinius Pollio said so distinctly: cp. Suet. Iul. 56. 4, Pollio Asinius parum diligenter parumque integra veritate compositos (sc. Commentarios Caesaris) putat, cum Caesar pleraque et quae per alios erant gesta temere crediderit et quae per se vel consulto vel etiam memoria lapsus perperam ediderit

14 cohorts before Hirrus joined him. Of the whole Optimate forces in the district, there were 7 at Sulmo (Caes. i. 18. 1), and 6 at Alba Fucentia (i. 24. 3), and, therefore, 18 at Corfinium. All these passed into Caesar's army, and also 3 cohorts of Rutilius Lupus from Tarracina (i. 24. 3), so that Caesar got possession of 34 cohorts.

This solution of the slight discrepancy between Pompey and Caesar is due to O. E. Schmidt (Briefwechsel, pp. 132 f.), and seems quite satisfactory.

IV. CICERO'S PERPLEXITY AT THE BEGINNING OF THE
CIVIL WAR.

It may be well to set forth, with a few references, the general considerations which influenced Cicero in deciding on the part he should play in this crisis.

1° He did not look on permanent neutrality as a possible course for a man of honour: Att. vii. 1. 4 (284); 3. 2 (294); 7. 7 (298); 9. 4 (300); 315. 4.

2° He was resolved ultimately to follow Pompey, if no arrangement could be arrived at between him and Caesar (326. 3)

(a) Through gratitude and affection: 328. 4; 332. 4; 333. 2; 359. 3; 361. 2 τοῖς εὐεργέταις καὶ φίλοις); 362. 3; 377. 2.

(b) Because Pompey was leader of the Optimates: 333. 2; 353. 4; 361. 2 (TOîs ἀρίστοις).

(c) Because he was about to restore the Republic: 333. 2; 349. 2; 359. 3 (talem causam agenti).

In 318. 2 Cicero writes that the considerations which urge him to join the camp of Pompey are his friendship with Gnaeus, the Optimate cause, and the shamefulness of making common cause with a tyrant.'

3° Though he sees the faults and errors of the Optimates

(a) their dilatoriness, irresolution, weakness, and abandonment of principle: 318. 1; 333. 4; 338. 2; 339. 2; 340. 3; 342. 4.

(b) their unpatriotic and violent threats in the event of their victory: 350. 2; 352. 2; 360. 7; 362. 3; 382. 3.

(c) their lust, as great as that of Caesar, for tyranny: Att. vii. 3, 4 init. (294); 5. 4 (297); 342. 4; 365. 6; 382. 4.

4° Yet Caesar's side he cannot, will not, join; for

(a) Caesar is a revolutionary, and his side is the wrong side: Att. vii. 9. 3 (300); 301. 3; 304. 1; 312. 2; 356. 2 fin.; 382. 2.

(b) he could not face the odium of such a course: 305. 3; 353. 3; 356. 3.

(c) it would be dishonourable to join Caesar: 320. 2; 350. 2; 390. 2; 392. 5; though he acknowledges at times the unexpected moderation which Caesar was displaying: e.g. 348. 1.

Accordingly the whole state of Cicero's mind when the crisis arose may be thus summed up-What he hoped for was an arrangement (compositio, concordia). Any

thing should be surrendered rather than have war: cp. Att. vii. 5. 5 (296). War would bring the tyrannis, whichever side was victorious. Therefore he temporized (tergiverser, 305. 3), and did not openly join Pompey, whose flight from Italy he condemned, while he despised and abhorred the incapacity, dilatoriness, and violent threatenings of his supporters. Moreover, peace was what Cicero most desired; now peace Pompey did not wish for; he even feared it: Att. vii. 8. 4, 5 (299). Yet Cicero hoped to be able to influence Pompey: ib. 3. 5 (294). On the other hand, Caesar was very powerful, very active, and very conciliatory. But he was a revolutionary; he was running amuck' (ruere, 319. 3); he is perditus (307. 1), a tyrant (318. 2); his acts were furor (310. 1), scelus (304. 1). If war was inevitable, Cicero must join Pompey; not to do so would be inglorious, dishonourable, ungrateful. Yet again, to think of the Optimates and the dreadful vengeance which would follow their victory. No matter; Pompey alone moved Cicero. What has been done by him and his side is a tissue of blunders; but his side is the right one. Mihi σkápos, he writes to Atticus, vii. 3. 5 (294), unum erit quod a Pompeio"gubernabitur.

ADNOTATIO CRITICA.