Deism leads to Atheism.

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much freedom as he has now fallen upon revealed, he need not enter upon any new hypothesis or different way of reasoning. For the same turn of thought, the same manner of cavilling, may soon find materials in the natural state of man for as large a bill of complaints against natural religion, and the mysteries of Providence, as is here brought against revealed doctrines.' It is interesting to remark, as illustrative of the clearness with which Law always saw the exact drift of an argument, how he here anticipates and, in fact, obviates an objection which was made in the last century, and has been repeated more than once in our own, against Butler's famous argument in the 'Analogy.' To prove that there are the same difficulties in natural religion as there are in revealed is, it is said, 'a dangerous process, because it may lead to Atheism.'1 'It not only may,' says Law in effect, but it must lead either to Atheism or to the complete dislodgment of the Deist from his position.' Now, when it is remembered that the Deist (as his very name implies) based his whole position on the assumption that God's existence, wisdom, power, love, &c., were all knowable without revelation, the force of this argument, as against Tindal, will be apparent. In fact, Law, by anticipation, carried Butler's train of reasoning to its logical conclusion, and in so doing hit exactly upon the true weakness of the Deist's position. That position was, in fact, quite untenable, because his weapons might be turned against himself. This was the chief reason of the sudden and utter collapse of Deism. And no one saw this more clearly than William Law. Others, no doubt- Bishop Butler among the number-pursued more or less decidedly the same course of argument; but no one, in my opinion, realised its full force as the true key of the position so thoroughly as Law. He

1 See inter alia, Miss Hennel's essay 'On the Sceptical Tendency of Butler's Analogy,' and Mr. Martineau's 'MS. Studies of Christianity.' The objection is as old as the days of the first Pitt.

124 Tindal's grovelling Conceptions of God.

recurs to the same argument when he deals with the special objections which Tindal raised against the Christian revelation. Instead of answering them in detail, he feltand felt quite rightly—that, as against a Deist, it was sufficient to take the line marked out in the following fine passage: There is nothing half so mysterious in the Christian revelation, considered in itself, as there is in that invisible Providence, which all must hold that believe a God. And though there is enough plain in Providence to excite the adoration of humble and pious minds, yet it has often been a rock of Atheism to those who make their own

reason the measure of wisdom.' Again Though the creation plainly declares the glory, and wisdom, and goodness of God, yet it has more mysteries in it, more things whose fitness, expedience, and reasonableness human reason cannot comprehend. Thus does this argument [of Tindal] tend wholly to Atheism, and concludes with the same force against Creation and Providence as it does against revelation.' He then applies the same kind of reasoning to the miracles and the prophecies.

Remembering, again, that Law was addressing a Deist, that is, a man who professed to have the highest reverence and appreciation of the perfection of the Deity, we shall see that there is something very telling and apposite in his dignified exposure of Tindal's somewhat grovelling and anthropomorphic conception of God. Writing, for instance, on what he calls the relative characters of God'-that is, God's relations to us as our Father, Governor, and Preserver, Law says: That which is plain and certain in these relative characters of God plainly shows our obligations to every instance of duty, homage, adoration, love, and gratitude. And that which is mysterious and inconceivable in them is a just and solid foundation of that profound humility, awful reverence, internal piety, and tremendous.

The Greatness of God.

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sense of the Divine Majesty, with which devout and pious persons think of God, and assist at the offices and institutions of religion. . . . And if some people, by a long and strict attention to reason, clear ideas, the fitness and unfitness of things, have at last arrived at a demonstrative certainty, that all these sentiments of piety and devotion are mere bigotry, superstition, and enthusiasm; I shall only now observe, that youthful extravagance, passion, and debauchery, by their own natural tendency, without the assistance of any other guide, seldom fail of making the same discovery.'

Tindal, again, objected to the popular conception of God as 'an arbitrary Being, acting out of humour and caprice.' How finely Law meets this objection! Though will and power, when considered as blind or imperfect faculties in men, may pass for humour and caprice, yet as attributes of God they have the perfection of God. His own will is wisdom, and His wisdom is His will. His goodness is arbitrary, and His arbitrariness is goodness.' In the same vein Law answers Tindal's question, ' Was it not as easy for God to have communicated His revelation to all nations as to any one nation or person, or in all languages as in any one?' 'This argument,' he replies, ' is built upon the truth and reasonableness of this supposition, that God does things because they are easy, or forbears things because they are difficult to be performed;' and then, summing up generally the argument on this point, 'We will, not,' he says, 'allow a Providence to be right, unless we can comprehend and explain the reasonableness of all its steps; and yet it could not possibly be right, unless its proceedings were as much above our comprehension as our wisdom is below that which is infinite.'

In the latter part of his treatise, Law turns, as it were, to the reverse side of the medal. Having vindicated the greatness of God, he now asserts the littleness of man.

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The Littleness of Man.

Perhaps on this topic he is in some danger of being run away with by his favourite hobby; certainly he was in some danger of offending the popular feeling of the day, which on both sides, Christian and Deist alike, ran strongly in favour of reason, and of proving religion to be of all things reasonable. But whether we can quite endorse all his assertions or not, we can hardly help admiring the ingenuity and adroitness with which he cuts away the whole ground from under his antagonist. He shows that this grand discovery of the Deists that man has the right to judge and act according to reason, is really nothing else than the discovery of a mare's nest. It was no more than if they said, a man has a right to see only with his own eyes, or hear only with his own ears. It was not a matter of duty, but of necessity. The real question between Christians and unbelievers was not whether reason is to be followed, but when it is best followed. But, after all, what do we mean by our own reason'? We have by nature only a bare capacity of receiving good or bad impressions; our light is really little more than the opinions and customs of those among whom we live. Talk of the perfection and sufficiency of our own reason! Why we are nothing better than a kind of foolish helpless animals till education and experience have revealed to us the wisdom and knowledge of our fellow-creatures. Tindal himself calls education a second nature. There are, then, according to him, two natures. This pleader for the sufficiency of the light of nature should have told us to which of the two natures we are to resign ourselves, the

first or the second. They may be as different as good and evil; yet, as they are both natures, both internal lights, which are we to follow? Which of the two is the perpetual, standing rule for men of the meanest as well as the highest capacities, which carries its own evidence with it, those internal and inseparable marks of truth?'1

Christianity as old as the Creation, p. 243.

6

'Case of Reason.'

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Law, who appears to have perceived almost instinctively the weakest points of his adversaries' position, dwells with great force upon another flaw in Tindal's argument, a flaw which belonged to him in common with most Deists, and which was probably one of the chief causes of the utter collapse of Deism. It is this: The Deists boldly asserted the perfection of human reason, but they offered no proof, nor even a pretence of proof, from fact or experience, of their assertion. The history,' says Law very truly, ' of all ages for near six thousand years past demonstrates quite the contrary. And yet the matter rests wholly upon fact and experience; all speculative reasonings upon it are as idle and visionary as a sick man's dreams about health.' So far, most thoughtful people will agree with Law; but they will not perhaps be disposed to follow him so readily when, pursuing his raid against his pet aversion, he goes on to declare that all the disorders of human nature are the disorders of human reason,' and that 'all the perfection or imperfection of our passions is nothing else but the perfection or imperfection of our reason. Medea, when she killed her children, and Cato, when he killed himself, acted as truly according to the judgment of their reason at that time as the confessor who chooses rather to suffer than deny his faith; the difference is purely the different state of their reason. For the passions may be said to govern our actions only as they denote the disordered state of our reason.' Law finally sums up the whole case of reason,' which in this part might more fairly be called a case against reason, in the following vigorous manner: 'In a word, when self-love is a proper arbitrator betwixt a man and his adversary; when revenge is a just judge of meekness; when pride is a true lover of humility; when falsehood is a teacher of truth; when lust is a fast friend of chastity; when the flesh leads to the spirit; when sensuality delights in self-denial; when partiality is a promoter