certain volume held a question for the jury in interest in the policy, were not paid in fraud of
an action for fraudulent representation.- creditors.-York v. Flaherty, 96 N. E. 53.
Townsend v. Niles, 96 N. E. 1035.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF.
See Breach of Marriage Promise.
III. PROMISES TO ANSWER FOR
DEBT, DEFAULT OR MISCAR-
RIAGE OF ANOTHER.
(C) Property and Rights Transferred.
§ 47 (Ind.) The bulk sales law held not to
apply to a sale by a partner of his interest, to
his copartner within Burns' Ann. St. 1908, §§
745, 3314.-Fairfield Shoe Co. v. Olds, 96 N.
E. 592.
§ 16 (Ind.App.) Promise of the mortgagor to See Courts, § 219.
a purchaser of his grantee to discharge of the
mortgage held not within the statute of frauds.
-Gregory v. Arms, 96 N. E. 196.
IV. REPRESENTATIONS.
$ 42 (Ind.) Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 7468, held
not to require false representations as to the
quality and value of land, made to induce plain-
tiff to lend on it as security, to be in writing,
in order to be actionable.-Stauffer v. Hulwick,
96 N. E. 154.
V. AGREEMENTS NOT TO BE PER-
FORMED WITHIN ONE YEAR.
See Criminal Law, § 1026; Indictment and In-
formation, § 196.
See Criminal Law, §§ 507, 1179; Fraudulent
Conveyances, 8 78.
III. CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY.
$78 (N.Y.) In a prosecution under Pen. Law,
§ 44 (Ind.App.) Statute of Frauds (Burns' § 970, which defines the offense of being a com-
Ann. St. 1908, § 7462) subd. 5, held not to ex- mon gambler, held, that on the evidence the ju-
tend to agreements concerning land. Tim-ry was justified in finding that defendant was
monds v. Taylor, 96 N. E. 331.
a common gambler.-People v. Bright, 96 N. E.
362.
§ 49 (Ind.App.) Statute of Frauds (Burns'
Ann. St. 1908, § 7462) subd. 5, held not to ex-
tend to contracts which may be performed
within a year.-Timmonds v. Taylor, 96 N. E. See Mines and Minerals.
VI. REAL PROPERTY AND ESTATES
AND INTERESTS THEREIN.
§ 63 (Ill.) An agreement to dedicate a street
to the public is not affected by the statute of
frauds and may rest in parol.-Marlow v. Rich,
96 N. E. 921.
VIII. REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY
OF WRITING.
§ 110 (Mass.) A memorandum by which a
power to sell real estate was attempted to be
exercised held to contain a sufficient descrip-
tion to satisfy the statute of frauds.-Coates
v. Lunt, 96 N. E. 685.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES.
I. TRANSFERS AND TRANSACTIONS
INVALID.
(A) Grounds of Invalidity in General.
§ 19 (Mass.) Transfer of a policy of insur-
ance, payable part to insured's wife and part
to his son in fraud of creditors, held subject to
vacation only as of the part payable to the
son.-York v. Flaherty, 96 N. E. 53.
(B) Nature and Form of Transfer.
$ 39 (Mass.) Premiums on life insurance,
paid when no one other than insured had any
See Charities; Perpetuities, § 8.
§ 1 (Ind.App.) A gift inter vivos, valid oth-
erwise, is not invalid because the enjoyment of
the gift is postponed until the donor's death.-
Grant Trust & Savings Co. v. Tucker, 96 N. E.
487.
§ 15 (Ind.App.) Where the language by a
donor is ambiguous, the interpretation given it
by the parties themselves is of great weight
and is often controlling.-Grant Trust & Sav-
ings Co. v. Tucker, 96 N. E. 487.
§ 21 (Ind.App.) Whether a bank in which the
owner of bonds deposited them, intending to
give them to a third person, was an agent or
trustee held a question of fact.-Grant Trust
& Savings Co. v. Tucker, 96 N. E. 487.
A gift inter vivos is not valid unless it has
been delivered to the donee or some third per-
son who is not the agent of the donor.-Id.
$ 47 (Ind.App.) The acceptance of a donee
will be presumed where a gift is to her benefit.
-Grant Trust & Savings Co. v. Tucker, 96 N.
E. 487.
§ 49 (Ind.App.) Where the owner of bonds
with the avowed intention of giving them to a
third person deposited them in a bank, proof
that after so depositing them he had possession
is not conclusive that there was no executed
gift.-Grant Trust & Savings Co. v. Tucker,
96 N. E. 487.
Though the owner of bonds, who had depos-
ited them in a bank, with the avowed intention
of giving them to another, collected the inter-
est, that fact is not conclusive that the bank
did not hold them as trustee for the donee.-Id.
In an action against an administrator to re-
cover possession of bonds given plaintiff by the
intestate, evidence held to warrant a finding
that there had been a completed gift.-Id.
See Bills and Notes, §§ 339, 375; Evidence, §
317; Partnership, § 77; Sales, § 235; Sher-
iffs and Constables; Taxation, § 810.
See Indictment and Information, § 184.
GRANTING CLAUSE.
See Appeal and Error, § 1066; Bills and
Notes, § 495; Frauds, Statute of, § 16; Ju-
dicial Sales; Principal and Surety.
§ 17 (I.) A circuit judge adjudging one
guilty of contempt of court held to possess ju-
risdiction of the person and subject-matter so
that another circuit judge could not discharge
him on habeas corpus.-People v. Zimmer, 96
N. E. 529.
Under Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 65, §§ 21, 22,
and independent thereof, the court, on habeas
corpus, held bound to refuse to discharge the
prisoner, when it is made to appear that he is
held under the judgment of a court which had
jurisdiction both of his person and the subject-
matter.-Id.
HABENDUM CLAUSE.
I. REQUISITES AND VALIDITY.
§ 25 (Ind.App.) Possession of a written in- See Deeds, § 97.
strument in whose favor it is made, such as a
guaranty, is prima facie evidence of delivery
to him.-Goldsmith v. First Nat. Bank, 96 N.
E. 503.
A bank suing on an unaccepted draft had the
burden to show that defendant executed and
delivered a guaranty of payment of such drafts.
Evidence held to show delivery of a guaranty
of payment of drafts drawn on defendant
through plaintiff bank.-Id.
GUARDIAN AND WARD.
See Cancellation of Instruments, § 46; Plead-
ing, §§ 8, 205.
II. APPOINTMENT, QUALIFICATION,
AND TENURE OF GUARDIAN.
§ 22 (Ind.App.) The guardian of a deceased
ward held not entitled to sue to assert the lat-
ter's interest in land, without showing right
to settle the estate under Burns' Ann. St. 1908,
§ 3070.-Martin v. Caldwell, 96 N. E. 660.
HARMLESS ERROR.
See Appeal and Error, §§ 1026-1073, 1170.
HEALTH.
See Food; Municipal Corporations, § 589;
Witnesses, § 374.
I. BOARDS OF HEALTH AND SANI-
TARY OFFICERS.
$3 (Ind.App.) Under Burns' Ann. St. 1908,
§§ 8684, 8838, creating boards of health, the
and not mere employés.-Watts v. City of
members of such boards are officers of the city,
Princeton, 96 N. E. 658.
$5 (Ind.App.) Under Burns' Ann. St. 1908,
8838, members of a city's board of health
cannot recover compensation for their services
until passage of an ordinance fixing salaries.—
Watts v. City of Princeton, 96 N. E. 658.
Where a member of a city's board of health
sued the city for services rendered as a mem-
ber of the board, he could not recover under
statutes authorizing the mayor and council to
IV. SALES AND CONVEYANCES UN-contract for services in preventing or limiting
DER ORDER OF COURT.
$105 (Ind.App.) Under Burns' Ann. St.
1908, § 295, cl. 4, the time to sue to recover
land sold by a guardian under a judgment di-
recting a sale in ex parte proceedings is lim-
ited as well as where the judgment was in an
adversary proceeding.-Sell v. Keiser, 96 N. E.
812.
A judgment and confirmation in ex parte pro-
ceedings for a guardian's sale of land is a final
judgment within Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 295,
the spread of disease.-Id.
$19 (Mass.) Under Rev. Laws, c. 102, §§
69, 71, the board of health held entitled to sue
to restrain the use of a building intended for a
stable, though no actual occupation had been
attempted.-Trowbridge v. Tupper, 96 N. E.
In an action by the board of health to re-
strain the use of a building for a stable brought
under Rev. Laws, c. 102, §§ 69, 71, evidence
tending to show a discrimination by the board
in issuing licenses for stables held inadmissi-
ble.-Id.
An action by a board of health under Rev.
Laws, c. 102, §§ 69, 71, held not improperly
brought though the city was not an original
plaintiff.-Id.
See Eminent Domain, § 233; Executors and
Administrators, § 20.
HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
See Evidence, § 317.
See Deeds, § 129; Wills, § 506.
See Appeal and Error, § 1078; Bridges; Dedi-
cation; Drains, §§ 23, 55; Municipal Corpo-
rations, §§ 408, 510, 511, 519, 561, 649-705,
755-821; Railroads, §§ 253, 312–348.
I. ESTABLISHMENT, ALTERATION,
AND DISCONTINUANCE.
(C) Alteration, Vacation, or Abandon-
ment.
$77 (Ill.) Where a court was without juris-
diction of an appeal from commissioners, it
should dismiss the appeal of its own motion.-] a conviction of murder in the first degree,
Conover v. Gatton, 96 N. E. 522.
Road & Bridge Act, § 106, held not to confer
jurisdiction on a circuit court to review the
action of commissioners in vacating parts of
certain highways on an appeal by individuals.
-Id.
IV. TAXES, ASSESSMENTS, AND
WORK ON HIGHWAYS.
§ 125 (Ill.) Laws 1909, p. 328, § 1, limiting
road taxes to 1 per cent. of assessed valua-
tion, held mandatory, and that the limitation
could not be avoided by holding more than one
election and authorizing the improvement of
different roads at different elections.-People
v. Cairo, V. & C. R. Co., 96 N. E. 838.
Under Laws 1909, p. 328, §§ 1, 4a, where
a tax in excess of 1 per cent. was levied for
the construction of hard roads, the tax was not
sustainable on the theory that the excess was
levied to pay bonds.-Id.
$ 127 (Ill.) A tax levy under Road and
Bridge Act, 15, held void where no damages
had been allowed or awarded for laying out,
widening, altering, or vacating roads or for
ditching or draining roads.-People v. Chicago,
B. & Q. R. Co., 96 N. E. 839.
§ 127 (Ill.) Under Roads and Bridges Act, &
10, 13, 15, held, that no valid tax levy can be
made under section 15, unless damages arising
from the laying out, etc., of roads have accrued,
and have been agreed upon or awarded by the
commissioners of highways.-People v. Cairo,
V. & C. Ry. Co., 96 N. E. 855.
§ 127 (Ill.) A certificate of highway commis-
sioners for an additional tax, within Hurd's
Rev. St. 1909, c. 121, § 14, held to show a con-
tingency justifying the additional tax.-People
v. Wabash R. Co., 96 N. E. 861; Same v. Illi-
nois Cent. R. Co., Id. 862.
$127 (Ill.) A certificate of highway commis-
sioners levying an additional tax held not to
show a contingency, within Hurd's Rev. St.
1909, c. 121, § 14.-People v. Atchison, T. & S.
F. Ry. Co., 96 N. E. 877.
See Landlord and Tenant, §§ 118, 196, 231.
HOLIDAYS.
See Execution, § 275; Wills, § 718.
See Criminal Law; Witnesses, § 359.
II. MURDER.
§ 18 (N.Y.) Penal Law, § 1044, defining mur-
der in the first degree, applies where a person
commits murder while engaged in the commis-
sion of more than one felony.-People v. Scher-
merhorn, 96 N. E. 376.
V. EXCUSABLE OR JUSTIFIABLE
HOMICIDE.
§ 101 (Ill.) Deceased's going on defendant's
premises and looking in his window held only a
technical trespass, not justifying an assault on
him.-People v. Hubert, 96 N. E. 294.
VI. INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.
127 (N.Y.) An indictment for murder in
the common-law form held sufficient to sustain
where the proof clearly brought the case within
the statutory definition that a homicide com-
mitted by a person engaged in the commission
of felony constitutes murder in the first degree.
People v. Schermerhorn, 96 N. E. 376.
(A) Presumptions and Burden of Proof.
§ 151 (Ill.) The killing being shown, held, de-
fendant has the burden of proving circumstanc-
es mitigating, justifying, or excusing him.-
People v. Hubert, 96 N. E. 294.
(B) Admissibility in General.
cused by others than the person assaulted by
§ 187 (Ind.) Evidence of threats against ac-
him held not admissible in absence of evidence
showing prima facie a common design to harm
accused.-Malone v. State, 96 N. E. 1.
$ 190 (Ind.) Evidence of some overt act by
the person assaulted before threats of such
person toward accused is admissible in evi-
dence.-Malone v. State, 96 N. E. 1.
(C) Dying Declarations.
$ 200 (N.Y.) In a homicide case, for reasons
of public necessity, dying declarations are ad-
missible in evidence.-People v. Falletto, 96 N.
E. 355.
§ 203 (Ill.) A declaration to be admissible as
a dying declaration must be made under the
fixed belief of declarant that his death is im-
pending.-People v. Cassesse, 96 N. E. 274.
Proof held not sufficient to render a declara-
tion admissible as a dying declaration.-Id.
§ 203 (N.Y.) Proof that declarant had no
hope of recovery when he made the dying dec-
laration need not be established by statements
made to or by him, but may be inferred from
the surrounding circumstances.-People v. Fal-
letto, 96 N. E. 355.
Before a dying declaration is admissible,
proof of the certainty of speedy death and
declarant's loss of hope of recovery must be
made.-Id.
§ 204 (N.Y.) That deceased lingered for
more than a day after making a dying declara-
tion does not make it incompetent; the com-
petency of such evidence depending on the de-
clarant's state of mind.-People v. Falletto, 96
N. E. 355.
§ 214 (Ill.) A dying declaration is admissible
to prove the killing, the murderer, and such
other facts as are immediately connected with
the killing.-People v. Cassesse, 96 N. E. 274.
$216 (N.Y.) In a prosecution for homicide,
evidence held to show that declarations made
by deceased were made after he had lost all
hope of recovery.-People v. Falletto, 96 N. E.
355.
§ 221 (N.Y.) A dying declaration has not the
same weight and value as the testimony of a
witness given in open court.-People v. Fallet-
to, 96 N. E. 355.
(E) Weight and Sufficiency.
tify a conviction of manslaughter.-People v.
$250 (Ill.) Evidence held insufficient to jus-
Cassesse, 96 N. E. 274.
$ 250 (Ill.) Evidence held to support a con-
viction of murder.-People v. Jennings, 96 N.
E. 1077.
$253 (N.Y.) In a prosecution for homicide,
evidence held to justify a verdict of guilty.-
People v. Falletto, 96 N. E. 355.
$253 (N.Y.) Evidence, in the trial of an in-
the common-law form, held sufficient to sustain
dictment for murder under a presentment in
a conviction of murder in the first degree.-
People v. Schermerhorn, 96 N. E. 376.
life.-De Brauwere v. De Brauwere, 96 N. E.
722.
$9 (Ind.App.) At common law the husband
real estate owned by his wife, and by them as
was entitled to the possession and control of
tenants by the entirety, and was the absolute
owner of the rents and profits.-Sharp v. Bak-
er, 96 N. E. 627.
by conveyance by one of the tenants of his in-
$14 (Ill.) A joint tenancy may be severed
terest to a third person, and this, in view of
the married women's act of 1861, under which
tenancy by the entirety ceased, though the joint
96 N. E. 892.
tenants be husband and wife.-Lawler v. Byrne,
husband and wife as tenants by the entirety is
$14 (Ind.App.) An estate in land held by a
subject to execution for their joint debt.-
Sharp v. Baker, 96 N. E. 627.
Under the married women's act, a husband
has no separate right, either to real estate held
by the wife, or by them as tenants by the en-
tirety, nor in the rents and profits thereof,
which could be sold on execution for his debts.
$307 (Ill.) Evidence in a homicide case held
to justify instructions on the theory of the as--Id.
sault on deceased having been for the purpose
of punishing him.-People v. Hubert, 96 N. E.
§ 314 (I.) Where defendants were entitled
to an indeterminate sentence under Parole Law
1899, § 1 (Hurd's Rev. St. 1909, c. 38, § 498),
so much of the verdict as purported to fix a
definite term of imprisonment could be treated
as surplusage, and an indeterminate sentence
imposed.-People v. Coleman, 96 N. E. 239.
X. APPEAL AND ERROR.
§ 338 (Ill.) In a prosecution for homicide, in
which the death penalty was inflicted, it could
not be said that the erroneous admission of in-
competent evidence was not prejudicial.-Peo-
ple v. Blevins, 96 N. E. 214.
$340 (N.Y.) In a homicide case, an erro-
neous instruction held not prejudicial.-People
v. Brown, 96 N. E. 367.
In a homicide case, the failure of the court
upon request to submit both degrees of man-
slaughter to the jury held not prejudicial.-Id.
XI. SENTENCE AND PUNISHMENT.
§ 354 (Ill.) Persons convicted of manslaugh-
ter on an indictment for murder held entitled
to an indeterminate sentence, under Hurd's
Rev. St. 1909, c. 38, § 498.-People v. Coleman,
96 N. E. 239.
See Charities, §§ 11, 17, 21, 45; Conversion,
§ 15; Master and Servant, § 301; Municipal
Corporations, § 705.
HOSTILE WITNESS.
See Criminal Law, § 489.
HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE.
See Street Railroads, §§ 103, 110, 118.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
See Constitutional Law, §§ 42, 116; Curtesy;
Descent and Distribution; Divorce; Dower;
Estoppel, 19; Executors and Administra-
The distinctions and peculiarities distinguish-
ing the estate by entireties from other joint
tenancies rest on the common-law fiction of
the unity of husband and wife.-Id.
Where an estate by entireties is created by
seised of a divisible part, but each is seised of
conveyance to husband and wife, neither is
the whole, so that on the death of one the sur-
vivor acquires no new or additional interest.
-Id.
A tenant by the entireties cannot during the
coverture convey, mortgage or devise the prop-
erty, so as to defeat the right of the survivor
to hold the entire estate.-Id.
§ 19 (N.Y.) A person who has advanced mon-
purchase of necessaries, may recover against
ey to a wife, deserted by her husband, for the
the husband for money so advanced.-De Brau-
were v. De Brauwere, 96 N. E. 722.
Where a deserted wife used her earnings to
furnish necessaries for herself and children, she
was entitled to recover such amount, as part
of her separate estate, from the husband.--Id.
II. MARRIAGE SETTLEMENTS.
§ 31 (Ind.App.) Facts held not to show as a
matter of law that an antenuptial contract was
abandoned.-Mallow v. Eastes, 96 N. E. 174.
III. CONVEYANCES, CONTRACTS, AND
OTHER TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
§ 52 (Mass.) The court setting aside a deed
third person held justified in adjudging that the
executed by a wife to her husband through a
husband was not entitled to recover any sums
expended by the husband on the property.-
Hoag v. Hoag, 96 N. E. 49.
A wife suing to set aside a conveyance to
her husband through a third person held not
guilty of laches.-Id.
A wife held not estopped from suing to set
aside a deed to her husband, through a third
person.-Id.
V. WIFE'S SEPARATE ESTATE.
(D) Conveyances and Contracts to
Convey.
193 (Ill.) The deed of a married woman
tors, 272; Insurance, §§ 138, 590, 787; held not void because not joined in by her hus-
Judgment, 715; Partition, § 55; Powers, § | band.—Lawler v. Byrne, 96 N. E. 892.
30; Wills, § 116.
I. MUTUAL RIGHTS, DUTIES, AND
LIABILITIES.
$4 (N.Y.) A husband's obligation to provide
his wife with necessaries is measured by what
would be suitable according to their situation in
IX. ABANDONMENT.
§ 303 (Ill.) Rev. St. 1874, c. 68, § 11, author-
izing the sale of the property of the other
spouse for the protection of an abandoned
spouse, held not unconstitutional.-Brand v.
Brand, 96 N. E. 918.
307 (Ill.) Rev. St. 1874, c. 68, § 11, au-
thorizing proceedings by an abandoned spouse
for separate maintenance, held to authorize
service by publication as in chancery.-Brand v.
Brand, 96 N. E. 918.
$315 (Ill.) Under Rev. St. 1874, c. 68, § 11,
held error for a decree in proceedings by an
abandoned wife for support and maintenance
to simply authorize her to sell the husband's
property without providing for protecting his
interest therein.-Brand v. Brand, 96 N. E. 918.
IMPAIRING OBLIGATION OF CON-
TRACT.
See Constitutional Law, §§ 116, 145.
IMPEACHMENT.
See Witnesses, §§ 340-405.
IMPLICATION.
See Constitutional Law, §§ 12, 40; Statutes,
IMPLIED CONTRACTS.
See Work and Labor.
See False Imprisonment; Habeas Corpus.
IMPROVEMENTS.
See Contracts, § 322; Drains; Eminent Do-
main, §§ 166, 171; Highways, § 125; Judg-
ment, 8497; Landlord and Tenant, § 150;
Life Estates, § 17; Mechanics' Liens; Mu-
nicipal Corporations, §§ 296-586.
INCOMPETENT PERSONS.
See Insane Persons; Spendthrifts.
INCONSISTENCY.
See Pleading, § 34; Witnesses, 88 379-405.
§ 87 (Ill.) An indictment must allege the day
and year on which the offense was committed,
but the time may be laid at any time prior
to the finding of the indictment, within the
period of limitations.-People v. Gray, 96 N. E.
268.
$93 (Ill.) An indictment must allege all of
the facts necessary to constitute the offense
charged, and will not support a conviction if
it does not.-People v. Trumbley, 96 N. E. 573.
§110 (Ill.) Under Cr. Code, subd. 11, § 6,
and section 237, an indictment held not to
sufficiently charge a certain person with the
offense of rape, so as to sustain a conviction.
-People v. Trumbley, 96 N. E. 573.
§ 110 (Ind.) In view of Burns' Ann. St.
1908, § 2062, cl. 5, certain indictments and af-
fidavits held sufficient.-Lipschitz v. State, 96
N. E. 945.
§ 11 (Ill.) The rule requiring an indictment
to accurately and clearly allege all the elements
of the offense charged applies to an exception
or proviso in the statute, which constitutes a
part of the description or definition of the
offense. People v. Trumbley, 96 N. E. 573.
§ 121 (Ill.) Whether the state shall furnish
to accused a bill of particulars and the char-
acter of the bill to be furnished held to rest
in the sound legal discretion of the trial court.
-People v. Gray, 96 N. E. 268.
VI. JOINDER OF PARTIES, OFFENSES,
AND COUNTS, DUPLICITY,
AND ELECTION.
§ 128 (Ill.) An indictment for rape, contain-
ing several counts, held good as against a mo-
tion to quash.-People v. Gray, 96 N. E. 268.
An indictment may contain several counts
charging the same felony in different ways, to
meet the evidence.-Id.
§ 132 (Ill.) The court, on a trial for rape,
held required to compel the prosecution to
elect on which act of intercourse it would rely
for a conviction.-People v. Gray, 96 N. E.
268.
The court may compel an election, where two
or more offenses are joined to the prejudice
of accused, but the time of so doing is ordi-
narily in the discretion of the trial court.—Id.
The court will not compel election, in a
prosecution under an indictment containing sev-
eral counts, charging the same felony in differ-
See Action, § 42; Guaranty; Insurance, § 141; ent ways to meet the evidence.-Id.
Principal and Surety.
VII. MOTION TO QUASH OR DISMISS,
AND DEMURRER.
See Adjoining Landowners; Master and Serv-2062, subds. 4, 5, and section 2063, subd. 10,
ant, §§ 317, 320.
INDICTMENT AND INFORMATION.
See Attorney and Client; Criminal Law. $g
327, 1179; Embezzlement, § 6; False Pre-
tenses; Forgery; Homicide, §§ 127, 253, 354;
Intoxicating Liquors, $ 201; Larceny. § 30;
Perjury, § 25; Trade-Marks and Trade-
Names, § 51.
V. REQUISITES AND SUFFICIENCY
OF ACCUSATION.
§ 61 (Ind.) That only licensed druggists or
pharmacists can sell intoxicants held a matter
of which judicial notice is taken, within Burns'
Ann. St. 1908, § 2047.-State v. Cameron, 96 N.
E. 150.
§ 81 (Ind.) An indictment is not bad for giv-
ing a commonly used abbreviation of a Chris-
tian name.-State v. Whiteneck, 96 N. E. 156.
§ 84 (Ill.) Where an accessory is charged as
principal, without showing his actual relation
to the crime, the charge must be as complete
and specific as against the actual perpetrator of
the crime.-People v. Trumbley, 96 N. E. 573.
$133 (Ind.) Under Burns' Ann. St. 1908, §
direction of verdict for defendant, in prose-
cution for sale of liquor without a prescription,
etc., on the ground that the indictment did not
charge that defendant was licensed as a drug-
gist, held error.-State v. Cameron, 96 N. È.
A motion to direct a verdict cannot be made
to take the place of a motion to quash the in-
dictment, or used to test the sufficiency of the
indictment.-Id.
§ 137 (Ind.) A motion to quash an indict-
ment without specifying one of the grounds
prescribed by Burns' Ann. St. 1908, § 2065,
was insufficient to test its validity.-Scott v.
State; 96 N. E. 125.
IX. ISSUES, PROOF, AND VARIANCE.
§ 173 (Ind.) There was no fatal variance be-
tween allegation of alteration of a receipt exe-
cuted by "Jos." H. R. and proof that the re-
ceipt was executed by "Joseph" H. R.-State v.
Whiteneck, 96 N. E. 156.
§ 180 (Ill.) An indictment, alleging the name
of prosecutrix, held sustained by the proof.-
People v. Gray, 96 N. E. 268.
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