vey. The appropriate words are "dedi et concessi," "have given and granted," but they may be supplied by others of the like import (g). This was the regular method, by the common law, of transferring estates in expectancy (that is, reversions and remainders) in corporeal hereditaments(h), as feoffment was of transferring a freehold estate in possession. And the same mode, viz. grant, was appropriate also to the transfer (for whatever estate) of hereditaments incorporeal (i)—such as advowsons, commons, rents, &c.,-of which we are to treat hereafter. For it obviously results from the nature both of things incorporeal, and of corporeal things in expectancy, that no livery can be made of them: not of the first, because they are not capable of possession; nor of the last, because the possession is in the particular tenant, and not in the grantor. For which reason they were formerly both said to lie in grant; while corporeal hereditaments in possession were said to lie in livery (j). And as the latter passed by force of the livery of seisin, so the former passed by force of the deed. But the conveyance by grant, is now extended to all kinds of hereditaments; for by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 2, it is enacted, that, after the 1st October, 1845, all corporeal tenements and hereditaments shall, as regards the conveyance of the immediate freehold thereof, be deemed to lie in grant as well as in livery" (k). It is also to be remarked under this head, that by the antient law, besides the grant itself, an additional ceremony was required where a reversion or remainder was the subject of transfer; viz. the

(g) 2 Sand. Us. 47. The word "give" or "grant" is by 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4, to imply no covenant as to title or otherwise; vide sup. p. 498, n. (x).

(h) Co. Litt. 172 a, 332 a, b. (i) As to incorporeal hereditaments, vide sup. p. 175; post,

C. XXIII.

(j) 2 Rep. 31 b; Doe v. Cole, 7 Barn. & Cress. 243.

(k) It will be seen hereafter (post, p 547) that the effect of this enactment has been to make a grant the usual method of passing real estate inter vivos, under the present system of conveyancing.

attornment of the tenant of the particular estate, to the grantee (1). But by the statute 4 & 5 Anne, c. 16, this requisite is now dispensed with (m).

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III. A Lease (or "demise") is a conveyance by which a man grants lands or tenements (usually with the reservation of a rent) to another, for life, for years, or at will (n), such estate being short of the lessor's own interest therein (o); for if it be to the full extent of that interest, it is then properly an assignment," and no lease (p). A lease of land for life, being a freehold interest, could not be constituted by the common law without livery of seisin ; and therefore the lease could, in such case, be only by way of feoffment (q): but if the estate were for years, or at will, no livery was required (r); nor was a deed, or even any writing, formerly essential to the efficacy of a demise of land (s). The law, however, on this subject has been since altered; for by the Statute of Frauds, (29 Car. II. c. 3,) ss. 1, 2, all leases whatever, with the exception of those not exceeding three years and with a rent of not less

(1) Litt. s. 568, 569; Doe v. Finch, 4 Barn. & Adol. 303. As to attornment, vide sup. pp. 472, 474; Litt. s. 551; Co. Litt. 309 a; Gilb. Ten. 90, 91.

(m) See Doe d. Agar v. Brown, 2 Ell. & Bl. 331.

(n) Litt. s. 58. A lease may be either of land in the possession of the lessor, or of land whereof he has the reversion or remainder; for of the latter he may make a lease for years in futuro, to take effect in possession, on the determination of the particular estate; and he may also grant the reversion for a term short of his own interest therein; but such grant must be by deed. See Co. Litt. 47 a; Bac. Abr. Leases (N.)

(0) As to the nature of leases ge

nerally, see Co. Litt. 43 b; and Bac. Abr., "Leases and Terms of Years," "where" (says Blackstone, vol. ii. p. 323, in notis)" the subject is treated "in a perspicuous and masterly man

66

ner: being supposed to be extracted "from a manuscript of Sir Geoffrey "Gilbert." As to leases under powers defectively executed, see 12 & 13 Vict. cc. 26, 110; 13 & 14 Vict. c. 17.

(p) 2 Bl. Com. 317.
(2) Litt. s. 59.
(r) Ibid.

(s) But a lease of an incorporeal hereditament could not be made at common law without deed. (Co. Litt. 49; Bird v. Higginson, 6 Ad. & El 824; Rex v. Marquis of Salisbury, 8 Ad. & El. 716.)

than two-thirds of the improved value, must now be put into writing and signed by the lessor or his agent lawfully authorized in writing (u). And, by the recent statute of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, (sect. 3), it is further provided, that a lease, required by law to be in writing, of any tenements or hereditaments, made after 1st October, 1845, shall be void at law unless made by deed: though, on the other hand, -by the effect of the same statute, (sect. 2,) providing that all corporeal hereditaments shall, as regards the conveyance of the immediate freehold thereof, be deemed to lie in grant as well as in livery—a lease even for life may now be effected by grant, without livery of seisin. It results, however, from the former observations with respect to estates for years, that a lease of land for years will not vest in the lessee a complete estate for all purposes, until he has made entry on the land demised; and that in the mean time he takes nothing beyond an interesse termini (v).

When the lease is for years only, the estate may be granted to take effect in possession either immediately, or at some future time (x); and, in the latter case, the lessee has of course no right to enter until that future time has arrived. But it is important carefully to distinguish these leases in futuro from mere agreements to let; for an intended lessor may, without using such words as actually to divest himself of any interest present or future, simply engage to grant a lease at a future period; and as no interest in the mean time passes, this will be a mere agreement, and no lease (y). And with respect to such agree

(u) As to signature in the case of demises under seal, vide sup. p. 502, n. (n.)

(v) Vide sup. p. 293. (a) Vide sup. p. 327.

(y) Whether a given instrument amounted to a lease, or only to an agreement to let, was (before the late provision of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 3, mentioned in the text,) a question of construction upon the words used,

and often a difficult one. (See Poole v. Bentley, 12 East, 168; Doe v. Groves, 15 East, 244; Doe v. Ries, 8 Bing. 178; Warman v. Faithful, 5 B. & Adol. 1042; Hayward v. Haswell, 6 Ad. & E. 265; Chapman v. Bluck, 4 Bing. N. C. 187; Doe v. Benjamin, 9 Ad. & Ell. 644; Doe v. Clarke, 7 Q. B. 211; Chapman v. Towner, 6 Mee. & W. 100; Curling v. Mills, 6 Man. & G. 182.) The statute above

ments, it is material to remark, that by 29 Car. II. c. 3, s. 4, they are required, even where the term agreed for is less than three years, to be in writing (z).

[The usual words of operation in a lease are "demise, "grant, and to farm let," demisi, concessi, et ad firmam tradidi (a).] For [farm or feorme is an old Saxon word signifying provisions (b); and it came to be used instead of rent or render, because antiently the greater part of rents were reserved in provisions-in corn, in poultry, and the like, till the use of money became more frequent: so that a farmer, firmarius, was one who held his lands upon payment of a rent or feorme; though at present, by a gradual departure from the original sense, the word farm is brought to signify the very estate or lands so held upon farm or rent.] Neither the words "to farm let," however, nor any of the others above specified, are indispensable to the effect of a demise; any expressions sufficiently indicating the intention of one of the parties to divest himself of the possession, for a determinate period, in favour of the other, being clearly sufficient to constitute a lease (c). And it has been adjudged that even the words "agree to let," may be so used as to amount in construction of law to an actual demise; and are not necessarily to be expounded as a mere agreement for a lease (d). In reference to the covenants contained in a lease, we may here observe, that it results from what has been before stated as to covenants running with the land (e), that the lessee is liable not only to the original landlord or reversioner, but in case of the

mentioned will probably have the effect of preventing, to a certain extent, the occurrence of this question; which there will also be now the less frequent inducement to raise in consequence of the recent Stamp Act, 23 Vict. c. 15, which imposes the same duty on an agreement for a lease as on a lease for any term not exceeding seven years.

(z) See Imman v. Stamp, 1 Starkie,

N. P. C. 12; Edge v. Strafford, 1
Tyrw. 293.

(a) Co. Litt. 45 b.

(b) Spelm. Gloss. 229.

(c) Bac. Abr. Leases, &c.; Doe v. Ashburner, 5 T. R. 163; Barry v. Nugent, 5 T. R. 165, n.

(d) Poole v. Bentley, 13 East, 168. Vide sup. p. 522, n. (y.)

(e) Vide sup. p. 498.

grant of the reversion, then to the grantee also, for the future performance of all such covenants contained in the lease, on the part of the lessee; and is entitled, on the other hand, to enforce against the grantee as well as the original landlord, the future performance of all such as are contained in it on the part of the lessor (f). As to the covenants in a lease, it is also material to notice, that to improve the landlord's security, the lease usually contains a proviso that on breach of any of these covenants by the tenant, the landlord shall be at liberty to re-enter, and resume and hold possession of the premises as if no lease of them had ever been made. Such a proviso constitutes, in case of a breach of covenant by the tenant, a most advantageous addition to the landlord's remedies, which would otherwise be confined to a right of action for damages on the covenant, and (as regards the nonpayment of rent) a right of distress.

IV. [An Exchange is a mutual grant of equal interests, the one in consideration of the other. The word 66 exchange" is so individually requisite and appropriated by law to this case, that it cannot be supplied by any other word or expressed by any circumlocution (g). The estates exchanged must be equal in quantity (h), not of value (for that is immaterial), but of interest;-as fee simple for fee simple,] a lease for years for another lease for years, and the like(i). And [no livery, even in exchanges of freehold, was, at the common law, necessary to perfect the conveyance (j): for each party stands in the place of the other, and occupies his right, and each of them hath

(f) See Thursby v. Plant, 1 Saund. by Wms. 230b; Wright v. Burroughes, 3 C. B. 344.

(g) Co. Litt. 50, 51; Eton College v. Bishop of Winchester, 3 Wils. 468. See the provision 8 & 9 Vict. c. 106, s. 4, mentioned in the next page.

(h). Litt. ss. 64, 65.

(i) As to whether an exchange by lessee for twenty years with lessee for thirty or forty years would be good, see Perk. sect. 275; 2 Shep. Touch. 296.

(j) Litt. s. 62.