3. [An appeal lies from all these courts to the sovereign, in the last resort (a); which proves that the jurisdiction exercised in them is derived from the crown of England, and not from any foreign potentate, or intrinsic authority of their own.

From these three strong marks and ensigns of superiority, it appears beyond a doubt that the civil and canon laws, though admitted in some cases by custom in some courts, are only subordinate, and leges sub graviori lege; and that, thus admitted, restrained, altered, new-modelled and amended, they are by no means with us a distinct independent species of laws, but are inferior branches of the customary or unwritten laws of England;] their proper appellation being the ecclesiastical, the maritime and the academical laws of this realm (b).

[Let us next proceed to the leges scriptæ, the written laws of the kingdom (c); which are statutes, acts, or edicts, made by the sovereign, by and with the advice and consent of the lords spiritual and temporal, and commons, in parliament assembled (d). The oldest of these now extant, and printed in our statute books, is the famous Magna Charta, as confirmed in parliament in the ninth year of Henry the third (e); though doubtless there were many Acts before that time, the records of which are now lost, and the determinations of them perhaps at present

(a) As to the appeal from the ecclesiastical and maritime courts, vide post, vol. 111. pp. 442, 458.

(b) Hale, Hist. C. L. c. 2; 1 Bl. Com. 84. As to these several courts, see 4 Inst. 123, 134, 321.

(c) Vide sup. p. 41.

(d) The Prince's case, 8 Rep. 20. (e) The statutes from Magna Charta down to the end of Edw. 2, including also some which (because it is doubtful to which of the three reigns of Hen. 3, Edw. 1, or Edw. 2

to assign them) are termed incerti temporis, compose what have been called the Vetera Statuta; those from the beginning of the reign of Edw. 3 being contra-distinguished by the appellation of the Nova Statuta. Dwarris on Statutes, 626. It may be observed, that, by 19 & 20 Vict. c. 64, and by 24 & 25 Vict. c. 101, a variety of Acts and parts of Acts not in use, or which have ceased to be in force, are now expressly repealed.

[currently received for the maxims of the old common law.]

The manner of making these statutes will be better considered hereafter, when we examine the constitution of parliament (ƒ). At present we will only take notice of the different kinds of statutes; and of the rules of law with regard to their effect and construction (g).

First, as to their several kinds. Statutes are either public or private. A public Act is an universal rule that regards the whole community (h). Private Acts are rather exceptions than rules, being those which only operate upon particular persons, and private concerns: such as the Romans entitled senatûs decreta, in contradistinction to the senatûs consulta, which regarded the whole commu

(f) As to the constitution of parliament, vide post, bk. IV. pt. 1. c. I. (g) The method of citing these acts of parliament is various. Many of our antient statutes are called after the name of the place where the parliament was held that made them; as the statutes of Merton and Marleberge, of Westminster, Gloucester and Winchester. Others are denominated entirely from their subject; as the statutes of Wales and Ireland, the articuli cleri and the prærogativa regis. Some are distinguished by their initial words, a method of citing very antient; being used by the Jews in denominating the books of the Pentateuch; by the Christian Church in distinguishing their hymns and divine offices; by the Romanists in describing their papal bulls; and in short by the whole body of antient civilians and canonists, among whom this method of citation generally prevailed, not only with regard to chapters, but inferior sections also; in imitation of all which we still call some of our old statutes by their initial words,

as the statute of Quia emptores, and that of Circumspectè agatis. But the most usual method of citing them, especially since the time of Edward 2, is by naming the year of the king's reign in which the statute was made, together with the chapter or particular act, according to its numeral order ;-as, 9 Geo. 2, c. 4. For all the acts of one session of parliament taken together make properly but one statute; and therefore when two sessions have been held in one year, we usually mention stat. 1 or 2. Thus the Bill of Rights is cited as 1 W. & M. st. 2, c. 2, signifying that it is the second chapter or act, of the second statute, or the laws made in the second session of parliament, in the first year of King William and Queen Mary. See also 13 & 14 Vict. c. 21, s. 3, as to the method of citing, in an act of parliament, any former statute.

(h) Lord Cromwell's case, 4 Rep. 13 a; Holland's case, ibid. 76 a; Kirk Nowill, 1 T. R. 125; Samuel v. Evans, 2 T. R. 569.

nity (i). Thus-to show the distinction-the statute 13 Eliz. c. 10, which prevents the master and fellows of any college, the dean and chapter of a cathedral, or any other person having a spiritual living, from making leases for longer terms than twenty-one years, or three lives, is a public act (j); it being a rule prescribed to spiritual persons in general: but an act to enable the Bishop of Chester to make a lease to A. B. for sixty years, which is otherwise, in general, beyond a bishop's power (k), concerns only the parties and the bishop's successors, and is therefore a private act. Of private acts, some are local, as affecting particular places only (1); others personal, as confined to particular persons. Of the first kind, an inclosure act is an example; of the second, an act for a change of name. With respect to the distinction between public and private statutes, it is to be observed that, as the law till lately stood, the courts of law were bound to take notice judicially and ex officio of the former, but not of the latter; so that, in order to claim any advantage under a private act, it was necessary to plead and set it. forth particularly. But now, by 13 & 14 Vict. c. 21, s. 7, every act made after the commencement of the then next session of parliament, is to be taken to be a public one, and judicially noticed as such, unless the contrary be expressly declared (m).

Statutes also are sometimes described as declaratory, or penal, or remedial, according to the different nature of their object or provisions. Declaratory statutes are where the

(i) Gravin. Orig. 1, § 24.

(j) Holland's case, ubi supra. (k) See as to church leases, post, bk. IV. pt. 11. c. III.

(1) See 14 & 15 Vict. c. 49, as to preliminary inquiries to be made in cases of application for local acts in certain cases.

(m) See Hargreaves v. Lancaster and Preston Railway Company, 1 Railw. Cas. 416. For the conve

nience of reference, acts are also now divided, in our printed statute books, into public general acts-local and personal acts declared publicprivate printed acts-and private acts not printed. See 5 & 6 Vict. c. 97, s. 5; Barnett v. Cox, 9 Q. B. 623. See further as to private acts of parliament, post, bk. 11. pt. 1. c. XXI.; bk. IV. pt. 1. c. 1.

old custom of the kingdom is almost fallen into disuse, or become disputable; in which case the parliament has thought proper, in perpetuum rei testimonium, and for avoiding all doubts and difficulties, to declare what the common law is and ever hath been. Thus, the statute of treasons, 25 Edw. III. c. 2, makes not any new species of treasons ; but only, for the benefit of the subject, declares and enumerates those several kinds of offence, which before were treason at the common law. Penal acts are those which merely impose penalties or punishments for an offence committed, as in the case of the statutes relative to game. Remedial acts are such as supply some defect in the existing law, and redress some abuse or inconvenience with which it is found to be attended, without introducing any provision of a penal character;-as in the case of the statute 3 & 4 Will. IV. c. 105, which introduces various improvements in the law relating to dower. But it is not every statute that falls within one or other of these divisions; for some combine more than one of these objects, and others have objects of a different description. There is also a distinction of acts of parliament, as being either enlarging, or restraining, enabling, or disabling acts. Thus the 32 Hen. VIII. c. 28, which gave bishops and other sole ecclesiastical corporations (except parsons and vicars) a more ample power of making leases than they possessed before, is called an enabling statute: the 13 Eliz. c. 10, which afterwards imposed the limitations above noticed (n) as to the making of leases by ecclesiastical persons, is described as a restraining or disabling statute (o).

Secondly, as to their interpretation. In interpreting statutes (as well as in declaring the rule of the common law (p),) the courts are governed by former adjudications (q); or, in the absence of these, by analogy and

(n) Vide sup. p. 71.

(0) Co. Litt. 44b; 1 Bl. Com. 87. (p) Vide sup. p. 48.

(q) By Lord Kenyon, Lacon v. Hooper, 6 T. R. 224: and see Rex v. Leek Wootton, 16 East, 122.

general reasoning (r). But many specific rules are also laid down for their guidance; and principally these which follow.

1. A statute begins to operate from the time when it receives the royal assent, unless some other time be fixed by the act itself for the purpose (s). The rule on this subject was formerly different; for at common law every act of parliament, which had no provision to the contrary, was considered, as soon as it passed, (that is, received the royal assent,) as having been in force retrospectively from the first day of the session of parliament in which it passed, though in fact it might not have received the royal assent, or even been introduced into parliament, until long after that day. Thus where a statute provided that every deed of annuity granted after the passing of the act should be inrolled within twenty days after execution, and the act received the royal assent in May, 1777, but the session had commenced in October, 1776, an annuity deed, executed in January, 1777, nearly four months before the royal assent was given, but after the.commencement of the session, was adjudged to be void for non-compliance with the provision (t). This strange principle, however, though rigidly observed for centuries, no longer prevails ; it being expressly provided by 33 Geo. III. c. 13, that, where no other direction is given, every act shall be considered as commencing from the date indorsed upon it as the date of its receiving the royal assent—a manifest improvement, it must be owned, on the former law; though it has been doubted (u) (and with reason) whether even the new rule is placed upon the right basis, and whether some fixed and reasonable period ought not always to be

(r) Hob. 346.

(s) 33 Geo. 3, c. 13; Nares v. Rowles, 14 East, 510. But where an act expires before a bill for continuing it, introduced in the same session, receives the royal assent, the latter act takes effect (unless

otherwise provided, and except as to penalties,) from the expiration of the former; 48 Geo. 3, c. 106.

(t) Latless v. Holmes, 4 T. R. 660. (u) See Kent's Comm. Lect. 20; Dwarris on Stats. 683.