this ground alone that they can claim the title of pious frauds: but they were men who knew "not what manner of spirit they were of:" they sought to promote, by means of falsehood, the cause of Him who lived and died for the Truth: they believed the Gospel to have come from God, but wanted faith in his power and care to support and prosper it, and turned aside from the straight path of sincerity, to seek for the expedient by the crooked roads of worldly policy. But still, though most unchristian in their spirit, though they had "neither part nor lot in this matter, but were in the gall of bitterness, and in the bond of iniquity," their general belief in Christianity was doubtless, in most instances, sincere; and I have adverted to their case for the very purpose of pointing out the important circumstance, that the fullest conviction of the truth of the cause in which we may be engaged, is no security against our sliding into falsehood, unless we are sedulous in forming and cherishing a habit of loving, and reverencing, and strictly adhering to truth.

Protestants, however, in these times, it may be said, have no pretended miracles-practise

no pious frauds. But how far is this to be attributed to a genuine detestation of falsehood, as odious in his sight who lived and died in the cause of Truth, with a firm reliance on his providence; and how far, to a conviction furnished by experience, that fraud is, in the end, detrimental to the cause it is designed to serve, and that in these days its success would be especially shortlived? To what degree each man is in each instance actuated by a love of truth, or by considerations of expediency, can be fully known only to the Searcher of hearts; it is only by the most rigid self-examination that we can approach to the knowledge of this in our case; and it is so far only as the former motive operates that we are acting on Christian principle. It is undoubtedly a just maxim, that in the long run "honesty is the best policy;" but he whose practice is governed by that maxim is not an honest man.

3. To suggest a few topics for the selfexamination I have alluded to, may not be unsuitable with a view to the inquiries we are engaged in. That all even of the learned and sagacious have not arrived at true conclusions

respecting the doctrines of Scripture, is at once evident from the great diversity of their conclusions. It is necessary to consider, therefore, how we may best escape being of the number of those who fall into such various errors ;---how we may be best qualified for profiting by the lessons of Him whose "Word is Truth." And this must surely be by a fervent desire and sedulous watchfulness to acquire and preserve a sincere, unbiassed, and candid disposition. Without this, the highest ability, combined with the most laborious study, will do nothing towards the attainment of that object.

That we may not, however, be led into too wide a field of discussion, it should be observed, that I do not propose to inculcate the duty of veracity in private life; nor to enter on any metaphysical disquisition on the nature of truth universally, or on what may be regarded as the different species of it; nor to treat of the various kinds of evidence by which it is to be established; but simply to speak of the importance, and the difficulty, of cultivating and establishing as a habit, a sincere love of Truth for its own sake, and a steady thorough-going adherence to it in all

philosophical, and especially in religious inquiries.

The first step towards attaining this state of mind, and ascertaining how far we have attained it, must evidently be a strong conviction of its value, together with a distrust of ourselves. If we either care not to be lovers of Truth, or take for granted that we are such, without taking any pains to acquire the habit, it is not likely that we ever shall acquire it. I must here, therefore, briefly notice some objections which I have heard urged against the very effort to cultivate such a habit as I am recommending; though, in fact, they arise from misapprehension, and are directed against a mistaken view of the subject.

(1.) The first is, that we cannot be required to make Truth our main object, but happiness;—that our ultimate end is, not the mere knowledge of what is true, but the attainment of what is good, to ourselves and to others. But this, when urged as an objection against the views here taken, is evidently founded on a mistake as to the meaning of the maxim, that Truth should be sought for its own sake. It is evident, in the first place, that I am not speaking of the pursuit of all truth on all

subjects. It would be ridiculous for a single individual to aim at universal knowledge; or even at the knowledge of all that is within the reach of the human faculties, and worthy of human study. The question is respecting the pursuit of truth, in each subject, on which each person desires to make up his mind and form an opinion. And, secondly, the purport of the maxim that, in these points, truth should be our object, is, not that mere barren knowledge without practice,--truth without any ulterior end, should be sought; but that truth should be sought and followed confidently, not in each instance, only so far as we perceive it to be expedient, and from motives of policy, but with a full conviction both that it is, in the end, always expedient, with a view to the attainment of ulterior objects, (no permanent advantage being attainable by departing from it,) and also, that, even if some end, otherwise advantageous, could be promoted by such a departure, that alone would constitute it an evil;---that truth in short, is, in itself, independently of its results, preferable to error,--and that honesty claims a preference to deceit, even without taking into account its being the best policy.