APPEAL-Bengal: limitation of time to appeal: special leave]-The petitioners, being the respondents in a suit in the High Court of Bengal, against whom a divisional Bench pronounced judgment, applied for a review of such judg ment, which was admitted for argument, but dismissed on the hearing. The petitioners applied for leave to appeal to Her Majesty in Council; but the High Court refused the application, on the ground that the time had expired within which such appeal could be granted. It appeared that the practice in respect of the time from which the limitation as to appeals ran had been changed pending the proceedings on review. Under these circumstances, their Lordships granted special leave to appeal. Ghose v. Ensuff, 16

Bengal: appealable value: other suits pending: special leave]-On a petition praying for special leave to appeal from a judgment of the High Court of Bengal, in a suit involving less than the appealable value, it appeared that important questions of law would arise on the hearing; that other suits were directed by the High Court to abide the event of the appeal; and that the aggregate suits involved a greater amount than the appealable value. Their Lordships granted special leave to appeal. Khine v. Shadden, 19

New South Wales: felony: venire de novo: special leave]-On a petition by the Attorney General of New South Wales for special leave to appeal from an order of the Supreme Court of that colony, it appeared that the respondent was charged, on a criminal information by the Attorney General of the colony, with murder ; that he pleaded not guilty, and was tried and found guilty by the jury. The Supreme Court afterwards, on an application by the respondent, made an order that a venire de novo should issue, on the ground that the jury were allowed access to certain newspapers pending their verdict. Their Lordships granted special leave to appeal. R. v. Murphy, 21

---

ATTORNEY-striking off the roll: misconduct] The appellant, an attorney on the roll of the High Court of Bengal, prepared a conveyance on behalf of his brother, containing a false recital as to consideration, knowing the same to be false, and attested the execution of the deed with such false recital, and signed his name as a witness to the receipt of the consideration money, knowing that no consideration had passed or was intended to pass. The deed was duly registered. The High Court ordered the appellant to be struck off the roll. Their Lordships were of opinion that the appellant was properly called upon to explain the circumstances under which the deed was executed; but that, as there was no evidence that the appellant was guilty of any fraudulent or dishonest intention, and as no dishonest use was attempted to be made of the deed, and as no person had been injured thereby, the circumstances were not sufficient to warrant the order of the High Court. In re Stewart,

25

BANKRUPTCY-adjudication in Barbadoes: effect of subsequent adjudication in England]-The appellant, a trader in Barbadoes, having quitted the colony in debt, and been adjudicated a bankrupt in his absence, came to England and contracted debts in England, and was adjudicated a bankrupt under the Bankruptcy Laws of England, and obtained his discharge. The appellant having returned to Barbadoes, proceedings were instituted by his creditors under the former bankruptcy in the colony, and the appellant was sentenced to a term of imprisonment:-Held, that, although an adjudication and discharge in bankruptcy in England under the imperial statute has the effect of barring any debt which a bankrupt may have contracted in any part of the world, yet that the discharge under the imperial statute would not deprive the Court of the colony of its jurisdiction to inquire into offences committed against the Insolvent Law of the colony, the insolvent being again within its jurisdiction, and such Court having once

acquired jurisdiction in the matter. Gill v.
Barron, 33

COVENANT-Covenant to pay annuity to feme sole
to her separate use: subsequent marriage of par.
ties]-The appellant's testator covenanted with
the respondent, a feme sole, to pay her so long
as she lived and complied with certain con-
ditions, an annuity to her separate use, free
from the control of any husband. The testator
subsequently married the respondent:-Held, in
an action by the respondent to recover arrears of
the annuity accrued since the death of the tes-
tator, that the covenant, though suspended
during the coverture, was not extinguished
by the marriage of the parties. Fitzgerald v.
Fitzgerald, 44

DEVISE-old French law: validity of proviso: "dé-
fense d'aliéner pure et simple"]-Testator de-
vised certain lands in Lower Canada to the
respondent, with a proviso that the devisee
should not in any manner encumber, affect,
mortgage, sell or exchange or otherwise alienate
the lands until after twenty years from the
death of testator. There was no substitution of
the devise in the event of alienation:- Held,
that such a proviso, being by the law of Canada
a "défense d'aliéner pure et simple," amounted
merely to advice by the person making the pro-
hibition, and was not legally binding on the
devisee. Renaud v. Guillett, 1

FORECLOSURE SUIT. See Practice.

Pre-

MORTGAGE — Construction of deed mortgaging a
sheep station in New South Wales, as to meaning
of the words "increase of the sheep": pleading]-
By an indenture of mortgage made between the
respondent B. and the appellants' testator,
certain flocks of sheep and certain herds branded
B, then depasturing on a certain station in the
colony of Victoria, "together with all and sin-
gular the issue, increase and produce of the
said sheep and cattle respectively," were
assigned by B. to the appellants' testator by
way of mortgage. By a subsequent indenture
of mortgage reciting the former indenture, B.
assigned "all the issue, increase and progeny of
the sheep" on the said station to the respon-
dents P. and D, with a power of sale.
vious and subsequent to the latter indenture, B.
purchased and brought upon the station large
additions to the flock of sheep, and branded
them with the letter B. B. also obtained a lease
of the station, and deposited it with P. and
D. as additional security :- Held, on a bill
filed by the appellants, after a sale, by P. and
D, both of the sheep and the lease, praying for
payment of advances out of the proceeds of the
sale of all the sheep and the lease, first, that
by the words "increase of the sheep" in the
first indenture was meant the natural increase
or offspring of the original sheep mortgaged,
and that such words did not include additions
made to the flock by purchase; secondly, that
the mortgagees under the first indenture of

NEW SERIES, 37.-PRIV. COUN.

mortgage were precluded from claiming the
proceeds of the sale of the lease or any personal
equity to have the sheep purchased substituted
for the original sheep, no such claim having
been raised by the original bill. Webster v.
Power, 9

PATENT-extension of term of letters patent]-The
Judicial Committee will not recommend an
extension of the term of letters patent, unless it
is proved to the satisfaction of their Lordships
that the original invention is of considerable
merit, that it is of public utility, and that there
has been inadequate remuneration.
In re
M'Dougall's Patent, 17

The Judicial Committee will not, upon an appli-
cation to prolong the term of letters patent,
adjudicate upon the validity of a patent; but
they will not recommend an extension of the
term unless it appears from the specification
that the invention was of great merit and public
utility, and that no great detriment will arise
to the public by reason of an extension of the
monopoly. Ibid.

66

extension of term of letters patent]-On a
petition praying for an extension of the term of
letters patent for an invention, defined by the
specification as metallic soap," to be applied
as a coating to ships' bottoms, it appeared
that the subject-matter of the invention was
composed of well-known articles in common
use. Their Lordships refused to recommend
any extension, on the grounds, first, that the
subject-matter of the invention was not suffi-
ciently defined by the term "metallic soap";
secondly, that the invention consisted of a com-
bination of substances in common use.
In re
M'Innis's Patent, 23

PRACTICE foreclosure suit: pleas: irregularity:
motion to act: decree]-The respondent com.
menced a foreclosure suit in the Supreme
Court of Halifax, Nova Scotia. The appellant
pleaded several insufficient and embarrassing
pleas. The respondent applied to the Court
to set aside the pleas as false and frivolous;
and the Court made an order to set aside
the pleas, and by the same order decreed
a foreclosure and a sale of the mortgage. Their
Lordships reversed the decree of the Supreme
Court, and remitted the cause back to the
Supreme Court, without prejudice to the respon-
dent, to call upon the appellant to reform or
amend his pleas; or, failing to do so, that the
pleas be set aside. Wallace v. M'Sweeny, 39
RECEIVER-appointment of, pending appeal]—On
a petition praying that a receiver might be
appointed of certain estates pending an appeal,
it appeared that a District Court decreed in
favour of the petitioner, but that the High
Court of Bengal reversed the decree. It also
appeared that the property in question was of
great extent, paying a large revenue to the
Government. Their Lordships refused to appoint
a receiver. Burmono v. Thakoor, 7

H

TABLE OF CASES.

Burmono v. Thakoor, 7
Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 44

Ghose v. Ensuff, 16
Gill v. Barron, 33
Khine v. Shadden, 19

M'Dougall's Patent, in re, 17

M'Innis's Patent, in re, 23
Regina v. Murphy, 21
Renaud v. Guillet, 1
Stewart, in re, 25
Wallace v. M'Sweeny, 39
Webster v. Power, 9