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Workmen's Compensation

Art. I, § 19

of action given under foreign laws and enforced by a rule of comity." Matter of Taylor, (1911) 144 App. Div. 634, 129 N. Y. S. 378.

Retrospective operation. This section does not operate retrospectively, and hence does not affect causes of action which had occurred before it went into effect. Isola v. Weber, (1895) 147 N. Y. 329, 41 N. E. 704; O'Reilly v. Utah, etc., Stage Co., (1895) 87 Hun 406, 34 N. Y. S. 358. Nor does it enlarge the existing right of the personal representative of a person killed by the negligence of another to recover damages therefor. O'Reilly v. Utah,

etc., Stage Co., (1895) 87 Hun 406, 34 N. Y. S. 358. See also Weber v. Third Ave., R. Co., (1894) 12 App. Div. 512, 42 N. Y. S. 789. However, where a person was injured before this provision became effective, but death did not result until thereafter, this section was properly applicable. Weber v. Third Ave. R. Co., (1894) 12 App. Div. 512, 42 N. Y. S. 789.

Effect on existing laws.- This provision was not intended to change the law previously existing beyond authorizing the recovery of actual damages sustained in excess of the limit which theretofore prevailed. Medinger v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., (1896) 6 App. Div. 42, 39 N. Y. S. 613.

Supervision of verdict. This section was not intended to change the supervision of courts over the verdicts of juries in this class of cases and their reduction when proper. Medinger v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., (1896) 6 App. Div. 42, 39 N. Y. S. 613.

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Notice to employer. It has been intimated that if section 2 of chapter 600 of the Laws of 1902, which provides that no action for recovery of compensation for injury or death under this act shall be maintained unless notice of the time, place and cause of the injury," shall be given to the employer within a prescribed time, be construed to extend to all cases arising under statutes and the common law where employees are concerned, and not to cases arising under this act," as the statute reads, then there is a fatal disagreement with the provisions of this section. Rosin v. Lidgerwood Mfg. Co., (1903) 89 App. Div. 245, 86 N. Y. S. 49. See also Gmaehle v. Rosenberg, (1904) 178 N. Y. 147, 70 N. E. 411, reversing (1903) 87 App. Div. 631, 84 N. Y. S. 1127, and affirming (1903) 83 App. Div. 339, 82 N. Y. S. 366.

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19. Workmen's compensation.

Nothing contained in this Constitution shall be construed to limit the power of the Legislature to enact laws for the protection of the lives, health, or safety of employees; or for the payment, either by employers, or by employers and employees or otherwise, either directly or through a State or other system of insurance or otherwise, of compensation for injuries to employees or for death of employees resulting from such injuries without regard to fault as a cause thereof, except where the injury is occasioned by the willful intention of the injured employee to bring about the injury or death of himself or another, or where the injury results solely from the intoxication of the injured employee while on duty; or for the adjustment, determination and settlement, with or without trial by jury, of issues which may arise under such legislation; or to provide that the right of such compensation, and the remedy therefor shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies for injuries to employees or for death resulting from such injuries;

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or to provide that the amount of such compensation for death shall not exceed a fixed or determinable sum; provided that all moneys paid by an employer to his employees or their legal reprosentatives, by reason of the enactment of any of the laws herein authorized, shall be held to be a proper charge in the cost of operating the business of the employer.

Amendment of 1913, which was proposed as the result of the decision of the Court of Appeals in the case of Ives v. South Buffalo R. Co., 201 N. Y. 271, 94 N. E. 431, Ann. Cas. 1912 B, 156, holding that the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1910 was unconstitutional.

The Workmen's Compensation Law (Laws of 1914, ch. 41) creating a state fund for the payment of prescribed compensations to be allowed employees engaged in certain hazardous employments for accidental injuries sustained by them in the course of their employment and relieving of further liability all employers who contribute their ratable share to the fund or who make other adequated provision for compensating their employees according to terms of the law is fully sustained by this section and is not violative of art. 1, § 6, in depriving an employee accidentally injured of the right to bring an action for damages against an employer who has complied with the requirements prescribed. Nor is the act an infraction of the provisions of the 14th amendment of the Federal Constitution. Jensen v. Southern Pac. Co., (1915) 215 N. Y. 514, 109 N. E. 600, affirming 167 App. Div. 945, 152 N. Y. S. 1120. See WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW.

ARTICLE II.

§ 1. Qualification of voters.

Soldier and sailor vote in war time.

Every male citizen of the age of twenty-one years, who shall have been a citizen for ninety days, and an inhabitant of this State one year next preceding an election, and for the last four months a resident of the county and for the last thirty days a resident of the election district in which he may offer his vote, shall be entitled to vote at such election in the election district of which he shall at the time be a resident, and not elsewhere, for all officers that now are or hereafter may be elective by the people; and upon all questions which may be submitted to the vote of the people, provided that in time of war no elector in the actual military service of the State, or of the United States, in the army or navy thereof, shall be deprived of his vote by reason of his absence from such election district; and the Legislature shall have power to provide the manner in which and the time and place at which such absent electors may vote, and for the return and canvass of their votes in the election districts in which they respectively reside.

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Const. 177, Art. VII; amended, Const. 1821, Art. II, § 1; amended in 1826; amended, Const. 1846, Art. II, § 1; amended in 1864 and in 1874; amended, Const. 1894, Art. II, § 1.

Relation to article 2, section 4.-The constitution contains no restriction upon the right to vote insured by this section "and the only express power given to the legislature in reference to it is to enact laws for ascertaining by proper proofs the citizens who shall be entitled to the right of suffrage.' People v. Wappingers Falls, (1894), 83 Hun 130 31 N. Y. S. 758, affirmed (1895) 144 N. Y. 616, 39 N. E. 641.

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Relation to article 12, section 1.- - This section is general and relates only to the general governmental affairs of the state, while article 12, section 1, which has reference to the organization of cities and incorporated villages and restricts their powers so as to prevent abuses in taxation and in the contracting of debts, is local and relates to the business or private affairs of the municipalities specified. Accordingly, when construed together, neither section is violated by a statute (L. 1898, ch. 269, art. 2, § 5) which defines the qualifications of voters in the village of Fulton and requires that a voter, in order to vote upon a proposition that the village establish a system of water works and issue bonds for the purpose, 66 Imust be entitled to vote for an officer, and he or his wife must also be the owner of property in the village." Such a statute is in accordance with the established policy of the state to limit the right of suffrage as to the business or financial affairs of its various villages to the taxpayers of a municipality, and is fully justified by these provisions of the organic law. Spitzer v. Fulton, (1902) 172 N. Y. 285, 64 N. E. 957, 92 A. S. R. 736, affirming 61 App. Div. 612, 69 N. Y. S 1146.

Restriction of candidates; article 10, section 2.- Where the legislature has the privilege under article 10, section 2 of prescribing either election or appointment as the mode of filling an office, it may in its discretion, when conferring on the elector the power to elect to that office, limit the number from whom he may select. Such a limitation in no wise abridges the right of the elector to vote for all elective officers. Thus chapter 80, Laws of 1853, declaring that no supervisor of any town shall be elected or appointed to hold the office of superintendent of the poor is not violative of this section. People v. Clute, (1872) 50 N. Y. 451, 10 Am. Rep. 508, reversing 63 Barb. 356. In that case the court said: Certainly, if the legislature may say to the voter, you shall not vote for any for this office, but it shall be appointive; it may say you shall not vote for any one for this office who is not free from this disqualification which we now declare. The legislature may

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not put upon any elector a personal restriction from voting for any officer who may be elective, or whom it may declare elective, save such restriction as is imposed by the constitution, for from that it is especially prohibited. But it may, in the exercise of its judgment for the public good, limit the number from whom the elector may select, for thus to legislate is within the general and sovereign power of legislation, which it constitutionally possesses." Exclusiveness of qualifications generally. As this section expressly designates the persons who are entitled to vote at elections, it has the effect "to negative the right of the elective franchise to all others, and the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is applicable to its construction." Hopper v. Britt, (1911) 203 N. Y. 144, 96 N. E. 371, Ann Cas. 1913B 172, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 825, reversing 146 App. Div. 363, 131 N. Y. S. 135; People v. Pease, 27 N. Y. 45, 84 Am. Dec. 242; People v. Barber, (1888) 48 Hun 198, 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 601; Ahern v. Elder, (1909) 195 N. Y. 493, 88 N. E. 1059, affirming 130 App. Div. 900, 115 N. Y. S. 1108; In re Gage, (1894) 141 N. Y. 112, 35 N. E. 1094, 25 L. R. A. 781. Right of women to vote.- A woman, not being a provision of this section, is, of course, excluded from the privilege of voting. In re Gage, (1894) 141 N. Y. 112, 35 N. E. 1094, 25 L. R. A. 781, affirming Matter of Cancellation, 5 Misc. 375, 26 N. Y. S. 167; People v. Barber, (1888) 48 Hun 198, 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 601. Therefore, it follows that

"male citizen " within the

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the Act of 1892 (ch. 214, Laws 1892), conferring upon women the right to vote for school commissioners, is unconstitutional. In re Gage, (1894) 141 N. Y. 112, 35 N. E. 1094, 25 L. R. A. 781, affirming Matter of Cancellation, 5 Misc. 375, 26 N. Y. S. 167. Furthermore, a woman who violates this section by voting at an election may properly be convicted under a statute, which provides that any person not duly qualified to vote under the laws of this state, who shall knowingly vote, or offer to vote, at any general or special town or charter election in this state, shall be adjudged guilty of a misdemeanor." People v. Barber, (1888) 48 Hun 198, 15 N. Y. St. Rep. 601.

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Burden of proof as to citizenship. If a voter is proved to have been alien born, and there is prima facie evidence that he has not become naturalized the burden of showing that. he has become a citizen is cast on the party desiring to retain the vote. But where the evidence is merely that an alien born has voted, the presumption is that he voted legally, and had qualified himself by naturalization. People v. Pease, (1863) 27 N. Y. 45, 84 Am. Dec. 242, affirming 30 Barb. 588.

Disqualification by inferior tribunal.— Apparently, one duly qualified to vote, as provided by this section, cannot be deprived of that right by an inferior tribunal; the officers presiding at an election determine the question at their peril, and are liable to him in damages, in case of an erroneous determination that he is disqualified, and a rejection of his vote. Silvey v. Lindsay, (1887) 107 N. Y. 55, 13 N. E. 444, reversing 42 Hun 116, 5 N. Y. St. Rep. 157.

Improper questioning by inspectors. The jurisdiction of inspectors of election, under the statute of 1842 defining their powers and duties (ch. 130, Laws of 1843, title 4) in questioning a person challenged, is limited to inquiries in reference to his place of residence and qualifications as an elector, as prescribed by this section and by section 2 of this article. Accordingly, where a person offering to vote was callenged as a deserter, but refused to answer questions upon that subject, and, thereupon, his vote was rejected by the inspectors, they acted without authority, and were liable to an action for the damages resulting therefrom. Goetcheus v. Mathewson, (1875) 61 N. Y. 420, reversing 5 Lans. 214.

Office not named on ballot. This provision confers the right to vote for a person for every office required by law to be filled at the election at which the voter desires to vote, and any law which prohibits him from so doing is void. Accordingly, section 104 of the Election Law (ch. 680 of the Laws of 1892) must be construed to give a voter the right not only to vote for any person for an office named on the official ballot, but also for an office which ought to have been named thereon, but which has been omitted therefrom by the neglect of the official charged with the duty of its preparation. People v. Wappingers Falls, (1894) 83 Hun 130, 31 N Y. S. 578, affirmed (1895) 144 N. Y. 616, 39 N. E. 641.

Fraudulent vote in another's name.— Inspectors of election cannot refuse a qualified voter his rights to vote merely because some person had fraudulently voted in his name. People v. Doe, (1905) 109 App. Div. 670, 96 N. Y. S. 389.

Registration in cities of first class. The provisions of chapter 521 of the Laws of 1908 are not unreasonable and do not controvert this section in so far as they require the electors in cities of one million or more inhabitants to sign the public copy of the register when they can write and to truthfully answer the statutory questions propounded to them when they cannot write. "It is matter of common knowledge that the great centers of population offer peculiar opportunities for fraud and corruption in the conduct of elections, which can be prevented or minimized only by special regulations adapted to the conditions out of which these evils arise. Thus it is that primaries and elections in cities have to be hedged about by statutory provisions that are not deemed necessary in villages and towns. The same reasons which underlie the distinction drawn between cities and rural communities apply

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to the classification of cities, for difficulty of preserving the purity of the electorate increases in geometrical ratio with the density and size of population. It is competent, therefore, for the legislature to prescribe such reasonable regulations as are designed to secure accurate information concerning the qualifications of voters, and that necessarily includes some method of identification." Ahern v. Elder, (1909) 195 N. Y. 493, 88 N. E. 1059, affirming 130 App. Div. 900, 115 N. Y. S. 1108.

Election districts. The word "elsewhere," as used in this section means some other election district polling place than that for the election district in which the voter resides. Accordingly, a polling place in a city for a town outside of the city, at which residents of the town only and not residents of the city are allowed to vote, can be established or authorized by the legislature without a violation of this section. "All that the constitution requires is that the elector must vote at the polling place designated by law for casting the vote of the districts where he resides, and the validity of his vote is not affected by the circumstance that the place is located on the wrong side of an imaginary line. When he does that he votes in the district of his residence and not elsewhere, within the spirit, and even within the letter of the constitution." People v. Carson, (1898) 155 N.Y. 491, 50 N. E. 292, affirming 86 Hun 617, 35 N. Y. S. 1114.

The words "having a population," as used in this section when construed as a part of the whole of the entire Constitution, are to be understood as limited to the resident citizen population of the county. "When the constitution makes the population of a county or district the measure of civil or political rights it is doing no violence to language to say that it refers to the citizen population, which alone has any standing in measuring or determining political, governmental or civil rights. The constitution, in its political aspects, is concerned only with the citizenship of the state; aliens have no rights except to an equal administration of the law, and it cannot be presumed that in making the constitution of 1894, which introduced this new limitation, the convention or the people who adopted it had any idea that they were giving to aliens in any part of the state the power, by their mere presence in any given locality, to determine the political or civil rights of any citizen of this state." Matter of Silkman, (1903) 88 App. Div. 102, 84 N. Y. S. 1025, per Woodward, J. (concurring).

§ 2. Persons excluded from right of suffrage.

No person who shall receive, accept, or offer to receive, or pay, offer or promise to pay, contribute, offer or promise to contribute to another, to be paid or used, any money or other valuable thing as a compensation or reward for the giving or withholding a vote at an election, or who shall make any promise to influence the giving or withholding any such vote, or who shall make or become directly or indirectly interested in any bet or wager depending upon the result of any election, shall vote at such election; and upon challenge for such cause, the person so challenged, before the officers authorized for that purpose shall receive his vote, shall swear or affirm before such officers that he has not received or offered, does not expect to receive, has not paid, offered or promised to pay, contributed, offered or promised to contribute to another, to be paid or used any money or other valuable thing as

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