know the effects that may be produced upon him while working in the manufacture of Paris green; and that it is the duty of the master to inform him, not only that the ingredients are poisonous, but also of the liability of the person to become poisoned by inhaling or otherwise coming in contact with their fumes."

The principle, in short, is that the master is bound to make known all concealed dangers; 19 and his duty is no less in this respect where the employment itself is free from danger, and the existing perils grow out of extrinsic causes and circumstances not discernible to the ordinary observer.20

The rule was carried, perhaps, further than the weight of authority will warrant in the case of Parkhurst v. Johnson.21 That was a case where the master employed an inexperienced laborer, and set him at work at his lime. kiln. The method of work was to remove the burned stone at the base, and, by standing on the mass above, crowd it down into the space left at the base, stepping off as it dropped. The servant, while doing this work with others, by reason of his inexperience failed to step off in time, and went down into the crater, and was killed. The employer was held liable. The danger was obvious; the employment required no skill. The master had a right to assume he knew as much of the peril as his observation and common knowledge would suggest. It was, however, held in that state, and in accordance with the current of authority on that subject, that, where an inexperienced person sought the position of brakeman, he could not be

20

"Dowling v. Allen, 74 Mo. 13.

Perry v. Marsh, 25 Ala. 659; Spelman v. Fisher Iron Co., 56 Barb. 151.

2150 Mich. 70, 15 N. W. 107.

heard to claim that he was not instructed in the duties of such employment. The position sought was one of known danger. It required no special skill or training to foresee that it was dangerous. He assumed the ordinary risks of such employment. He cannot be heard to say, "I sought the position with the full knowledge of my inexperience, but you knew it, and therefore insured me against injury." 22 The same was held in Alexander v. Railroad Co.,23 where the master knew of the servant's inexperience; and held in part in Iowa,24 to the extent that where the master has no knowledge of the fact of his inexperience, he has the right to assume that the servant contracts that he has the experience to properly perform the duties of his position, and that he knew at least the obvious dangers attending the employment.

Failure on the part of the master to give instruction to his servant, where it is his duty so to do, will not relieve him from responsibility for the negligent act of a fellow servant, causing him injury, where the servant had not acquired knowledge of such dangers. It is only when he has been properly instructed, and knows the dangers of his employment, that he stands upon the same footing as any other employé, and cannot recover for an injury caused by a fellow servant.25

The books are full of cases that relate in some manner to the doctrine herein stated. I have not attempted to

"Dysinger v. Railway Co., 93 Mich. 646, 53 N. W. S25.

23 83 Ky. 589.

Mayes v. Railway Co., 63 Iowa, 568, 14 N. W. 340, and 19 N. W. GSO.

25 Jones v. Florence Min. Co., 66 Wis. 283, 28 N. W. 207; Curran v. Merchants' Manuf'g Co., 130 Mass. 374; Anderson v. Morrison, 22 Minn. 274.

collect them, and have selected some of the more important, having a direct bearing as illustrating the application of For others that also apply, see

the rule and exceptions.

table in footnote.26

26 Table of cases: Crowley v. Pacific Mills, 148 Mass. 228, 19 N. E. 344; Ciriack v. Merchants' Woolen Co., 146 Mass. 182, 15 N. E. 579; Wheeler v. Wason Manuf'g Co., 135 Mass. 294; Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572; Walsh v. Peet Valve Co., 110 Mass. 23; Sullivan v. India Manuf'g Co., 113 Mass. 396; O'Connor v. Adams, 120 Mass. 427; Curran v. Merchants' Manuf'g Co., 130 Mass. 374; Ryan v. Tarbox, 135 Mass. 207; Cayzer v. Taylor, 10 Gray, 274; Rolling-Mill Co. v. Corrigan, 46 Ohio St. 283, 20 N. E. 466; Glover v. Dwight Manuf'g Co., 148 Mass. 22, 18 N. E. 597; Atkins v. Merrick Thread Co., 142 Mass. 431, 8 N. E. 241; Rock v. Indian Orchard Mills, 142 Mass. 522, 8 N. E. 401; Jones v. Florence Min. Co., 66 Wis. 268, 28 N. W. 207; McGowan v. La Plata Min. Co., 9 Fed. 864; Pratt v. Prouty, 153 Mass. 334, 26 N. E. 1002; Ciriack v. Merchants' Woolen Co., 151 Mass. 152, 23 N. E. 829; Coullard v. Tecumseh Mills, 151 Mass. 85, 23 N. E. 731; Tinkham v. Sawyer, 153 Mass. 485, 27 N. E. 6; Probert v. Phipps, 149 Mass. 258, 21 N. E. 370; Gates v. State, 128 N. Y. 221, 28 N. E. 373; Johnson v. Ashland Water Co., 77 Wis. 51, 45 N. W. 807; Stackman v. Railway Co., 80 Wis. 428, 50 N. W. 404; De Graff v. Railroad Co., 76 N. Y. 125; Russell v. Railway Co., 32 Minn. 230, 20 N. W. 147; Cook v. Railway Co., 34 Minn. 45, 24 N. W. 311; Woutilla v. Duluth Lumber Co., 37 Minn. 153, 33 N. W. 551; Berger v. Railway Co., 39 Minn. 78, 38 N. W. 814; Craver v. Christian, 36 Minn. 413, 31 N. W. 457; Carroll v. Williston, 44 Minn. 287, 46 N. W. 352.

CHAPTER VIII.

MASTER'S DUTY (Continued)-DELEGATION OF.

The master's duty respecting the furnishing and repair of appliances, providing a safe place to perform the work required, making adequate rules, employing servants, and instructing them as to the dangers accompanying their services, is personal, and cannot be delegated, p. 129.

He may delegate the performance of the duty, but, in so doing, the responsibility remains, p. 129. As to repair of appliance, some courts hold that duties of such character are not personal to the master, and may be delegated, and the master relieved from responsibility for negligence in the manner of their performance, pp. 129, 130. The rule is not applicable to the construction of an appliance, p. 129.

The master's duty, in such a case, is met when he provides suitable materials, and trusts the duty of construction to skillful workmen, p. 130. The latter rule has been applied to a building in process of construction, pp. 130, 131.

Courts differ upon the question of what duties are personal to the master, but the rule in all of them is that, where such duties are declared to be personal to the master, the performance thereof cannot be delegated by him to another, so as to relieve him from responsibility for the manner of their performance, p. 131.

The rule in New York, Massachusetts, Michigan, Wisconsin, Maine, and the federal court stated, pp. 131, 133, 135-139.

The rule in each state stated and discussed in subsequent chapters, p. 140.

The duties herein before stated as devolving upon the master are such in character that the performance thereof in proper cases cannot be delegated by him to another, so as to excuse him from responding in damages to a servant who has received injury, either by their not being performed or being negligently performed. If the master choose, he may delegate the performance of the duty, but, in so doing, the responsibility remains.1

There is much confusion among the authorities upon the question as to whether the master's duty and responsibility end short of a complete performance. There is but little difference among them as to his responsibility where there is neglect in furnishing proper and reasonably safe instrumentalities in the first instance, but the principal contention is as to the master's duty in keeping and maintaining them in such reasonably safe condition. In the federal courts, the courts of New York, Wisconsin, Maine, and many others, the doctrine is that the master is presumably pres ent all the time, even in the performance of the actual labor; while in Massachusetts and some other states this extreme is not held in the case of corporations, but rather that when the master has used due care in the first instance, and provided suitable and reasonably safe appliances, and provided suitable means for keeping and maintaining them in

'Morton v. Railway Co., 81 Mich. 433, 46 N. W. 111; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Herbert, 116 U. S. 650, 6 Sup. Ct. 590; Laning v. Railway Co., 49 N. Y. 521; Van Dusen v. Letellier, 78 Mich. 502, 44 N. W. 572; Wheeler v. Wason Manuf'g Co., 135 Mass. 294.

MAST. AND SERV.-9