against corporations than against natural persons. This is not generally admitted. We do not see why the principle would not be the same. But corporations are more likely to deal through general agents than individuals or firms are."

It is also the settled law of Maine that those servants of the master who are employed in the furnishing or repair of machinery and appliances are not the fellow servants of those who are employed in their use. "To provide machinery, and keep it in repair, and to use it for the purpose intended, are very distinct matters. They are not employments in the same common business, tending to the same common result. The one may properly be said to begin only when the other ends." 19 "A servant engaged in the use, so far as regards the repair, of the machinery used, stands in the same position as any person not a servant, but who was rightfully in his or her position; and the same responsibilities and liabilities rest upon the master for acts of himself or servant as would in such case." 20 The court cites Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co.21 as sustaining the position last stated. They must have misconstrued the doctrine of that case; the rule being in that state, as we have seen, that it is the duty of the master to provide suitable and safe machinery, but it relates ordinarily only to the purchase in the first instance, not to the repair; that those engaged in the repair are fellow servants with those engaged in the use.

The rule in this state (Maine) as to the master's duties is substantially the same as in New York in respect to reasonably safe premises, selection of competent servants,

"Shanny v. Androscoggin Mills, 66 Me. 426. *Shanny v. Androscoggin Mills, 66 Me. 426. 102 Mass, 572.

and making and promulgation of rules. In fact, the doctrine in all aspects is substantially the same. If there is any difference, it is in the extent to which its application to superintending agents is limited.22

"Wormell v. Railway Co., 79 Me. 397, 10 Atl. 49.

CHAPTER XIII.

FELLOW SERVANTS (Continued).

THE RULE IN MASSACHUSETTS.

The doctrine first declared in this state, p. 248. Public policy the reason for the doctrine, p. 248. The test of the existence of the relation is a common employment, p. 248.

Not controlled by the fact that the employes may be working in different departments, or that one is of higher grade or greater authority, pp. 249, 250.

The distinction so clearly made in New York between those engaged in the furnishing and maintaining in repair of the appliances and those servants who use them is followed in respect to those who furnish in the first instance, p. 251.

As to those engaged in the ordinary repair of appliances, they are fellow servants with those who use them, p. 252.

The statement of the rule is controlled somewhat by language used in some cases, where it is held that there is a duty of supervision which is personal to the master, pp. 252–260.

Statute (Chapter 270, Laws 1887), p. 261.

THE RULE IN OHIO.

The New York rule as to those engaged in the furnishing, maintaining, and repairing of appliances is ignored, p. 263.

The broad rule exists in this state, p. 263.

THE RULE IN MASSACHUSETTS.

The courts, in discussing the rule that ought to be applied in determining when the relation of fellow servants exists, go back to the reasoning in the early cases of Farwell v. Boston & W. R. Corp.1 and Murray v. S. C. R. Co.2 being the first cases in which the doctrine was declared in this country. The grounds upon which the principle was placed were decidedly different in the two courts.

The South Carolina court placed the exemption of the master from liability for injuries negligently caused by one servant to another in the same employment upon the ground that there was a joint undertaking on the part of the several agents or servants engaged by the master, where each one stipulated for the performance of his several part; that they were not liable to the master for the conduct of each other, nor was the master liable to one for the conduct of another; and that, as a general rule, where there was no fault in the owner, he was only liable to the servant for his wages.

In the Massachusetts case the court placed the exemp tion of the company on the ground that the contract of the servant implied that he would take upon himself the risks attending the performance of the service which he had contracted to perform; that those included the injuries which might befall him from the negligence of fellow servants in the same employment. Such exemption of the master was said to be supported by considerations of policy. The court said in its decision, and in defense of policy as a consideration for the rule: "Where several persons are employed in the conduct of one common enterprise or undertaking, and the safety of each depends much on the 14 Metc. (Mass.) 49.

1 McMul. 385.

care and skill with which each other shall perform his appropriate duty, each is an observer of the conduct of the others, can give notice of any misconduct, incapacity, or neglect of duty, and leave the service, if the common employer will not take such precautions, and employ such agents as the safety of the whole party may require. By these means, the safety of each will be much more effectually secured than could be done by a resort to the common employer for indemnity in case of loss by the negligence of each other." To the argument that the rule and reasoning ought not to apply where two or more are engaged in different departments of duty, where one could in no manner exercise control of or influence the conduct of another, the court said: "When the object to be accomplished is one and the same, when the employers are the same, and the several persons employed derive their authority and compensation from the same source, it would be extremely dif ficult to distinguish what constitutes one department, and what a distinct department of duty. It would vary with the circumstances of each case. The master is not exempted from liability, in such case, because the servant has. better means of providing for his safety, when he is employed in immediate connection with those from whose negligence he might suffer, but because the implied contract of the master does not extend to indemnify the servant against the negligence of any one but himself; and he is not liable in tort as for the negligence of his servant, because the person suffering does not stand in the relation of a stranger, but is one whose rights are regulated by contract, express or implied."

From the reasoning and decision of the court in this case has developed to a very large extent the doctrine established in the different states. Some courts have followed its reasoning; others only in part. The differences