ordinary care. What the particular duty may be in this respect in any given case is to be determined generally from the nature and character of the emplovment, the location of the premises, and the particular facts. There are some employments, the nature of which is so hazardous that no place wherein they may be carried on is reasonably safe. The method employed, and the act to be accomplished, necessarily make the premises unsafe. Other premises are unsafe from their location or surroundings, and necessarily So. What is meant by the use of the term "reasonably safe" is that the perils of the employment shall not be unnecessarily increased by a neglect to use proper care in providing such safeguards as are usual and proper in the performance of hazardous duties of the character assumed, and suitable to the extent that the servant, in the exercise of due care, can perform his duty without exposure to dangers that do not ordinarily come within the obvious scope of such employment as usually carried on.2

'Coombs v. New Bedford Cordage Co., 102 Mass. 572; Swoboda v. Ward, 40 Mich. 423.

An employé cannot recover for injuries received by reason of a stairway's being defectively constructed and dangerous; such defect and danger consisting in the stairway being steep, the want of a railing, and steps at irregular distances apart. The court say: "It is certainly true that it is the duty of the employer to furnish his employé a reasonably safe place in hich to work, and with reasonably safe appliances and apparatus. At the same time, it is equally well settled that the employer may conduct his business in his own way, although another method be less hazardous; and the employé takes the risk of the more hazardous method, if he knows the danger and enters the employment. Here the plaintiff must have seen whatever defects existed in the construction of the stairway, for such defects were plain and obvious. If he had used his senses, he would have discovered them the first time he went up and down the stairway." Sweet v. Ohio Coal Co., 78 Wis. 127, 47 N. W. 182.

The master should not direct the servant to work in a place which he knows, or, by the exercise of reasonable care and diligence, might know, to be dangerous, within the rule.3

There must be exercised by the master the same duty of inspection, and the same constant and vigilant supervision to discover defects that exist or may occur, as is imposed upon him in regard to the condition of his appliances and

Consolidated Ice Machine Co. v. Kiefer, 26 Ill. App. 466.

A corporation whose building superintendent or foreman causes an excessive weight of snow and débris to be thrown upon and left upon the roof of a shed, in consequence of which it falls upon and injures an employé who works under it by his direction, is guilty of negligence, which renders it liable to such employé, if he himself is free from negligence. Johnson v. Bank, 79 Wis. 414, 48 N. W. 712.

Where an ice house was defectively constructed, pursuant to a plan of the owner, even though by an independent contractor, and such defect was the cause of the injury to one working near it, such injury being caused by its fall, the owner is liable for such injury. Meier v. Morgan, 82 Wis. 289, 52 N. W. 174.

When an ice house was filled under the direct supervision of the owners, and, in so filling it, they carelessly permitted ice to be pushed against the side of the building, thus weakening it, causing it to fall, and thereby an employé working near was injured, the owners are liable for the injury. Id.

Such owners, with knowledge of a weakness or defect threatening the strength of the building, cannot set a man at work immediately under it, and shift all responsibility upon the builder. Id. To the general proposition that the general duty of the master to exercise care to prevent the exposure of his servant to unnecessary and unreasonable risks requires him, among other things, to use reasonable diligence in seeing that the place where the service is to be performed is safe for that purpose, see Cook v. Railway Co., 34 Minn. 46, 24 N. W. 311; Noyes v. Smith, 28 Vt. 59; Hutchinson v. Railway Co., 5 Exch. 343; Gibson v. Railway Co., 46 Mo. 163; Huddleston v. Lowell Mach. Shop, 106 Mass. 282; Snow v. Railway

machinery, varied only in respect to the danger that may be anticipated, and which is to be avoided.4

Where a coal company knew that boys in their employ were in the habit of using a dangerous entrance to a chute, they were held to the duty, in the employment of a boy of 14, to either forbid its use, or put up proper safeguards about it; otherwise, its use by the boy was not contributory negligence.*

So it was held gross negligence on the part of the master to place cogwheels which are unprotected and unguarded in such a position, with reference to where his employé is to perform his work, that the employé, by the least forgetfulness or by unavoidable accident, may be thrown upon them and injured.†

It is as much the duty of a railroad company to keep

Co., 8 Allen, 441; Ryan v. Fowler, 24 N. Y. 410; Patterson v. Railroad Co., 76 Pa. St. 389; Swoboda v. Ward, 40 Mich. 420.

The master's duty and liability to his servant extend not only to such unnecessary and unreasonable risks as are in fact known to him, but to such as he ought to know, in the exercise of proper diligence; that is, diligence porportionate to the occasion. Cook v. Railway Co., 34 Minn. 47, 24 N. W. 311; Hayden v. Smithville Manuf'g Co., 29 Conn. 548; Noyes v. Smith, 28 Vt. 59; Gibson v. Railway Co., 46 Mo. 163.

The servant has a right to presume that the master will do his duty; and therefore, when directed by proper authority to perform certain services, or to perform them in a certain place, he will ordinarily be justified in obeying orders, without being chargeable with contributory negligence, or with the assumption of the risks of so doing. Russell v. Railway Co., 32 Minn. 230, 20 N. W. 147; Hutchinson v. Railway Co., 5 Exch. 343; Gibson v. Railway Co., 46 Mo. 163; Cook v. Railway Co., 34 Minn. 47, 24 N. W. 311.

4

Van Dusen v. Letellier, 78 Mich. 502, 44 N. W. 572; Bessex v. Railway Co., 45 Wis. 482.

* Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Nee (Pa. Sup.) 13 Atl. 841.

Nadau v. White River Lumber Co., 76 Wis. 128, 43 N. W. 1135.

its railroad track in repair as it is, to keep its machinery, engines, and cars in such repair; and any neglect to keep them in such repair, or permitting the same to be obstructed in such manner as to increase unnecessarily the danger to its employés, is negligence for which the company may be responsible, in case of an injury happening to an employé by reason of such want of repair, or obstruction.5

Bessex v. Railway Co., 45 Wis. 482.

It is not negligence to use open and unblocked frogs at a station where there are several tracks. Southern Pac. Co. v. Seley, 14 Sup. Ct. 530, reversing Seley v. Southern Pac. Co., & Utah, 319, 23 Pac. 751.

It is not negligence per se to fail to block frogs and switches. To make it negligence, there must be proof that they are inherently unsafe and dangerous when carefully used, and so generally known by those engaged in operation of railroads. Missouri Pac. Ry. Co. v. Lewis, 24 Neb. 848, 40 N. W. 401.

A railroad must construct and maintain its roadway and appendages and overhead structures in such manner and condition that an employé can do all the duties required of him with reasonable safety. Where it knowingly maintains a bridge over its track so low that brakemen cannot perform their duty on top of the cars, it is liable to a brakeman who, having no knowledge of its dangerous character, is struck by the bridge, and injured, while in the performance of his duty on top of the car. Baltimore, etc., Ry. Co. v. Rowan, 104 Ind. 88, 3 N. E. 627; Houston & T. Ry. Co. v. Oram, 49 Tex. 341.

A different view is taken by other courts. In Baylor v. Railroad Co., 40 N. J. Law, 23, it is held that a railroad company is not bound to build its bridges high enough to enable its employés safely to stand upright on top of its cars; and a brakeman who, in the performance of his duty, is injured while in that position, cannot maintain an action therefor, although he was suddenly called upon to discharge that duty.

In Baltimore & O. R. Co. v. Stricker, 51 Md. 47, it was held that a conductor of a railway train, who was injured by a bridge while standing on the top of a car in motion, in the discharge of his duty, and who was well acquainted with its position and character, and accustomed to pass under it, could not recover. This is according

So it has frequently been held that to place structures dangerously near the track,-such as cattle pens, sheds, and the like, or to permit lumber or other articles to be so

to the great weight of authority. The controlling feature, ordinarily, is the knowledge or opportunity for acquiring knowledge of the character of the structure by the employé. Hooper v. Railroad Co., 21 S. C. 541; Clark's Adm'r v. Railroad Co., 18 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 85, note; Baltimore, O. & C. R. Co. v. Rowan, 23 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 397, note; Howard v. Railroad Co., 24 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 458, note; Altee v. Railway Co., 21 S. C. 550; Brossman v. Railroad Co., 113 Pa. St. 490, 6 Atl. 226; Wells v. Railway Co., 56 Iowa, 520, 9 N. W. 364; Illick v. Railway Co., 67 Mich. 632, 35 N. W. 708.

Where an employé upon a train mounts a car which is 16 or 18 inches higher than those commonly used, and too high to permit him to pass under the bridge standing erect, and he mounted such car either under the danger signals or near them, and where there was nothing to obstruct his view either of the signals or bridge, he could not recover as matter of law. Lynch v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., 63 Hun, 635, 18 N. Y. Supp. 417.

Where the distance from the running board on cars commonly in use on defendant's road to the trestle was 5 feet 71⁄2 inches, and plaintiff was 5 feet 8 inches in height, but by stepping to one side of the running board he could pass under in safety, and at the time of his injury he was standing upon a car higher than those commonly in use, which left a space between it and the trestle of only 4 feet 5 inches, such cars having been in use to some extent, to plaintiff's knowledge, for three months prior to his injury, it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover. Rock v. Retsof Min. Co., 61 Hun, 623, 15 N. Y. Supp. 872.

Where an employé was injured by an overhead bridge while standing with his back to the bridge, watching the passage of the cars over a reverse curve, in the performance of his duty to see and report if any of them should break loose, the tickler or telltale a short distance from the bridge being out of order, and insufficient to warn him of his danger in approaching the bridge, he having knowledge of the location of the bridge, and of the defect in and insufficiency of the telltale, it was held he could not recover. Wallace v. Central Vermont R. Co., 63 Hun, 632, 18 N. Y. Supp. 280. The