servants in the same common employment; so it cannot be said that he would be less vigilant and cautious in this respect by reason of the stipulation in the contract. In fact, most courts expressly place the doctrine of fellow servant upon the ground of public policy, and say, with reason, that when servants have no recourse against the common master for injuries to one by the neglect of another, it operates as an incentive to greater care and vigilance by the servants in looking out for the safety of themselves and their fellows, which necessarily results in securing to the public greater safety and greater security from risks and loss. It is perfectly obvious that whatever stimulates employés as servants of one engaged as a common carrier to increased attention to duty, and to the exercise of care and skill in their calling, in providing for their own safety, renders such service more safe for the public. Therefore, if public policy is at all contravened by the provisions of such statutes amendatory of the common law, it is in this: that they tend to increase the dangers and risks to the public. The legislature of a state cannot, by the enactment of a statute, prohibit persons capable of contracting from mak ing contracts to their mutual advantage and benefit, when no public right or interest is affected; nor can they intrude upon the functions of the judicial branch of our system of government by declaring such contracts inoperative, or that they shall not be upheld by the courts, when fairly made. An act cannot be made against public policy by a simple declaration that it is so. It must be so in fact; that is, it must in some manner contravene public right or the public welfare. While, as we contend, the Alabama court was inconsistent in holding the contract void in the case stated, yet it may be said that the Ohio court was entirely consistent in so holding a similar contract void. The common law in the latter state had not been changed or affected by legislation. The common law therein was the result of public policy. Any contract, therefore, in effect evading the responsibilities placed upon the master by the common law would be against public policy. Where it is sought to include in such contract risks not impliedly assumed in the contract of employment, the additional risks must be based upon an adequate consideration. Where such contract is signed while the servant is in the defendant's employ, and no new consideration is made, or provision to continue the servant in the employment, it is void for lack of consideration.10 The Georgia court holds that the servant may, in the contract of service, assume all risks appertaining to the service, including the negligence of the master, yet such risks as arise from criminal negligence of the master or his servants are to be excepted from the general rule upon the subject.11 A paper signed by a brakeman, recognizing the rule of the company forbidding the coupling of cars without a stick, and waiving all liability of the company for any results of disobedience of such rule, is not to be construed as a contract by the company exempting itself from liability for its own negligence.12 A parent, or one standing in loco parentis to a minor, cannot contract so as to exempt the latter's employer from responsibility to the minor for permanent injuries inflicted upon him.13 10 Purdy v. Railroad Co., 125 N. Y. 209, 26 N. E. 255. "Western & A. R. Co. v. Bishop, 50 Ga. 465; Fulton Bag & Cotton Mills v. Wilson, 89 Ga. 318, 15 S. E. 322. 12 Russell v. Railroad Co., 47 Fed. 204. "International & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Hinzie, 82 Tex. 623, 18 S. W. 681. MAST. AND SERV.-31 CHAPTER XXIV. CONTRACTS RELEASING CLAIMS. General rule is that they are valid, p. 482. May be impeached for fraud or misrepresentation, p. 482. Effect of mistake or ignorance of employe, p. 482. Release obtained, without knowledge of counsel, after action commenced, p. 487. Contracts between the master and servant, whereby the servant accepts a stipulated sum or other valuable consideration as compensation for the injury, and thereby releases the employer from all claim for damages, are, in general, valid and binding upon the servant. Such contracts may, however, be impeached for fraud or misrepresentation on the part of the employer in procuring them from the servant.1 And in some cases it has been held, if a party did not fully understand the contents of a contract or release at the time he signed the same, upon that fact being made to appear he will not be bound by its terms.2 It cannot, however, be said, upon principle, that any other or different rule should be applied in determining the va Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Welch, 52 Ill. 183. Shultz v. Railway Co., 44 Wis. 638; Butler v. Regents of State University, 32 Wis. 124; Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Doyle, 18 Kan. 58. lidity of such contracts, or the capacity of the contracting parties, than would be applied to ordinary contracts, or the capacity of the parties thereto. Mental incapacity on the part of one of the contracting parties to a contract may always be urged against its enforcement, without regard to the particular cause that may have induced it. Contracts, however, should not be evaded upon the mere pretext alone that the party seeking to avoid its provisions did not understand it, especially when the language is plain, certain, and expressive; otherwise, such contracts, either as agreements or as evidence thereof, may become valueless, or of no import, other than as throwing the burden of proof upon the opposite party. The door for the commission of perjury would be thus thrown open; and, the guilty party being secure from punishment by the very nature of the transaction, it would seem that justice and reason demand, in such cases, at least that the person asking release from his agreement should present some convincing cause, not in law attributable to his own neglect, but which was produced by the conduct of the other party, amounting to an imposition upon his rights, by means of which he was induced to sign and execute the agreement, before he should be permit ted to impeach or avoid it. Any other rule, as has been said, would render unavailing contracts of compromise. The recent case of Albrecht v. Milwaukee & S. Ry. Co.3 fully sustains the views we have stated, and explains, if it does not qualify, what was said by the same court in earlier cases.4 It was there said, with reference to an instruction of the circuit court that an employé might avoid the binding effect of a release by merely showing that at · (Wis.) 58 N. W. 72. Shultz v. Railway Co., 44 Wis. 638; Butler v. Regents of State University, 32 Wis. 124; Sheanon v. Insurance Co., 83 Wis. 527, 53 N. W. 878. the time he signed it he did not know its contents or effect, that "written instruments, regularly executed and delivered, cannot be thus dealt with and avoided, and their operation defeated." The following statement in the opinion of the supreme court of the United States 5 was approved: "It cannot be tolerated that a man shall execute a written instrument, and, when called upon to abide by its terms, say, merely, that he did not read it or know what it contained." The doctrine of the Wisconsin court is and it is sustained by respectable authority-that the employé or party, as the case may be, may avoid the terms of his contract if it was signed through his excusable mistake or negligence; the burden of proof being upon him to rebut the presumption of gross negligence. Mere neglect on his part to read the contract, in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence on the part of the other party, is not such negligence as may be excused. Neither is his inability to read English, or understand the contents of the paper, an excuse. "He could and should," say that court, "seek the assistance of some one capable of properly informing him. Not to do so is gross negligence." The supreme court of Iowa is in accord with the Wisconsin court to the extent that "where a party had the capacity to read the release signed by him, and had an opportunity to do so, and no fraud was practiced upon him to prevent him from reading it, but he chose to rely upon what another said about it, he is estopped by his own negligence from claiming that it is not legal and binding upon him according to its terms."7 Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U. S. 50. Albrecht v. Milwaukee & S. Ry. Co. (Wis.) 58 N. W. 72; Fuller v. Insurance Co., 36 Wis. 603; Sanger v. Dun, 47 Wis. 615, 3 N. W. 3S8; Sheanon v. Insurance Co., 83 Wis. 527, 53 N. W. 878. 'Wallace v. Railway Co., 67 Iowa, 547, 25 N. W. 772; Bell v. |