CHAPTER XI

AMERICAN POLICY IN PANAMA

THE policy of the American Government toward the Panama revolution was severely criticised in two quarters: to wit, by Colombians, and by a certain class of partisan opponents of the administration in the United States. By the world at large it was generally approved. That such approval was deserved should be evident to all who regard the matter impartially, logically, and with a proper historical perspective. The major part of criticism has been directed against the orders to our naval forces, which have been said to have prevented, and to have been intended to prevent, the Colombian Government from suppressing rebellion. (The charge that the revolution was conceived and planned in this country, "in the shadow of the Capitol at Washington," with the connivance of our Government, is too absurdly false to require attention. The indisputable facts of the record completely disprove it, and show it to have had its origin in nothing better than either ignorance or malignance.) The orders in question were, however, based upon long-established treaty rights and duties, and were consistent with the policy and practice of our Government for more than a half century before. I have already indicated that the sending of the Nashville to Colon on November 2 was a mere repetition of what had been done before several times, whenever there seemed to be need of protection to American interests there. It was perfectly well known, not only to the Government but to the general public, that a revolution was imminent on the Isthmus, and that Colombian troops were on their way thither to suppress it. In such a case, the lives and property of Americans were sure to be

endangered, and free transit on the railroad to be interrupted. Certainly it was incumbent upon the Government to take prompt steps to prevent such wrongs, rather than to wait until they were committed and then vainly try to undo or savagely to avenge them. What was the order to the commander of the Nashville? It was identical with that sent on the same day, November 2, to the commanders of the Boston and the Dixie, and ran as follows:

"Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interruption threatened by armed force, occupy line of railroad. Prevent landing of any armed force with hostile intent, either Government or insurgent, either at Colon, Porto Bello, or other point."

That amounted simply to an order to maintain our treaty rights and to fulfil our treaty obligations, concerning transit on the Isthmus, and it was directed against the Panaman revolutionists as much as against the Colombians. Neither party was to be permitted to interfere with the free working of the railroad. Neither was to be permitted to land armed forces with hostile intent at the terminals of the railroad, where they would certainly convert the road into a theatre of hostilities, or at any other point-such as Porto Bellofrom which their sole purpose would be to march against the railroad and interrupt traffic. On the same day this order was sent to Rear-Admiral Glass at Acapulco, directing him to proceed at once to Panama with all available forces.

"Maintain free and uninterrupted transit. If interrup tion threatened by armed force, occupy line. Prevent landing of any armed force either government or insurgent, at any point within fifty miles of Panama. If doubtful as to the intent of any armed force, occupy Ancon Hill strongly with artillery. Government force reported approaching the isthmus in vessels. Prevent their landing, if in your judg ment landing would precipitate a conflict."

As before, the object was to maintain our treaty rights and fulfil our treaty obligations It is true, the order was

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calculated to prevent Colombia from sending troops to sup press the insurrection. But if Colombia had exercised rea sonable prudence, she would have sent an army thither many weeks before, when the revolution was first openly threatened. Then she would have had it on the ground, for ready use. But since she did not do so, but deliberately elected to wait until the revolution was an accomplished fact, the United States was not required to let her violate our treaty rights for the vindication of her own neglected and practically abandoned authority. Again, on November 4, the commander of the Nashville was ordered to send a battery across to Panama, to compel the Colombian gunboat to stop bombarding that city-an order which was perfectly proper, since such bombardment would have interrupted free transit of the Isthmus, but which it was not necessary to execute, since the Bogotá did not resume the bombardment after the firing of three shells the evening before. I have already mentioned the order not to permit the railroad to be used for military purposes. Nothing could have been more proper than that, for it was obvious that if either party were permitted to make such use of the road, the other party would have a right to attack it, and the free use of the road for peaceful transit, guaranteed by the United States in the Treaty of 1846, would have been interrupted. On November 9 this order was sent to the commander of the Boston at Panama:

"Sufficient force must be sent to watch movements closely of the British steamers seized at Buenaventura, and to prevent the landing of men with hostile intent within limits of the State of Panama."

At that time the Panaman revolution had been fully accomplished. The Provisional Government was at work, efficiently performing its functions, and had been recognised by the United States. Colombia had become a foreign power. Under the Treaty of 1846 the United States was bound to guarantee the Isthmus against oppression by any foreign

Power. Therefore it ordered the protection of the Isthmus against Colombian invasion. It may be said—it has been said that such construction of treaty obligations was strained and unreasonable, and that in forbidding Colombia to attempt the reconquest of Panama this country was acting without warrant in international law. That is not to be conceded. But even if, for sake of argument, it were to be conceded, what would it prove? Nations do not wait for warrants in international law when their own welfare is jeoparded. Self-preservation or self-defence is proverbially declared to be "nature's first law." It is that, for states as well as for individuals. There was no "warrant in international law" for our Declaration of Independence. There was none for the conduct of Jay, Adams, and Franklin in 1783, in making a treaty in direct violation of the instructions under which they were commissioned. There was none for Jefferson's dictum, that if France would not sell Louisiana to us, we must take it from her by force; or for Monroe's similar policy toward Spain in Florida. There was none for our long-maintained policy forbidding Spain to do as she pleased with Cuba. There was none for John Quincy Adams's warning to the Russian Government to relinquish its holdings upon this continent, or for the Monroe Doctrine which logically followed. There was no legal sanction for the conduct of the United States in warning Great Britain and France to quit Hawaii and in ordering France out of Mexico. It may be, of course, that the United States sinned in all these things. If so, then it kept on sinning in the same way in Panama. But if it did not sin in them, neither did it when it pursued the same policy in Panama.

The question of our Government's policy in Panama is, as the term implies, a question of policy. It is not a question of executive details, because there were no such details concerning which, per se, any material question could be raised. There was no waging of war. There was no slaughter. There were no torturings nor imprisonments. There was no

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arbitrary overthrowing of an established government. All that was done was to exercise the moral influence of a definite and peaceful policy.

Our policy was justified, and indeed made necessary, by domestic obligations. Congress had directed the President to construct a canal at Panama, rather than at any other point. We need not stop to consider why Panama was chosen. That was a matter of congressional enactment, not of administrative policy. The question of route had been discussed, with a wealth of investigation and detail, for many years. Whether wisely or not, and whether for adequate or inadequate reasons, Congress finally declared, explicitly and unequivocally, in favour of Panama. The President had to obey that mandate. There was no alternative, save in case of his inability to make satisfactory terms within a reasonable time. The President promptly proceeded to do the work prescribed by Congress. He made terms, which the Senate accepted as satisfactory, for the construction and control of the canal. He was himself the sole judge of what was a "reasonable time" in which to make such terms. That time proved to be something less than a year and a half, and it was approved as "reasonable" by the Senate. Thus far, then, the President scrupulously obeyed the law.

But it is said that the law directed him to make his terms with the Colombian Government, and that, instead, he made them with Panama. It is true that Congress mentioned the Colombian Government as the one with which he was to negotiate. Obviously, that was because it was at that time the sovereign of Panama. But it is equally obvious that Congress meant not that government, per se, but whatever lawful government the President might find in possession of the Isthmus. That is because (a) the Congress of the United States could not guarantee that President Marroquin's or any special Colombian Government would remain in power at Panama, nor give the President any assurance of what government he would find there when he made the treaty;