the ideas which it had conceived, with new developments, with new applications, and perhaps under new forms, for they were all operators in the great work which was called humanity. Arbitration was one of those ideas, one of those stars of thought, which to-day, considered as a generous utopia, would soon become perhaps a diplomatic usage adopted by all nations. What was to-day a utopia, to-morrow might become a reality. There would be difficulties to overcome, and the paths might be more or less obstructed, but the aim would be ultimately reached. The Convention of Geneva was

the first step towards the realization of an international and universal code of laws between the civilized Powers. The time had come when they must study various international subjects affecting this humanitarian claim which was everywhere demanded by public opinion. That code of international laws did not exist, notwithstanding certain usages and customs vague and indefinite, without any formal and diplomatic sanction, and which were left to the entire arbitrary will of individuals. The Convention of Geneva would be the first article of that diplomatic universal code of nations. The second article of that code would be the convention on behalf of the prisoners of war. Strengthen the present social system in England, so that the morbid and subversive ideas of the Continent cannot enter; let them continue to develop the local government in the country, and strengthen the spirit of private initiative. Such were the principal means by which she could preserve herself, and guard in the middle of the general future overthrow with which they were threatened. They must aid this preservation by giving her powerful support in certain genuine international works. England would at the same time consolidate the efforts she had made to increase her interior strength. Nothing that concerned humanity must be foreign to her. If England loved peace, such was not the case upon the Continent, where there existed people who looked upon war as a holy thing, as a useful and even necessary thing. The French nation loved war, and in that fact lay the danger. Notwithstanding that, it was very remarkable that it was in France that the treaty of peace had, as consecrated by the generous initiative of Great Britain, represented by Lord Clarendon, the idea of settling by the diplomatic arbitration the conflicts among nations. Seven years later another generous initiative was given in France likewise-that of the Emperor Napoleon III.-who proposed to the Powers of Europe the project of a permanent international jury, which, if it had been agreed upon, would have compelled all the Governments to submit to the moral influence of a European arbitration. If the thought of the Emperor Napoleon III. had found favour, as it might have done, and if it had been supported by universal public opinion, how many sorrows and how much blood would have been spared to the Continent during these long eight years past! War is a duel between two nations. Let us, then, follow the same rules in a duel between nations as between gentlemen. For inevitable duels I have asked the international doctor who dresses wounds to demand the witnesses of

the duel in the person of a permanent diplomatic court of arbitration, which, if it cannot absolutely prevent the duel, may at least, by continuing to sit when the belligerents have begun to fight, arrest sometimes at the first blow the duel of two nations, by declaring honour to have been satisfied. The interest of parties would thus be conciliated more easily through their being rendered more tractable after the first blow by the moral pressure of the civilized world, represented by a permanent court of arbitration.

DISCUSSION.

Mr. JOHN HODGKIN (Lewes) said he was far from entertaining the very sanguine views of the gentleman who had read the first paper, for he could not indulge hope that there would be unanimity for the rejection of war in a body of legislators, embracing so large a number of personal warriors, and a far larger number of those who were directly and indirectly connected with the practice and politics of war. But at the same time he did not pass from the idea of sanguine expectation to anything approaching discouragement, and would not discourage any one who laboured in the cause of universal peace. Indeed, there were two strong considerations which served to prevent his falling into anything like despondency. Perhaps there were many in the company before him who, having spent a life mainly in dealing with legal subjects, could recollect the abolition of trial by battle, presumed to be by judgment of God, and the abolition of duelling. These results were produced by different measures; but the fact that both of them had taken place during his legal memory induced him to feel that, by the progress of right reason, and of careful consideration apart from passion, even the far more difficult question of preventing international war might be, if not actually attained, yet very materially promoted by the efforts of Christian philanthropy and Christian morals. The objection that the system when introduced might not be submitted to after the award was very important; but it did not materially affect the recognition of the principle, either in individual instances or in the case of the united concert of nations, because a great point would be gained if time were given to the disputing nations to review their position, and to look the merits of the question in the face before going to war. It was possible that pacific action of this kind might be the means in a vast majority of instances of getting rid of that false notion of honour which tended to the beginning of

war.

Mr. F. P. LABILLIERE (London) said there was a danger of exaggerating the good results likely to be obtained from the system proposed. They had heard within the last twenty years of a great many things that were to render wars impossible. But what was the real fact? Within the last twenty years they had had nothing but a succession of wars, commencing with that of the Crimea, which broke out just after those very glowing pictures were drawn of the advent of universal peace. Probably war might to a considerable degree be prevented by the adoption of the principle of international arbitration, but to say that the establishment of an international court of arbitration would altogether do away with war was greatly to exaggerate the good results that might flow from the adoption of the system. So long as human passions and international animosities remained, all they could hope for was that one or two wars might be prevented out of half-a-dozen. Looking at the wars that had taken place, could they suppose that any system of international arbitration would have prevented the war between France and Germany? No; it would simply have been thrust aside. The same would have been the case in the dispute between Prussia and Austria in 1866, although the two nations were of the same race, and of a much cooler temperament than the French. Could it be supposed that any system of arbitra

tion would have prevented the American civil war? The slavery question, which gave rise to it, was the foundation of a deep-seated animosity, which could not have been suppressed but by the sword. Though much good might result from the adoption of the principle, and it was therefore wise to encourage it, yet it would be idle to suppose any court could be established in these days capable of binding human passions as developed in international animosities.

M. ARTURO DE MARCOARTU (Madrid, Spain) thought the time had come when an international code of law might be framed for the assent of nations.

Mr. A. ROOKER (Plymouth) did not sympathize with the remarks which fell from the speaker before the last. In the very last case before the country, namely, that of the indirect claims made by America, no one could doubt that on the part of the American Government there was a sincere desire to insist on those claims, and no one could doubt also that the almost unanimously expressed opinion which followed, created so strong a moral influence that America was compelled to succumb to the feeling which was pronounced by the universal mind of Europe. He could not help feeling that if by the establishment of a court of arbitration they could succeed in obtaining a strong expression of the united opinion of the civilized world in relation to many questions that led to differences, they would have gone a great way towards preventing war. He admitted that the idea of preventing war entirely, by simply setting up a court of arbitration, was somewhat utopian, and that the references made to ancient history on the subject were scarcely applicable. The Achaian League was a confederation of States having a common nationality, not a union of diverse peoples. It was the same in the case of the Ionian League, and the Hanseatic League was a union of wealthy cities having a common object. The Helvetic Confederacy was also a confederation of cities not very unlike, and having very similar interests. Courts of arbitration seemed to be adapted for the settlement of disputes between States confederated together, and agreed to resort to such a court in case of dispute, rather than for nations antagonistic to each other. If the States of Europe were confederated together in such a way as to constitute a high court of appeal, that court must be endowed with power to make its decisions respected. The recommendation that if an international court of arbitration were formed, the contracting Power that refused to abide by its decision should be outlawed could not be adopted, because a cessation of the diplomatic relations would inevitably lead to war. The act of withdrawing an ambassador meant nothing less than a declaration of war. It would, however, by no means be impossible to say that commercial relations affecting the well-being of the country should cease if the decision of the confederate court was not abided by.

Mr. A. G. LANGLEY (Chudleigh), while sympathizing with the object in view, did not believe that anything could be done with an outlawed nation unless the court of arbitration had material and physical force to back up their remonstrance. Suppose a European court had interfered when Prussia invaded Denmark, would Prussia have attended? When the Emperor of France was overthrown, some hope was entertained that the republic would be reasonable; but it soon commenced raising a larger army than that under the empire. Before international arbitration could be successfully established, all the troops of Europe must be abandoned.

Mr. F. P. BALKWILL (Plymouth) said, the last speaker had quite overlooked the power of moral force, and seemed to regard physical force as the only force capable of controlling the world. The discussions on the Washington treaty had shown what power could be exerted by expression of opinion. With the increase of civilization, and the power exercised by the press, a nation's reflection upon what was thought of it by others would check it in a course which might otherwise lead to war.

Mr. W. BALL (London) remarked that sovereigns, of whatever character, were of necessity influenced to a greater or less extent by public opinion; and surely the erection of an international court would form a powerful instrument in influencing the minds of monarchs and statesmen. The establishment of such a court was merely a work of time. When the public opinion of a nation had arrived at that state to require of its king that he should join an international court, however

much his inclination and ambition might lead him in a contrary direction, he would be obliged to give way to the determination of his people.

Dr. WADDILOVE (London) said, it was unfortunately necessary to deal with things as they are. In 1856 there was a grand movement towards the creation of a court of arbitration; and when France and Prussia began to dispute prior to the late war, England and Russia tried to induce them to go to arbitration, under the treaty of Paris. Both scoffed at the idea. Suppose France and Prussia were outlawed in consequence: they would scoff at that too, and it would do no good. No such chimerical scheme could be carried out. Although the judgment of the Geneva arbitration might be acted upon, he did not believe that other Powers would in future be inclined to submit their differences to a tribunal similarly constituted. It was idle to talk of moral suasion. Although public opinion had some weight in this country, there were some sovereigns in Europe who were really despots, and if they and their ministers wanted war, war they would have, despite the public opinion of England or any other country. No amount of moral suasion would prevent two men going to law if they had a mind to do so.

Mr. R. N. FOWLER, M.P., did not think the discussion had been of a very practical nature. England had given a strong proof of her anxiety not to resort to war, and had shown that she was even prepared to make sacrifices to avoid that evil, having consented, in the recent arbitration, to be bound by regulations which certainly had not been applied in former times, and under which she had had a decision given against her which would involve her in some pecuniary obligations, and some amount of loss of dignity. This had been brought about in deference to the general sentiment of the country; but public feeling could not be expected to operate with similar force on the Continent, for at the present moment two of the greatest nations of Europe were armed to the teeth, and ready to engage in the war at the first opportunity which offered itself. What should be done was to make some attempt to suppress the war spirit of the Continent. He would rejoice to see a tribunal of the character indicated by Dr. Stock established as a substitute for war; but he was not sanguine of the attainment of that object.

Mr. J. W. BATTEN (London) could not entertain the sanguine views of Dr. Stock. He could understand an international congress taking place for the propagation of peace views, but could not comprehend of what materials a court of the character suggested could be composed. To his mind, a court must have some power of binding Governments. Was it to be composed of accredited deputies or legates from existing Governments? If so, was Abyssinia, for instance, to be invited? There were Governments existing whose whole constitution and spirit was built up upon martial notions. It was very sad that it was so, but the fact could not be gainsaid. Those who advocated the establishment of these courts left out of the calculation the fact that war depended on the habits of the people. The Leagues of Greece, to which reference has been made, were spoken of as being composed of men "of one blood, one title, one tongue," and the act most esteemed among them was the destruction of the foreign foe. On the other hand, the Anglo-Saxon race, as at present developed, was very slow to wrath. This had been proved by the recent Alabama arbitration. He was sorry to say that the French nation did not seem at all to take any lessons from the past. He had visited their cafés immediately after the war, and listened to their songs, and he had never heard a single word of repentance or a whisper of a promise of better conduct in the future. There was nothing but the old story of vengeance and idle recollections of past glories. Then, again, let them take Germany. Those Germans whom he had met seemed to be simply men of war. They loved the clashing of the broadsword; and when we were attempting to spread our notions of arbitration, Prince Bismarck never had a single thought in his head but that of welding the German States together by blood and iron. Again, who could tell now whether the future of Prussia was to be worked out by fruitful strifes or rivalries of peace. The great obstacle to the successful accomplishment of all efforts to settle disputes by arbitration was that the war spirit could not be rooted out, and that they had to deal with the passions and not the intellect of mankind.

Dr. Srock, in reply, stated that in respect of the growth of public opinion he bad addressed five-and-twenty public meetings, that several members of Parliament had attended those meetings, and in each case so strong was the public

sentiment on the subject that those members had promised to present a petition to Parliament on the subject. Nations fought from a mistaken sense of honour. Let the nations first bind themselves to go to arbitration, then the charge of cowardice would not apply. Honour would be satisfied only by going to arbitration. The case of disputed ownership of the Lobass Islands, which had become valuable on account of the guano beds found in them, was a case in point. The ownership lay between England, the United States, and Peru. Lord Palmerston, who was Foreign Secretary at the time, said England's claim was perfectly fictitious, and washed his hands of the matter. The United States thereupon sent a naval expedition to take possession of the islands; but it chanced that a treaty had been entered into between the United States and Peru, that all disputed questions should be settled by the arbitration of a third neutral Power. Accordingly a plenipotentiary waited on the President of the United States, and asked him why the naval force had been sent in contravention of the articles of the treaty. The President asked the plenipotentiary to call again, and in two days told him that the expedition had been recalled, and that the American claim was so bad that he would not trouble Peru to go to a reference. That was a case in which right would not have triumphed over might, but for the existence of a treaty embodying the principle for which he contended. Honour, in that case, could not have been satisfied but by a withdrawal or a reference. An incident prefacing the late war might be related as bearing on this question. The Emperor of the French sent to the mayors of France a confidential inquiry as to whether a war with Germany would be popular. The answers which had fallen into the hands of the Provisional Government were, in nine cases out of ten, against the proposed war. That was an instance in which the necessities of one man overrode the wishes of the whole people.

"War is a game, which, were their subjects wise,

Kings would not play at."

The PRESIDENT (Sir John Coleridge) said the discussion from the beginning to the end had not touched the question before the section. Instead of considering the possibility of forming an international court of arbitrators, the section had discussed the horrors of war, and the wisdom of introducing in the negotiations between co-ordinate Powers some such provision as that in case of difference arising between them, war should not be the arbitrator. All those things were sensible, practical, and legitimate for their consideration, and for pressing upon the attention of Government. It might be very right that in every treaty entered into with foreign nations, there should be some kind of provision, that in case of difficulty upon the subject of the treaty, the high contracting parties should agree that before the sword was resorted to, a reference should be made to arbitration. That was sensible and practical. But the question before them, which he rather regretted had been couched in the terms it was, asked whether a court of international arbitration could be formed with a view to avoid war? and, if so, in what way? Now, as a lawyer, he could only answer the question in the negative; and for this reason, that he knew of no analogy which could be drawn between suitors in ordinary courts, and the case of disputes between parties who are subject to no one, but who are sovereign States, and can be bound by no laws which can be laid down. The analogy of a court entirely failed them, and they were a good deal misled by the inaccurate expressions so current regarding international law. A law implied a right, and something that could be enforced. International law was nothing of the sort, but simply a collection of precedents, which varied, and must necessarily vary, from century to century, and of rules by which civilized nations agreed they would conduct disputes with one another when the sword was drawn. There was no tribunal to which a breach of international law could be referred, and from the nature of the case no such tribunal could be created. Looking at the past, it was obvious that although wars had not ceased, they were being confined within smaller areas; that the miseries of war were mitigated; and that the consequences of war were less terrible than in former times. The only practical issue he could see to a question of that sort was to hope that by a general diffusion of education and of enlightenment upon this subject, Christian nations