the farmer had the advantage of good roads to take his produce to market; but had not the town's people a similar advantage, since they could not have the produce without that means of conveyance? They had, therefore, as much reason to contribute towards the expense of repairing those roads as farmers. It was also said that the increased value of common land was much greater than that of other kinds of property. The fact that the income of the country was 700,000,000l. a year, while real property was assessed at over 100,000,000l., proved that the great increase was in other property than landed or real. It was unfair to represent that the question was confined to the landed interest alone. It was manifestly unfair that the man who had accumulated 5000l., and built himself a house, should be made to pay a tax upon it, while the man who invested a million of money in the funds, or in foreign property, but lived in furnished lodgings, escaped the burden altogether.

Mr. T. STRANGE (Hereford) considered that, when the agricultural classes paid one-fifth of their income in rates, and the rich only one-tenth, some remedy ought to be applied. With regard to pauperism, it had been stated that where there was one pauper in towns, there were two in the country. That showed at all events, that the migration of surplus labour from one part of the country to the other tended to equalize taxation.

Mr. HOLYOAKE (London), who had a paper on the question, intimated that it would be unnecessary to read it, as it was to the same effect as Mr. Raper's speech. Mr. A. P. PROWSE (Plymouth) believed that such discussions as the present did not embarrass legislation, and that the Social Science Congress might be instrumental in affording information for the guidance of Parliament. In considering the charges for the poor, those which had reference to the health of the community ought more properly to belong to national taxation than to local. He was glad to hear the President of the Health Department (Dr. Acland) insist, in his address that morning, that it was a national duty to look after the health of the people. When a labouring man, who had scarcely enough to maintain himself, fell ill, and his family were thrown upon the parish, it appeared to be to the interest of the nation that it should get him restored to health as speedily as possible. The charges upon the poor were extremely heavy in this country, but in Ireland they were very light, owing in a great measure, he believed, to the introduction there of the dispensary system; and he was satisfied that, were the system also introduced into England, great benefit would result from it. But, in order to have proper medical officers, their appointment should be taken out of the hands of boards of guardians, and placed in the hands of public officers selected by the central authority in London, viz., district officers of health.

Mr. W. MORRISON, M.P., pointed out that the English system of taxation was not scientific, and that therefore it was extremely easy to pick holes in it. He understood that Sir Massey Lopes did not propose to rate personal property, but that a large contribution to local taxation should be paid out of the Consolidated Fund. His answer to that proposition was, first of all, that it did away with local government, because the central office in London, supplying a large portion of the expenditure, would make the local representative bodies their slaves; and in the second place, because it would lead to waste. Even at the present time the sentiment of the country was in favour of greater expenditure, considering how very few there were who were able to rise to that point of wisdom and reasoning, which showed that it was a great kindness to the poor to administer the poor law strictly. He really thought that Sir Massey Lopes had shown a good case with regard to the militia, but that in the case of lunatics and the medical administration of the poor law he had not. He considered also that Mr. Davenport was right in the objection he made to the constant forcing up of local expenditure by practically irresponsible Government officials in London. Until we got strongly constituted local bodies, we should be unable to resist the natural desire of all officials to exalt their departments by forcing up the expenditure. Plymouth had furnished a case in point with reference to lunatics, which had excited a good deal of feeling. Sir Massey Lopes had objected that in levying income tax upon land no allowance was made on account of repairs; but it should be remembered that the same sort of objection applied to the levying of income tax on other kinds of property. For instance, he took a lease of a coal mine, and got so many tons per month; it was

a simple rule of three sum, how soon the corpus of his estate would be exhausted, yet he was not allowed to deduct a farthing for depreciation. A professional man in paying his income tax might deduct his premium to the insurance office, but he could not deduct anything if he had not insured his life, although his professional income might come to a sudden end. A still stronger case was that of a Government annuitant, holding an annuity for say ten years, and who paid income tax on the full amount of his temporary income. The question specially before them, however, was on what principle local administration should be conducted? Assuming that it was to be by some form of representative boards, he would urge, first of all, that the area of selection should be at least as large as a county, and that the board should be small. He believed that the whole question of cconomy in local administration was wrapped up in the question of electing first-rate men; that the smaller the board the more responsibility there would be upon it; and that the greater honour there was attached to it, the better would be the men who would come forward. It was no use for first-rate men to come forward unless there were some means by which they could be elected on the ground of efficiency, and not upon party grounds. It was upon some system of voting by quotas that that object could be secured; and when good men had been obtained, that system would enable them to retain their seats for years, though in that time they might incur an amount of unpopularity by telling people the truth, or acting contrary to the wishes of a portion of their constituents.

Mr. E. G. DAVENPORT said, the question appeared to him to have been discussed thus far almost entirely from a provincial and a landlord's point of view. As a member of a vestry and board of guardians for one of the principal west-end parishes of London, he should venture to offer a few remarks upon the subject from a metropolitan point of view. The towns were quite as much interested in the matter as the provinces. The burden of the rates on land, and the per centages they formed on the landlord's capital sunk in it, &c., were questions of which little or nothing was heard in London. They only knew two classes: those who levied the rates and those who payed them. During the last fifteen years the poor rate in his parish had doubled in amount, while the general rate had only increased about 2d. in the pound. Ratepayers naturally asked why they were called upon to pay so much more than formerly. After looking carefully into the matter, all they could tell them was, that out of the total sum raised, the vestry had direct control over only about one-third. Within the last ten years the sum over which they had no control had increased 50 per cent., while those directly under their control had increased only about 7 per cent., and this with a constantly expanding population. On further investigation they found that numerous practically irresponsible and possibly phantom boards were continually sending in precepts for any number of thousands they chose to claim. These demands there was no power to resist, and they were sometimes made in a most arbitrary manner, local rating authorities being not unfrequently compelled by them to spend much more on different buildings, establishments, &c., than they knew to be really necessary for the requirements of the ratepayers. The conditions to which rating authorities were now reduced was simply that of collectors, without the power of resigning their post. They were the jackals who had to find the prey for the lions of centralization. They got all the kicks which infuriated ratepayers lavished on the system, while these irresponsible boards got the greater part of the halfpence. If this state of things were allowed to continue and expand, men of position, education, and independence would soon be compelled to abstain from taking any part in local affairs, and filling a post which ought to be but little less honourable than taking part in imperial affairs. Thus a fatal blow would be struck at local self-government. Sir Massey Lopes had materially simplified the question by stating that there was no intention to rate personal property. The difficulties in the way of so doing were enormous, and he must confess he had never yet heard any satisfactory scheme propounded. Possibly some plan might be ultimately devised to bring into rating at all events a portion of that large amount of property which now escaped. He would be quite satisfied for the present to see as much as possible of local thrown upon imperial taxation. By so doing many would at all events pay something who now contributed nothing to the rates,

and there would be some one responsible for the way in which the money was disbursed. This brought him to the principal point which he wished to see amended, viz., that for every penny raised some one person or body of persons should be directly responsible to the ratepayers for the way in which it was spent. He was, and he was quite sure his colleagues were, equally prepared to accept this responsibility as far as concerned their own local expenditure, such as sewers, highways, watering, &c.; but he protested against being held responsible for money spent by others, and over which he had no control. Let any boards who wanted money raise it themselves, or at all events tell the ratepayers exactly what they wanted it for; and when it had been spent account to them directly and intelligibly for how it had been expended. He had, of course, only been able to speak from experience of his own locality; but he believed the views he had expressed were in the main those held generally by metropolitan rating authorities. Any relief that could be obtained from the present unsatisfactory state of local taxation would be most acceptable.

Arbitration in the Settlement of National Disputes, viewed in Relation to the Events and Results of the late War. THOMAS BEGGS.

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T will doubtless be felt by many, that the moment, when the nations of Europe are intent upon an increase and reorganization of their armaments, and when the daily journals at home are filled with details of military manoeuvres, is not an appropriate one for the discussion of the subject now before us. If, however, the events of the late war are carefully reviewed in connection with the results, and with the history of this century, the conclusion will be forced upon us that the hour is not distant when the question of International Arbitration must be considered by statesmen as something more than a measure to be desired; as one, in fact, of absolute necessity. The minds most hopeful as to the future, those the least prone to look with forebodings or despondency upon the sinister aspects of the times, cannot but perceive that there are grave perils underlying the present apparently brilliant prosperity. These perils may be averted by the wisdom and firmness of those in whose hands power is invested, and by the growth of a healthy public opinion; but it is scarcely possible to conceive that true progress can be made so long as such oppressive burdens rest upon the industry of all countries as are imposed by war establishments. Any material reduction in expenditure cannot be expected so long as it is deemed necessary to keep up armies and navies to the maximum war standard. If relief is to come, it must begin at this source; and therefore it is a fitting time to inquire whether, now that Europe is at peace, some arrangement is not practicable by which disputes could be settled without recourse to arms, and a reduction in armaments effected. The arguments in support of this view are familiar to all who have thought upon the subject; but they receive additional emphasis from what has passed within the last two years, and what is now passing around us. The arguments may be briefly recapitulated. It is contended that large armaments are calculated to excite and keep alive national jealousies; that instead of being preservatives of peace, they are often excitements to war, thus becoming a source of danger

rather than a bulwark of security. After what has passed before our observation within only a few months, they cannot be regarded as a protection against internal anarchy. The Government that enters upon war has now to anticipate two foes: one outside his own territory, and one that has been bred within it: the one an open foe that meets him in the field; and the other one that commences hostilities, without any declaration of war, and waits a moment of failure or weakness to make his attack. It is surely not premature in the present state of Europe to inquire whether a new policy cannot be inaugurated, one that would aim at the establishment of a congress for the settlement of disputes founded upon a well-considered code of international law. No greater work could possibly be undertaken by the eminent statesmen and jurists of the several nations.

It would be quite impossible, even if it were necessary, in the space allotted to me, to enter upon the enlarged field indicated by the foregoing sentences; but it is essential to our purpose to briefly glance at some of its leading features. We must try at least to understand the lessons taught us by the late war in their proper application. That war has added another to the many examples supplied by history, as to the instability of all States where military glory has become the ruling passion. All history is eloquent upon this point, and France has given the latest and most striking illustration. It has rarely happened where so many vicissitudes have been experienced by any one nation, and perhaps none where so many reverses have been crowded into less than a century, a very brief period in the history of a nation. After the battle of Austerlitz all Europe laid at her feet; but she went on, intoxicated by her successes, adding conquest to conquest, until the power she had abused met its death-blow in Russia, and finally expired at Waterloo. In 1814 and 1815, after the struggle of a quarter of a century, during which time Europe was an extensive camp, her capital was twice in possession of the foes her restless ambition had provoked. In her humiliation she still nourished the love of glory. It is reported that the first Napoleon, who had a thorough knowledge of the French character, said, in his captivity, "Whenever I hear of a nation living without bread, then will I believe that the French will live without glory." During her adversity and through all her disasters she clung to the delusion that France must be the ruling Power in Europe. After the restoration of the empire, her energies have been directed mainly to the consolidation of her military strength, and this excited the jealousy of neighbouring States. It was apparent that her army and navy could not be needed for her own defence, as it was not seen that any Power desired to attack her. It was supposed, therefore, that the augmentation of her forces was designed for the purposes of aggression. The attitude assumed by France kept the nations in a state of chronic alarm, and it was owing to her policy that the armaments of Europe were placed upon a war footing. It affected ourselves as much as any other nation. It is a defect of our national character

to take fright at distant, and sometimes at imaginary dangers. In the wisdom of our cabinet, it was deemed necessary to augment our land and sea forces and spend large sums upon our fortifications, and in this outlay the ministry were supported by the press and the people. To be prepared for war as the best means of preserving peace, had become a superstition with us, and it was in vain to urge the simple truism so often used by Mr. Cobden, that if all the nations went on adding to their armaments in the same ratio of increase, they would find themselves relatively no stronger than before. All remonstrance was in vain. The pressure upon the industrious classes in this country and throughout Europe was immense, and the results are now seen in a deep and wide-spread spirit of discontent amongst the wagereceiving class, a discontent which manifests itself in an antagonism to property and the property classes. It is a spirit with which no soldier can measure swords. I will not ask whether the warlike preparations of France were due to the will of the man who, by so singular a destiny, had been called to supreme authority, or to the ambition of those who surrounded him; that among other problems must be solved by history, but this is certain, that every step taken towards the establishment of constitutional government weakened the personal influence of the emperor. It is manifest that war had become an unconquerable desire of an influential class of the Parisians, and of part of the French people.

We cannot follow such speculations at present, but may pause for a moment, to ask what became of all this mighty preparation? After all her efforts to regain and keep up her position as the first military Power in Europe, after a huge outlay in fortifying her capital and strengthening her fortresses, in an evil hour she was tempted to precipitate her forces upon Germany, with the proud expectation of reaching Berlin. In a few months her strongest fortresses were in the hands of the Germans; whole armies, along with the emperor, had to surrender as prisoners of war; Paris was under the horrors of a blockade; and within a year of the date of the declaration of war she had to submit to terms dictated by a victorious enemy, and involving, besides a large money compensation, the dismantling of some of her fortresses, the loss of some of her fairest provinces, and the maintenance of an army of occupation until the ransom was paid. Such is the end of a war rashly commenced, and for which it may be presumed the great preparations spoken of had been made. The loss in its money value defies all calculation; but there can be no doubt that in the aggregate it will amount to more than the whole of our national debt. It has left nothing behind it but seeds of distrust, and, it is to be feared, an intense desire for retaliation and vengeance. A palpable truth lies upon the surface: her armaments became a temptation. Men seldom perfect a machinery that they do not strongly desire to put in action. "How oft the sight of means to do ill deeds, makes ill deeds done."

If the means thus wasted upon her armaments, and in the prosecution of a disastrous war, had been expended upon the improve