the bay from Salem to Dorchester. Inland, to the west, the furthest settlement was Watertown, lying on the north bank of the Charles river, some five miles from Charlestown. In all likelihood it was only the strong desire for congregational unity and for religious ministration which, coupled with the lack of clergy, kept this process from going yet further.

Change in

tution.

The growth of fresh settlements brought with it an expansion in the constitutional machinery of the colony. Of all the colonies that have yet come before the consti- us, Virginia is the only one where a system of local representation came into existence at once in full working order. In every other case it was reached after a variety of contrivances and compromises. The reason is plain. Every other colony enjoyed a certain amount of independence before it had grown large enough to make a local representation either needful or possible. Only in Virginia had the colony the needful materials for a representative assembly at the time when it first acquired the right of self-government. It might be thought that the rapid formation of separate plantations would have made Massachusetts a second exception. But, if it be not a paradox to say so, the constitution of Massachusetts was older than the existence of the colony. The legislature of the colony was simply the General Court of the Company transferred across the Atlantic. At the same time the dispersal of the settlers at once unfitted that body for the work of legislation. The remedy first applied to this difficulty was, not to substitute a representative assembly for a primary one, but to limit the functions of the Court. It is clear that there was an oligarchical temper at work among the leading men in Massachusetts. The action of this was plainly shown by the transfer of all legislative rights from the Court of freemen to the Governor, DeputyGovernor, and Assistants.

At the same time the election

1630-1

CHANGE IN THE CONSTITUTION.

139 of the Governor was handed over from the freemen to the Assistants. These measures were enacted in October 1630.1 In the following March this change was carried yet further. Hitherto seven Assistants had been required to form a legal meeting. The return of several of the leading men to England made it difficult to secure the presence of a full court. Accordingly it was enacted that, if less than nine Assistants were in the colony, then a majority of them should constitute a meeting.2 This system, if retained, might, and in all likelihood would, have thrown the supreme power into the hands of a small oligarchy resident at Boston. There is good reason to think that this was followed by a still further aggression upon the rights of the freemen. In May 1631 it was enacted at the General Court of Election that it shall be lawful for the commons to propound any persons that they should desire to be chosen Assistants.' 3 One leading authority on the history of Massachusetts has seen in this a substitution of the invidious and difficult process of removal' for the right of election. This must, perhaps, be regarded as a conjecture, but it is conjecture which approaches nearly to certainty. It is at least safe to assume that the change, even if it did not deprive the freemen of their right of election, encompassed the exercise of it with difficulties.

about

True to English precedent, Massachusetts found the salvation of her constitutional liberties in a question of Dispute taxation. When the Governor had intended taxation.5 to change his abode to Newtown, the assembly resolved to fortify that settlement at the public charge. Although Winthrop abandoned his purpose of leaving Boston, the fortification of Newtown still went on, probably with a view to guarding the frontier of the

4

Palfrey, History of New England, ed. 1882, vol. i. p. 349.

87.

5 Our knowledge of this dispute is derived from Winthrop (vol. i. p. 70).

colony against the Indians. To meet the cost a rate was levied on each town by order of the Governor and Assistants. Against this the men of Watertown protested. Their objection seems to have rested, not on the ground that the Court had ceased to be a properly elected body, but on one less tenable, that the government merely existed for administrative purposes, and that the power to tax or make laws was vested in the whole body of freemen. Such a contention, by denying the validity of representation, really struck a blow at those popular rights which it proposed to defend. Happily the refusal to pay the rate went for more than the grounds on which that refusal was based. We may be sure too that in fact the men of Watertown were contending against an oligarchical spirit, which was probably made all the more dangerous by the conspicuous personal merit of the man in whom it was embodied. The recusants were summoned to Boston, and after being admonished by the Governor withdrew their opposition. The tone in which Winthrop talks of the transaction shows, as is but natural, no sympathy with his opponents. Yet the temper in which the men of Watertown defended their local rights was the best assurance that the same spirit would not be wanting if the liberties of the whole colony were ever threatened by any higher power.

Though the men of Watertown gave way on the main issue, their protest seems to have borne fruit. In the next year the powers of the Governor were formally defined by an act unhappily no longer extant. It was also enacted by the General Court in the following May, that the whole body of freemen should choose the Governor, Deputy-Governor, and Assistants. It is clear that a strong feeling on behalf of popular rights was 1 Winthrop, vol. i. p. 72. The records of this very important court are evidently imperfect.

2

16.

p. 75.

1631-2

DUDLEY ATTACKS WINTHROP.

141

abroad, since at the same time it was proposed that each train-band should choose its own officers. This proposal, however, was given up, in deference to the remonstrances of Winthrop.1

A further step towards self-government was taken in the resolution that every town should appoint two representatives to advise the Governor and Assistants on the question of taxation.2 We can hardly err in supposing that this was the direct result of the protest made by the men of Watertown.

attacks

This constitutional dispute was followed soon afterwards by a personal one. In 1632 Dudley, the DeputyDudley Governor, brought certain charges of arbitrary Winthrop administration against the Governor. Our knowledge of the dispute which ensued is derived entirely from Winthrop himself, and the tone in which he tells of it bears witness to his fairness of mind and generosity of temper.3

The matter was laid before a court of arbitrators, most of them, it would seem, ministers. The first of the grievances was an act by which, as Dudley contended, he had been injured. According to him Winthrop had formally entered into an undertaking to change his abode from Boston to Newtown, and had thereby induced Dudley and others to move. The Court decided that there were circumstances which extenuated Winthrop's breach of agreement, but that he was in fault. The other charges against Winthrop are of more interest, since they all bore on the constitutional question of the origin and extent of the Governor's power. The first contention which Dudley put forward was that the Governor had no power beyond that of an Assistant, except the right to summon the Court and to take formal precedence. Winthrop replied with the somewhat weak plea that the Court, in constituting him 1 Winthrop, p. 76. 3 Ib. p. 82-86.

2 Ib.

3

Governor, gave him all the power which belonged to a Governor by common law or statute. Dudley then charged the Governor with a series of acts by which he had exceeded the limits of his power. The attack was, no doubt, made more galling by Dudley's assertion that he proceeded in love, and not by way of accusation.' So bitter was the feeling on each side, that the arbitrators, instead of deciding on the general question, had to content themselves with keeping the peace between the disputants. The proceedings of which the Deputy Governor complained fell under two heads, executive and judicial. Winthrop, he said, had of his own responsibility moved the ordnance, fortified Boston, lent powder from the public store to the men of Plymouth, and permitted the establishment of a trading station and a fishing wear. Dudley furthermore charged Winthrop with remitting and postponing penalties, and with having induced the Court, after it had decided on a case, to change its verdict.

It

Winthrop does not seem to have met Dudley's charges in detail, but to have contented himself with the general, and not unreasonable, plea that some slips' during three years of office ought to be overlooked. was less worthy of his character to contrast his own liberality towards the public with the parsimony of his opponent. The arbitrators came to no formal decision, and Dudley, as it would seem, had to content himself with having called public attention to the supposed infringements of the constitution.

Most of the acts to which Dudley objected were no more than the needful use of executive power in contingencies for which the law cannot provide, and which must from their very nature be left to the discretion of one man. Nor is it easy to see how such power could be abused so long as the right of popular election was a reality. But we must not forget that the elective