ment. Their testimony must be mutually corroborative, and must go to establish the main points of the case for which it is introduced.

8. It adds not a little to the weight of testimony, when the facts alleged are of such a nature, that the witnesses, if they have falsified, are open to detection. So obviously just is this rule, that any case which fails to come under it does not admit, on this very account, of being substantiated in the most satisfactory manner by testimony. For example, suppose two or three individuals should profess to have intercourse with the spiritual world, and from time to time should relate very seriously the wonders which they had seen there. They have no external proofs to urge in support of their statements. These rest on their simple testimony; but this testimony, is uniform and consistent, and is entitled to all the weight which their general character for truth and honesty can give it; still, if they have falsified, their fellow men have no means of detecting them, they cannot look into the spiritual world, and cannot tell whether the witnesses have spoken the truth or not. Compare this now with another case. I receive a letter, subscribed by two or three credible witnesses, informing me that an absent friend is sick, and urging me to visit him immediately. Every one perceives that the testimony in this latter case is vastly stronger and more satisfactory than in the former. Why? The number of witnesses is the same; and the characters which they sustain for integrity and honesty may be equal. But in the latter case, the witnesses, if they have falsified, are open to detection. And they certainly will be detected; they knew they should be, when they wrote. Hence, they had stronger inducements than the witnesses in the former case could have, to speak the truth.

9. Convincing testimony will be, not contradicted, but confirmed, at least so far as might be reasonably expected, by other evidence. Wherever this rule fails to apply, the testimony, however good in other respects, is rendered suspicious, if it be not destroyed. For example, suppose a navigator to return from the Pacific Ocean, and assert that he had discovered a large and important island. He gives the latitude and longitude of the place, and describes its peculiarities, its productions, and inhabitants. His whole crew agree with him in the statement, and thus we have their united testimony to the fact in question. But suppose, on examination, that they have brought nothing away with them from the discovered island. They

have none of its peculiarities in their possession, they have nothing to exhibit in evidence that they have ever been there. Suppose, also, that shortly after, another navigator returns, who passed over the same latitude and longitude-the same spot exactly, and saw no island. Suppose this last is followed by a third, who passed over the same spot, and bears the same testimony. He saw no island. What now are we to think of the testimony of the first? It is in great measure, if not utterly, destroyed. By failing of the requisite confirmation, it is rendered of no account, and its author is justly regarded as a falsifier.

There are various ways in which testimony, if true, may be confirmed; and in which, in most cases, it will be confirmed. It may be confirmed by circumstantial evidence, as well as positive; by proofs direct and indirect. And in order to be convincing, it must be confirmed, at least so far as, from the nature of the case, might reasonably be expected.

10. I mention but another law of testimony, which is, that it be followed up by a correspondent, consistent course of action. The author of it must live and act as though his testimony was true. This position may be illustrated by a familiar example. In the year 1492, Columbus returned from his first voyage to America, and testified to Ferdinand and Isabella that he had discovered a new world. His whole company united with him in this testimony. But suppose that, instead of acting as though what they said was true, they had appeared and acted just as if it was not true. They exhibit nothing in evidence that they have discovered another continent. They can give no concurrent, consistent description of this continent, or of any portion of it. They are unwilling to return, and make another voyage. They are unwilling that others should go upon their track, and verify the testimony which they have given. In view of a course of conduct such as this, who would have yielded to Columbus the least credit? Who would not have denounced him, as a gross deceiver? The truth is, we expect consistency in honest men. We feel that we have a right to expect it. And where we do not perceive it in a witness, or at least some reasonable portion of it, we lose all confidence in his testimony. Unless strongly corroborated by other evidence, we reject it as worthless.

I have thus stated, under several particulars, what I conceive to be the laws of testimony. I have noticed the conditions, the circumstances, under which the evidence of testimony be

comes conclusive. The facts testified to must be, in their nature, possible. The witnesses must be sufficient in point of numbers, and competent as to understanding and means of knowledge. Their characters must be in general fair, and their motives disinterested. Their testimony must be plainly, explicitly given, and the different parts of it must be mutually consistent and corroborative. While of a nature, if untrue, to admit of contradiction, it must be, not contradicted, but confirmed, by other evidence. It must also be followed out, on the part of witnesses, by a correspondent course of action and life.

I would not be understood to say, that these laws of testimony are all of them of equal value; or that a testimony which does not conform to them all is, of course, to be rejected. But I do say, that testimony which does conform to them all is in every case to be received. Such testimony is fully entitled to credit. It is sufficient, of itself, to establish truth. It is such as the world receives and acts upon, without the least hesitation, in regard to all subjects. In short, it is incontestible and conclusive, and cannot be set aside, but upon principles which, so far as respects the wide field of testimony, would introduce a universal scepticism.

I am aware that I use strong language here, and I will illustrate the propriety of it by putting a strong case. There are some persons in this country-ignorant persons, to be surewho seriously doubt whether there is, on the coast of Africa, any such colony as Liberia. They have heard so many contradictory stories respecting the colony-some extolling it, and others condemning it-that they incline to the opinion that there is no colony there. Now what are my readers to think in regard to this matter? We have never been there. The question is to us, or certainly to the most of us, one of pure testimony. Is the testimony conclusive? Let us compare it with our canons, and see. It is certainly possible, in the first place, that that there should be such a colony. Then the witnesses who testify to its existence are numerous. They are capable of forming a judgment respecting it, and have had the requisite means of information. Their characters, in many instances, are good; and although some of them may be actuated by motives of interest, this certainly is not the case with them all. Not a few who tell us that there is such a colony, for they have seen it, would probably be glad if there was no colony there. The testimony on the point

in question has been given with abundant plainness; and so far as respects the fact of the colony, it is entirely consistent with itself. If untrue, it might long ago have been contradicted; but so far from being contradicted, it is continually confirmed. And besides, the authors of the testimony act in consistency with it. They sail to and from the colony, and manifest all that interest in regard to it-either in its favor or against it—which might be expected, on supposition of its real existence.

We see, therefore, that the testimony, as to the existence of Liberia, conforms to all the laws of valid testimony, and consequently is conclusive. There is such a colony. No intelligent person can doubt it. No intelligent person does doubt it, any more than he would, if he had seen it with his eyes.

Still further to illustrate the application of our rules, I may even put a stronger case. I never saw the city of London; and the same, I presume, may be said of the greater portion of my readers; still, we do not doubt that there is such a city, any more than if we had seen it. The fact of its existence has become as certain to us, on the evidence of testimony, as if we had derived it from the evidence of sense. And now if we reflect a moment, we shall perceive that the testimony on which wer ground our faith as to the existence of London conforms to each and all of the laws of testimony above laid down. We shall perceive, too, that this is the reason, and the sole reason, why our faith in the existence of London is so strong. If the testimony in the case were different; if it failed to conform to some one, two, or three of the laws of valid testimony; if, for example, the witnesses were few, and incompetent, of bad character, and deeply interested; if their testimony had not been confirmed, as might be reasonably expected, and they did not themselves act as though they believed it ;-under these circumstances, we might have our faith shaken as to the existence even of London. We might be constrained to disbelieve its existence altogether.

It is important to remark here, that where we can be satisfied as to the authenticity of testimony, the laws of testimony apply equally to facts of ancient date, as to those of recent or present occurrence. We have heard for example of such a city as Carthage. We are satisfied that the testimony as to the existence of this ancient city is authentic. We find, by comparison, that this testimony conforms to all the laws of valid testimony which have been considered. Under these circum

stances, we no more doubt that there was anciently such a city as Carthage, than we do that there is now such a city as London.

We have all heard of such a man as Cicero. The testimony respecting him, as recorded on the page of history, we deem authentic. This testimony we find conformable to all the laws which have been laid down. Hence, we as firmly believe that there lived, some two thousand years ago, such a man as Cicero, as we believe that there now live such men as Lord Brougham or O'Connell.

The only difference as to proof from testimony, between events of ancient and of recent date, relates to the authenticity of the testimony. The question of authenticity may not be so readily settled in the former case, as in the latter. But when settled, the laws of testimony are applicable to both alike, and so far as they apply to both, the proof from testimony will be equal.

The way is now prepared to apply these principles to a particular case, in which all my readers have a deep personal interest; refer to the testimony in support of Christianity. The evidences of Christianity do not fall, all of them, under the head of testimony. By no means. But it will be seen, in the sequel, that if they did, there would be no room for doubt or hesitancy on the subject. The evidence in the case derived from testimony is of such a nature, and so strong, that it can never be set aside, without violating all the laws of testimony, and adopting principles which, if carried out, would introduce an almost universal skepticism.

The main facts alleged, which go to constitute the christian system, are familiar to all who read the Bible, and need not be repeated here. They rest materially, though (as I said) not wholly, on the evidence of testimony. The authenticity of this testimony, or of the records conveying it, is indubitable. No one doubts the authenticity of the Orations of Cicero, or the Odes of Horace. Yet I hazard nothing in saying, that the evidence in favor of the authenticity of the four gospels is far greater in amount, and more satisfactory in kind, than that in support of either of the works above mentioned. Presuming then the question of authenticity as being settled, let us look at the testimony in support of Christianity, and compare it with the canons above laid down.

First, then, the facts of the christian system involve no im