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be no longer tolerated; though if they meant to preach Unitarianism, they must have known that their object was at that moment not tolerated. Mr. Shadwell protested against its being supposed, that he intended, or wished to prevent persons from thinking as they pleased on these subjects, but contended that preaching and propagating such opinions was attacking the very vitals of Christianity, was contrary to the law, which had by the recitals of its acts pronounced it blasphemous and wicked, and ought not to be countenanced by the Court.

He then commented on the other points of the case.

Mr. Ching followed in the same line of argument, and suggested that it ought to be the policy of the Court to render the minister independent of his congregation. Mr. Solicitor General appeared for the defendants, and said he should not enter into the doctrinal questions that had been raised, conceiving the case lay in a very narrow compass, whether the majority of the trustees should have the management of the trust; and whether a trustee who had never acted for thirty years, and who had left the place, ought not to be considered as deserting the trust.

The question as to the change of sentiments of the minister did not at all arise; the defendants stated, that they themselves were of various opinions on some religious subjects; all they insisted for was the liberty of choice, having chosen the present minister for three years, and being now desirous of another election. If, as Mr. Maunder alleges, this trust is misapplied, why had he quietly laid by more than thirty years, knowing that the congregation were as they have always been Unitarian; and why did he now, in 1817, come forward to complain of those doctrines being taught? He contended that the doctrines had nothing to do with the question, and that the defendants were entitled, under the trust deed, to the management of the charity.

Mr. Benyon also argued in the same way. He could not see that this doctrinal point had any thing to do with the question, and was therefore totally unprepared to argue it; but as Mr. Shadwell had made so extraordinary a speech on the subject, he could not sit down without protesting against it. If the Dissenters of this country were really in the situation he described, they had gained very little. He was exceedingly sorry to hear such a speech, and trusted that Mr. Shadwell would before the case closed, retract what he stated, for nothing could be more mischievous or more void of foundation in law. He had attempted to prove that impugning the doctrine of the Trinity was an offence at common law and how? By two cases which settled that Christianity was part of the

law of the land, and as such, the impugners of it were indictable; and who doubted this? Nobody contested that point; but was this proving his case? To do this, he had supposed in the absence of any kind of legal decision on the subject, that this Christianity meant the doctrine of the Trinity, and had given them a learned account of the councils of Nice, Trent, &c. to shew what nobody doubted--that these councils and the Church of Rome had been believers in the doctrine of the Trinity. He had then shewn that this was not one of the points on which the Protestant Church of England differed from the Roman Catholic, and from all this it followed that the doctrine of the Trinity was the Christianity which formed part of the law of England. If all this is so, it extends to every article of the Church of England, and every one who impugns any one of those articles, is liable to indietment and punishment. And this is the state in which all Dissenters, but particularly Unitarian Dissenters are, to stand. We have been used to bless ourselves for being born in a happy country, a country of free inquiry and toleration; but if this is the law, we have been very much deceived in our estimation. He considered the question as irrelevant, but he could not let such a mischievous statement of the law pass without raising up his voice to deny it. He had always understood, and still did believe, that the law did not take cognizance of particular opinions, except such as impugned the divine authority of religion and the Holy Scriptures; and the cases which Mr. Shadwell had cited, would be found carefully to guard against the law being extended any further.

Mr. Phillimore followed on the same side, arguing that it was perfectly competent for the trustees to choose the minister for a term of years. That in this case they had done so, and that Mr. Steward had accepted the situation, which he now refused to give up on those terms. That the congregation were all unanimous on the subject, and had actually chosen another minister in Mr. Steward's place, and that he and Mr. Maunder ought not to be permitted to prevent the general wish of the whole congregation.

Sir Samuel Romilly in reply, observed, that the question was, what was proper to be done by the Court; it being quite clear that something must be done to put an end to the present discordant state of this congregation, and whether defendants were to be suffered to get possession of four-fifths of this endowment, for it was admitted on all hands that the whole could not be recovered. He contended that the injunction must, if granted, extend not only to stay execution but also trial, for all they could recover was four-fifths, and what good would that do? Mr. Maunder would still

(as having the legal estate of a part) be enabled to keep Mr. Steward in his present situation.

As to what had been said on the subject of Mr. Maunder's having, as was contended, abandoned the trust by never having acted, and having left the congregation thirty years, &c., he could only observe, that Mr. Maunder had thought the objects of the charity mistaken or disregarded, and therefore withdrew; he merely declined attending to hear doctrines which his conscience disavowed: in short, he was in a minority, and therefore submitted, as he must do, to the majority.

The counsel on the other side had contended, that the Court had nothing to do with the doctrinal question that had been raised; they had endeavoured to lay that point quite out of the question as irrelevant, but if the nature of the charity was as the plantiff contended, could they keep that question out of view? If the Court is to see the trust, to consider it in order to carry it into effect, it must look what it is, and what is the intent of the foundation. How can they avoid this?

The Solicitor General has stated the question to be merely, whether the defendants have committed any breach of their trust, and if they have not, whether they are not entitled as the majority of the trustees to regulate the charity; but then the question must arise, can they divert the purposes of that charity, as we say they have diverted it; the majority can only have the power of managing the trust as established, they cannot alter the object of it. The only important question, therefore, Sir Samuel Romilly contended was, whether they had diverted the charity from its original and legitimate object. "In 1701, land had been settled and a meetinghouse built for the service and worship of God," and there can be no question that this meant the worship of the Trinity. It must have meant so, because the opposite doetrines had at that time no legal establishment or toleration, being expressly excepted by the Toleration Act. A change had now taken place in the opinion of the persons having the management of the trust a difference of opinion from what must be taken to be the opinion and intention of the founders; and can they divert the charity by applying it to the support of these new opinions, especially if (as we contend) those opinions are illegal? And can they call upon the Court to carry into effect a trust for such illegal purposes? I apprehend they cannot. I am confident that if a man were now to make an endowment for the support of lectures for the propagation of Unitarianism, that the Court must refuse to carry such a trust into effect. The Court could no more carry into effect a trust for promoting Unitarianism

than Judaism, which it refused to do in the case of Decosta and Depass, which was a foundation for lectures on the Jewish law. There can be no doubt that both are illegal at law. God forbid that any persons, whether Unitarians or Jews, or holding any description of religious opinions, should be prosecuted on that account. There can be no person so illiberal as to cherish such idea, and in my opinion it would be most illiberal to attempt any legal interference on such subjects; but at the same time I apprehend that a Court would be bound to say, that it would not carry any trust for such purposes into effect.

The question, therefore, is solely whether these gentlemen can be suffered to divert the object of the charity, by preaching any other doctrines than the doctrines of Christianity, as they were tolerated when the trust was founded.

Another point in the case, Sir Samuel Romilly observed, was not a light one, viz. whether the trustees were competent to appoint the minister for a limited term, as in this case they had done of three years, and not for life. He contended that this was inconsistent with the intent of these trusts and good policy. In the case of trusts for the support of schools, the trustees have in many instances, and sometimes very laudably, endeavoured to keep a proper controul over the master, by making him dependant on their will, but the Court has always said that such limitations are illegal, and that the appointment must be free of any stipulations whatever of that sort. This case, be contended, was one of similar policy, and nothing in the trust deed empowered such limitation.

The foundation was here to teach the gospel, and the regulation of such an establishment ought to be considered, and might be very properly regulated with reference to the religious establishment of the country. The policy of that establishment has been to make the minister independent of the will of his hearers, and to give him a freehold interest. The congregation must not be set up as the censors at their caprice of their minister. Because he preaches on a particular Sunday a sermon which clashes somewhat with their notions, which may perhaps give offence because some particular vice or action is reprobated, which comes home to and offends some of his hearers, are they to be allowed to cashier and dismiss him at their pleasure? Such a power of giving notice of quitting, be thought had never been allowed by the Court.

Sir Samuel Romilly then adverted to some remarks made by Mr. Phillimore on Mr. Steward, contending that it did not appear by his answer, that he had but lately adopted Trinitarianism. He would not trouble the Court with reading passages,

to shew defendants' intention as to the future conduct of the trust; it was quite clear and admitted that they intended to alter the object by preaching Unitarianism, and that in fact it has been always of late appropriated to preaching the Unity of God; they admit this, adding that there are various opinions on that question among them, but that all agree on the point of contending for the liberty of choice of their minister.

Lord Chancellor.-There are so many considerations in this case of great importance, not only as regards the parties to it, but also the public, that I should not execute my duty if I stated my final opinions as to the various points of the case, till I had read the bill and answer. There are many and very different questions. If this was an application for no other purpose than to get trusts of an institution of Protestant Dissenters, which trusts were well known, administered, there would be no difficulty. There would be no occasion to disturb ourselves with questions as to the practice of injunctions, &c., because the Court would say there shall be no injunctions, no trials at law, nor any expense of that sort to the ruin of the institution, incurred, as we might save it all by making an order upon the parties for regulating and adjusting all matters in pursuance of the trust; and if I find it clear that the parties are all before the Court, and that the legal estate is vested partly in plaintiff and partly in defendants, it is quite competent to the Court to put the whole matter at rest, and in just as good a state, without wasting the charity in trials, and without any ejectment or legal proceedings what ever. If the case, however, be any thing more than such a common application to the Court to administer a common trust estate, of which the object is well known and defined, I must precisely understand the nature of it, and all the facts of the

case.

It is stated and urged upon the Court that this is an institution for the benefit of Protestant Dissenters, and to apply property to maintain a preacher; and that it is highly expedient and necessary to have some decision as speedily as possible. Although it must be granted that this Court is bound to administer such a trust, and that with all the expedition it can give, yet I cannot say that I have often found a case of this sort where it was easy to do so. Amongst the various questions that arise, especially when it is considered (as I am sorry to say I have generally found the fact to be), that cases of this sort, on religions and controversial questions, are conducted with greater acrimony between the parties, than most other matters that come before the Court:-if, as is often the case, the trust is rendered multifarious and ambi

guous by, in some trust deeds of this sort, requiring the assent of the congregation in the choice of ministers, in others the assent of only a select portion of the congregation, in others that of the trustees only, in others by prescribing no form at all, as in the present instance-it is easy to come to this Court for a remedy, but not so easy for this Court to find it.

It is here coutended that this was originally a Protestant institution to celebrate divine worship generally; and it is also insisted that the very instrument which creates the trust, bears on the face of it proof of the intent that the doctrine intended to be inculcated was the doctrine of the Trinity; and the clauses in the deed are referred to, which provide for the application of the fund in case of the Legislature rendering it unlawful to carry on that kind of worship. It is then observed that the act of Toleration, with a view to which the parties must be supposed to have looked, and which had passed before this trust, did not extend to the toleration of any doctrine impugning the Trinity. And it is therefore contended that those who instituted this trust must have thought they were establishing it for a lawful purpose: whereas the Toleration Act did not tolerate the impugners of the Trinity, and therefore an establishment for that purpose would have been illegal.

It is said, on the other hand, that the Acts of Parliament on this subject have been repealed: it is certainly true that the Legislature has repealed such laws with respect to the Trinity; it has also repealed the Scotch laws on the subject, which, I believe, even went so far as to inflict the punishment of death. It has also, I believe, within the last week, passed an Act for the same purpose with regard to the Irish laws on the subject; but I can confidently state that in one House, at least, it was never intended, by so doing, to alter or affect the common law.

I do not presume, however, to state here, and as sitting in a Court of equity, what is the effect of these acts on the common law; but if the common law is not altered, and it should be held that impugning the doctrine of the Trinity is an indictable offence at common law, then I cannot here execute a trust for the support of what would thus be decided to be illegal opinions.

It is not for the Court here to say how much or how little of toleration it is proper and desirable to extend; but it must look to what is the law of the land, and to the state in which the Legislature has placed the questiou.

But there is another view of the question: when these institutions are established for religious worship, and you cannot find froth the deed declaring the trust, what species

of opinion or form of worship was intended, the Court can find no other means of deciding it than by inquiring what has been the usage; and if any particular usage can be settled and supported, the Court must administer the trust in that manner, which may be supposed, from usage, to have been established, and to exist, as it were, in contract between the parties. But, (and I think the point has been settled in a case which came from Scotlaud in appeal to the House of Lords,) if an institution is established to carry on worship or to teach doctrines thought by the founders to be most conformable to Christianity, I do not apprehend that it is in the power of any members who may hereafter have the management of that institution, to alter the frame and object of it because their views vary. They cannot say to the rest we have changed, and therefore, as we are the majority, the constitution of the trust must change.

The case referred to settled, I think, that if they differed amongst themselves, you must look to the origin of the trust and settle it upon that foundation.

In this view it is important to see what the record says on this subject. Without entering into the effect of the repeal of the laws on the subject, which it would be improper for me, sitting in a Court of equity, to decide, and which, if it should arise, would much better be decided by the judges of the courts of common law; without deciding this question (having myself an opinion on the subject, but not called upon here to pronounce it), do the deeds manifest, with regard to the allusions to the Toleration Act, that this is an institution requiring the inculcation of the doctrine of the Trinity? Because, if that was the doctrine intended by the founders, and if the trustees have changed that object, I apprehend that it is not in the power of part or the whole of the congregation or trustees to call upon another trustee to effectuate that purpose. Even if Unitarianism had then been legal, yet if Trinitarianism was appointed and intended by the deed founding the trust, Anti-trinitarianism cannot now he supported by it. Meaning to speak with all reverence on the subject, it would be merely a question whether a trust for the benefit of A. could be diverted to the benefit of B. If this is the state of the question, it decides the case.

I am fully aware of the importance, with a view to conciliation, and abating the heat with which I am sorry to see controversies of this sort generally carried on, that a final and speedy determination should be made; yet if parties will frame such deeds with such obscure and undefined trusts, the Court must inquire, and time must be taken up; but it is their own fault,

With respect to the choice of the minister, I am not much acquainted with the practice in institutions of this sort: it is perhaps very uncertain, and probably in general they do not choose their minister for life. This Court would not perhaps much like this mode of appointment; but if the trust of the institution direct it, it must carry it into effect. The policy of the established church has been to make the minister independent of the congregation; but I do not apprehend that this policy can govern the decision of the Court, if the trust directs any other form.

So with respect to the persons who are to elect, I apprehend the Court must look to the usage. Some deeds of this kind confer the power upon some parties, some on others; but where it is wholly unascertained, the Court cannot administer the trust, till they know all these points by inquiring into the subject. On the face of the deeds nothing is said; inquiry, therefore, must be made: I can only say, I will read the Bill and Answer, and ascertain the facts as well as I can; and if I can get out of the affliction, I will decide the case on Thursday.

There certainly shall be no trial; there never shall be any expense of that sort incurred. If I can find out the state of the questions in this cause, so as to make an order on the subject, it will save every thing of that sort.

17th July, 1817. Lord Chancellor.-The motion before me on Monday arose upon a bill filed by the Attorney General, at the relation of Mr. Maunder and Mr. Steward, who alleges himself to be minister of the congregation of Protestant Dissenters assembling at Wolverhampton, against Mr. Pearson, together with others who assert that they are, together with Mr. Maunder, the trustees of the property in question, which is expressed in the trust-deeds to be a charity for the maintenance of "the service und worship of God" at that place, and who contend that Mr. Maunder ought to be considered as being no longer a trustee, or that if he has part of the legal estate of the trust property vested in him, that he ought to be considered as holding it for the purpose of being administered, as the other trustees or the majority shall direct, and that he is himself incapable of acting. And this information, as I collect from reading it, is filed to prevent those from acting as trustees who it contends have no such character; or if they are legally invested with such character, then the information is to be considered as filed for the purpose of insisting that the defendants being invested with the character of trustees for one purpose, mean to execute that trust for another purpose, contrary to the intention of the founders; and upon

these grounds, which afford a civil question in this Court, the information contends that it is entitled to certain relief, and particularly to an injunction to prevent the present legal proceedings of the defendants.

The deeds upon which the questions in this case arise, are the deed of 1701 (the particular effect of which it will be necessary to state carefully), another in 1742, to carry on this part of the trust, and lastly, the deed of 1772, by which last the premises were conveyed to Mr. Mauu. der and others. Another part of this trust is an acre of land, given for the purposes of the trust, and originally settled thereto in 1720, which is in 1772 vested in Mr. Maunder and eleven others. It appears also, that there have been two sums of £200 each, given for the same purpose, which, with £99, accumulations of rents, &c. of the other trust property, was laid out in the three per cents., part of which stock has been sold and laid out in leasehold property (it does not appear in whom vested), and the residue was invested in a promissory note given to four of the trustees, which still remains so invested. A further sum of £100 has been given by another person, which is for the henetit of the minister. In 1793, a stable was purchased by the trustees, and in 1794, a school-room, &c. erected, but it is alleged by the answer, that previous to that time dissensions had arisen in the congregation, and that the plaintiffs did not subscribe to such erection. It appears also, that the dwelling-house on the trust has been usually, but not always, the residence of the minister, it having been sometimes let, and the rent appropriated for his benefit.

It becomes here necessary (not for the purpose of expressing any opinion on doctrinal points, but in order to see what can be referred to as ascertaining the nature of this trust), to discover, if possible, the meaning of the original founders as to the purposes to which it was to be applied. Observing that the first trust deed is dated in 1701, it is important to remark that in 1689 the Act of the 1st of William and Mary, commonly called the Toleration Act, was passed, which exempted certain persons coming under the description of Protestant Dissenters, from the penalties of certain laws therein mentioned; and I observe again, the object seems to have been merely as stated in the title to exempt the persons therein described "from the penakties of certain laws," that is to say, certain particular statutes, therein mentioned and enumerated; and it does not appear to have done, or to have been intended to have done, any more-leaving the common law exactly as it was with regard to any offences recognised by that common law against religion or the esta

blishment. And in that Act there is an express provision, that nothing in that Act contained shall extend to give any ease, benefit or advantage to any Papist, &c., or "to any person that shall deny in his preaching or writing the doctrine of the blessed Trinity as it is declared in the aforesaid Articles of Religion;" this, I repeat, was enacted in 1689, and the original creation of this trust was in 1701. Afterwards, in 9 and 10 William III. an Act passed, entitled "An Act for the more effectual suppressing of Blasphemy and Profaneness;" and it recites, that whereas many persons have of late years openly avowed and maintained many blasphemous and impious opinions, contrary to the doctrines and principles of the Christian religion, greatly tending to the dishonour of Almighty God, &c.: wherefore, "for the more effectual suppressing of the said detestable crimes, it is enacted, that if any person, &c. shall, by writing, teaching, &c. deny any one of the Persons in the Holy Trinity to be God," or shall assert that there are more gods than One, or deny the divine authority of the Scriptures, he shall suffer certain pains. You will observe the recital to be not that the opinions are contrary to those of the Church of England, but to the Christian religion, and then to repress such doctrines so declared by the Statute to be contrary to the Christian religion, it is enacted as in the Act mentioned. The information, however, was required by the Act to be given within a limited period, and an opportunity was given to the offender to renounce his error. There can be no doubt that prior to this statute, blasphemy was an offence punishable at common law; and it is impossible, as it appears to me, to contend that the preamble is not to be taken as proof, that in the eye of the legis lature these doctrines, against which it is directed, amounted to blasphemy. nobody can contend that this statute by any means affected the common law, but left it exactly in the same state as before. As the late Act which repealed this Act repealed also the Scotch law on the same subject, I have here one of those Acts; it relates to and is directed against denying the doctrine of the Trinity expressly under the title of blasphemy; and it enacts that those who denied that doctrine should be punished with death. These Statutes remained in force till the 53rd of the present King, when the Act passed which repealed the excepting clause in the Toleration Act, and the 9th and 10th King William, so far as relates to the doctrine of the Trinity, and also the Scotch laws; and I should observe that there seemed to be no difference of opinion in any individuals of either House; that, without considering what offence there was at commor

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