that the power was questionable in any respect, or subject to any imputation, until after or at the trial of the case in Louisiana.

Here, again, the imputation of fraud strikes deep and wide. It does not merely affect the undersigned, but the numerous other persons in Alabama and Texas-parties, counsel, and witnesses-concerned in the production and proof of this power, including the empre sarios, Samuel M. Williams and Stephen F. Austin: the land in dispute having passed from La Vega and been sold under this power by Williams for the benefit of Austin, the real owner, and the proceeds transmitted to him for his release from prison in Mexico. If the power was a forged one, then, who perpetrated the felony? For all these persons, including as well Stephen F. Austin and Samuel M. Williams as the other later parties to the title, and himself, the undersigned indignantly denies the charge; and he entreats every member of the House to pause, ere he entertain the suggestion of an imputation, which not only affects the property, but the honor, of so many persons among the highest and best in the country, living and dead, who have not been and cannot be heard in their vindication by the House. The undersigned might aver, that of this power of attorney he had no knowledge whatever; but he will not do so in this relation, for, in the face of such an imputation, involving the honor of so many persons of the highest character and estimation, he disdains to plead any consideration of personal distinction.

This power of attorney, as it appears in the case, is in the form of what is denominated, in the jurisprudence of Spain and Mexico, a testimonio; that is, an authentic instrument of title, importing verity; that is, proving and giving faith of itself, without other proof. It is not a deed, in the sense of the common law; that is, a sealed paper, deriving authority from the seal and signature of the grantors; nor is it a copy, depending on verification by comparison with an original; but it is a duplicate original of a judicial act. In and by it, Juan Gonzales, regidor and alcalde in turn of the city of Leona Vicario, authenticates the fact that, on the 5th day of May, 1832, José Maria Aguirre, Tomas Vega, and Rafael Aguirre appeared before him, and declared that they constituted and appointed Samuel M. Williams their attorney, to sell and convey certain sitios of land, conceded to them on the 25th of March, 1825, under the colonization laws of the State. In addition to this act is a power, executed on the 28th day of April, 1832, by the same parties, in the same form, and authenticated by the same magistrate, authorizing the same Samuel M. Williams to locate the lands in question.

All parties admit the truth of the power to locate, without which, indeed, there would be no subject-matter of controversy; and the power of sale remained unimpeached until called in question by affidavit of Spencer, at the trial of the cause in the circuit court at New Orleans; that is, twenty-five years after its date, and twenty-four years after the location of the land by Williams.

Notwithstanding this objection, the instrument, after due consideration of the court, was admitted as authentic; and this ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court.-(Spencer vs. Lapsley, Howard's Rep., vol. 20, p. -.)

Its authenticity is now disputed on two grounds:

First, in a deposition, taken ex parte, Tomas de la Vega, after having acquiesced and lain by twenty-five years, now denies that he gave the power. On the other hand, the magistrate, Juan Gonzales, makes oath to the verity of his own signature, and the authenticity of the act. It is oath against oath; on the one hand, the magistrate; on the other, the party interested, seeking to invalidate the judicial act under which the lands passed, and thus to get back the land.

Secondly, an ex parte deposition of a person, purporting to be keeper of the archives, asserts that the protocol of the power on file is without the signature of La Vega. To which it is obvious to reply that, even if the deposition be true, still the protocol is no more authentic than the testimonio, and it is just as competent to say that the festimonio proves the falsity of the protocol.

In a word, as the testimonio is a title, importing verity of itself, it cannot be deprived of its authority by the mere allegation, collaterally, of discrepancy between it and the protocol, but remains possessed of authority, with full presumption of authenticity, until the contrary be proved on special proceedings applicable to the subject-matter.

Such, as the undersigned believes, is the rule of the laws of Spain and Mexico, pertinent to the question. And thus, notwithstanding all suggestions to the contrary, the instrument is entitled to be respected as authentic in regard of all the matters before the House. Of course, neither its existence nor its use in court can be imputed, either to the undersigned or his associates in interest, as a wrongful act. In reference to this point, some of the questions put in the inquiry before the committee seemed to intimate that the conduct of the undersigned and his associates, in despatching an agent to Saltillo to investigate the imputations cast on this power of attorney, were obnoxious to censure. The undersigned is unable to perceive why. Believing then, and still believing, that the power of attorney is perfectly genuine and authentic; believing that the fraud is on the other side, and that Tomas de la Vega, if he in truth gave the alleged deposition, is colluding with Simon Mussina to attack their title, might not the parties interested endeavor in good faith to explore the facts, where alone they could be explored, in the State of Coahuila ? The testimony of Mr. League proves the perfect good faith with which he, in behalf of all the parties interested, endeavored to ascertain the truth, not so much for the sake of the interests at stake, as for the vindication of their honor. He pursued the regular course in such matters-that of direct application to the magistrate, Gonzales, and of such inquiry otherwise as he or his agent was permitted to make at Saltillo, with powerful interests there to obstruct the inquiry. And there was nothing in the steps taken in this respect, including the indemnity paid to Gonzales, to induce him to go to New Orleans and testify, which is not of constant occurrence in the trial of questions of admiralty and of foreign contract, and other cases of international relation.

And the undersigned most respectfully submits to the House that it cannot, in this way, and on the trial of this preliminary question H. Mis Doc. 136-3

of impeachment, upset a power of attorney which has already received the sanction of the courts of law, and which, if s bject to question in other cases, must be tried in those courts of law. The House cannot in this way try a question of right existing, or which may exist, between Mr. Lapsly and Simon Mussina, as the personator of Tomas de la Vega; above all, it cannot, upon any proofs before it, adjudicate that question in favor of Mussina.

In this relation the undersigned cannot forbear to allude to a most significant fact which occurred in the course of the present investigation. Mr. Potter, a lawyer in Texas of well-earned distinction, and a most intelligent witness, objected to answer certain of the questions in committee, put in behalf of Mussina, from suspicion that the real object of them was to elicite facts, or make evidence, to be used in land suits pending in the courts. There is much in the case to justify that suspicion; and the undersigned entreats that this consideration may have due weight in the deliberations of the House.

There is one other subject which, although collateral only to the charges preferred, yet occupies a large space in the evidence before the committee, to which the undersigned begs leave to refer in conclusion, namely, the case of Ufford vs. Dycks, tried in the district court of Texas in 1854.

In that case the plaintiff claimed under a concession and grant to Rafael Aguirre, and the land passed by deed of Samuel M. Williams, as the attorney of Aguirre, it being the power of attorney heretofore spoken of, the authority of Aguirre being given by the same act-that is, the case involved another title, of which the same paper was a documentary incident. It is not pretended that the undersigned had any interest in the case; but it is said that he ought not to have tried it, because it depended on a power of attorney in which he was interested.

He replies, first, that he entered upon the case without any knowledge or suspicion of its relation to that power. The power was never read in the case; it was not argued; no question was presented upon it for the court to consider; it went into the case by agreement of counsel; so all the counsel testify.-(Testimony, pp. 254, 698, 410.) Of course, the undersigned did not rule upon it, or do anything else regarding it. Nor, if he had, could anything which he might have said or done in the premises have had any effect, either as law or fact, on questions to be tried in the circuit court of Louisiana.

But that is of no moment. It is immaterial that a judge has interest of his own depending on a question of law which arises in a case before him. Of course he has, in most cases. He declares a rule of personal right in behalf of others, which is also his personal right; and so in questions of property. Nor is it material that he has interests affected by a particular document, unless those interests are at issue in the same case. These are questions which might once have been opened to doubt; but they are so no longer. It is now settled that nothing disqualifies, except such interest in the suit, as, in a question of evidence, would render a witness incompetent to testify. That

is the rule, as pronounced by all the judges of England in the case of Dimes vs. Grand Junction Canal Company, where a decree made by the vice chancellor, and enrolled by the chancellor, (Lord Cottenham,) was called in question, because of the interest of Lord Cottenham as a stockholder of the Grand Junction Canal. The successive arguments on this question before the master of the rolls, (Lord Langdale,) the chancellor himself, and the House of Lords, are a full and most instructive commentary on the subject, and completely vindicate the conduct of the undersigned in the case of Ufford vs. Dycks.-(See Beavan's rep., vol. 12, p. 63; Hall & Tuells' Rep., vol. 2, p. 92; House of Lords' cases, vol. 3, p. 759.)

To conclude, the undersigned begs permission to refer to one other topic, incidental to the general subject. He is informed that rumors have been circulated industriously to the effect, that the people of the State of Texas have already prejudged his case, and that they call for his impeachment. If such were the sentiment of the people of Texas, that circumstance should not, and of course would not, and could not, influence the deliberations of this House. A question of the impeachment of a judge is one to be decided on its merits. His popularity or unpopularity is a thing altogether foreign to the question. When mere popularity becomes the sole test of judicial qualification, there will cease to be any assurance of the faithful administration of justice. "Plaudits," it has been well said, "are fitter for players than magistrates;" and "a popular judge is a deformed thing." Judges are "to do good, to love the people, and give them justice;" but nihil inde expectantes. At the same time, the undersigned emphatically denies that the people of Texas expect or call for his impeachment; and he pronounces the assertion that it is so, if it have been asserted, a calumny on the people of Texas as well as on himself, by whomsoever, high or low, the assertion may have been made.

The legislature of Texas, many years ago, did, it is true, entertain complaints against the undersigned; and the subject of those complaints was investigated by the House of Representatives here, whose action acquitted the undersigned; and that action disposed of those particular complaints, not here only, but also in Texas. When the present new complaints arose, the legislature of Texas intimated its wish to have them duly investigated, but it did not prejudge the case; it expressly disavowed having any desire on the subject, other than for a speedy termination of the controversy, which it deemed due alike to the State and to the undersigned, and which he also earnestly desires. He offered, at an early stage of the inquiry, to show the true sentiment of the people of Texas in the premises, as he would have done, if the committee had permitted, and had not decided that it was a matter of inquiry unfit to be entertained by them, and of course improper for the consideration of the House. And the undersigned is prepared to resume his official duties, with undoubting confidence in the candor, the right feeling, and the good will of the people of Texas. Meanwhile, he submits the whole case to the intelligence and wisdom of the House; and feeling conscious, as he does, of perfect uprightness of act and thought, and well knowing that the charges pre

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ferred against him are unjust and untrue, he must, of course, expect that the House wil so determine; but if it should be otherwise, and the House be not prepared to give him a full, complete, and free acquittal of the charges, then he desires that such course be taken in the matter as shall bring it to conclusion at the bar of the high judicature provided by the constitution for the ultimate decision of all such questions, the Senate of the United States. JOHN C. WATROUS.