important, the expense to the nation, both in time and money, is too great to justify the House in proceeding upon mere ex parte testimony presented by a private accuser. Neither the investigating committee nor the House should rest satisfied with such evidence alone. They ought to go beyond this rule, and examine so much testimony as to create a rational belief that the accused is guilty."-(Peck's Trial, p. 427.)

Mr. Buchanan, in these remarks, suggests a distinction, the disregard of which, it is conceived, is the source of prevalent errors on the subject. The accusation of the House is to be considered by the Senate as an ex parte one when presented there for trial; but it is not to be considered or treated as an ex parte one when it is before the House on the question of bringing in or presenting articles of impeachment. That conclusion is dictated by considerations of justice to the party ac cused, but still more by considerations of dignity of the House, and its duty to itself, to the Senate, and, in general, to the government and people of the United States.

The House of Representatives, therefore, it is humbly submitted, is not to content itself with inquiring if there be probable cause of accusation; it is not to proceed ex parte; it is to investigate the broad question of guilt or innocence; it is limited in this inquiry to charges of malfeasance in office, and of specific acts of high crime or misdemeanor, recognized by law, and capable of being produced in distinct articles of impeachment; of the actual truth of which the House, on its conscience and honor, is to be satisfied before carrying them up to the bar of the Senate.

Nevertheless, and in disregard of justice and of parliamentary law, when, at the last Congress, the memorials which are now before the House accusing the undersigned of high crimes and misdemeanors, were first received and considered, the charges were heard by a committee of the House ex parte. On that ex parte hearing, a criminatory report was made, composed largely of matters not official, and not in any sense constituting high crimes and misdemeanors; and with the report of the committee a volume of ex parte evidence was printed, consisting of imperfect records of judicial proceedings, and placed in the series of the documents of the government. If that House had gone farther in this direction, and had proceeded ex parte to frame articles of impeachment against him, the undersigned would have had less cause of complaint, being confident that his official integrity and his personal honor would thus have been vindicated long since by a full and impartial trial at the bar of the Senate. But in consequence of this action on the part of the last House, which, by its committee, professed to proceed ex parte as a grand jury, and yet, in violation of all the rules applicable to such a proceeding, printed the ex parte evidence taken before it, the undersigned has been subject to the injury of being forced to encounter the prejudices, which thus had been diffused among his countrymen, and may possibly have reached the members of the present Congress.

The undersigned, however, notwithstanding the circumstances of disadvantage to him under which, for the reasons stated, he comes before the House, does not hesitate to appeal to, and to rely upon, its

exalted sense of justice, in the consideration of the charges against him now a second time presented to the House.

Three memorials praying for the impeachment of the undersigned, each of them presented in a previous Congress, have been called up in this House, and referred to its Committee on the Judiciary. Of these memorials, the first, that of William Alexander, had been considered in the thirty-second Congress, (1851-'52,) and by it rejected, in effect; and that decision has, on its committee's report, been confirmed by the present House. The other two memorials, one in the name of Jacob Mussina, and the other in that of Eliphas Spencer, are now, upon a divided report of its committee, to undergo the judgment of the House.

The memorial subscribed by Jacob Mussina, like that subscribed by Eliphas Spencer, as appears by the evidence before the committee, is morally and really the act of Simon Mussina. He, as himself testifies, prepared, drafted, blocked out both memorials. He appears here, not as counsel to conduct a prosecution, but in the anomalous character of the agent of two prosecutors, not apparently in virtue of any power of attorney, if there could be a power of attorney for such a purpose, but on his personal declaration. As such agent, though not a professional person conversant with the law, he yet presumes to prefer charges of imputed legal errors on the part of the undersigned; and with still greater temerity he presumes to prefer numerous charges of fact, of all which, as he admits on oath, he has no personal knowledge. The extraordinary circumstance of the volunteer personation of Jacob Mussina and Eliphas Spencer by Simon Mussina is important, as it will hereafter be seen, to be borne in mind, in appreciating the matters of charge contained in the two memorials.

The memorial in the case of Jacob Mussina suggests numerous charges in form, reducible to four only, in substance, namely:

1. Imputed errors of law in the trial of a suit in chancery before the undersigned, entitled Cavazos and others against Stillman and others, upon which alleged errors of law corrupt partialit is inferentially imputed.

2. Imputed oppression as to the appeal of the case to the Supreme Court.

3. Imputed oppression in a case incidental to this, that of the United States against Mussina.

4. Imputed irregularities in the summoning of jurors for service in the district court.

I will take leave to speak of this fourth charge first, disposing of it in a very few words

This matter of charge is independent of any of the particular facts, of personal relation, which concern either Jacob Mussina or Eliphas Spencer, or the special interests of Simon Mussina. It alleges that, at the June term of the court, 1853, the undersigned made an order directing the marshal not to summon jurymen, for the court to be held at Brownsville, from the counties of Cameron, Starr, Webb, and Hidalgo, which are within the judicial district of Brownsville; and that such jurors were not drawn by ballot, as required by the statutes of the State of Texas, in conformity with the acts of Congress.

The facts are these: Sundry suits were pending at Brownsville, instituted by Mr. William G. Hale, of Galveston, as counsel for the plaintiffs, against persons residing in the district of Brownsville. Mr. Hale desired to have these cases transferred for trial to Galveston, on account of the difficulty of obtaining impartial jurors in that neighborhood, because of the common interest of the inhabitants in the questions at issue. Mr. Power, acting for the defendants, opposed this, arguing the inconvenience of carrying numerous witnesses to Galveston; and accordingly, on written application by him and others, it was ordered that the venue for the next term of the court should run to counties other than those constituting the district of Brownsville. This order was founded on obvious reasons of justice, and perfectly consonant with the express letter of the law, which requires that jurors for service in the courts of the United States "shall be returned, as there shall be occasion for them, from such parts of the district, from time to time, as the court shall direct, so as shall be most favorable to an impartial trial."-(Act of Congress of September 24, 1789, sec. 29, Laws United States, vol. 1, p. 88.)

As to the mode of drawing jurors, that, if irregular, was the act of the marshal, as fully appears by the evidence before the committee, and not of the court. In whatever form done, it was never made the cause of exception or challenge by any party, plaintiff, or defendant, in any cause whatever. But there was not, it is conceived, any irregularity in the matter; for, as proved before the committee, jurors for the court were obtained in a manner conforming as near as possible to the statutes of Texas, in obedience to the provision of the federal law, that "jurors in all cases, to serve in the courts of the United States, shall be designated by lot or otherwise, in each State respectively, according to the mode of forming juries therein now practised, so far as the laws of the same shall render such designation practicable by the courts or marshals of the United States."—(Ti supra.)

To comprehend thoroughly the case of Cavazos against Stillman, it is necessary to give account of the nature and history of that case.

It was a suit in equity in the district court of Texas, instituted at the January term, 1849, and decided at the January term, 1852. It was a bill of peace. The original parties were Rafael Garcia Cavazos and wife and six others, all in name and in fact citizens of the Mexican republic, complainants; and Charles Stillman, Richard Fitzpatrick, Patrick C. Shannon, Samuel A. Belden, and W. W. Chapman, all in name and in fact citizens of Texas, defendants.-(Transcript, p. 1.)

In the course of the preliminary or incidental proceedings in the case, the bill underwent several amendments. Four of the plaintiffs were made defendants by their own consent, (Trans., p. 42,) they ap pearing as such in person or by counsel, (Trans., p. 27,) in accordance with a rule of practice in chancery, sanctioned by the Supreme Court. (Wisner vs. Barrett, Washington's Reps., vol. 4, p. 642; Greely vs. Smith, Story's Reps., vol. 3, p. 76.) The complainants dismissed their bill as to two of the defendants, Chapman and Fitzpatrick.-(Trans., p. 205.) And Jacob Mussina, styled "citizen of

the said State of Texas," was made defendant, (Trans., p. 42,) on the express application of his agent, Simon Mussina (Mr Hale's Statement, p. 7.) All the defendants appeared.-(Trans., pp. 43, 31, 56, 146, 148.)

The matter in dispute was a part of the lands constituting the site of the town of Brownsville. Of the defendants, Stillman, Belden, and Mussina claimed to hold under the city of Matamoras, on the ground that the land, although originally the property of Cavazos or his ancestors, had been taken from them by process of expropriation for public uses as ejidos or commons of that city. The plaintiffs, on the other hand, stood on their title by ancient grant from Spain to José Salvador de la Garza, with possession, denying the alleged expropriation to the public uses of the city of Matamoras, and of course denying all pretended title derived under such assumed expropriation, and demanding to have their title quieted by authority of law.—(Mr. Hartley's testimony, p. 408.)

Simon Mussina, as attorney in fact of Jacob Mussina, participated in all the proceedings in person, and by successive or joint counsel of more or less eminence, namely: Messrs. Johnson and Swett, F. H. Merriman, Volney E. Howard, M. M. Potter, O. C. Hartley, and Alexander and Atchison, (Trans., passim, Testimony, pp. 304, 402, 270,) and the case was fully tried, and fairly and completely argued on its merits, and with a vast body of exhaustive evidence, (Trans., p. 258,) and finally decided on its merits, to the effect that Cavazos had the superior title, and that of course Mussina and his particular associates, Stillman and Belden, had none.-(Trans., p. 1062.) The proper legal consequence followed, of a decree to give peace to the title of Cavazos.

The undersigned feels entirely confident that any competent jurist who shall take the pains to examine the transcript in this case will concur with him in conclusion. In fact, the legislature of Texas did subsequently, by act of February 8, 1852, confirm the grant in question to the heirs and assigns of José Salvador de la Garza. And as to the counter claim of Stillman, Belden, and Mussina, that whole matter came, by the act of Mussina himself, before the supreme court of the State of Louisiana, which adjudged, June term, 1856, not only that the title of Cavazos was good as against Stillman, Belden, and Mussina, but also and especially that, as between himself and his codefendants, Mussina had no title whatever, nor any interest in the cause. (Mussina vs. Alling, Louisiana Annual Reps., vol. 11, p. 568.) Mussina took no appeal from the decree of the district court, and made no proper movement to take any until some time in January, 1857, a few days before the expiration of the five years allowed him for that purpose by the act of Congress.-(Mussina Petitioner, Howard's Reps., vol. 20, p. —.)

Shannon took an appeal July, 1856, four and a half years after the decree, but did not take it lawfully, as expressly decided by the Supreme Court.-(Shannon vs. Cavazos et al., Howard's Rep., vol. 20, p. —.)

Now, it is upon such a case, and so situated, that, for imputed technical errors of the judge in the course of the trial, Simon Mussina,

in the name of Jacob Mussina, charges corruption by inference only from such imputed legal errors; for there is no proof, not a tittle nor shadow of evidence, to justify the charge. But it is perfectly manifest that corruption is never to be imputed from the mere act of erroneous rulings at nisi prius. If it were so, what judge would escape the charge? His errors, if any, are to be corrected on appeal, if material to the case in the judgment of the Supreme Court.

And if the undersigned were corrupt in the case, in whose favor and by whom was he corrupted? Not by or for the winning party. Mr. Hale, the counsel for the complainants, pronounces the allegation a scandalous falsehood, and declares that if any such intimation be applied by Mussina to him he will prosecute for libel or perjury.— (Statement, p. 8.)

The undersigned need hardly say that he also, for himself, repels the false charge with indignation and scorn; and that he has no interest, directly or indirectly, in the cause, or in common with any of the complainants. He decided the case, after a long and patient hearing, and with ample consideration of everything said in it by or for Mussina, and he decided it as he thought, and now thinks, correctly; and for such just and rightful decision of the case he is no more subject to the imputation of corruption than was, in like circumstances, and for a like decision in substantially the same case, the supreme court of the State of Louisiana.

And did the undersigned err in any of his rulings in the case as alleged by Mussina? This he denies, and he prays the attention of the House to the imputed errors.

1. First, it is alleged that he acted unjustly in "sustaining the bill of complaint, after the master had reported that the soliciter of the complainants had no authority to institute the suit, from which no appeal was taken," (meaning, apparently, to which no exception was taken.)

This statement is incorrect, and substantially untrue. The motion to which it refers was made by two of the defendants only, Fitzpatrick and Shannon, and by them afterwards withdrawn.-(Trans., p. 40.) Of course the whole question fell to the ground, and neither called for nor could receive any sustaining act on the part of the undersigned.

2. Secondly, it is alleged that the undersigned ordered that certain of the complainants, who, by the sworn averments of the bill, were citizens of Mexico, should be stricken from the bill (as complainants) and made defendants, by averring on the record that they were citizens of Texas.

That is incorrect, and in substance untrue. It was by consent that these parties became defendants, and they voluntarily appeared as such. There was no sworn averment of the bill as to their citizenship; nor is the point material. There might lawfully be alien defendants as well as plaintiffs by consent, (Mason vs Ship Blaireau, Cranch's Rep., vol. 2, p. 240; Piquignot vs. Pennsylvania Railroad, Howard's Rep., vol. 16, p. 104.) And, if it were otherwise, that would not affect the jurisdiction of the court as to other competent parties. (Conolly vs. Taylor, Peter's Rep., vol. 2, p. 566, and other cases.)