the original writing was apparent. A motion was made for probate with this legacy in blank. The Judge refused the application, until the will should have been inspected by some person skilled in decyphering. This was accordingly done, and not only was the original writing made out, but the marks by which it was concealed were also decyphered to be a series of abusive epithets applied to the legatee, although they apparently consisted of a mere mass of scratches and flourishes without any purpose whatever. Cases of this class are of daily occurrence, as well in wills disposing of small as of large properties. It is evident, therefore, that a practical familiarity with the subject itself, combined with a general knowledge of Testamentary Law, is necessary to the satisfactory conducting even of the common form business in a Court of Probate. I will illustrate this by one further instance. A case lately occurred in which a testator by a codicil altered the bequests in his will, so as to affect several of the remainders with respect to certain individuals, but retaining them in full force as to others. The testator subsequently burnt the codicil with the intention of reviving the will as originally drawn. Under the old law he would have effected his object. The present law, however, requires a reexecution of the will, or the execution of a subsequent codicil, in order to such a revival. The testator did neither, and the will remained, therefore, after the destruction of the codicil, in point of law, exactly as it was during its existence. The probate, in order to set out the legal contents of the will, must show this; it must state the whole contents of the will, for that remained in force as to some of the legatees; it must recite the execution and destruction of the codicil; and it must also, without giving probate of it, set out the contents of the destroyed codicil, otherwise the law would be defeated. This is a case, undoubtedly, of more than ordinary difficulty, but it is also one which might happen as well with respect to a will affecting a small property as a large one, and affords an example of the difficult questions, though merely practical, which may be involved in a grant of probate in common form.

A Registration Office in the above case would have merely

to receive and register the will, leaving any parties whose interests might be affected to bring forward elsewhere the above circumstances as they were advised.

But the importance of this distinction between Probate and Registration becomes still further evident, when we consider that the Probate is now the only evidence of the contents of a will, so far as the personalty is concerned, whereas, in regard to realty, the will itself must be resorted to; and that Probate, if applied to real estate, would determine the contents of wills in reference to lands, as it now does their contents with respect to personalty.

4. It remains to consider briefly the fourth and last duty of a Court of Probate, viz. the declaring a personal representative of the testator's estate. This, as far as personalty is concerned, is absolutely necessary in every case; and whether the deceased has died testate or intestate. Without it, neither creditors nor legatees would know into whose possession the property of the deceased had come; and, consequently, would be unable to enforce their just claims against it.

Where a deceased person leaves a will, and appoints one or more executors in plain words, who himself, or themselves, present the will, a Registration Office might, upon taking charge of the will, grant a certificate, that he or they are the executors named in it; and this might suffice for many purposes. But whenever (as constantly happens) one out of several executors alone presents himself, or the language of the will is doubtful with respect to the appointment, or the executors all refuse to interfere, nothing but a Court of Probate can meet the difficulties of the case. As the law now stands, if several executors are named in the will, and one alone asks for probate, the right of the others to come in afterwards has to be preserved. This is almost entirely a question of practice. The determining whether a person is or is not an executor according to the tenor, is often a question of great nicety: and as a person may be constituted executor with respect to part only of the deceased's estate, this also gives rise to other difficult inquiries. In default of the executors, administration with the will annexed is granted

to the residuary legatee, in trust or otherwise, for life, or substituted to the widow, to the next of kin, to a simple legatee, or even to a creditor; and a uniform practice must be observed in cases which are similar with respect to every one of these grants. A Registration Office is relieved from all these considerations.

Supposing, however, that the deceased dies intestate, a Court of Probate (in virtue of its right to appoint a representative to the deceased's estate) has a field open to it, wholly distinct from any which can by possibility belong to a Registration Office. The Statute of Distributions, combined with established practice, in cases to which that Statute does not extend, affords the ordinary principles upon which such grants are made, but a class of cases still more difficult remain to be glanced at.

It frequently happens, that the personal representative dies before the estate has been fully administered. In case of an executor, his executor remains in law the representative of the original testator; and this chain continues until broken by some person included in it dying intestate. If the original deceased died intestate, and his administrator dies, having only partly administered the estate, the difficulty occurs earlier. But, in any case, the rule which obtains is to make the grant in accordance with the interest; and I need not point out that difficult questions, both in regard to Law and Practice, frequently arise out of cases of this kind; but with these an Office of Registration could have no possible

concern.

I trust that I have now sufficiently explained my conception of the inherent differences existing between Registration and Probate; and nothing more remains than to make one or two short remarks in conclusion.

1. The experience of, I believe, upwards of 4000 cases which have occurred in the Prerogative Court since the passing of the present Act with respect to wills, justifies the remark, that the many new phases under which testamentary papers may present themselves are by no means exhausted.

2. The providing for such future exigencies, as well as the due administration of the other matters I have adverted to,

renders it absolutely necessary that the officials superintending the common form of business of Courts of Probate should be persons previously from practice acquainted with that business, and conversant with those legal principles upon which it depends.

ART. VII.-PRIVATE ACTS OF PARLIAMENT.

A SPECIAL or Private Statute is an Act of the Legislature sanctioning for a particular emergency what the general law does not allow.

Such enactments, the civilians observe, are not properly termed laws, which ex vi termini have a universal operation': and, indeed, in our own Courts of Justice, Private Acts of Parliament are construed, for the most part, less as laws than as anomalous arrangements between private parties expressly sanctioned by the Legislature for the special occasion that has given rise to them.

Private Statutes have in this country long occupied a prominent place both in the business of Parliament and of our Civil Tribunals. Thousands of commercial undertakings have in modern times thus received the special sanction of the Legislature. Canals, railways, and a large class of other public works are regulated in this manner; and no inconsiderable portion of the time of Parliamentary Committees is taken up in investigating the schemes of their promoters. The merchant, the landowner, and the local officer, no less than the magistrate and the lawyer, have daily to consider the extent of the powers which Parliament has conferred on the promoters of public undertakings; and the construction of Local and Personal Acts comes naturally to form no inconsiderable part of the business of Westminster Hall.

The system of special legislation for particular emergencies

1 See Gravini Orig. lib. ii. c. 74. De Privilegiis non irrogandis. See also Taylor's Civil Law, p. 234. (ed. 4.)

is not peculiar to the present age or to this country. The practice of granting particular exemptions from the general law, and making special and private statutes or edicts for extraordinary occasions, appears indeed to be recognised by the constitution of most countries', the principal difference between the system adopted in various states consisting less in substance than in the mode of affording the public sanction to such private laws.

Under the name of beneficia and privilegia (quasi priva leges), the Imperial Code recognised private laws and constitutions made on a given emergency, conferring special authority to do what the general law would not sanction3 such special laws affording within the limited scope of their operation a sanction equivalent to that of the general law of the State.1

By an express provision of the laws of the Decemvirs privileges could only be conceded by the general voice of the people 5; but in the latter days of the Republic this notion was little regarded, the concession of private laws became a common practice, and was often made conducive to very bad purposes. If a popular governor had exceeded the bounds of legitimate authority in his province, a private law was passed

1 See Vinn. Inst. lib. i. tit. 2.; De Constitutione, 6.; Mont. Esprit de Lois, lib. vi. c. i.

In America a public company, according to circumstances, is incorporated by special Act of Congress, or derives its power from the legislature of the particular State in which the subject matter occurs. A learned dissertation on the operation of such Acts, by Chief Justice Story, will be found in Jackson v. Catlin, 2 Johnson's Rep. 263., 8 Johnson's Rep. 520.; see also 1 Kent Commentaries on the American Law, p. 200. 460.

Proceedings somewhat similar to our Parliamentary Inquiries, with reference to Private Acts, take place in France on an application for extraordinary powers not sanctioned by Law.

The promoters of a railway scheme, for instance, treat with the Government for a concession, and on proof of the responsibility of the parties, of a portion of the necessary amount of money being deposited, and a guarantee given that the remaining funds will be subscribed, they are permitted to take out statutes which are passed by the Council of State.

2 A. Gell. x. 20.

4 See Cod. Just. xi. 15.; Inst. 1, 2. 6.

See Plin. x. 56, 57. 110.

5 Vetant leges sacratæ vetant 12 tabulæ leges privatis hominibus irrogari.