and lands in Porto Rico than it required for governmental purposes, and the act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat., 731), authorized the President "to make, within one year after the approval of this act, such reservation of public lands and buildings belonging to the United Sates in the island of Porto Rico ** * as he may deem necessary," the balance "not so reserved being granted to the government of Porto Rico," etc.

The title to all of these lands being in the United States, the effect of the proclamations was to reserve for public purposes certain lands out of the public lands in Porto Rico ceded by Spain to the United States; to assign to certain Executive Departments of this Government the control of the lands reserved as aforesaid; and to relinquish to the government of Porto Rico such of said lands as were not so reserved.

Where it is found that the Government work can the better be carried on by a transfer of the control of a particular parcel, it is thought the Secretary has ample authority to make the same. The acts of the Secretaries are the acts of the President. They are but the instrumentalities through whom he performs the multitudinous duties devolved upon him specifically by law, and an order sent out in the regular course of business from the appropriate Executive Department, is the legal equivalent of the President's own order to the same effect. (U. S. v. Macdaniel, 7 Pet., 14; In re Neagle, 39 Fed. Rep., 833, 860; Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U. S., 755, 768.)

Respectfully,

Approved.

W. H. MOODY.

HENRY M. HOYT,

Solicitor-General.

The SECRETARY OF COMMERCE AND LABOR.

NAVY REGULATIONS-BOUNTY.

The regulations of the Secretary of the Navy issued July 1, 1901, pursuant to the act of March 1, 1889 (25 Stat., 781), which act provides a bounty to each person enlisting as an apprentice in the United States Navy, are inconsistent with law and void in so far as they require a refund of the bounty, or any portion of it, in case an apprentice

is discharged within a year after his enlistment for disability not incurred in the line of duty.

Under section 1547, Revised Statutes, all navy regulations issued since July 14, 1862, require the approval of the President.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

November 8, 1904.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th ultimo, wherein you request my opinion as to the validity of certain regulations issued by the Secretary of the Navy, in connection with the act of Congress of March 1, 1889 (25 Stat., 781), which authorizes the Secretary to furnish a bounty to each person who enlists as an apprentice in the United States Navy.

The act provides as follows:

"That in order to encourage the enlistment of boys as apprentices in the United States Navy, the Secretary of the Navy is hereby authorized to furnish as a bounty to each of said apprentices after his enlistment, and when first received on board of a training ship, an outfit of clothing not to exceed in value the sum of forty-five dollars."

I should hesitate to render you my opinion upon this subject, in view of the well-established rule holding the opinions of the Comptroller of the Treasury, upon a question involving the payment of money by any Executive Department of the Government, to be final and conclusive (act of July 31, 1894, 28 Stat., 208; 21 Opin., 178; Id., 181; Id., 188; 22 Id., 581; 23 Id., 468), were it not for the fact that the present case is unusually important, since it involves the validity of regulations issued by the head of an Executive Department, and therefore appears to fall within the exception to that rule recognized by the Attorney-General when he is duly asked for his opinion before the Comptroller has passed upon the question, and the Comptroller himself joins in the request. (21 Opin., 224; 21 Id., 402.) For this reason I proceed to an examination of the question on the merits.

It is necessary, in order to determine whether the regula tions in question are valid, first to examine the language of the statute above quoted, for the purpose of ascertaining whether that language is mandatory or permissive.

The purpose which Congress had in mind when it enacted

this legislation was to encourage boys to enlist as appren tices in the United States Navy, and with this end in view, Congress authorized the Secretary to furnish as a bounty to each of said apprentices after his enlistment, and when first received on board of a training ship, an outfit of clothing not to exceed in value the sum of $45.

Taking up the particular point of interpretation, the question to be considered is whether the words "is hereby authorized" are mandatory or permissive. The general rule is that, where Congress confers a power upon an executive officer which involves the rights or interests of private individuals or the general public, the language used by Congress is to be considered as imposing a duty rather than a discretion. While the ordinary meaning of the language above quoted is generally permissive, yet as used in law it is often mandatory and equivalent to imposing an imperative obligation.

Congress undoubtedly did not intend that the Secretary of the Navy should have such discretionary power with respect to furnishing the bounty authorized by the act here under consideration, as would enable him to furnish it in one case and in another case decline to furnish it.

In a number of cases decided in the Federal courts, the word "may," which is practically synonymous with the word "authorize," has been held to be mandatory and not permissive when embodied in a statute.

In the case of the Supervisors v. United States (4 Wall., 435, 445), in which the phrase "may, if deemed advisable," was under consideration, the court said:

"The counsel for the respondent insists, with zeal and ability, that the authority thus given involves no duty; that it depends for its exercise wholly upon the judgment of the supervisors, and that judicial action can not control the discretion with which the statute has clothed them. We can not concur in this view of the subject."

The rule stated by Black on Interpretation of Laws, page 156, is as follows:

"Thus, it is well settled that may, in any statute, is to be construed as equivalent to 'shall' or 'must' when the public interests or rights are concerned, and when the public or third persons have a right de jure to claim that the power

granted shall be exercised. "The result seems to be,' says a learned writer, 'that when a public power for the public. benefit is conferred in enabling terms, a duty is impliedly imposed to exercise it whenever the occasion arises. These terms are then, in effect, invariably invested with a compulsory force.””

See also 15 Opin., 621; 24 Id., 594; Sedgwick on Construction, etc., 375, 377.

In my opinion the language used by Congress in the act here under consideration is to be construed as imposing upon the Secretary of the Navy an imperative obligation. and not merely discretionary power. The whole purpose of the act is to "encourage the enlistment of boys as apprentices in the United States Navy," and upon the Secretary of the Navy is imposed the duty of executing the provisions of the statute.

Taking up now the validity of the regulations issued by the Secretary of the Navy on July 1, 1901, in pursuance of the act of Congress hereinbefore quoted, those regulations provide:

"An outfit of clothing, not exceeding in value the sum of forty-five dollars shall be furnished to apprentices and landsmen for training; apprentices to receive the outfit after arrival at a training station and landsmen for training after reporting on board a receiving or training ship or at a training station. When not transferred immediately to a training station, apprentices may be furnished upon enlistment with such portions of the outfit as are necessary for health and comfort. Landsmen for training, discharged for disability not incurred in the line of duty, or by request, during the first six months of enlistment, shall refund the full value of outfit received, and half the value thereof if so discharged between six months and one year after enlistment. Apprentices discharged for such disability, or by request, during the first three months of enlistment, shall refund the full value of outfit received, and one-half the value thereof if so discharged between three months and one year after enlistment. Where landsmen for training or apprentices are discharged after one year from date of enlisting, or for disability incurred in the line of duty, no refund of cost of outfit shall be required."

13243--VOL 25-04-18

Section 1547 of the Revised Statutes provides:

"The orders, regulations, and instructions issued by the Secretary of the Navy prior to July first, eighteen hundred and sixty-two, with such alterations as he may since have adopted, with the approval of the President, shall be recognized as the regulations of the Navy, subject to alterations adopted in the same manner."

It is a well-settled rule of judicial construction that the regulations issued by the Secretary of the Navy, in conformity with the section of the Revised Statutes above quoted, are valid and have the force of law, when they are not inconsistent with the statute under which they are issued by the Secretary.

*

The regulations here under consideration provide that any apprentice "discharged for disability not incurred in the line of duty during the first three months of enlistment, shall refund the full value of outfit received, and one-half the value thereof if so discharged between three months and one year after enlistment." The act of Corgress which authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to furnish a bounty to apprentices does not contain any language from which the inference could be drawn that apprentices discharged within one year after date of enlistment shall refund any part of the clothing outfit previously furnished them as a bounty. Congress has offered the bounty as an inducement to boys to enlist as apprentices in the United States Navy, and when the offer is accepted by any person, the right to such bounty accrues when the applicant is first received on board of a training ship.

In my opinion it would be an erroneous interpretation of the statute to hold that, in case an apprentice were discharged within a year after the date of his enlistment, for disability not incurred in the line of duty, he would be obliged to refund any portion of the bounty furnished him at the time of enlistment. This disability may or may not be incurred through any fault or negligence on the part of the apprentice, but according to the regulations here under consideration he would be compelled to refund the bounty or a portion thereof, if he were discharged for such disability, in view of the fact that he would be incapacitated for further service.

In the case of Glavey v. The United States (182 U. S., 595,