124 C. Cls.

INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION, APPEALS FROM-Con.

March 3, 1893, and that as of that date the Paw-
nees were entitled to have credited to their account
$1.25 per acre for each acre in question plus
interest at the rate of 5% per annum in accordance
with the terms of the Agreement of that date
between the Pawnees and the United States, and
that subsequent reservation or setting apart of
the land for school and agency purposes in July
of 1893 merely had effect of withdrawing it from
settlement and sale and did not revest title in the
tribe. Pawnees entitled to award under Section
2 (4) of the Indian Claims Commission Act.
Indians 11.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION.

Id.

See Contracts LXIII, LXIV, LXV, LXVI, LXVII, LXVIII,
LXIX, LXX, LXXI.

IRAN, ARMY CONTRACT IN.

See Contracts LXXII, LXXIII, LXXIV, LXXV, LXXVI,
LXXVII.

JURISDICTION.

I. Under the provisions of the Federal Employees'
Compensation Act (5 U. S. C. 793), the action of
the Administrator or his designees in allowing or
denying any payment under the Act is final and
conclusive and the United States Court of Claims
is without jurisdiction. Defendant's motion for
summary judgment is granted and the petition is
dismissed. Nolen, 230.

II. In the instant case, where the cause of action for
compensation accrued June 22, 1943, and the
claim for salary accrued not later than August 27,
1943, plaintiff's petition filed in the Court of
Claims on April 9, 1952, would be barred by the
six-year statute of limitations even if otherwise
cognizable. Id.
461.

Courts

III. Where the plaintiff in the instant suit seeks damages
for an alleged breach of contract based on the fact
that the defendant's agents at Leavenworth peni-
tentiary, while plaintiff was on parole from that

124 C. Cls.

JURISDICTION-Continued

institution, under Section 4164 of Title 18, U. S.
Code, delivered custody of plaintiff to the agents
of the State of Indiana, it is held that the Court
of Claims has no jurisdiction. Defendant's
motion to dismiss is granted, and plaintiff's
petition is dismissed. Hacker, 261.

IV. On the facts alleged and admitted in the instant case,
and under the provisions of Section 4164 of Title
18, there is no contract, express or implied, of
which the Court of Claims has jurisdiction.
Courts

449 (1).

Id.

V. If any wrong has been done plaintiff under the facts
set out in the pleadings it is in the nature of a tort
over which the Court of Claims has no jurisdiction
under subdivision 5 of 28 U. S. C. 1491. Id.
Courts 449 (2).

See also Contracts XLIV, XLV, XLVI, XLVII; Report to Con-
gress I, II, III, IV, V, VI; Taxes XXVII, XXVIII.
JURISDICTIONAL ACT.

I. In a suit under a Jurisdictional Act, where plaintiff,
a lessee of property in Hoboken, New Jersey,
asserts a claim for damages when the Government
acquired the fee to the leased property and plain-
tiff's lease was terminated, it is held that plaintiff
is not entitled to recover. Defendant's motion for
summary judgment granted. Plaintiff's motion
denied and petition dismissed. Breinig Brothers,
Inc., 645.

Eminent Domain ✪ 82.

II. The Jurisdictional Act of August 24, 1949 (63 Stat.
1169), referring plaintiff's claim to the United
States Court of Claims for adjudication, contained
no admission of liability on the part of the United
States and merely intended to confer jurisdiction
on the court to consider plaintiff's claim and to
render judgment if there already existed a sound
basis for liability. Id.
125 (1).

United States

JURISDICTIONAL ACT-Continued

124 C. Cls.

III. The legislative history of the Jurisdictional Act sus-
tains the conclusion that Congress merely intended
to confer jurisdiction on the Court of Claims to
consider plaintiff's claim and to render judgment
if there already existed a sound basis for lia-
bility. Id.

United States ✪ 125 (1).

IV. It has been repeatedly held by the courts that in a
condemnation suit the Government is not liable
to a lessee when the fee is taken. Id.

V. Judgment of condemnation of the property entered
on June 7, 1943, was vacated after the Govern-
ment had purchased the property from the owner.
The plaintiff was a lessee of the property and
under its agreement with the owner its lease
terminated when the United States purchased the
property. Had the judgment of condemnation
stood, plaintiff, being a lessee, would not have
been entitled to recover from the United States,
nor is it entitled to recover under the deed from
the owner to the United States, dated June 29,
1943, in view of the agreement between the plain-
tiff and the landlord providing for the termination
of the lease for a consideration, upon the vesting
of title in the United States. Id.

See Eminent Domain, I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI,
XII, XIII, XIV, XV.

LESSEE, SUIT BY.

See Jurisdictional Act I, II, III, IV, V.

LICENSE AGREEMENT.

See Patents XV, XVI, XVII, XVIII.

MERCHANT SHIP SALES ACT.

See Contracts XLVIII, XLIX, L, LI, LII, LIII, LIV, LV, LVI.
MILITARY USE.

I. Following the decision in United States v. Powell,
330 U. S. 238, in which the shipments involved
were phosphate rock and superphosphate for use
as farm fertilizer shipped to Great Britain for use
in that country's wartime program for intensified
production of food; it is held that in the instant

124 C. Cls.

MILITARY USE-Continued

case where the shipments involved were for the
purpose of furnishing fertilizer to occupied areas,
for civilian use, from December 1945 to September
1946, plaintiff under the provisions of the Trans-
portation Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 898, 954), is entitled
to recover. Union Pacific, 254.

II. Plaintiff, a common carrier by railroad, sues for an
amount representing the difference between the
regular freight rate charged to defendant and the
land grant rate to which the Government claims
it was entitled on articles and commodities owned
by defendant and carried over plaintiff's lines.
Plaintiff's contention is sustained that the Govern-
ment was not entitled to land grant rates on the
particular shipments involved for the reason that
these shipments were not military property of the
United States moving for military use within the
meaning of Section 321 (a) of the Transportation
Act of 1940. Id.

III. From December 1945 to September 1946, in con-
junction with other common carriers, plaintiff
transported a number of shipments of paper bags,
nitrogen fertilizer solution, and Kaolin-type
ground clay from various points in the United
States to the Cornhusker Ordnance Plant in Ne-
braska, which during the period in question was
operated by the Emergency Export Corporation,
under a contract with the War Department, for
the production of fertilizer grade ammonium
nitrate, intended for export to areas occupied by
United States and Allied forces in Europe and
Asia, to expedite and increase food production in
such areas, for distribution to civilians and to
increase food production for consumption by the
civilian population. It is held, under the authority
of the decision in United States v. Powell, 330 U. S.
238, the shipments involved in the instant case
were not military property of the United States
moving for military and not for civil use, within
the provisions of the Transportation Act of 1940.
Id.

Public Lands 85.

124 C. Cls.

MUTUAL MISTAKE.

See Contracts LVII, LVIII, LIX.

OPA PRICES.

See Eminent Domain VII, VIII, IX, X.
PATENTS.

I. The first ground of plaintiff's motion for relief from
the judgment heretofore entered in the Court of
Claims (122 C. Cls. 160) is that the judgment is
erroneous because of the provisions of Section 286
of the Act of July 19, 1952 (66 Stat. 792), revising
and codifying the laws relating to patents. The
court had granted defendant's motion for summary
judgment because it was held that plaintiff's
claim was barred by the statute of limitations.
Section 286, supra, excludes from the six years
the period during which the claim is pending
before the agency authorized to settle the claim.
The judgment from which plaintiff seeks relief
was entered April 8, 1952. Neither in the Act
itself, nor in the legislative history of the Act is
there any indication that Section 286 was intended
to apply to a suit in which the judgment had
already been rendered. Plaintiff's motion for
relief on this ground is denied. Gage, 322.
Limitation of Actions 6 (11).

II. In plaintiff's petition for rehearing on its petition
to the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari the
passage of the Act of July 19, 1952, was urged.
The petition for rehearing was denied by the Su-
preme Court on November 24, 1952 (344 U. S.
894). Id.

III. The court concludes that the other ground relied
upon in plaintiff's motion is without merit and
plaintiff's motion is overruled. Id.

IV. In a suit against the United States for the alleged
unauthorized use of United States letters patent
Nos. 2,106,043 and 2,198,585, where by leave of
the court defendant's general traverse was with-
drawn and the cause came before the Court of
Claims on defendant's special plea of misuse of
the alleged patent monopoly by the original plain-