Third Department, July, 1915. [Vol. 170. the facts may be more fully shown. We conclude, therefore, that the inquisition and order are not fairly sustained by the evidence, and in the interest of justice they are set aside and a new hearing granted, without costs. All concurred. Order appealed from reversed and inspection set aside. Attorney-at-law-improper practices. PER CURIAM: The attorney was notified informally that a complaint had been filed against him. He appeared before the court and the court heard him fully, and also the complainants. The attorney accused evidently believes that he is fully justified in the practices he has pursued, and the important question is not so much whether he should be disciplined or punished for any past act, but whether his conduct is professional and such as should be continued. It is evident that the attorney is carrying on the collection agency. The fact that his wife has signed a certificate that she is carrying on the business does not release him from responsibility, as he and not his wife is chargeable with the acts complained of. In carrying on the collection agency the attorney violated the proprieties of his profession in a manner which subjects him to the discipline of the court in two respects: (1) The accounts for collection are given to the agency under an agreement that the agency may assign them. They are assigned to a party in an adjoining town and sued in his name, in Justice's Court, in that town. He has no interest in the matter except he receives a small fee for allowing the use of his name and verifying the complaint. Substantially all the claims received are put in judgment, with the understanding between the agency and the clients that the costs of putting the claim in judgment shall be borne by the agency unless the claim is collected. If the amount of a claim, or the aggregate of several claims, justify, action is brought in Supreme Court. If collected without suit the agency receives twenty-five per cent of the amount collected; if with suit, fifty per cent. The assignments are made in bulk, sometimes fifty or one hundred at a time, and the suits brought in a wholesale manner. (2) Subdivision 5 of section 2869 of the Code of Civil Procedure deprives a justice of the peace of a town adjoining a city of jurisdiction of an action brought against a resident of the city, unless one of the parties plaintiff is a resident of such town. The theory of the statute is that a resident of a city shall not be called into Justice's Court outside of his city except by an actual resident of the town where suit is brought. Where an attorney receives hundreds of claims at a time (the debtor and creditor both being residents of the city), and causes them to be assigned to a resident of a town adjoining the city for the sole purpose of bringing suits in that town, he is evading the statute and depriving the defendants of a privilege which the law has secured to them. The assignments are merely colorable; the actions are, to all intents and purposes, prosecuted by the claimants who live in the city, and the assignments are merely instruments made for the purpose of evading the statute. There App. Div.] Third Department, July, 1915. may be individual cases which would justify a transfer so as to bring a suit in an adjoining town; but where transfers are made by wholesale, and actions brought in the manner shown, the practice is unprofessional, and the attorney is evading the law, and thereby depriving the defendants of a right which the statute intends they shall have. Section 274 of the Penal Law has been taken from the Code of Civil Procedure* and may now be considered as an act regulating attorneys, and applies to the person rather than to the court in which he practices. It prohibits an attorney from promising or giving any valuable consideration to any person, as an inducement to place, or in consideration of having placed, in his hands a demand, for the purpose of bringing an action thereon, or of representing the claimant in the pursuit of any civil remedy for the recovery thereof. The understanding with the agency by which it is to put all claims in judgment, and if the claim is not collected, that the agency pays the cost of collection, is fairly within the spirit of this prohibition. (Stedwell v. Hartmann, 74 App. Div. 126; affd., 173 N. Y. 624.) It is due to the attorney to state that the actions in the adjoining town have not been brought there for the purpose of annoying or making unnecessary expense to defendants, but in order to effect a considerable saving in costs to the agency, as the fees of a justice in the town are much less than those of a city magistrate. Charges were brought against the attorney before a bar association of his county; it fully investigated them and made certain suggestions of impropriety in the conduct of the business, which has been remedied. The association felt that some of the practices we have referred to were unprofessional, but were not violations of the law, and recommended that the complaint be dismissed. In view of the fact that the attorney has complied with the suggestions made by the association, we feel it is unnecessary at this time to take any further action against him other than to point out the impropriety of his conduct in the respects stated. We, therefore, hold the matter to give him an opportunity to correct the practices of the agency in the two respects mentioned, and if they are corrected within a reasonable time no further action will be taken in the premises. Otherwise the matter will, upon notice, be given further consideration. All concurred. WALTER J. BROWN, an Infant, by LLEWellyn Brown, His Guardian ad Litem, Respondent, v. ADIRONDACK FARMS, Appellant. Master and servant― negligence- infant-proper instructions. Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, entered in the Washington county clerk's office on the 11th day of January, 1915, for the sum of $1,087.36, and from an order bearing date the 4th day of January, 1915, denying the defendant's motion for a new trial. Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. All concurred, except Smith, P. J., dissenting in opinion in which Howard, J., concurred. * See Code Civ. Proc. § 74, as amd. by Laws of 1907, chap. 700, for provision cited in opinion.-[REP. Third Department, July, 1915. [Vol. 170. SMITH, P. J. (dissenting): Defendant is a corporation working farms in the towns of Fort Ann and Moreau. In December, 1912, the defendant was operating a corn husker and shredder. The shredder was a machine several feet in length, at the end of which was a table from which corn was thrown from below. Along this table was a running board on the opposite side to the corn loads. On this running board an operator stood. Bundles of corn tied with twine were pitched down from the loads to the table. This corn was pushed into the rolls of the shredder and was thrown by those rolls into the interior of the machine, from which finally it reached a silo which was being filled. Upon the machine, on the side opposite to which the operator stood, was a door or cover which covered the shredder head rolls. This door was hinged at the top of the machine to be lifted up. When the stalks were damp they would sometimes accumulate and wind up with some of the twine around this shredder head and stop the action of the shredder head. The shredder head, together with the rest of the machine, was driven by a belt attached to an eighteen horse power gasoline engine, which was located about thirty or forty feet in the rear of the shredder. This belt ran from a pulley of about thirty inches in diameter on the engine to a pulley on a shaft which operated the shredder head. The face of this latter pulley was about eight inches wide. Sometimes when the corn was wet the machine would become clogged by the winding of the corn and strings around the cutter head. Ordinarily when the machine became clogged the belt would be thrown off from the pulley which operated the shredder head, and thus the power would stop. This door on the opposite side of the table could then be opened and the corn and strings which clogged the machine could safely be taken out. At times, however, if the belt was a little loose, instead of being thrown from this small pulley which operated the shredder it would slip around it, so that when the clogging was relieved by the pulling out of the corn and strings the belt would take hold of the pulley and start the machinery in motion. The plaintiff was a boy who, at the time of the trial in January, 1915, was nineteen years of age. In December, 1912, at the date of the accident, he was sixteen or seventeen years of age. He had been employed for about three months driving a team drawing hay, and the defendant's witnesses claim that he never had been asked to do anything whatever with the working of this shredder. His evidence is that he was several times asked to feed the machine and did do it, and that sometimes it clogged three or four times a day, and it would clog almost every day; that he had seen Mattison, the foreman, go around and lift up the cover under which were the rolls with knives and spikes on them which were clogged, and he had seen him reach in and pull the stalks out. He swears that after this was unclogged the rolls would start up slowly, and that he himself had fed the husker, and when it had clogged he had gone around on the other side of the table and had opened this door and had pulled out the stalks and the strings without stopping the engine, and that when he had gotten it unclogged the shredder would begin to move. Upon the day in question, the 4th day of December, 1912, according to the plaintiff's testimony, he was told to feed the shredder. App. Div.] Third Department, July, 1915. The shredder became clogged and he went around and opened the door and started to pull out the corn and the strings, and the machinery thereupon started and caught his hand and pulled off his arm. It is not claimed that the defendant was negligent in not furnishing a proper machine. It is not shown that any other machines were furnished which would prevent this clogging. No question was submitted to the jury as to any negligence of the defendant in not furnishing proper tools with which to remove this clogging. The only question submitted to the jury bearing upon defendant's negligence was the question whether the plaintiff had been properly instructed upon the danger involved in relieving the clogging of the shredder, and the jury must be presumed to have found that the defendant was negligent in not giving proper instructions. This finding was, in my judgment, without legal warrant, because the danger was so obvious that instructions would have been superfluous. It is not claimed that the plaintiff did not know that upon the removing of the clog the machinery started up. The only claim of negligence upon which this judgment is sought to be sustained is that in this particular case it started up faster than it ordinarily started up, and that he had not been warned that the machinery would start up so rapidly upon the removing of the clogging. If then the defendant had warned the plaintiff that there was danger in removing this clogging by reason of the starting of the machinery it would not havc prevented the accident, because this fact the plaintiff already knew. The only warning which, if any, would have been effective according to the plaintiff's own theory, is the warning that sometimes the machinery would start more rapidly than at other times. To my mind to require the master to give that warning which could only be considered material after an accident disclosed its materiality, would be to place a greater burden upon the master than reasonable care and prudence would require. It is true that the boy has been injured, and I will assume by reason of his age that he was not guilty of negligence contributing to the accident. The action is not brought under the Employers' Liability Act; it is a common-law action for negligence. However unfortunate to the boy the accident may have been, I am unable to find any negligence of the defendant in failing to inform the boy of the danger involved in his work which was obvious, and of which apparently he had as much information as had the master himself. I recommend, therefore, that the judgment and order be reversed and the complaint dismissed upon the finding of this court that the defendant has been guilty of no negligence which caused this injury. Howard, J., concurred. Effie Brown, Respondent, v. Edward Crossman and Others, Appellants. -Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs, the court finding no error of sufficient importance to call for a reversal of the judgment. Margaret Dwyer, Respondent, v. New York Telephone Company, Appellant. Judgment and order affirmed, with costs, the court holding that any error committed in the charge was not sufficiently harmful to call for a reversal. All concurred. Third Department, July, 1915. [Vol. 170. Joseph Dudiak, Appellant, v. Port Henry Iron Ore Company of Lake Champlain, Respondent.- Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs. James M. Donahue, Appellant, v. George D. Northridge, Respondent. — Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs. Rose Drusky, as Administratrix, etc., of Meyer Drusky, Deceased, Respondent, v. Schenectady Railway Company, Appellant.-Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs. Herbert E. Eggleson, Respondent, v. Town of Potsdam, Appellant. -Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs. E. Watson Gardiner, Respondent, v. Willis Wendell, Appellant.- Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs. C. B. Goldacker, Respondent, v. Hudson River Orchard Company, Inc., Appellant.-Judgment and order affirmed, with costs. All concurred, except Kellogg and Woodward, JJ., who dissented. John Gardner, Respondent, v. Elmira, Corning and Waverly Railway, Appellant.- Motion denied. Cora W. Keyes, Respondent, v. Lestershire Heights Realty Company and Griffin S. Ackley, Appellants.- Order affirmed, with costs, with usual leave to defendant to withdraw demurrer and answer upon payment of costs in this court and in the court below. All concurred. Mary Lutkins, Respondent, v. Theodore L. Lutkins, Sr., Appellant. - Judgment and order unanimously affirmed, with costs. In the Matter of the Application of Walter S. West, Appellant, for the Removal of Hiram C. Todd, Respondent, and the Reinstatment of Himself as Trustee, etc.- Decree unanimously affirmed, with costs. In the Matter of Charlotte Potter, Deceased. (Alleged Will, Dated May 8, 1912.) — Order affirmed, with ten dollars costs and disbursements. All concurred. In the Matter of the Judicial Settlement of the Account of Edward A. Pattison and Hugh P. Blackinton, as Executors, etc., of Charles A. Cheney, Late of the Village of Hoosick Falls, N. Y., Deceased. Cheney Free Public Library and Historical Rooms, etc., Appellant; The Samaritan Hospital of Troy and Others, Respondents.- Decree of the surrogate affirmed, with costs. All concurred, except Kellogg and Woodward, JJ., who dissented. Richmond D. Moot, Appellant, v. Margaret A. Moot, Respondent. -Order modified by reducing counsel fee to $1,250, and as modified affirmed, without costs. All concurred; Woodward, J., not sitting. In the Matter of the Claim of Mary Morrissey, Respondent, for Compensation to Herself and Children under the Workmen's Compensation Law, for the Death of John Morrissey, v. New York Railways Company, Employer and Self-Insurer, Appellant.- Award affirmed. All concurred. In the Matter of the Claim of Edward Edwardson, Respondent, against Jarvis Lighterage Company, Employer, and Ætna Life Insurance Company, Insurer, Appellants.-Motion denied. In the Matter of the Claim of Adam Welch, Respondent, for Compen sation under the Workmen's Compensation Law, v. New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company, Employer and Self Insurer, |