who, perplexed at the obftinate refiftance of truth, in the various arrangement of his ideas turned the edge of his raillery, before he was aware, against this phantafm, and was the first that fell into his own deceit.

Hence may be feen what the noble writer feems to have spoken at random, at least, not at all to the purpose of the question he was upon, that fuch indeed is the inflexible nature of truth, that all the wit in the world can never render it ridiculous, till it be fo distorted as to look like error, or fo difguifed as to appear like folly. A circumftance which, though it greatly recommends the majesty of virtue, yet, as it cannot fecure it from infult, doth not at all fhew the innocence of ridicule; which was the point he had to prove.

But to fee what little good is to be expected in this way of wit and humour, one may go further; and obferve, that even the ridicule of falfe virtue, which furely deferves no quarter, hath been fometimes attended with very mifchievous effects. The Spaniards have lamented, and I believe truly, that Cervantes's just and inimitable ridicule of knight-errantry rooted up, with that folly, a great deal of their real honour. And it was apparent, that Butler's fine fatire on fanaticism contributed not a little, during the licentious times of Charles II. to bring fober piety into difrepute. The reafon is

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evident:

evident there are many lines of resemblance between Truth and its Counterfeits: and it is the province of wit only to find out the likenefes in things; and not the talent of the common admirers of it to discover the differences.

But you will fay, perhaps, Let Truth, when thus attacked, defend itself with the fame arms; for why, as your mafter afks, fhould fair honefty be denied the use of this weapon? Be it fo: come on then, and let us impartially attend the iffue. We have, upon record, the most illuftrious example of this contention that ever was. The difpute I mean, was between Socrates and Aristophanes. Here truth had all the advantage of place, of weapons, and of judges: Socrates employed his whole life in the cause of virtue: Ariftophanes, only a few comic scenes against it. But, heavens! against what virtue! against the pureft and brightest portion of it that ever enlightened the gentile world. The wit of the comic writer is well known: that of the philofopher was in a fupreme degree, juft, delicate, and forceable; and so habitual, that it procured him the title of the Attic buffoon. The place was the politeft ftate in the politeft time, Athens in its glory; and the judges the grave fenators of Areopagus. For all this, the comic poet triumphed: and with the coarseft kind of buffoonry, little fitted, one would think, to take fo polite a people, had B 2

the

the art to tarnish all this virtue; and, what was more, to make the owner refemble his direct oppofite, that character he was most unlike, that character he most hated, that very character he had employed all his wit to detect, lay open, and confound; in one word, the SOPHIST. The consequences are well known.

Thus will raillery, in defence of vice and error, be ftill an overmatch for that employed on the fide of truth and virtue. Because fair bonefty uses, though a fharp, yet an untainted weapon; while knavery ftrikes with one empoifoned, though much duller. The honeft man employs his wit as correctly as his logic; whereas the very definition of a knave's raillery is a fophifm.

But, indeed, when a licentious buffoonry is once appealed to, and encouraged; its effects have no dependance on the fit choice of its object. All characters fall alike before it. In the diffolute times of Charles II, this weapon, with the fame eafe, and indeed in the fame hands, completed the ruin of the best, and, of the very worst Minister of that age. The hiftorians tell us, that Chancellor Hyde was brought into his mafter's contempt, by this court-argument. They mimicked his walk and gesture, with a fire-fhovel and bellows, for the mace and purfe. The fame ingenious

ftroke

ftroke of humour was repeated on Secretary Bennet, and, by the happy addition of his black patch, with juft the fame fuccefs. Thus, it being the reprefentation, and not the object represented, which strikes the fancy, Vice and Virtue must fall indifferently before it !.

• The author of a late book called Elements of Criticifn, speaking of men's various opinions concerning the use of ridicule, proceeds against what is here faid, in the following manner" This difpute has produced a celebrated quef"tion, Whether Ridicule be, or be not, a teft of Truth? "Which (fays he) stated in ACCURATE TERMS, is, Whesther the SENSE of Ridicule be the proper teft for diftinguishing "ridiculous objects from those that are not fo? To answer "this question with PRECISION, I must premise that Ri"dicule is not a subject of reasoning but of SENSE or "TASTE." Vol. ii. p. 55. The Critic having thus changed the question, which he calls ftating it in accurate terms; and obfcured the answer, which he calls, giving it with precision, he concludes, that Ridicule is not only the best, but the only, teft of Truth.

But what is all this to the purpose? Is the Dealer in Ridicule now debarred the liberty of doing what he has fo often done, putting his object in a falfe light; and, by that means, making Truth appear like Error? As he is not, I inferred, against Lord Shaftesbury, That Ridicule is not a test of Truth. How does our Critic addrefs himself to prove the contrary? Not by fhewing, that ridicule is fuch a test: but that the TASTE of ridicule is the test of what is ridiculous. Who doubts that? It is the very thing complained of. For when our taste for ridicule gives us a fenfible pleasure in a ridiculous representation of any object, we do not stay to examine whether that reprefentation be a true one, but conclude it to be fo, from the pleafure it affords us.

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I hope then, Gentlemen, you will in time be brought to own, that this method is the

His fecond change of the question is a new fubftitution, viz. Whether Ridicule be a talent to be used or employed at all? Of which he fuppofes me to hold the negative. What elfe is the meaning of these words? "To CONDEMN A TA"LENT FOR RIDICULE, because it may be converted to "wrong purposes, is not a little ridiculous. Could one for"bear to fmile if A TALENT FOR REASONING Was CON"DEMNED, becaufe it alfo may be perverted ?" p. 57. He has no reason to fmile fure, at his own mifreprefentation. I never condemned a talent for ridicule because it may be abufed; nor for any other reafon. Though others, perhaps, may be difpofed to fmile at his abfurd inference, that we may as well condemn a talent for reafoning. As if reafon and ridicule were of equal importance for the conduct of human life.

He may then perhaps afk, "If I do not condemn the ufe of Ridicule, on what employment I would put it, when I have excluded it from being à teft of truth?" Let him not be uneafy about that. There is no danger that the talent for ridicule fhould lie idle, for want of proper business. When reafon, the only teft of truth I know of, has performed its office, and unmasked hypocrify and formal error, then ridicule, I think, may be fairly called in, to quicken the operation. Thus, when Dr. S. Clarke had, by fuperior reafoning, expofed the wretched fophiftry which Mr. Collins had employed to prove the Soul to be only a quality of Body; Dr. Arbuthnot, who very rarely mifemployed his inimitable talent for ridicule, followed the blow, and gave that foolish and impious opinion up to the contempt and laughter it deserved, in a chapter of the Memoirs of Scriblerus. But to fet Ridicule on work before, would be as unfair, indeed as fcandalous, as to beftow the language due to convicted Vice, on a character but barely fufpected.

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