from whence thefe proceed, is that which we mean by the foul.

adly, By the immortality of the foul, I mean nothing elfe, but that it furvives the body, that when the body dies and falls to the ground, yet this principle which we call the foul, ftill remains and lives feparate from it; that is, there is still a part of us which is free from the fate of the body, and continues to perform all thofe aperations, to the performance of which the organs of the body, are not neceffary; that is, when our bodies are deftitute of life, and become a dead carcafe, there is ftill fomething that did belong to us, which retains the power of understanding, which thinks, and reafons, and remembers, and does all these freely.

3dly, That he that goes about to prove the foul's immortality, fuppofeth the existence of a deity, that there is a God: For although there be a very intimate and ftrict connection between these two principles as to us, as being the two great pillars of all religion; yet that which is first and most fundamental to all religion, is the existence of a God; which if it be not first proved, the best arguments for the foul's immortality lofe their force. Therefore, as to the prefent argument, I fuppofe the being of God as a thing acknowledged, and not now to be proved; which I may the better do, having formerly endeavoured to make good this grand principle of religion, against the pretenfions of the Atheists.

4thly, The existence of a God being fuppofed, this doth very much facilitate the other, of the foul's ime mortality. For this being an effential property of the divine nature, that he is a fpirit, that is, fomething that is not matter; it being once granted that God is, thus much is gained, that there is fuch a thing as a fpirit, as an immaterial substance, that is not liable to die or perifh; fo that he that goes about to prove the immortality of the foul, fhall not need to prove that there may be fuch a thing as a fpirit, that the notion of an immaterial fubftance does not imply a contradiction; becaufe, fuppofing that there is a God, who is effentially a fpirit, there can be no doubt of the poffibility of fuch a thing as a fpirit; and though there be this difference between God and all other fpirits, that he

iş an infinite spirit, whereas others are but finite; yet no man that grants the existence of an infinite fpirit, can with any pretence or colour of reafon deny the poffibility of a finite fpirit.

5thly, and lastly, It is highly reafonable, that men hould acquiefce and reft fatisfied in fuch reafons and arguments for the proof of any thing, as the nature of the thing to be proved will bear; because there are feveral kinds and degrees of evidence, which all things are not equally capable of. It is fufficient that the evidence be fuch as the nature of the thing to be proved will admit of, and fuch as prudent men make no fcruple to admit for fufficient evidence for things of the like nature, and fuch as, fuppofing the thing to be, we cannot ordinarily expect better, or greater evidence for it.

There are two kinds of evidences, which are the highest and most fatisfactory that this world affords to us; and thofe are the evidence of fenfe, and mathematical demonftration. Now there are many things, concerning which the generality of men profefs themselves to be well fatisfied, which do not afford either of these kinds of evidence. There is none of us but doth firmly believe that we were born, though we do not remember any fuch thing; no man's memory does furnish him with the teftimony of his fenfes from this matter, nor can any man prove this by a mathematical demonstration, nor by any neceffary argument, fo as to fhew it impoffible that the thing should be otherwife. For it is poffible that a man may come into the world otherwife, than by the ordinary course of generation, as the firft man did, who was created immediately by God; and yet I know no man in the world who doubts in the leaft concerning this matter, though he hath no other argument for it, but the teftimony of others, and his own obfervation, how other perfons like himself came into the world. And it is reasonable to acquiefce in this evidence, because the nature of the thing affords no greater. We who never were at Jerufalem, do firmly believe that there is fuch a place, upon the teftimony and relation of others: and no man is blamed for this, as being over-credulous; because no man, that will not take the pains to go thither, can have any other greater evi

dence

dence of it, than the general teftimony of thofe who fay they have feen it. And indeed almost all human affairs, I am fure, the most important, are governed and conducted by fuch evidence, as falls very much short both of the evidence of fenfe, and of mathematical demonitration.

To apply this then to my prefent purpose. That the foul of man is of an immortal nature, is not capable of all kinds and degrees of evidence. It cannot be proved by our fenfes, nor is it reafonable to expect it thould be fo proved; becaufe the foul is fuppofed, by every one that difcourfeth of it, to be a thing of fuch a nature, as cannot be feen or handled, or fall under any other of our fenfes: nor can it be proved to us by our own experience, while we arc in this world; becaufe whoever dies, which is the only trial that can be made whether our fouls remain after our bodies, goes out of this world. As for mathematical demonstration, the nature of the thing renders it incapable of it. It remains then, that we reft contented with fuch arguments as the nature of the thing will bear, and with fuch evidence as men are contented to accept of, and do account fufficient in other matters; fuch evidence as a prudent confidering man, who is not credulous on the one hand, and on the other is not prejudiced by any interest against it, would reft fatisfied in.

Having premifed these general confiderations, to clear my way, I now come to fpeak to the particular arguments, whereby the immortality of the foul may be made out to our reafon. And the best way to estimate the force of the arguments which I fhall bring for it, will be to confider before-hand with ourfelves, what evidence we can in reafon expect for a thing of this nature. Suppofe our fouls be immortal; by what kind of arguments could we defire to be affured of it? Setting afide miracles and divine revelation, could we defire more than this?

I. That the thing be a natural notion and dictate of our minds.

II. That it doth not contradict any other principle that nature hath planted in us, but does very well acVOL. VIII.

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cord and agree with all other the most natural notions of our minds.

III. That it be fuitable to our natural fears and hopes.

IV. That it tends to the happiness of man, and the good order and government of the world.

V. That it gives the most rational account of all thofe inward actions, which we are conscious to ourselves of, as perception, understanding, memory, will, which we cannot without great unrealonablenefs afcribe to matter, as the caufe of them. If all these be thus, as I fhall endeavour to make it appear they are, what greater fatisfaction could we defire to have of the immortality of our fouls, than thefe arguments give us? I do not fay that any one of these arguments doth fufficiently conclude this thing; nor is it neceffary, that taken fingly and by themfelves they should do it; it is fufficient that they concur to make up one entire argument, which may be a fufficient evidence of the foul's inmortality. To illuftrate this by an inftance: Suppose a man should ufe thefe two arguments, to prove that fuch a man deferves to be credited in fuch a a relation, 1ft, Because he had fufficient knowledge of the thing he relates; and, 2dly, Because he is a man of integrity and fidelity. Neither of thefe alone would prove the man to be worthy of credit, though both together make up a good argument. So it is in thefe arguments which I have produced; it may be, no one of them is a fufficient inducement, taken fingly and by itfelf, to fatisfy a man fully that the foul is immortal; and yet they may concur together to make a very powerful argument. I begin with the

I. That our fouls are of an immortal nature, that they do not die and perifh with our bodies, but pafs into another state upon the diffolution of our bodies, is a natural notion and dictate of our minds. That I call a natural notion, which the minds of all men do naturally hit upon and agree in, notwithstanding the diftance and remoteness of the feveral parts of the world from one another, notwithstanding the different tempers, and manner and ways of education. The only way to measure whether any thing be natural or not, is by en

quiring

quiring whether it agree to the whole kind or not; if it do, then we call it natural. Omnium confenfus naturæ vox eft, "The confent of all is the voice of nature,' fays Tully, fpeaking of the univerfal agreement of all nations in this apprehenfion, that "the fouls of men "remain after their bodies." And this he tells us he' looks upon as a very great argument, Maximum verè argumentum eft, naturam ipfam de immortalitate animarum tacitam judicare, quod omnibus curæ fint, & maxime quidem, quæ poft mortem futura funt: "This is a very great 66 argument that nature doth fecretly, and in mens fi"lent thoughts, determine the immortality of the foul, "that all men are folicitous of what fhall become of "them after death." Nefcio quomodo inhæret in mentibus quafi feculorum quoddam augurium futurorum, idque in maximis ingeniis altissimisque animis & exiftit maxime & apparet facillime : "I know not how, faith he, there fticks in the mind a certain kind of prefage of a fu"ture ftate, and this is moft deeply fixed and difcovers "itself fooneft in the choiceft fpirits." Again the fame author, Ut deos effe natura opinamur, fic permanere animes arbitramur confenfu nationum omnium: "As this opinion "is plante in us by nature, that there is a God, fo by "the confent of all nations we believe that the fouls "remain after the body." I might multiply teftimonies to this purpose out of the antient Heathen writers; but thefe which I have produced out of this great author, are fo plain and exprefs, that I need bring not other.

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As for those barbarous nations which have been dif covered in these latter ages of the world, and which before the first planting of America, were never known to have held correfpondence with thefe parts of the world, yet all thofe nations agree in this principle, of the immortality of the foul; nay, even the most barbarous of those nations, thofe who are most inhuman, and eat one another, thofe of Joupinamboult in Brazil, who are faid by fome authors, but I think not upon fufficient grounds, not to acknowledge the being of a God; yet even these, as Lerius tells us, who lived among them, had a very fixed and firm perfuafion of this principle of religion, the immortality of the foul. "There is not,

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