which either House has thought it expedient to The special approbation assure the King of its approval of the measures by Parliament of the Execu- that he has been advised to adopt, or of its unabated confidence in his present counsellors.

tive.

rence.

Such occasions are, however, of comparatively rare occurThe confidence of Parliament is usually rather inferred from its conduct than expressed by open declarations. Parliament, as long as a ministry possesses its confidence, will give a general support to the Executive Government, and will receive favourably the legislative measures which the ministry proposes for its consideration. It will reject every motion that is calculated to reflect upon the ministry, and every bill which tends to embarrass it. In such circumstances it is unnecessary to ask for any special expression of confidence; and it is seldom expedient* that the Legislature should select some particular branch of the public policy of the Government, and to the exclusion of all the other branches mark that single portion with its approbation.

Although the confidence of Parliament is better shown by its acts than by its words, there have been instances in which it has expressed a favourable opinion either of the Administration generally or of some particular part of its policy. The cases in which such votes have been passed are where a hostile motion has been made in one House and is in that House met not by a direct negative but by an expression of positive approval; or where a hostile vote has been passed by one House, and an appeal, as it were, is made from that vote to the other House; or where some circumstances unconnected with their executive policy-as, for example, the rejection of an important bill-are likely to lead to the resignation of ministers. The most remarkable

example of a motion of condemnation turned into a triumph occurred in 1823. A motion was made in the House of Commons severely censuring Mr. Canning's foreign policy in reference to the affairs of Spain. For this censure the friends of the ministry proposed to substitute a highly laudatory address; and the amendment was carried by an immense majority. The occasion, however, on which votes of confidence are usually asked from one House is to neutralize the effect of hostile proceedings in the other House. In 1784 the House of Lords came to the support of the King and Mr. Pitt in the unequal contest which the latter was waging against a hostile House of Commons. The form of this vote was rather that of confidence in the King than in his ministers. It declared His Majesty's undoubted right to appoint his own ministers, and expressed the full confidence of the Lords in His Majesty's wisdom in exercising the prerogative. I do not recollect any other instance in which the Lords have expressed themselves in a similar manner. But there are several cases in which, after the Lords had disapproved some part of the policy of the Government, the House of Commons adopted votes expressive of its confidence in ministers. In such circumstances, indeed, if the ministry desire to remain in office, a counter-vote in the Commons either directly or by implication should be obtained. But the principles which govern this case, and the precedents by which they are confirmed, require separate discussion.

Connected with this subject, and yet I think distinguishable from it, are the votes of confidence passed by the House of Commons in Lord Grey's ministry when the second Reform Bill was lost in the House of Lords; and again when the passing of the third Bill was endangered. On those occasions the House of Lords did

not find fault with His Majesty's servants or any part of their conduct. They merely refused to consent to a certain legislative measure, or at least to consent to it in the form in which it was submitted to them. Such, however, was at that time the state of public feeling that the ministry declined the responsibility of continuing to administer public affairs. The House of Commons, which entirely sympathized with the ministerial project, sought to strengthen Earl Grey's hands and prevent the formation of an Anti-Reform Ministry. It adopted vigorous resolutions expressive of its regret at the change in His Majesty's Councils and its unaltered confidence in his late advisers. The ministry accordingly on the first occasion remained firm; and on the second, after their resignations had been accepted, were recalled.

Parliament

sign reasons

§ 6. Since Parliament thus acts as a council of advice to the Crown on all questions of general policy, and since the adoption of its advice is secured by the needs not as- appointment to the high offices of state of for its mistrust persons in whose political principles it symof ministers. pathizes, and in whose judgment and integrity it has confidence, it follows that Parliament may express its disapprobation of any ministry without any special cause of complaint. The mere distrust of the servants of the Crown, on whatever grounds that distrust is felt, is sufficient to entitle Parliament to ask for a ministry on which it can rely. The fact that a ministry is unable to secure the confidence of Parliament, and that its continuance in office is likely to disturb the harmony that should exist between the King and his Supreme Council, is sufficient to justify the Crown in a change of its advisers. This principle, which had previously been vehemently

*

denounced by Sir Robert Walpole, was called in question in the contest of 1784. The King, in answer to one of the addresses of the House of Commons complaining of his new ministry and praying for a change, assigned as a ground of his refusal to grant the request that “no charge or complaint had been suggested against his present ministers." In the debates of the time Mr. Pitt contended that the independence of the Crown, and even its existence, were endangered, if its prerogative of naming ministers were usurped by the Commons," or if (which is precisely the same thing) its nomination of men is to be negatived by us without stating any one ground of distrust in the men, and without suffering ourselves to have any experience of their measures." We have already seen that the nomination of ministers by the Commons is not precisely the same thing as its objection to any ministerial appointment. But there can be little doubt that Mr. Pitt's doctrine is untenable. Parliament has a preventive as well as a vindictive power. If it perceive the King in danger of being misled by weak or by wicked counsellors, it is bound to interpose its advice without waiting for the actual occurrence of the mischief that it has, or thinks that it has, cause to anticipate. It votes large sums for the public service and duly secures their appropriation; but it may reasonably require to be satisfied that the agents by whom these moneys will be expended are men not merely of character, but of capacity and skill. The question of capacity or of incapacity is one of opinion, and admits also of various degrees. Parliament would, therefore, be excluded from tendering any advice upon such questions, if it were required to prove the absolute inefficiency of one ministry or the relative superiority of another. If Parliament, when it

advised a change of ministry, were bound to accompany such advice with a stated charge, the King would be obliged to hear and determine the sufficiency of the charge. Such an obligation is contrary to the principles of modern administration. The fundamental principle of that policy is that the discretion of the Crown shall always be exercised in conformity with the wishes of the nation. This power of the King to change his servants who hold their offices during pleasure is undisputed. The question, therefore, is, whether His Majesty will exercise his power in conformity with his own personal opinion or with the advice of his Parliament. Modern practice has placed the matter beyond dispute. The King of England must often say what the sorrowing King of Gath said to the departing David,* "I have not found evil in thee since the day of thy coming unto me unto this day nevertheless the lords favour thee not."+

* 1 Sam. xxix. 6.

For the subject discussed in this section see the following authorities :Burke's Works, iii. 134; Hallam's Middle Ages, iii. 71; Massey's Hist. of Eng., ii. 236; Lord Russell's Life of Fox, ii. 54-89.