to do so, but in the exercise of a wise discretion they are content with securing full and mature consideration of the plan. A people is truly free when it is governed by persuasion, and not by command. In our free Constitution, then, if all arguments have failed, the permanent governing bodies—that is, the Crown and the Lords-feel that they have performed their duty, and cease to oppose when they are unable to persuade. This practice, however, prevails only in the case of ministerial questions. Bills have often been passed during many successive years, and by different Parliaments, and yet the resistance of the Lords has not been overcome. But such bills have been introduced by private members. Where a change of ministry and a dissolution consequent thereon have taken place, or where the Opposition have in effect declined to accept this test, the practice of the Constitution is now settled. Some compromise is usually made, but in any case the disputed bill becomes law.

The weakest part of this system is in its connection with the privileges of the Commons regarding finance. The Commons claim-and, practically, their claim is not now disputed an exclusive authority over money bills. They have sometimes been tempted to use this exclusive power as a means of coercing the other branches of the Legislature; that is, they have included in the same bill grants of money and provisions on some dissimilar subject. In such circumstances the Lords or the Crown, as the case may be, are placed under the hard necessity of refusing to make the needful provision for the public service or of accepting a measure to which they honestly object. In the reigns of William the Third and of Anne, this "most reprehensible device," as Hallam* calls it, was used with

*Const. Hist., iii. 141.

success.

But it has long been settled that tacking, as it is called, is "unparliamentary, and tends to the destruction of the Constitution."

The troubles that some years ago arose in Victoria were mainly due to the circumstance that in dealing with money bills the Constitution Act of the colony converted into positive law what in England is merely a rule of parlia-. mentary practice. The result was that the exclusive claim of the House of Commons became an exclusive right of the Legislative Assembly. It cannot be said that the House of Lords would break any law if it were to alter an Appropriation Bill; but the Legislative Council is in express terms forbidden to make any such alteration; consequently the temptation to use the tack is much stronger in Victoria than it is in England. Yet, in the one country as in the other, after the question was understood, the right judgment of the people has prevailed, and it is not probable that the controversy of 1865 will be renewed.

There is a cognate question of greater difficulty. May the Lower House include, in an Appropriation Bill, a grant of money for a purpose to which the other House has expressed its dislike? Such an inclusion is not a tack, because the grant is not foreign to the purposes of the bill. Further, the case of the Paper Duties Bill, to which I shall in a subsequent chapter more fully refer, does not apply; for this is a matter of expenditure, and that related to The leading authority in the Imperial Parliament on the present subject is the case of Mr. Palmer. This gentleman, who was the author of important postal reforms, had a disputed claim against the Post-office. The controversy lasted many years; and, in its course, a bill providing for a certain portion of the claim was passed by the

revenue.

* See Todd's Parl. Govt., i. 438.

Commons and rejected by the Lords. Subsequently, a motion relating to a different portion of the claim was carried in the House of Commons, and resulted in the introduction for Mr. Palmer's benefit of a considerable sum into the Appropriation Bill; but when it was shown that the Lords had expressed an opinion that Mr. Palmer's claim was unfounded, the grant was withdrawn from the Appropriation Bill, and was placed in a separate measure, with the avowed purpose "of affording to the Lords an opportunity of considering that grant distinctly from the other grants of the year." Other questions arose, and other proceedings were taken in the matter; but, although they have still an interest, they are not necessary for my immediate purpose. Except the Paper Duties Bill, which relates to a different branch of the subject, I know of no other English precedent directly in point. But the whole matter was discussed at great length, and with dangerous heat, in Victoria. A Governor of the colony,* Sir Charles Darling, had for certain reasons been recalled. The Legislative Assembly proposed to grant to him, or failing him to his wife, a large sum; and the amount was accordingly included, without any previous communication with the other House, in the Appropriation Bill The Legislative Council objected to the grant, because it was contrary to the rules of the Colonial Office, and tended to public corruption, and rewarded a Governor for conduct which had led to his removal. They could not amend the bill; and, as their only remaining course, laid it aside. The other House was not less resolute, and refused to place the Darling Grant in a separate bill. A violent and protracted contest arose. At length the Secretary of State, in a

* See Todd's Parl. Govt. in the British Colonies, 112-116.

despatch to the Governor, expressed his regret that the Legislative Assembly should have thought it advisable to include in the Appropriation Bill a grant exceptional in its character, and notoriously obnoxious to a majority of the Upper House. He intimated the opinion of Her Majesty's Government that the Queen's representative ought not to be made the instrument of enabling one branch of the legislature to coerce the other; and, therefore, that the Governor ought not to recommend the grant to Lady Darling, unless on the clear understanding that it would be brought before the Legislative Council in a manner which would enable them to exercise their discretion respecting it without the necessity of throwing the colony into confusion. Ultimately an arrangement was made by the Colonial Office with Sir Charles Darling in pursuance of which he declined for himself and his wife any grant from the colony.

From these authorities it appears that the question is one in which we must distinguish. If the grant be an ordinary financial matter, the Upper House, whatever its opinion may be on the merits, ought not to interfere. That House is not responsible for the prudence of the annual expenditure. It retains, indeed, a latent power which may in case of need be exercised. But, in the absence of any great emergency-and it is with such a state of facts alone that we are now concerned the action of the Upper House would be inconvenient, and therefore their power should not be used; and, therefore, no blame can be imputed to them for the expenditure. But where the purpose of the grant is unusual, and is not within the ordinary expenditure of the year, it becomes a matter not of mere finance but of policy. In these circumstances the Upper House is entitled to claim that a forbearance which in ordinary cases they are willing to exercise shall not be

196 HARMONY OF THE SEVERAL POWERS IN THE STATE.

expected, and that no coercion shall be employed to deprive them of their right of free judgment. It has never been contended* that the Lords may not deal with questions of legislative policy even though these questions involve matters of revenue. On the like principle they ought to be free to discuss any matter of public policy, even though that policy involves the spending of money. The wisdom of enforcing, on any particular occasion, this right at so great a cost depends, of course, upon the circumstances of each case. But the loss of an Appropriation Bill is conclusive evidence of wrong somewhere, whether that wrong be aggression or obstinacy, or both. Opinions will always differ as to whether a given state of facts does or does not justify the rejection of an Appropriation Bill. But the distribution of the blame which such a rejection implies must be determined by that arbiter, which, as Hallam+ observes, "has been the great preservative of the equilibrium in our Government-the public voice of a reflecting people, averse to manifest innovation, and soon offended by the intemperance of factions."

* May's Const. Hist. of Eng., i. 476.

+ Const. Hist., iii. 141.