United States for one of the purposes mentioned in the clause of the Constitution. To bring the case under the ciause there must be a purchase with consent.' Card 1953, December, 1895.

673. The mere fact of its being the owner of land situated within a State does not entitle the United States to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over the same or of offences committed thereon, nor does the fact that the land has been duly reserved for military purposes confer such authority. Where the United States is the proprietor of the land at the time of the admission of the State, it may obtain such exclusive jurisdiction, by expressly reserving the same to itself in the act of admission. Where this has not been done, or where the land has been purchased or otherwise acquired by the United States subsequently to the admission of the State, exclusive jurisdiction over the same can be vested in the United States only by an act of cession of such jurisdiction on the part of the State, or by the State's giving its consent to the "purchase" by the United States. See the terms of the provision of clause 17, sec. 8, Art. I, of the Constitution. A mere consent by a State, through its legislature, to the "purchase" by the United States of land within its limits for any purpose covered by the clause of the Constitution cited is as operative for the purpose of vesting the exclusive jurisdiction as is an express cession of the same. XLII, 514, 524, March, 1880; XLIII, 234, February, 1880.

674. Where a State statute, in consenting to the purchase by the United States of land within the State and ceding to the United States jurisdiction over the same, added that such jurisdiction should be exercised "concurrently with" the State, held that this qualification was subject to the objection that it amounted to more than the mere reservation (not unfrequent) of the right to serve upon the land legal process for acts done and crimes committed outside of the same, and should

1 See Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S., 525, 539; Chicago and Pacific Ry. Co. v. McGlinn, 114 U. S., 542; Benson v. U. S., 146 U. S., 325, 331; In re Kelly, 71 Fed. Rep., 545; In re Ladd, 74 Fed. Rep., 31.

2 United States . Stahl, 1 Woolworth, 192, and McCahon, 206; Ex parte Sloan, 4 Sawyer, 330, 331, 332; Clay r. State, 4 Kans., 49. Much less does the mere fact of its being the occupant of the land give it this authority-as where it occupies land as a camp. United States v. Tierney, 1 Bond, 571.

See the first three cases cited in last note. The fact that the person against whom the offence has been committed-as the person killed in a case of alleged murderis an employee of the United States, adds nothing to its jurisdictional authority. Er parte Sloan, supra.

That the term "exclusive legislation," employed in the Constitution, is equivalent to exclusive jurisdiction, or rather that exclusive jurisdiction is a necessary incident of exclusive legislation, see 6 Opins. At. Gen., 577, 578; United States r. Cornell, 2 Mason, 60; Er parte Sloan, 4 Sawyer, 330.

See United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 60; 6 Opins. At. Gen., 577, 578; 7 id., 628, 629; 8 id., 30, 104, 387. A State may give such consent by a single general act, prospective in terms, and covering all cases of future purchases by the United States. Note, for example, the act of the legislature of Texas of April 4, 1871, remarked upon in the opinion of the Attorney General of April 10, 1878 (15 Opins., 480).

therefore be regarded as inconsistent with a grant of exclusive jurisdiction to the United States over such land; further that it so far qualified the consent given to the purchase as to make it at least doubtful whether, in view of the provisions of Sec. 355, Rev. Sts., the Secretary of War would be authorized to expend an appropriation which had been made by Congress for the erection of public buildings on the land. XLIII, 197, February, 1880.

675. But where a State statute, in ceding jurisdiction to the United States over certain lands purchased within the State by the authority of Congress as sites for public structures, added-"But the State reserves the right to execute process lawfully issued under its authority within and upon said sites," &c., advised that such reservation might properly be regarded as having the same effect as that indicated by Atty. Gen. Cushing in 8 Opins., 387, viz., as reserving merely the right to serve process within the lands for acts done and crimes committed without the same (so as to prevent them from becoming an asylum for fugitives from justice), and that the cession might therefore properly be accepted as sufficiently vesting in the United States the exclusive jurisdiction over the premises contemplated by the Constitution. XLII, 567, July, 1866; XLIII, 234, February, 1880; 27, 132, October, 1888.

676. The effect of the possession by the United States of exclusive jurisdiction over land in a State, occupied for public purposes, is practically to withdraw the persons stationed or residing within the same from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the courts of the State, and from liability to the process of the same (except so far as may legally have been reserved by the State-see § 675 ante), as well as from taxation and other burdens of citizens of the State. On the other hand, such persons are not entitled to enjoy any of the privileges of such citizens, as the privilege of voting, of the use of the public schools,*

See United States v. Cornell, 2 Mason, 60; United States e. Davis, 5 id., 356; 6 Opins. At. Gen., 577, 578; 7 id., 628, 634; 8 id., 30, 102, 411, 417; 20 id., 242, 298, 611. See, on this general subject, the following as the principal authorities: Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U.S., 525; United States v. Travers, 2 Wheeler C. C., 490; Do. r. Tierney, 1 Bond, 571; Do. r. Stahl, Woolworth, 192, and McCahon, 206; Commonwealth v. Clary, 8 Mass., 72; Mitchell v. Tibbetts, 17 Pick., 298; Opinion of Justices, 1 Met., 580; State v. Dimick, 12 N. Hamp., 194; People v. Godfrey, 17 Johns., 225; Do. v. Lane, 1 Edmonds, 116; Commonwealth e. Young, Bright, 302; In re O'Connor, 37 Wise., 379; Clay v. State, 4 Kans., 49; Painter v. Ives, 4 Neb., 122; 6 Opins. At. Gen., 577; 7 id., 628; 8 id., 30, 102, 387, 418.

In this connection, note an opinion of the Attorney General of February 7, 1880 16 Opins., 468), that whether a superintendent of a national cemetery can legally be required to work upon the public roads of the State (in compliance with a law of the State requiring all male citizens between certain ages to perform such work), must depend upon whether he resides upon land acquired by the United States over which the State has parted with its jurisdiction; that if the jurisdiction over the cemetery grounds within which the superintendent resides has been surrendered to the United States, he is exempt from such obligation.

&c. XXI, 567, July, 1866; XXXIII, 8, March, 1872; XXXIX, 151, August, 1877; Card 3521, September, 1897.

677. The law is settled that where consent to purchase has been given, or exclusive jurisdiction has been ceded, by a State to the United States, as to land of the United States situate within the State, the land is no longer a part of the State in a political or legal sense, and no taxespoll tax, or State, county, town, or school tax, or other can legally be imposed upon those lawfully commorant thereon. XLIX, 187, July,

1885.

678. A cession of jurisdiction by a State to the United States may be qualified or conditional, and cedes only so much as is specifically expressed. But a consent to purchase, as the term is intended in the constitutional provision (Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 17), conveys the whole or an exclusive jurisdiction. So, where a State legislature, in giving the consent to a purchase for a constitutional purpose, couples with it a condition or qualification inconsistent with the possession of an exclusive jurisdiction by the United States as a condition that the State shall retain the same civil and criminal jurisdiction over persons and their property on the land that it has over other persons and property in the State or shall retain the right to tax persons living on the land and their property,-held that the jurisdiction is not such as is designed by the Constitution, and cannot legally be accepted by the United States. 59, 159, 408, April and May, 1893; 63, 98, December, 1893; 64, 330, April, 1894.

679. It has repeatedly been held, and is now regarded as well settled law, that exclusive legislation and exclusive jurisdiction mean one and the same thing, and that where a State has ceded to the United States the right of exclusive legislation over a tract of land within the territorial limits of the State, a reservation to the State of concurrent jurisdiction is valid only so far as it is not repugnant to the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Thus where the act of the legislature provided that "the United States may enter upon and occupy any land which may have been or may be purchased, or condemned, or otherwise acquired, and shall have the right of exclusive legislation and concurrent jurisdiction together with the State * over such land and the structures thereon, and shall hold the same exempt from all State, county and municipal taxation," it was held that the only legal effect of the "concurrent jurisdiction" therein reserved to the State was to admit of the service of civil and criminal process by the State upon the lands of the United States, and thus to prevent such 1See Fort Leavenworth R. R. Co. v. Lowe, 114 U. S., 525.

2 See 8 Opins. At. Gen., 418.

*

*

places from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives from justice. L, 255, May, 1886; Card 1581, July, 1895.

680. The term "purchase," as employed in statutes, has been construed as embracing all the forms of acquiring title-including condemnation-except that by descent.' But in Kohl . U. S., the Supreme Court say: "It is true the words to purchase' might be construed as including the power to acquire by condemnation, for, technically, purchase includes all modes of acquisition other than that of descent. But, generally in statutes, as in common use, the word is employed in a sense not technical, only as meaning acquisition by contract between the parties, without governmental interference." In a case, therefore, of certain lands in a State acquired by the United States by condemnation in the exercise of the right of eminent domain, advised that a special act of cession of jurisdiction be obtained from the State. 50, 474. December, 1891.

681. The term or other public building of any kind whatever," used in Sec. 355, Rev. Sts., held to include the observation towers," for the erection of which in the Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Park appropriations were made in the acts of August 5, 1892, and March 3, 1893. Cession of jurisdiction by the State is therefore requisite before the appropriation can legally be expended. 60, 30, June, 1893; 63, 60, December, 1893.

682. The term "or other public building," &c., as occurring in Sec. 355, Rev. Sts., held to include the viaduct at Rock Island for the construction of which appropriation was made by Congress by acts of 1889 and 1890. The consent of the State of Illinois to the purchase of the site by the United States or cession of jurisdiction, is therefore requisite to the legal expenditure of the funds appropriated. 43, 454, November, 1890.

683. Sec. 355, Rev. Sts., in prohibiting the expenditure of public money, for the purpose therein mentioned, before the consent of the State to the purchase of the land is obtained, does not preclude the mere purchase itself. The land therefore may legally be paid for, and the title thereto acquired, in the absence of such consent. 63, 1, December, 1893. Neither the constitutional provision (Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 17) nor the statute (Sec. 355, R. S.) precludes the United States from acquiring the title to the land. 64, 330, April, 1894.

17 Opins. At. Gen., 114, 121; Er parte Hebard, 4 Dillon, 380, 384; Burt e. Mchts. Ins. Co., 106 Mass., 356, 364.

291 U. S., 367, 374.

'In 7 Opins. Át. Gen., 114, Mr. Cushing treated the land acquired by the United States for the use of the Washington Aqueduct as coming within the provisions of Sec. 355, Rev. Sts.

'See 10 Opins. At. Gen., 34, 39; 15 id., 212, 213.

684. In view of the general rule of interpretation, that a statute is not to be construed as retrospective unless its language clearly shows that it was so intended, held that a general statute of 1891, giving the consent of the State of Louisiana to the purchase by the United States of land within the State for public purposes, was in effect prospective and did not apply to the purchase of the land at Jackson Barracks, made before the date of such act. Moreover the Constitution of Louisiana of 1868 forbids the enactment of retrospective laws. XLV, 436, September, 1882; L, 95, March, 1886.

685. The deficiency appropriation act of March 3, 1899, authorized the Secretary of War "in cooperation with the Floyd Memorial Association," to cause to be erected over the remains of Sergt. Charles Floyd, a member of the Lewis and Clarke Expedition, a suitable monument near Sioux City, Iowa, and appropriated five thousand dollars for the purpose. Held that the act did not authorize or require the acquisition by the United States of the land upon which the monument was built; that it may be assumed that Congress intended that the monument should be cared for by the association and that the United States should be at no other expense than that of the appropriation for assisting in its construction. There is no statute which would prohibit the expenditure of this particular appropriation, if title to the site be not acquired by the United States; and in practice appropriations have frequently been expended in works of improvement where such title to the sites has not been obtained, especially in improvements of navigable waters and highways. The prohibitions of Sec. 355, Rev. Sts., are not viewed as applicable to the case under consideration. Card 7482, March, 1900.

686. The title of the United States to the lands at Fort Monroe, as ceded by the State of Virginia, being limited to the line of ordinary low-water mark, held in view of the provisions of Secs. 355 and 4661, Rev. Sts., that a cession of jurisdiction over the necessary soil under the water beyond low-water mark should be obtained from the State before the appropriation, made by the act of August 10, 1888, for the iron pier to be constructed at Fort Monroe, be expended. LIII, 328, April, 1887.

687. Held that the act of Congress granting to the West Shore R. R. Co. a right of way across a part of the military reservation at West Point, New York, did not operate to oust, as to such way, the exclusive jurisdiction over the reservation previously ceded by the State to the United States. It simply imposed upon the military authorities the duty of not interfering with the legitimate use of its right by the railroad company. 41, 457, July, 1890.

Compare 15 Opins. At. Gen., 480.