of his command between certain hours, when "off duty," limits extending one mile beyond the military reservation, and forbidding them to enter or patronize within said limits gambling houses, saloons, etc., held that he did not exceed his authority in the matter. Card 1210, April, 1895.

ORDER-CONVENING A COURT MARTIAL.

1857. Held that the fact that the order convening a court martial was dated on a Sunday did not affect the validity of the proceedings in a case tried by the court under such order. XXXVII, 317, February, 1876.

1858. An order convening a general court martial should properly be so headed and authenticated, or so authenticated, as to show that it was issued by an officer authorized by the statute law-the 72d or 73d Article of War-to create such a tribunal. Thus held that such an order (issued in time of war) signed by an officer describing himself as commanding a "post" or "district" was prima facie invalid and inoperative, though capable of being shown to be valid by proof that the command was of such dimensions and so situated as practically to constitute a separate army, division, or separate brigade.1 XI, 162, 170, 176, 214, November and December, 1864; XXVI, 510, April, 1868. 1859. It is not a material objection to the validity of the proceedings or sentence, that the regiment or corps of a member of the court or of the judge advocate, is erroneously stated in the order convening the court, provided the description given is sufficient to identify the officer. XXXV, 433, June, 1874.

ORDER OF PROMULGATION.

1860. Where a general court martia nas had two presidents, it is immaterial whether the first or the second is mentioned in describing and identifying the court in the caption of the order promulgating its proceedings. It is not indeed necessary to indicate the president at all. XIII, 324, February, 1865. Nor is it necessary that such an order should set forth the specifications to the charges; nor-though this is usual, where the business of the court is completed-that it

The order should properly indicate for what trial or class of trials the court is convened, or its terms should be so general in this particular as to authorize the court to entertain any case that may be referred to it for trial. A court, restricted by the order convening it to the trial of a special case or class of cases, would not be empowered (in the absence of further orders) to take cognizance of a case not within such designation. See G. O. 106, Army of the Potomac, 1862, where the proceedings of a court martial in a case of a private soldier were disapproved as without jurisdiction, because the convening order had authorized the court to try the cases only of such officers as might be brought before it.

should formally dissolve the court. III, 84, June, 1863. An order of promulgation, indeed, is a mere form, habitual as a means of communicating the proceedings or their result to the army, for the sake of convenience and example, and of making a summary memorandum of the same, but not necessary to the validity of proceedings or sentence.1 Though no such order is issued in a case, the proceedings or sentence in the same will be formally complete and fully operative, if the official action thereon of the reviewing authority be duly endorsed upon or appended to the record, and actual or constructive notice thereof is given to the party affected. XXXII, 102, November, 1871; Card 1226, April, 1895.

ORDNANCE DEPARTMENT.

.

1861. It is required, in general and comprehensive terms by Sec. 1167, Rev. Sts., that all officers, persons, &c., who may be ntrusted with any ordnance stores or supplies, shall make certain regular returns to the Chief of Ordnance of such property in their possession or charge, according to certain forms and regulations to be prescribed by that officer with the approval of the Secretary of War. The act of March 3, 1879, c. 183, authorizes and directs the Secretary of War, at the request of the head of any department, to issue arms and ammunition, when r quired for the protection of the public money and property,-"to be delivered to any officer" of such department as may be designated by the head of the same, and to be accounted for to the Secretary of War. Held that the provision of Sec. 1167 might properly be regarded as applying to the class of officers indicated in this act, who therefore would properly be required to furnish the returns prescribed by that section. XLII, 210, March, 1879.

1862. Held that Section 1167, Revised Statutes, does not direct or authorize the Chief of Ordnance, subject to the approval of the Secretary of War, to draw up and enforce in his department a system of rules and regulations for the inspection of ordnance property with a view to its condemnation and sale or destruction. Card 63, July,

1894.

1863. An officer of the line, on passing the examination for a vacancy in the Ordnance Corps, does not become an ordnance officer by a mere transfer. He must be appointed, confirmed and commissioned in the usual way. 37, 156, December, 1889.

The insertion, in an order of publication, of the proceedings had upon a re-assembling of the court for a revision of its findings or sentence, though at one time occasionally resorted to, is now unusual. Such an addition can hardly be pertinent except where it is designed as a basis for special comments, on the part of the reviewing officer, upon the action of the court in connection with the matter of the revision.

1864. The Army Appropriation Act of June 16, 1892, provided:— "That sergeants of ordnance shall receive the same allowances of clothing as other sergeants in like staff departments." Held that this provision entitled these sergeants to receive, free of cost, a certain number of units of the different articles that go to make up their clothing, or, when the allowance was expressed in dollars and cents, the amount which such articles would cost when made up in the form and style required for such sergeants. 55, 326, September, 1892.

1865. Held that Section 1765, Revised Statutes, does not prohibit the payment of compensation to an ordnance sergeant for work as "time keeper" under the United States Engineer Department, such employment having no affinity or connection with the line of his official duty1 as ordnance sergeant and not interfering in any way with the same. Card 2570, September, 1896.

P.

PARDON.

1866. The President is empowered, by Art. II, Sec. 2, par. 1, of the Constitution "to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States"; and a pardon, like a deed, must, in order to take effect, be delivered to and accepted by the party to whom it is granted.* Thus there can be no pardon of a deceased officer or soldier; and that the pardon is asked by the party's widow or heir, who is to be pecuniarily benefited thereby, cannot affect the principle. XV, 486, 654, July and September, 1865; XXI, 564, and XXII, 291, July, 1866. So where, in a case of an officer who had died while under a sentence of suspension from rank, a pardon was asked for the purpose of having the stigma removed from his record in the service, held that the case was not one in which the pardoning power could be exercised. VII, 138, February, 1864.

1867. It is the effect of a full pardon (otherwise of a mere remission of the punishment-see REMISSION) to remove all penal consequences (except of course executed penalties-see § 1869, post) and all disabilities, attached by U. S. statute (or army regulation) to the offence, or to the conviction or sentence. Thus the pardon of a convicted deserter will relieve him from the loss of the rights of citizenship attached by the act of March 3, 1865 (Secs. 1996, 1998, Rev. Sts.) to a conviction

1 See Converse v. U. S., 21 Howard, 463; U. S. r. Brindle, 110 U. S., 688; Meigs r. U. S., 19 Ct. Cls., 497. See, also, § 1812, ante, and notes.

2 United States v. Wilson, 7 Peters, 150; In re De Puy, 3 Benedict, 307; 6 Opins. At. Gen., 403. And, in the absence of an express rejection, it is conclusively presumed to be accepted on actual or constructive notice.

312 Opins. At. Gen., 81; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wallace, 380.

of desertion. XXXI, 183, February, 1871. But a pardon by the President will be ineffectual of course to remove a disqualification incurred by the offender under a State statute. XXIX, 251, September, 1869; XLI, 465, November, 1878.

1868. Held that a pardon extended to an enemy for his offence or offences as such, committed during the war, did not entitle him to be paid rent for the occupation of his real estate by the U. S. military authorities while occupying by the right of conquest the region of country in which such estate was situated. XXII, 5, 16, March, 1866. 1869. A pardon cannot reach or remit a fully executed sentence, though the same may have been unjustly imposed. VIII, 228, April, 1864; XXXVI, 631, August, 1875. A pardon cannot of course undo a corporal punishment fully inflicted; nor can it avail to restore to the army an officer or soldier legally separated therefrom and made a civilian by a duly approved sentence of dismissal (see I § 1199, ante), or by a dishonorable discharge. XII, 427, and XIV, 568, June, 1865; XX, 302, January, 1866; XLI, 465, November, 1878; Cards 2049, 2216, 2174, 2809, February to December, 1896; 3810, January, 1897; 5624, January, 1899. Nor can it restore a fine paid (XVI, 305, June, 1865; XXXV, 471, July, 1874), or pay forfeited (XX, 90, October, 1865; XXVIII, 567, May, 1869), when the amount of the same has once gone beyond the control of the Executive and been covered into the U. S. Treasury and become public funds," whatever may have been the merits of the case. XXXVI, 192, January, 1875; XXXVII, 445, March, 1876; 34, 334, August, 1889; Card 3810, supra. Otherwise, however, where the money still remains in the hands of a military disbursing officer or other intermediate official. XVI, 676, November, 1865. Where, however, any portion of a punishment remains unexecuted, that portion may be remitted by the pardoning power. II, 29, February, 1863. 18 Opins. At. Gen., 284; 9 id., 478; 14 id., 124. And see People v. Bowen, 43 Cal., 439. That this disability can attach only upon a conviction, see § 1061, and authorities cited in note.

by

27 Opins. At. Gen., 760.

See 8 Opins. At. Gen., 284.

12 Opins. At. Gen., 548; Ex parte Garland, 4 Wallace, 381.

*2 Opins. At. Gen. 330; 16 id. 1. This, because the same Constitution which confers the pardoning power contains a provision “of equal efficiency” (Art. 1, Sec. 9 par. 7,) to the effect that money in the public treasury shall not be withdrawn except an appropriation made by law. 8 id. 281. Compare, in this connection, Knote . United States, 5 Otto, 149, where it was held that an executive pardon would not entitle a party to the proceeds of certain personal effects, confiscated and sold by the United States as the property of an enemy, after such proceeds had been duly paid into the Treasury. See, also, §§ 1272 and 1273, ante.

$14 Opins. At. Gen., 601. But see A. R. 952 of 1895 (1053 of 1901).

And the Executive, in the exercise of the pardoning power, "may pardon or remit a portion of the sentence at one time and a different portion at another." 3 Opins. At. Gen., 418.

Congress alone can restore pay fully forfeited to the United States, or otherwise pecuniarily indemnify an officer or soldier for the consequences of a legally executed sentence. XLIV, 270, January, 1881; 34, 334, August, 1889.

1870. It is the effect of the exercise of the pardoning power by the President to relieve the party from all punishment remaining to be suffered. Where, therefore, he remits the unexecuted portion of a term of imprisonment, an additional penalty, which, by the express terms of the sentence, was to be incurred at the end of the adjudged term, as a dishonorable discharge from the service, cannot be enforced. The pardon having intervened, the sentence ceases to have any effect whatever in law, and the soldier-the remainder of his service being regular must be honorably discharged. VIII, 669, July, 1864; XX, 460, March, 1866.

1871. The pardoning power extends to continuing punishments, or punishments which are never fully executed,-remitting, in each case the punishment from and after the taking effect of the pardon. Of this class is the punishment of disqualification to hold military or public office, as also that of the losing of or reduction in "files" (or relative rank) in the list of officers of the offender's grade: these being continuing punishments, may be put an end to at any time by a remission by the pardoning power.1 XXX, 262, April, 1870; XXXI, 24, November, 1870; XLI, 158, March, 1878; 41, 380, July, 1890; 56, 431, December, 1892; 60, 348, July, 1893.

1872. Where a soldier has been duly convicted of desertion, the loss of the rights of citizenship incident thereto are in practice restored by a formal pardon from the President; a remission of the punishment adjudged by the court martial does not have such effect. Card 3010, June, 1897.

1873. While to restore to or place upon duty an officer or soldier, when under arrest or charges on account of an alleged offence, would not probably in this country, to the same extent as in England, be regarded as operating as a condonation of the offence, the promotion of an officer while under sentence or awaiting action on the sentence has been viewed as a constructive pardon of the offence or offences on account of which he has been tried. But held that such a promotion could not operate as a pardon of other offences committed by him, of the commission of which no knowledge was had by the Executive at the date of the promotion. XXXV, 649, November, 1874. While

3

1 See 12 Opins. At. Gen. 547; 17 id. 31, 656; G. C. M. O. 54, 1884, and S. O. 116, A. G. O., 1886; also G. C. M. O. 85, A. G. O., 1891.

*See Clode, Mil. Forces of the Crown, vol. 1, p. 173; Prendergast, 244-5, in con nection with the cases cited of Sir Walter Raleigh, Lord Lucan, Capt. Achison, &c. See 6 Opins. At. Gen. 123.