prince de la maison de France ne puisse ni régner ni rien acquérir dans l'étendue de la monarchie d'Espagne par aucune des voies qui seront toutes spécifiées."

It will be borne in mind that we are only at present speaking of intentions; and what we have just stated must be taken as conclusive evidence of the intentions of France as well as the allies so far as 1710. But did anything occur between that period and the signature of the Treaty of Utrecht to alter those intentions? Yes. The Emperor Joseph died, and was succeeded by Charles of Austria, whom it had been previously agreed to acknowledge as King of Spain.

It has already been explained how, in consequence of this event, the recognition of Philip V. took place. But it was only consented to on the express condition that the branch of Philip V. should be completely separated and made a distinct family from that of France, as appears from the following extract from his act of renunciation :-" Separating by the legal メ means of my renunciation my branch from the royal trunk of France;" and the renunciations of the other French Princes were first converted into fundamental laws both in France and Spain, and then incorporated into the treaty in lieu of the stipulation in the preliminaries above mentioned. But there is not a particle of evidence to show that any alteration had taken place in the views of the allies as to the perpetual exclusion of the French Princes. Quite the contrary. The declaration of Philip V. above mentioned of July 8th, 1712, proves incontrovertibly that that principle of exclusion was maintained in all its rigour. The words of that declaration are so con

vincing, that we will here transcribe a short extract from them :

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L'Angleterre en prit occasion de porter ses vues jusqu'à prévenir et anéantir les effets de tous autres accidents qui pourraient encore survenir un jour; cette couronne vint à proposer et soutenir, comme un moyen nécessaire pour éviter toutes sortes d'inconvéniens dans les circonstances qui pourraient arriver, qu'il fallait que je renonçasse, en mon nom et en celui de tous mes descendants, à la monarchie d'Espagne, ou à celle de France en telle sorte que, si je demeurais dans l'Espagne, aucun de mes successeurs ne pourrait jamais succéder à celle de France; et que ceux qui régnent ou régneront en France, ni tout autre prince qui est issu de cette famille, ou qui en naîtra ci-après, ni ses descendants, ne pourront jamais posséder la couronne d'Espagne."

It is evident, therefore, that the intention was to exclude the French Princes, absolutely and for ever, from the crown of Spain: nevertheless, if the words of the treaty, and of the acts incorporated in it, referred only to the rights derived from Anne of Austria and Maria Theresa, it might be supposed that the allies had committed an oversight, and France might perhaps consider herself at liberty to take advantage of it. But the fact is precisely the reverse.

In the first place, upon considering with attention the act of renunciation of the Duke of Orleans, it will be clearly perceived that that document consists of two parts: first, that which abdicates all existing rights; and secondly, that which renounces future

ones.

The first indication of this distinction is contained

in the title of the act itself, which may be divided into two clauses, the first of which is as follows:

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Renonciation avec serment de Philippe, Petit-Fils de France, Duc d'Orléans, à la couronne d'Espagne." This clause relates to the rights already supposed to be vested in the Duke of Orleans. The second clause refers to future rights in these words: "et à toute X espérance d'y pouvoir succéder un jour, lui, ses enfans, et ses descendans."

The next passage in which this distinction is pointed out is the following one :

“Désirant prévenir les craintes que pourraient causer les droits de notre naissance, ou tous autres qui pourraient nous appartenir, nous avons résolu de faire ce désistement, cette abdication, et cette renonciation de tous nos droits pour nous et au nom de tous nos successeurs et descendans."

Here the distinction is evident between existing rights, "Les droits de notre naissance," and future ones, "tous autres qui pourraient nous appartenir." It is to be observed that the act does not say, "tous autres qui nous appartiennent," or "qui peuvent nous appartenir," but "qui pourraient" nous "appartenir,” i.e. which may hereafter belong to us.

The next sentence in this act is one of the most important that we shall have to cite, and we perceive in it the same distinction which the preceding passage points out. It is divided into two parts, the first of which is to the following effect :

"Nous nous déclarons et nous tenons, dès à présent, nous, nos enfants, et descendants, pour exclus et inhabiles, absolument et à jamais, et sans limitation ni distinction de personnes, de degrés, et de sexe, de

toute action, et de tout droit à la succession de la couronne d'Espagne."

These words certainly contain as absolute a renunciation as possible for the Duke of Orleans and his descendants, for ever, of any rights which were already vested in him at the time when the act was executed. But it does not appear to us that they can be strictly and legally construed as a renunciation of any new title which might in future accrue to any of his descendants; and we must therefore take them as applicable only to existing rights. But in the second part of that sentence which immediately follows, the same words nearly are repeated over again, with the addition of the word " incapable," and of the phrase "de quelque manière que la succession puisse arriver à notre ligne." We quote below the words of the second clause of this sentence:

"Nous voulons et consentons que dès maintenant et pour toujours on nous tienne, nous et les nôtres, pour exclus, inhabiles, et incapables, en quelque degré que nous nous trouvions, et de quelque manière que la succession puisse arriver à notre ligne.”

The terms of this instrument appear to have been taken, for the greater part, from the acts of renunciation which had been previously executed by Anne of Austria and Maria Theresa. But this last clause is not contained in either of these former acts; and it is evident that it has been added in this one in lieu of the stipulation in the preliminaries of 1709, to which we have above referred, "soit par testaments, appels, successions, conventions matrimoniales, &c." It appears to us to be as comprehensive as any form of words that could have been devised, and to contain

as explicit a renunciation of future rights as could have been desired. We will here only further observe that the circumstance of the first part of this sentence being repeated a second time with the addition of this last clause, seems to indicate plainly the distinction above mentioned between existing and future rights.

But that distinction is again most clearly marked in the following clauses of this document. For, after the passage last quoted, the act goes on to recite all the rights which could be supposed at that time to belong to the Duke of Orleans, and to renounce them and having done this, afterwards proceeds to renounce every other right whatever, which might thereafter appertain to him or to his descendants.

The first part of this sentence is to the following effect:-"Nous ratifions la renonciation que la dite Dame Reine Anne a faite, et toutes les clauses que les Rois Philippe III. et Philippe IV. ont insérées dans leurs testaments :-Nous renonçons pareillement à tout le droit qui nous PEUT appartenir et à nos enfants et descendants en vertu de la déclaration faite à Madrid le 29me Octobre, 1703, par Philippe V., Roy des Espagnes, notre neveu."

The Duke of Orleans was descended from Anne of Austria only; not from Maria Theresa. He therefore only speaks of rights derived from the first-named princess; and it is to be remarked, that, in doing so, he says not that he renounces them, but that he ratifies her previous renunciation of them.

We observe also that the expression, in speaking of rights derived from the declaration of Philip V., is "tout le droit qui nous PEUT appartenir," not " rait appartenir," ie. which may belong to us now.

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