argument to address to the prince so disputing that claim, to say "You must not oppose my taking the crown of Spain, because I am disqualified from possessing that of France." He might reply, "I know and care nothing about your claim to the throne of France; but this I know, that you are for ever excluded, disabled, and incapacitated, by the most solemn acts and treaties, from succeeding to the crown of Spain, in whatever manner the succession may fall to your line; and I shall oppose, by all the means in my power, your attempt to deprive me of my undoubted right to it."

If a war should thereupon ensue, that war has already been declared, beforehand, by the Duke of Orleans of 1712, to be unjust, unlawful, and unduly undertaken, on the part of his descendant; and to be, on the contrary, just and lawful, on the part of his opponent. The truth is, that this marriage ought never to have taken place at all; and that the only manner in which it could now be rendered in any degree consistent with the stipulations of treaties, would be by means of an act of renunciation on the part of the Infanta, for herself and her descendants, of all claim to the succession to the crown of Spain. Such an act might be taken to have the effect of relieving her children from any disqualification from succeeding to the crown of France, which might apply to them as descendants of Philip V., and it is not probable that the powers of Europe would now object to such an arrangement.

It has been said that it would be impossible for the Infanta to execute such an act of renunciation; but that the Duke of Montpensier would, if required, re

nounce his eventual right to the crown of France. But why should it be easier for the Duke of Montpensier to abdicate his right than for the Infanta to renounce hers? What is the difference? Simply, that she is nearer to the crown of Spain than the Duke to that of France.

We are not aware that the proximity to the crown of the prince who renounces his rights can, in any way, affect the validity of the act by which he does so. Το maintain the contrary, would be to assert that an act of renunciation can only be valid where it is of no use; and that, immediately the case arises against which it was intended to provide, it loses its force and ceases to have any effect.

The Infantas Anne of Austria and Maria Theresa renounced their contingent rights to the Spanish throne when they married Louis XIII. and Louis XIV. Yet at that time there was no Treaty of Utrecht in existence; why then should not the Duchess of Montpensier imitate their example now that, in addition to the motives of general policy which dictated the former renunciations, there is the further one of respect for the faith of treaties? We can easily understand that the Duchess of Montpensier may feel a repugnance to renounce her rights; but she should have considered this matter before she married; now that the marriage is accomplished it is too late. She must accept the necessary consequences of that act; and those who took a part in hurrying it to its completion, must accept the responsibility of their conduct. We may be asked upon what ground we conceive that England is entitled to demand (seeing that the descendants of Philip V. are excluded from the crown of France, as

well as those of the Duke of Orleans from that of Spain) that the Duchess of Montpensier should renounce her rights to the succession in Spain rather than that the Duke should renounce his to the succession in France?

Our answer is as follows. It has been shown above that, in consequence of the existence of the Salic Law in France, no Spanish prince could, previously to the Treaty of Utrecht, acquire rights to the French crown for his children, by means of a marriage with a French princess; but that, as female succession prevailed in Spain, a French prince might, by marrying a Spanish princess, acquire, for his children, rights to the crown of Spain.

This then was the danger which it was the special object of the Treaty of Utrecht and of the acts of renunciation to avert. And, if this object should be eventually defeated by the acquiescence of England in the succession of the children of the Duke of Montpensier to the Spanish crown, the Treaty of Utrecht will indeed become a dead letter, and the fruits of all our exertions to preserve the independence of Spain will be lost. It is possible that the designs of the French Government may be frustrated, in the present instance, by the dispensations of Providence; and that the marriage of Queen Isabella may be blessed with an ample succession of heirs to her throne. But we may be sure that the same game would be played over again by France, on the next occasion, unless it be resisted now; whereas, if that resistance is successful, Spanish independence may become henceforward something better than an empty name.

The descendants of the Duke of Orleans are ex

cluded from the succession to the throne of Spain. It is proposed, now, that the Duke of Montpensier should renounce his claim to succeed to the crown of France. But if the renunciation of 1712, and the arrangements made at Utrecht, are not now respected, what better security would exist for the faithful observance of the renunciation which it is suggested that the Duke of Montpensier should now execute?

We can easily understand that the Duke of Montpensier may prefer, for his son, the near prospect of ascending the throne of Spain, to the much more remote chance of succeeding to that of France. But the Duke of Montpensier has no right to make any option whatever between two crowns from one of which he and his descendants are for ever excluded.

The Royal Cedula of Philip V. is drawn up in terms too clear and precise to admit of doubt on this point. There is no corresponding act in France which could apply with equal force to the children of the Duchess of Montpensier. And, in the act of renunciation of Maria Theresa, it is expressly recommended that any Spanish princess who might, thenceforward, marry a French prince should imitate her example. And this, be it remarked, was long before either the introduction into Spain of the Salic law, or the existence of the Treaty of Utrecht. The following is the passage in question :

66

Lesquels (les Royaumes d'Espagne) et ceux de France sont également intéressés, à ce que la grandeur et majesté qu'ils soutiennent, et conservent en euxmêmes, avec tant de bonheur et de gloire du nom de leurs Rois Catholiques et très Chrétiens, ne soit point diminuée et ne décheoit point, comme nécessaire

ment elle se diminuerait, et décheroit, si, par le moyen, et à cause de ce mariage, ils se viendraient à unir et conjoindre dans quelques uns des enfans et descendans, dont le succès causerait aux sujets et vassaux le mécontentement et affliction, qui se peut considérer; et dont justement on pourrait craindre qu'il résulterait les dommages et inconvéniens qui se rencontrent et se reconnaissent plus facilement avant qu'ils arrivent, qu'ils ne se répareroient, et remédieraient après qu'ils seraient arrivés, et que l'on les aurait expérimentés. Et partant il a convenu prévenir les remèdes à ce qu'ils n'arriveraient pas; et que ce mariage seroit cause d'effets contraires à ceux que l'on se promet et que l'on doit espérer que l'on obtiendra par icelui. Outre qu'avec cet exemple, et à son imitation, on facilitera dorénavant les mariages réciproques entre mes enfans et descendans, et ceux du Roi Monseigneur: ce qui m'est une considération de particulière consolation et contentement; d'autant que ce sera le moyen de retroicir et renouveller plusieurs fois le lien du sang et du parentage; et d'assurer et affermir plus fortement les alliances, amitiés, et bonnes correspondances lesquelles ont été liées par de si heureux principes, et contractées entre ces deux royaumes, et se continueront à la gloire de Dieu, et demeureront glorieusement entre iceux et les Rois Catholiques et très Chrétiens.”