is very different: because Spain, in consequence of the loss of her colonies, is no longer a formidable power; and that, therefore, the union of the crowns of Spain and France, if it should ever be brought to pass, would no longer be pregnant with danger to the balance of power, and to the liberties of Europe.

We will never believe, until we see proof of it, that there lives the English statesman who would even harbour such a thought as this within the inmost recesses of his breast; much less can we believe that any one will be bold enough to propound such a doctrine in the British House of Commons. The loss of the Spanish colonies has certainly tended to diminish the power of Spain. But, if the dominions of the Spanish crown are no longer what they were at the time of the Treaty of Utrecht, there has been, on the other hand, a very important change effected with respect to the dominions of France; we allude to the French possessions in Africa, which renders it needless to point out the immense importance to England of preserving the real as well as nominal independence of Spain; but as we have already touched upon this subject we will add no more respecting it on this occasion.

This is, however, only a difference of degree, and not of principle; for even supposing that France had no African possessions, and that Spain did not possess any colonies at all, it would still be impossible to contemplate the contingency of the union of France and Spain without feeling that France would thereby acquire such an increase of power as must be in the highest degree injurious to the interests of the rest of Europe, and probably fatal to the repose of the world.

There is one more argument, if such it can be called, which we shall notice in conclusion. It has been said that, after all, it is very uncertain whether the children of the Duke of Montpensier will ever succeed to the crown of Spain; and that even if they should do so, the chance of the crown of France being united with it is so very slight and distant that it can afford no just motive for our interference.

But even placing the question on this narrow ground, can it be seriously meant to recommend that England should acquiesce in this scheme because the actual union of the two crowns is not likely to take place next month? Such is not the manner in which our ancestors reasoned at the commencement of the last century, when Philip V. assumed the crown of Spain. At that time there seemed to be little probability of his succeeding to that of France; but it is well known that before long a mortality occurred in the French royal family, which placed him so near to the throne as to induce Louis XIV. to urge him, in 1712, to abandon Spain, and preserve his rights to the French succession; and who can tell what similar events may happen again in the course of a dozen years?

No one can pretend, however,--not even those who most strenuously labour to evade the stipulations of the Treaty of Utrecht,-that since that treaty was signed a case parallel to the present one has ever occurred. There has only been one marriage since that time between a Spanish princess and a French prince, and that one occurred, as we have already stated, at a moment when England and Austria were at war with France and Spain, and even that princess

was not the heiress to the Spanish crown. This is the first instance of such an attempt to break through the rules laid down as the law of Europe. If this attempt be allowed to succeed, is any one weak enough to suppose that an appeal to the Treaty of Utrecht can ever be made again?

If it be said that we shall always be at liberty to resist when a case of danger occurs, we answer, that unless we do so now, we shall lose our power of making any effectual opposition hereafter. The principle of excluding French princes from the succession in Spain is equally violated, whether it be done by one a little nearer or by one a little more remote from the throne of France; and if we were to permit that violation now, and to appeal, in any future contingency, to the Treaty of Utrecht, we should probably be told that the treaty is a dead letter, and that if we had meant to stand by it we ought to have done so before. We should find also that our opponent had made use of the interval to strengthen his position in Spain; and we should discover, when too late, that we had lost our moral influence by our apathy on this occasion.

Let us not deceive ourselves on this point. The real object of the French Government in this matter has been to set aside the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht. An attempt was made in 1761 to evade it, and to obtain the same object indirectly by means of the Family Compact. But now that Spain has engaged with England not to renew that compact, the object is to get rid of the treaty altogether; they had hoped that its stipulations were forgotten (and in some instances, perhaps, they were not mistaken), and that their violation of it might pass without observation;

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but since that violation has been brought into public notice, by what means have they sought to justify it? By citing the marriage of the daughter of Louis XV. with the Duke of Parma!

Now, if that marriage can justify the succession of the son of the Duke of Montpensier to the crown of Spain, what is there that may not be justified hereafter by the fact of that succession?

But this is a very narrow view of a highly important subject. It is, in fact, assuming that the sole object of the Treaty of Utrecht was to prevent the union of the two crowns: an idea which we have already shown to be unfounded.

The real question at issue between England and France is that respecting the establishment of an exclusively French influence at Madrid-such an influence as shall enable the French ambassador, by obtaining the appointment of Ministers devoted to French interests, to guide and direct the policy of Spain, both in peace and war, according to the wishes of the French Government: so that, in peace, English goods may be excluded from the markets of Spain, and differential duties may be established in Spanish ports favourable to French and hostile to British vessels; and that in time of war Spain may either side openly with France, or may afford to her the advantage of taking refuge and refitting in Spanish. ports.

We know that there are some persons who believe that the effect of this marriage is not likely to be such as we anticipate from it, and that the French Government will not acquire by it any increase of influence in Spain. We sincerely trust they may be right;

but, if so, we shall be greatly surprised, and we are sure that the French Government will be grievously disappointed. In what manner, but by court intrigue, has the government of Spain been carried on since the fall of Espartero? Let any one take up the columns of The Times' newspaper and he will see there innumerable proofs both of the existence of that influence, and of the uses which are made of it; and he will see there, also, the mention of a significant fact, namely that the Spanish ambassador at Paris X was the only one of all the foreign ambassadors resident in that capital who assisted at the fête lately given by M. Guizot to the Bey of Tunis as an independent sovereign. All the other ambassadors absented themselves on that occasion, because the Bey being a vassal of the Porte, they were anxious not to take part in a proceeding which might give umbrage to the Sultan, and they were unwilling to compromise their own dignity by yielding precedence to an individual who, not being an independent prince, was not entitled to it. But the French Government wished to flatter him, and treated him with honours which were not due to him, because it is important to them to have a friend on the eastern frontiers of Algeria whenever they make their meditated attack towards the west on Morocco; and to this scheme the ambassador of Spain lent his countenance and assistance. The effect of the influence of France upon the policy of Spain is, therefore, already visible; and it appears to us wonderful that any Englishman should attempt to deny it.

It is remarkable also, that the individual member of the royal family of France, who has shown most