papers presented to the French Chambers by LouisPhilippe's Government. The proposal itself was commonly called that for joint action, or "action commune," and was the subject of much discussion in the correspondence which subsequently took place between the two Governments; as there seemed to be ground for supposing, from the shortness of the period that elapsed between the time when it was first made, and the moment when the double marriage was publicly announced-a period of less than six weeks-that the proposal itself was not made with sincerity, but was merely a stratagem designed to deceive the English Government, and to conceal, or disguise the real nature of the proceedings of M. Bresson at Madrid. Such a stratagem as this, if it might be thought allowable between belligerent or hostile nations, is one of which history fortunately affords but few examples between governments closely allied in friendship, and professing the most anxious desire to cultivate assiduously an "entente cordiale." We have already, in a former part of this work, made some few observations on this subject. We will not enter upon it again at length, but will merely request particular attention to the following extract of a letter written five days before the proposal for "Joint Action," of July 20.

M. Guizot to Louis-Philippe.

EXTRACT.

"Val Richer, Mercredi, 15 Juillet, 1846.

"Voici Bresson convaincu, comme moi, que c'est vers les fils de Don François de Paule qu'il faut diriger nos efforts, en se mettant à l'œuvre. Je l'ai déjà poussé, et je continuerai de le pousser dans ce sens. Nous retrouverons bien là aussi un embarras. Londres pour Don Enrique; nous pour le Duc de Cadix. Toujours la même lutte entre les Progressistas et les Moderados, et toujours les mêmes patrons pour les deux partis. Evidemment le Duc de 'Cadix vaut infiniment mieux pour la Reine, pour l'Espagne, et pour nous. JE NE CROIS CEPENDANT PAS QUE NOUS DEVIONS LE PROPOSER À LONDRES NOMINATIVEMENT ET PAR PRÉFÉRENCE À SON FRÈRE. CE QU'IL FAUT proposer à LONDRES COMME OBJET

E

Tant

que

DE NOTRE APPUI COMMUN À MADRID, CE SONT LES FILS DE DON FRANÇOIS DE Paule. La Reine d'Espagne et son Gouvernement choisiront celui qui leur conviendra le mieux. les modérés seront au pouvoir, ET LA REINE CHRISTINE À MADRID, NOUS SOMMES BIEN SÛRS QUE, S'ILS ACCEPTENT CETTE COMBINAISON, ILS CHOISIRONT CADIX. Si les Progréssistes devenaient les maîtres, ils choisiraient Don Enrique. Nous ne pouvons éviter cette chance.

"Maintenant, faut-il aller droit à Lord Palmerston, et lui proposer que la France et l'Angleterre agissent en commun ET NETTEMENT à Madrid, pour engager la Reine d'Espagne et son Gouvernement à vider sans délai la question du mariage au profit de l'un des fils de Don François de Paule, celui qu'ils préféreront? Je suis enclin à le penser.

Si nous faisions cette démarche, il y aurait fort à prendre soin de la loyauté de notre attitude envers Naples pour Trapani, et aussi des chances possibles de Montemolin, dans l'avenir, si les fils de Don François de Paule ne réussissaient pas."

Here is a distinct avowal that the whole object of the proposal was deception. The French Government professed to us that they were quite indifferent between Don Enrique and his brother. In his despatch to Count Jarnac, of October 5th, 1846 (see the Papers laid before Parliament), in reply to Lord Palmerston's animadversions respecting this hollow proposal, M. Guizot says—

"Je proposai donc, au Gouvernement Anglais, de les (the two sons of Don Francisco de Paula) soutenir en commun avec nous, et je déclarai, en même tems, que nous n'avions, NI À L'UN NI À L'AUTRE DE CES PRINCES, aucune objection, et que celui des deux qui conviendrait à l'Espagne et à sa Reine nous conviendrait égale

ment!

"Ce que j'ai dit à Londres, JE L'AI DIT PAREILLEMENT À MADRID. M. le Comte de Bresson a toujours eu pour instruction d'appuyer les deux Infants, et de dire d'avance que nous adhérions pleinement au choix que ferait entre eux la Reine. L'AMBASSADEUR DU ROI A FIDÈLEMENT REMPLI SES INSTRUCTIONS."

Yet the letter of July 15th incontestably proves that the proposal was only made because they were "bien sûrs" that "ils choisiront Cadix." And, with respect to the faithful

execution of his instructions by M. Bresson, we have no doubt that he did so execute them: only, as we have seen already by his letters of July 12th and 13th, that he had then proposed to Queen Christina to associate together Cadiz and Montpensier, those instructions must have been very different from M. Guizot's description of them.

But those letters of M. Bresson's, of July 12th and 13th, must have been received before the 20th, probably on the 17th or 18th, but certainly before the 20th, because it is on the 20th that the King returned them to M. Guizot, with his commentaries. Those letters stated that Queen Christina had agreed to the offer of Cadiz and Montpensier, and that the Duke of Cadiz was about to be summoned to Madrid. In fact the whole question was almost as good as settled. Yet it is on the 20th of July that M. Guizot writes his letter to Count Jarnac, instructing him to make to Lord Palmerston the proposal for joint action!

Is it necessary to make any comment to show that this was not a proposal made with sincerity and good faith?

But, further; the King objects to M. Bresson's offer about the "simultanéité," and insists upon M. Bresson being disavowed. M. Guizot, had his proposal for joint action been sincere, would doubtless have acquiesced in the propriety and necessity of this measure. But he does just the contrary; and by determined resistance, and the employment of arguments not more sincere than his proposal for joint action, succeeds in first creating delay, and then diverting the King from his purpose.

We have now finished all the observations, which we wished to make, respecting the light thrown, on the subject of the Spanish marriages, by the very remarkable and interesting publication to which we have so frequently referred. We will merely add that we recommend, to the attention of our readers, two letters of which we have not taken especial notice. The first is a letter from Lord Aberdeen to M. Guizot, dated Haddo House, September 14th, 1846, and is to be found in No. 21, p. 325. The second is contained in No. 51, the last of the publication, at pp. 481, 482, and is a

letter addressed by the Prince de Joinville to the Duke de Nemours, dated on board Le Souverain,' off Spezzia, November 7th, 1847.

In conclusion, we have a remark to make, in confirmation of our observation at the beginning of this Postscript, that posterity would have great difficulty in believing that the question, respecting the interpretation of the Treaty of Utrecht, could ever have really given rise to any difference of opinion between the statesmen of the present day, or between persons capable of forming a sound judgment on the subject. Two considerations combine to lead us to this opinion.

I. The only argument used, in opposition to our interpretation of the Treaty, was, in substance, that the acts of renunciation were never intended to have any other effect than that of annulling the rights of the issue of the two marriages which had, at that time, taken place between Spanish Princesses and French Princes; namely, that of Louis XIII. to Anne of Austria, and that of Louis XIV. to Maria Theresa: but that the parties to the Treaty of Utrecht never contemplated the avoidance of the rights which might accrue to the issue of any other similar marriage which might take place in future. And this argument was pushed to the extent of declaring that the framers of the Treaty could not, by possibility, have overlooked the case of a future marriage; the only inference from which is, either that they did make due provision against the occurrence of a similar alliance in future; or, if not, that it was their express intention, wish, and design, that, whenever another such marriage might occur again, rights precisely similar to those which they had just made such vast efforts to set aside, should come into full and immediate operation. Now this, on the face of it, appears extremely improbable. What motive could exist to make the parties to the Treaty look, either with less apprehension, or with more reverence, upon rights which might descend to a French Prince, through some future alliance, than upon those which were derived from a marriage which had already taken place? It is clear that the general principle on which

such rights could be set aside, namely, danger to the balance of power, would apply equally to both cases. And, therefore, since we are not to suppose that the negotiators were careless, and guilty of an oversight (which our opponents declare to be impossible), we do not see how we can believe them to have wilfully made provision for the future destruction of that safeguard which they had manifested so much anxiety to establish "for all time to come."

This supposition, therefore, appears to be, primâ facie, highly improbable.

But, when we consider the peculiar circumstances under which the Treaty of Utrecht was signed, the sanguinary war which had been carried on for so many years, and the vast sacrifice of blood and treasure that had been made for the purpose of preventing a French Prince from ascending the throne of Spain, as well as the extremely long and protracted negotiations that preceded the conclusion of peace, it certainly does seem to us utterly incomprehensible that any one should attempt to maintain such a doctrine for one moment. From the time of Charles V, a constant struggle for supremacy had been carried on between the Houses of Austria and Bourbon. The House of Bourbon had twice endeavoured to obtain, by marriage with a Spanish Infanta, a contingent claim to the succession to the crown of Spain. But, in both cases, the Princesses (Anne of Austria and Maria Theresa) renounced their rights, for themselves and their descendants, for ever, in the most solemn acts, drawn up in the most stringent form. Upon the death of Charles II., however, Louis XIV. did not hesitate to set at nought the solemn renunciation of his wife, and to seize the crown of Spain for his grandson Philip. A long war ensued, and, when at length peace was made, it was resolved, by the allies, to take effectual steps to prevent a similar case from ever happening again. Experience had shown that a renunciation, however solemnly made or strongly worded, would not, of itself, as "un acte isolé," and without some solid guarantee for its strict execution, afford any real security for its faithful observance, or, consequently, for the repose of