ing example is one given by Aristotle (ch. iv), redressed by Poste. It is taken from the Euthydemus of Plato, § 12-18. The middle term, yрaμμaτikós, is a schoolboy who has learned to spell. The minor term is ambiguous. ὁ γραμματικὸς ἐπιστήμων· ὁ μανθάνων γραμματικός· .. ὁ μανθάνων ἐπιστήμων. Such obvious cases as these would of course deceive no one. The scorn with which logical examples are often treated overlooks, however, the fact that premises in actual discussions are often very wide apart,—one or the other, indeed, perhaps not stated at all,—and the conclusion also remote; and so an ambiguity may very well escape detection, and lead to error. Whenever we can bring together the premises and conclusion in the form of a compact syllogism, the sophism of equivocation is usually quite manifest. We must recollect, too, that a series of arguments is like a chain, which is not stronger than its weakest link. If an ambiguous term is lurking somewhere, the chain cannot be depended on. One may observe, "There is a great deal of truth in what has been said." Yes, maybe it is all true, except one essential point. The sophistry is most dangerous that lies hidden in minute neglected points. "Burglars do not, in general, come and batter down the front door; but climb in at some window whose fastenings have been neglected. An incendiary does not kindle a tar barrel in the middle of the hall, but leaves a lighted candle in the thatch or in a heap of shavings." Perhaps no fallacy is so prolific of false doctrine as this. Are mere words, then, so dangerous? "Men imagine," says Bacon, "that their minds have the command of language; but it often happens that language bears rule over their minds." And this rule is often misrule. Living languages, especially, abound in ambiguities, and no procedure is safe that has not provided against them, and that does not keep close watch upon them. The only remedy is an exact definition and a consistent use of terms. Whoever would discuss a subject in writing or speech with scientific accuracy must set out with definitions, and often state the precise sense in which he uses common words. It is one criterion of an advanced science to have its terms accurately defined. The mathematical and physical sciences were the first to make progress in this direction, and only in recent times have the moral sciences thus attempted to escape vagueness and erroneous consequence. It would, perhaps, be impossible to enumerate the sources or kinds of ambiguity in words, or the errors which are consequent upon it. Some select illustrations must suffice. A word used at one time in its etymological or primary sense, and at another in a secondary or acquired and perhaps more customary sense, yields of course a quaternion. Thus a "representative" being originally a mere spokesman, his constituents may mistake his proper function, and hold him a trust-breaker if he uses his own judgment about measures. They might as rightly insist that a sycophant is merely a fig-shower. So one might fancy himself safe from legal penalties for "publishing a libel," so long as he did not print it. Laws, however, do not travel in meaning with their words. The honor of a discovery is usually accorded to him who first publishes it. Hence M. Biot, against the decision of the Royal Society, claimed the priority in the discovery of fluxions for Leibnitz over Newton, because of a private letter on the subject written by the former to Oldenburg in 1676, which was prior, and, in the legal meaning of the term, a publication. Again, the word "to utter," meaning originally "to give out," "to issue," has changed its meaning. No one, however, under indictment for "the utterance of counterfeit coin" would be likely to plead in defence that nobody ever uttered coin except the princess in the fairy tale.' More serious errors arise from the customary use of the same word in various senses. The word "nature" is quite ambiguous. Butler pointed out three meanings. Sir C. G. Lewis makes two general classes of its various meanings: 1st, a positive idea, expressing essence, quality, or disposition; 2d, a negative idea, excluding art, or human regulation or contrivance. The phrase "human nature" is used in the positive, "state of nature" in the negative sense. "Every man has a natural right to his liberty" is a jumble of uncertain sounds. The word "moral " is variously used. It seems to have lost entirely its etymological sense (mos, custom), as has also the Greek synonym "ethical" (0os, custom), but it has branched out into various meanings. It is opposed to physical in "the moral and physical sciences," and to demonstrative in "moral and demonstrative reasoning." Even in the specific sense of right and wrong its signification fluctuates. Accurately, its criterion is law; a moral act is one imposed by a superior. Hence when we speak of the moral governor of the universe, it must be understood to mean merely goodness or equity, which qualities 'De Morgan, p. 243. may attach to a supreme legislator; but the sovereign has no moral duties; his enactments create these for his subjects. The confusion of "law" in the juridical sense with "law" as a uniformity of nature is exemplified in Butler's chapter on "The Moral Government of God." He calls the course of nature a government merely on the ground that it induces precautions to avoid pain. But these precautions have nothing moral in them; they may be used for criminal ends. Guy Fawkes obeyed a law of nature when he arranged for firing his powder-mine with safety to himself." The several meanings in which the word "inconceivable" is used, and its confusion with "incredible," have obscured greatly, and needlessly extended, the controversy between the intuitional and empirical schools of philosophy. Antipodes were incredible to the ancients, but not properly inconceivable. Every child conceives clearly that "the cow jumped over the moon," and maybe believes it, or maybe not. Necessary truth is a thing conceivable, the contradictory of which is inconceivable, i. e., cannot be thought or imaged by the mind. This contradictory is incredible; but it does not follow that whatever is inconceivable is incredible. Two contradictories may be equally inconceivable, as finite and infinite space; but, being logical contradictories, one must be true. Again, before the coming of Christ, it was inconceivable that justice and mercy could consist, but not incredible; since. then it has become clearly conceivable also. Now it is inconceivable that election and free-will can consist; but these, not being logical contradictories, are nevertheless found credible." The mercantile public frequently commit a fallacy by the ambigu ity of the phrase "scarcity of money." In the language of commerce, "money" has two meanings,-currency, or the circulating medium, and capital seeking investment, especially investment on loan. In this last sense the word is used when the "money market" is spoken of, and when the value of money is said to be high or low, the rate of interest being meant. The consequence of this ambiguity is that as soon as the scarcity of money in this latter sense begins to be felt, as soon as there is a difficulty of obtaining loans, and the rate of interest is high, it is concluded that this must arise from causes acting upon 2 Bain's Logic, p. 617. The troublesome ambiguities of "inconceivable" are discussed by Mill in his Examination of Hamilton, ch. vi; and in his Logic, bk. ii, chs. v-vii. He argues, however, in the interest of empiricism, and has failed to dissipate the mists. the quantity of money in the other and more popular sense; that the circulating medium must have diminished in quantity, or ought to have been increased. A cry then arises for more money, for more circulating medium, no increase of which can possibly relieve this pressure.* When St. Paul concludes (Rom. iii, 28) that "A man is justified without the deeds of the law," he is using the word "justify" consistently throughout, as meaning "treated by God as free from guilt." When St. James says (Epist. ii, 24), "Ye see then how that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only," he too is using the word consistently, meaning "seen to be just before God," which, he says, requires the evidence of works. All candid minds will see and acknowledge that in such a case the two statements are not contradictory, and that both arguments are conclusive." The paronomasia, or pun, is generally the logical sophism of equivocation. Charles Lamb quotes the following, taken from Swift's Miscellanies: "An Oxford scholar meeting a porter who was carrying a hare through the streets, accosts him with this extraordinary question: Prithee, friend, is that thine own hare or a wig?" Lamb comments on this, and analyzes the fun of it admirably. The Logic of it is quite plain. The enthymeme implied in the question expands thus: A wig is not one's own hair; Surely that is not your own hare; .. It must be a wig. Here are two negative premises, or else undistributed middle, as well as ambiguous middle. Still we may say that a pun is quite generally a mock argument founded on a palpable equivocation of the middle term. As herein: "Two men ate oysters for a wager, one ate ninetynine, but the other ate two more, for he ate a hundred and won." Here the reason is formally proposed. Virgil's famous line,' 'Mantua, væ miseræ nimium vicina Cremona !" contains a double pun, as such untranslatable of course, but may similarly analyzed. be It may be well to remark here, once for all, that most kinds of witty jests are mock logic of some sort. Humor seems to relate primarily to feeling, feeling exaggerated or misplaced. Wit relates Mill's Logic, p. 564. Essays of Elia, "Popular Fallacies," No. ix. McCosh's Logic, p. 176. "Eclogue ix, 28. rather to cognition, is more intellectual in character, and often, from under a logical play of thought manifestly and even absurdly fallacious, lets fly a sharp dart of truth. Dr. Johnson's fishing-pole, “a rod with a worm at one end and a fool at the other," is a mock definition. Mr. Beecher's jest, "People are the good people, the bad people, and the Beechers," is a mock division. Artemus Ward, travelling on a railway-car, suddenly cries out in alarm, "Mister Conductor, you've put the cow-catcher on the wrong end of this 'ere train; there ar'nt nothing on airth to prevent a cow from coming right in behind here, and biting the folks." Here is a curious mixture of humor and sarcasm; humor in the affected alarm at the supposed mistaken arrangement, and the grotesque consequences apprehended; wit in the sly assumption "Your train runs slower than a cow," implied by the deduction through the ambiguous "cow-catcher." Even the most scriously intended sophism becomes, when reduced to strict logical form, so palpably a ludicrous sham that we wonder any one could be deceived by it. As majesty stripped of its externals becomes a jest, so many a grave argument may be exposed to laughter and contempt. § 3. The second class, Fallacia amphiboliæ (appißoxia), differs from the last in that the ambiguity lies in the construction of a sentence rather than in a term. E. g., How much is twice two and three? I will go and return to-morrow. I hope that you the enemy may slay. A member of the House of Commons, charged with having called another a liar, rose and said, "It is quite true, and I am sorry for it." An example of Aristotle's is: τοῦτο ὃ ὁρᾷ τις ὁρᾷ .. ὁ κίων ὁρᾷ. The major premise is ambiguous. Another example given by Aristotle he takes from the Euthydemus, § 67. A disputant says, in reply to the question Is the speaking of the silent possible? that if we go. by a factory at work, we shall find iron tools far from being silent things. This furnishes the syllogism, The speaking of iron tools is possible; The speaking of iron tools is the speaking of the silent; .. The speaking of the silent is possible. (Poste.) In the Nicene Creed, the words "by whom all things were made" are |