III. SOPHISMS IN MATTER.

§ 1. The Sophismata extra dictionem are those in which we must go beyond the outer form and beyond the diction, and inspect the matter of thought, in order to discover the logical fault. They are commonly called "Material Fallacies," and described as those whose fault does not lie in form nor in language, but in the matter, meaning by this that the form is correct, but that the premises are falsc. If so, then they are logically faultless, and, as already said, their consideration does not belong to our subject. But it is not so; these sophisms are logically, formally faulty; only it is requisite that we examine the matter in order to discover this. Of this genus, Aristotle, and after him the Latin logicians, enumerated seven species,' as follows:

2

The first class, Fallacia accidentis (rapà rò avußeßnkóc), arises, says Aristotle, from the equation of subject and accident, or whenever it is assumed that subject and accident have all their attributes in common. By "accident" here (ovμßeßnós as opposed to ovría) Aristotle means, not merely what is usually called the accident in Logic, but any subordinate part of a general notion. Every species and individual is to be regarded as an accident of its genus in this sense. For example, "All men (subject) are mortal; but Every horse is (an accident of) mortal; hence (equating subject and accident), Every horse is a man, and Every man is a horse." But it does not follow that "man" and "horse" have all their attributes in common. An example from the text is: "Since Coriscus is not Socrates, and Socrates is a man, it does not follow that Coriscus is not a man, because Socrates, who is denied of Coriscus, is merely an accident of man." Obviously these examples are, the one undistributed middle, the other illicit major; but as illustrations of the present sophism we must take a different view of them. Either premise of the first and the major of the second are supposed to be converted simply, instead of per accidens.

1 De Soph. ch. v. Aristotle does not consider these sophisms as having false premises, but exposes in detail their formal faults. He repeatedly excludes from Logic the consideration of matter as true or false.

'See De Soph. ch. xxiv, where Accidens is discussed at greater length.

This, if legitimate, would give Barbara and Camestres, but, being illegitimate, gives rise to the F. accidentis. Another example from the text is as follows:

You do not know what I am going to ask you about;

I am going to ask you about the nature of the summum bonum;

.. You do not know the nature of the summum bonum.

Here the subject (unknown) of the genus (about to be asked) is equated with its accident (summum bonum). The example may be viewed as undistributed middle, or still more properly as an amphiboly.

We are now enabled to classify certain sophisms which have long been lying loose in our Logics. The standard example is :

He who calls you a man speaks truly;

He who calls you a knave calls you a man; .. He who calls you a knave speaks truly.

Here is inferred of a subject naming a species (knave) what is premised of a subject naming a genus (man). This is the best solution I have seen, but it is not thereby brought under any Aristotelic class. De Morgan confesses it troublesome, and concludes it is best considered Equivocation.' But it is clearly Aristotle's F. accidentis. Thus: "You (subject) are a man (genus); but A knave is (an accident of) a man; therefore (equating subject and accident) You are a knave." Or else, evidently, undistributed middle.

The name given to the legitimate conversion of A by Boethius' confirms this explanation of Aristotle's meaning. He has been very generally and very variously misunderstood, so that practically this species of sophism has long since dropped out of the list. Indeed, there are very few logicians who treat it correctly, or seem even to understand it. Errors arising from this malconversion have already been indicated in i, § 6, on Paralogisms.

§ 2. The second class, Fallacia a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter (τὸ ἁπλῶς ἢ μὴ ἁπλῶς ἀλλὰ πῇ ἡ ποῦ ἢ ποτὲ ἢ πρός τι Xéyɛσ0α), arises from the confusion of an absolute statement with a statement limited in manner, place, time, or relation. It is obvious that this includes the correlative Fallacia a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid. This, beyond question, was the intent of Aristotle; but Whately, followed by De Morgan, Mill, Bain, and their seconda

ries, identifies the latter with F. accidentis, which, in the Aristotelic sense, is ignored. It is needless to make separate species of these correlatives."

The first infers from a statement made under a restriction (secundum quid) to one made without restriction (simpliciter). E. g.:

Whatever is pernicious ought to be forbidden;

The use of wine is pernicious;

.. The use of wine ought to be forbidden.

Here the minor premise refers to wine used immoderately; the conclusion, to wine, however used. This is the time-honored sophism of arguing against a thing from the abuse of it.

The second infers from a statement made without limitation to one limited, proceeding from what is essential, it may be, to what is accidental. The old standard example is:

What you bought yesterday you ate to day;

You bought raw meat yesterday;

.. You ate raw meat to-day."

Here is inferred, in the conclusion, of meat with the accidental quality of rawness added, what in the major is said of it simply; i. e., of the essential substance, without regard to its accidental qualities.

The first of these cases, when we look into the matter, may evidently be construed as illicit minor; for what is premised of some, a certain use of wine, is concluded of all use of wine. The second case is plainly a quaternion, having an ambiguous middle; for "What you bought yesterday" is used in two different senses,-first simply or essentially only, secondly with its accident.

Under this class of sophisms might be included one to be called F. a dicto secundum quid ad dictum secundum alterum quid. When it is asserted that the desire of a sportsman to take life is cruel and despicable, to answer that those, also, who eat flesh from which life has been taken by others have therefore cruel and despicable desires is to infer from one special case to another special case, and is the sophism named.*

See De Soph. ch. xxv.

Hence, perhaps, the confusion with F. accidentis.

"This piece of raw meat has remained uncooked, as fresh as ever, a prodigious time. It was raw when Reisch mentioned it in the Margurita Philosophica, in 1496; and Whately found it in just the same state in 1826."-De Morgan, p. 251. "De Morgan, p. 265.

Perhaps the commonest and most dangerous sophisms of the species now before us are those which do not lie in a single syllogism, but slip in when passing from one syllogism to another in a chain of argument, and are thus committed by changing the premises. One of the conditions oftenest changed is the qualification of time. It is a principle in political economy that prices, profits, wages, etc., "always find their level." This is often interpreted as if it meant that they are most generally at their level, while the truth is they rarely are, but, as Coleridge expresses it, "they are always finding their level," which might be taken as a paraphrase or an ironical definition of a

storm.

It is a very good rule not to encourage beggars, but we should not infer of all who solicit alms what is true only of professional beggars. So, also, it is a good general rule to avoid lawsuits, but sometimes circumstances make an appeal to law a duty. These may be taken as instances of the error vulgarly called the misapplication of abstract truth; that is, where a principle, true in the abstract, is applied to concrete cases, and reasoned on as if it were true absolutely, and no modifying circumstances could ever by possibility exist. This is to reason a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid. It is an error very common and very fatal in politics and society."

It is by this fallacy that orators and devotees deceive others, and are themselves deceived, while they use the words loyalty, authority, liberty, faith, religion. The essence of these noble qualities is confounded with their accidents. Men commend a loyalty to a person which is disloyalty to a nation; obedience to a power which has no rightful authority; a liberty which is licentiousness; a faith which is mere credulity; a religion which is superstition.1o

The gods, say the Epicureans, must be invested with human form, because that form is most beautiful, and everything beautiful must be found in them. But as the human form is not absolutely beautiful, but only in relation to other bodies, it does not follow that it must be in God, who is beautiful absolutely."

The law, especially in criminal cases, requires a degree of accuracy in stating the secundum quid which to many persons seems absurd. A man indicted for stealing a ham was acquitted on the ground that the evidence showed only that he had stolen a part of a ham. Another being convicted of perjury committed "in the year 1846," the

judge entertained the objection of the counsel that it ought to have read "in the year of our Lord 1846." 12 Such minutiæ are denounced as "the quibbles and quirks of the law;" but abundant experience has shown that the most minute caution is requisite not to commit injustice through the fallacy of secundum quid.

We recur again to the statement that jests are usually palpable fallacies. Boccaccio tells the following story: "A servant who was roasting a stork for his master was prevailed upon by his sweetheart to cut off a leg for her to eat. When the bird came upon the table, the master desired to know what was become of the other leg. The man answered that storks never had but one leg. The master, very angry, but determined to strike his servant dumb before he punished him, took him the next day into the fields, where they saw storks standing each on one leg, as storks do. The servant turned triumphantly to his master, on which the latter shouted, and the birds put down their other legs, and flew away. Ah, sir,' said the servant, but you did not shout to the stork at dinner yesterday; if you had done so, he would have shown his other leg too."" The gist of this is in the assumption that what can be predicated of storks in general can be predicated of roasted storks; a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid. And so when the calculating boy, Zerah Colburn, was asked how many black beans it would take to make ten white ones, he promptly replied, "Ten, if you skin 'em." A worthy reply. A bean stripped of its accidents is still a bean.

§ 3. The third class, Ignoratio elenchi (rò Tapà Tùr TOU EXÉYXOυ ayvo ar), is ignorance of the refutation, answering to the wrong point, proving something not the contradictory (elenchus) of the thesis which one intends to overthrow. This supposes a disputant, an attempt at confutation, and is the view to which Aristotle limited his treatment. It is usual now to take a wider view, and under the more general title, proposed by Whately, of Irrelevant Conclusion, or mistaking the issue, to include all cases where the attempt is to establish a thesis by a proof of something not sustaining it, or of something which may be mistaken for it. This latter might well be termed Ignoratio or Mutatio conclusionis. Formally the fault is either in establishing something that is not the required contradictory of the thesis, or else establishing something that is not the required thesis.

12 For a discussion of these two cases, sec De Morgan, p. 252 sq.