so on, adding each time a single grain, until at last the respondent is forced to say that the total reached does make a heap. I then charge him with saying that a single grain makes all the difference between what is and what is not a heap, which is absurd. This reasoning, as applied to various objects, is called by various names. Besides Sorites, which Cicero" renders by Acervalis, we have the Crescens, the Superpositus, the Calvus, and others. This last name is derived from the exemplum of Eublides, wherein the series of ques\tions begins with asking whether pulling one hair from a man's head makes him bald. The sophism is used by Horace" to ridicule the fashion of valuing authors merely for their antiquity. The name Sorites does not occur in Aristotle. After him, it was used by the ancients, but only as a designation of the above sophism. About the middle of the fifteenth century it came to be applied also to the chain syllogism," between which and this ancient sophism there exists no analogy whatever." In explanation of the sophism, Krug says," "It attempts, from the impossibility of assigning the limit of a relative notion, to show, by continued interrogation, the impossibility of its determination at all. There are certain notions which are conceived only as relative, as proportional, and whose limits we cannot, therefore, assign by the gradual addition or detraction of one denomination. But it does not follow that, if a notion cannot be determined in this manner, it is incapable of any determination, and therefore null." This explanation is adopted by Hamilton." The sophism, in this view, is evidently, as to form, a fallacy of definition. § 7. The Ignava ratio (àyòs λóyoç) is commonly attributed to the Stoics, by whom it was employed in support of their doctrine of fate." It is propounded by Cicero" in the form of a complex constructive dilemma; thus: If it be fated that you recover from your present disease, then, whether you call in a doctor or not, you will recover; and if it be fated that you do not recover, then, whether you call in a doctor or not, you will not recover. But it is fated either that you recover, or that you do not recover. .. It is useless to call in a doctor. 20 De Divinatione, ii, 4. 21 Epist. ii, 1, 43 sq. 23 See Hamilton's Logic, pp. 267-69. 24 Logik, § 177. 22 Part 4th, iv, § 3. 25 Logic, p. 332. 27 De Fato, ch. xii. The strictly logical conclusion drawn from these premises would be,— .. Whether you call in a doctor or not, you will, or you will not, recover. This amounts to nothing. The dilemma is badly formulated. Let us redress it, and in more general terms; thus: If an event is fated to be, my effort is useless; and if it is fated not to be, my effort is useless. This is, in form, a simple constructive dilemma, and logically sound. The ancient idea of fate is the ground of this argument for inaction. It considered all future events as pre-established, fixed by an inevitable necessity, by a destiny originating independently of divine will and beyond divine control, so that not only nature and man, but the gods themselves, were subject to its unalterable decrees. An event that is fated to be will inevitably be, regardless of any second causes that may concur to counteract or modify its order. "If this doctrine were true," says Cicero, "life would be reduced to a state of hopeless inactivity, and the above argument would prove the inutility of any endeavor to bring about a desirable result or to avert a threatened calamity." Fate was personified by the Greeks in the Parca; the impersonal doctrine prevailed in the rest of the ancient world. It has barely survived with the Turks, who, as fatalists, will not take precautions against pestilence, and who have suffered Constantinople to be repeatedly destroyed by fire without an effort to stay the conflagration. It need hardly be said that there is no such thing as fate, personal or impersonal. It is a vain and vague imagining, without ground in fact or reason. Necessitarians of the present day do not argue in the above form. Their doctrine admits the contingency of second causes; but these are determined and determining. "There is no thing produced, no event happening, in the known universe which is not connected by a uniformity or inevitable sequence with some one or more of the phenomena which preceded it. These antecedent phenomena, again, were connected in a similar manner with some that preceded them, and so on. All the phenomena of nature, then, are the necessary, or, in other words, the unconditional, consequences of some former collocation of causes. The state of the whole universe, at any instant, is the consequence of its state at the previous instant. If one knew all the agents which exist at the present moment, and the laws of their agency, he might predict the whole future history, of the universe.' This doctrine excludes human liberty, and, if pushed to its logical results, does not differ essentially from fatalism. The controversy between Liberty and Necessity has continually agitated the world, in one form or another, from most ancient times. No controversy is more ancient, none more universal, none has more keenly excited the minds of men, none has exerted a greater influence on morals; it has divided not only schools, but nations, and has modified not only their opinions, but their manners, customs, religion, and government. Under its influence the Ignava ratio has taken many forms, been applied to various matter, and received a variety of names. Among these are: De fato, Metens (the reaper), De possibilibus, De libero arbitrio, De providentia, De divinis decretis, De futuris contingentibus, De physica prædeterminatione, etc. We are here concerned with the argument only in the form given above. The subsumption is false. Let us examine it. What is meant by "an event fated to be?" The essential idea of "fated" is "inevitable," that is, not modified by any precedent or concurrent events, substantially and personally expressed by "regardless of my effort." So our personal argument reduces to: If an event is, regardless of my effort, to be, my effort is useless; and if it is, regardless of my effort, not to be, But every event is, regardless of my effort, All my effort is useless. Now, consider this subsumption. Who can affirm it? What ground has it? It may be true of some event, as an eclipse, that I can neither effect it nor affect it; and of it we may say that it must either take place from other causes or not at all. But many events depend wholly or in part upon my effort as a conditio sine qua non. The only real fate is a concurrence of causes, an assemblage of conditions. Supply a new cause, take away one of the necessary conditions, and the result will be different, though still, if you please to call it so, a fated or necessary result. Fate changes then her decree. Sending for a doctor introduces a new cause; neglecting to send may be the omission of a condition necessary to recovery. Mill's Logic, p. 250. If the necessitarian objects that my will is itself determined by prior causes, I reply that then, it may be, I am fated to send for a doctor, and so to recover; or may be fated not to send, and, as a consequence of this neglect, fated to die. So my effort is not useless, not inconsequent. Zeno, the Stoic, who adopted the argument, once, it is said, conceded this. He undertook to flog his slave for theft, who aptly pleaded that he was fated to steal. "And I to flog you," was the reply. § 8. Praxis. Among the following miscellaneous examples are some cases of good reasoning from true premises, and others from false premises, as well as fallacies proper. If the reasoning is sound, give the mood; if not, analyze the thought, indicate the logical defect, and name the species of fallacy. 1. A legitimate argument may fail to win assent; No fallacy is a legitimate argument; .. No fallacy can fail to win assent. 2. Whatever represses the liberties of mankind ought to be resisted; Among those things that do so, there are governments; .. Governments ought to be resisted. 3. Every one desires happiness; Virtue secures happiness; .. Every one desires virtue. 4. Idolatry is wicked; Wickedness should be punished by law; .. Law should punish idolatry. 5. Christianity cannot be proven true by its success, for Mohammedanism has succeeded; Nor can it be proven by its alleged miracles, for Buddhism has its alleged miracles; .. Christianity cannot be proven to be true. 6. We ought to give one day in seven to religious duties, Inflicting capital punishment is killing; .. We are forbidden to inflict capital punishment. 8. A king is a man. Then it immediately follows, by added determinants, that a good king is a good man. 9. No moral principle is an animal impulse; But some animal impulses are principles of action; .. Some principles of action are not moral principles. 10. The papists would be aggrieved if the penal laws against them were enforced; But these are not, and hence they have no reason to complain. 11. Nothing is better than wisdom; Dry bread is better than nothing; .. Dry bread is better than wisdom. 12. No person destitute of imagination is a true poet; Some who are destitute of imagination are good logicians. .. No true poet is a good logician. 13. Some practically virtuous men are necessitarians; But all necessitarians speculatively subvert the distinction between vice and virtue; .. Some who deny the distinction are practically virtuous. 14. Interference with another man's business is illegal; Underselling interferes with another's business; .. Underselling is illegal. 15. Pestilence, being "a visitation of God," its event is not determined by physical causes. 16. No one desires to do wrong if cognizant of its nature, but only in consequence of ignorance; and, therefore, virtue is knowledge, and is to be attained by education; for no one desires evil knowing it as such, and to do wrong is evil.-From Plato's Gorgias. 17. His imbecility of character might have been inferred from his proneness to favorites; for all weak princes have this failing. 18. Quod tangitur a Socrate illud sentit; Columna tangitur a Socrate; Ergo, Columna sentit. 19. The right of the government is unquestionable; therefore we ought to obey it. 20. Every visible object that does not decompose light is seen by white light, and is therefore white; A black-board is a visible object that does not decompose light. .. A black-board is white. 21. Any form of government that excludes the people from political power is subject to violent revolutions; A democracy does not so exclude the people, and therefore is not subject to violent revolutions. |