Folly of Unreadiness Modern Warfare them. It would have been comparatively small satisfaction to the American heart to drive Spain out of Cuba after long preparation and by slow advances. It was a delight to the American people to do it with quick preparation, to do it almost upon the instant, and to do it so completely that none could be so stupid as not to understand. This popular spirit is of course both childish and unwise. It does not accord with our real seriousness as a nation. We do not conduct our ordinary business on such a haphazard principle. It is terribly unsafe to trust to the luck of emergency preparation in the event of war. For wars to-day are very different from those of the past. They are now far more of an exact science and are fought with weapons and tools and enginery that require years in making, and they call for men on sea and land who are trained specialists. Even in our great Civil War it took about a year after war began for both sides to get ready to fight; but neither side got any advantage, for both were equally unready. Nowadays every powerful nation, except ours, has great numbers of expert soldiers and vast quantities of all the materials of war ready at hand, to be used instantly. If we had been obliged to fight Great Britain or Russia or Germany or France, instead of Spain, our lack of readiness might have cost us very dear. There are no braver men for battle in the world than Americans; but mere bravery is no match for equal bravery with better weapons, ampler supplies, and Size of our Army Excellence of our Soldiers superior organization. It is the duty of our Congress and our legislatures to see that we are never again so poorly prepared. At the time of the declaration of war the regular army of the United States numbered 27,532 men. The regular army of Great Britain in time of peace consists of about 220,000 men, of France 2,043,000, of Germany 1,969,000, of Russia 1,145,000, of Spain 352,000. It is Our little army of regular troops has much improved in character and efficiency in recent years. The officers, nearly all of them graduates of the Military Academy at West Point, are liberally educated both as professional soldiers and as men of affairs. doubtful if any army in the world has more competent commanders. With remarkably rare exceptions, the officers are men of character themselves, and are able to see that the character of the enlisted man has a great deal to do with his worth as a soldier. Much more care than formerly, therefore, is given to the standing of the enlisted men. They must not only be within the limits of age, eighteen to thirty, and in perfect health, but their habits of life and moral character must also give promise of the willing and efficient soldier. Everything which good leadership among the officers can suggest is being done in our regular army to make for the highest efficiency. The uniform has been adapted to afford comfort rather than to make a show. High State of Training Congress and the Army The old-time elaborate manual of arms has given way in considerable measure to physical exercises which are calculated to develop supple, sinewy, and hardy men who can endure hardships and perform difficult deeds requiring strength and athletic skill. Much also has been done at the army posts to give to the private soldier a substantial education, in the confidence that the more intelligent a man is, the better soldier he will make. The regulars were consequently reasonably well ready for service when war was declared. They were well drilled and somewhat inured to camp life and field service. They had a fair field equipment. They were armed with a modern weapon called the KragJörgensen rifle, and they were supplied, while in the midst of the Cuban campaign, with cartridges of smokeless powder. But the regular troops were only a handful of men, and the points in which they excelled were only those which were within the power of the professional officers of the army to develop and direct. Congress had for years refused not only to grant any enlargement of the army, but also to authorize such reorganization as military experience had shown to be necessary and as had been adopted in all modern European armies. Such matters relating to the army as depended either upon legislation by Congress or upon administration by civilian officers were either seriously lacking or deplorably confused. In the Santiago campaign the transportation and supply departments almost entirely broke down under their responsibilities. |