Mr. Baily and Mr. C. Hall appeared for the defendant, but were not called upon.

KINDERSLEY, V.C.—I am of opinion

that this motion is altogether misconceived. One thing is clear, that had it not been for this Order, (1) the defendant would have had to print both his answer and the schedule; and it is contended, in support of this motion, that the Order precludes such printing. The question therefore is, whether this is such a schedule as the Orders prescribe shall not be printed. The second of these Orders refers to the exception of a schedule of accounts and documents; and the question, therefore, on this motion, resolves itself simply into this: whether this schedule, containing the whole print of this original bill, is a schedule of accounts and documents? It is certainly not a schedule of accounts. Is it then a schedule of documents? The purpose and object of these Orders were, that inasmuch as upon common questions of administration the defendant was called upon to set forth accounts, documents, &c., it is now made unnecessary to have those printed with the answer: it is sufficient that there should be the common office copies. But this case is nothing of the kind; it is not a case coming within the language, and certainly not within the intention, of the Orders. The contention of the defendant is that, in point of fact, this present bill is the same in substance as the bill originally filed; and for the purpose of shewing that it is so, he appends that original bill to his answer, instead of inserting it in the body of it; and in order, no doubt, to save expense, and for greater convenience, it was made a part of the schedule in the printed form, and not as a schedule of documents, but in fact as a part of the defence. This case, therefore, is not a case contemplated by the Orders, and there is no irregularity in what has been done. The motion, therefore, must be refused, with costs.

(1) i. e. The exception as to schedules contained in the 2nd Order.

WOOD, V.C. GLADSTONE v. THE OTTOFeb. 26, 27.

Demurrer

MAN BANK.

Jurisdiction

Rights of Foreign Sovereign-Inconsistent Grants.

By a concession from the Turkish Government certain persons were authorized to form a bank, to be called the Bank of Turkey, with the sole privilege of issuing paper-money and bank-notes in Turkey. Shortly afterwards, and before the Bank of Turkey had commenced business, the Turkish Government granted a similar concession to the directors of the Ottoman Bank. A bill was filed by the Bank of Turkey against the Ottoman Bank and the Sultan, seeking a declaration of the rights of the Bank of Turkey, and an injunction to restrain the Ottoman Bank from issuing paper-money or bank-notes in Turkey:-Held, on demurrer, that the Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the acts of a foreign Sovereign, who, having entered into a contract with British subjects, makes a grant in derogation of that contract, nor to restrain British subjects from doing in a foreign country whatever they are authorized to do by the sovereign power there.

In 1858 William Gladstone and others, the plaintiffs in this suit, took up a scheme for the formation of a joint-stock company for carrying on banking operations in the dominions of the Sultan, under the name of The Bank of Turkey. It was an essential stipulation in such scheme that the Turkish Government should grant to the projected company the exclusive privilege of issuing bank-notes throughout the Sultan's dominions; and it was arranged that it should be made a condition precedent to the company's commencing business that the whole of the kaimes, or paper-money, which had been issued by or in the name of the Sultan should be withdrawn from circulation, and that no further issue of paper-money should be made by or in the name of the Sultan.

A statement of the above-mentioned scheme was submitted to and approved by the Turkish Government; and on the 18th of May 1858 the Sultan gave his royal assent to a concession, which provided, amongst other things (Art. 3) that the duration of the concession should be for thirty years; (Art. 11) that The Bank of Turkey should have the exclusive privilege

of issuing bank-notes, payable on demand, which should be a legal tender in those parts of the empire of the Sultan where there were branch banks; (Art. 12) that the Government should not issue any description of paper-money, nor accord or permit the exercise of any similar privilege in the empire to any person or company during the existence of the concession to the bank.

The concession was delivered over to and adopted by the plaintiffs on the 15th of February 1859, and The Bank of Turkey was started by the plaintiffs to carry out this concession. The bank never actually commenced operations; but the Bill stated that the plaintiffs and other persons continued to be shareholders in it.

The Turkish Government not only neglected to withdraw their kaimes, but proceeded to issue a further amount of papermoney. Under these circumstances, the directors of The Ottoman Bank (a joint-stock banking company) concerted a scheme for supplanting The Bank of Turkey, and the Turkish Government granted to them a concession similar to that granted to The Bank of Turkey, together with the sole and exclusive privilege of issuing paper-money and bank-notes, which were to be a legal tender within the Turkish dominions.

This Bill was thereupon filed, by William Gladstone and others, on behalf of themselves and all other persons interested in the concession of the 15th of February 1859, or as shareholders in The Bank of Turkey, and The Bank of Turkey, against The Ottoman Bank, the directors of The Ottoman Bank, and His Imperial Majesty the Sultan. The 34th paragraph of the Bill was as follows:

"The plaintiffs have lately discovered, as the fact is, that the defendants, The Ottoman Bank, a joint-stock banking company, incorporated by charter, and who carry on business in Bank Buildings, in the city of London, have recently concerted a scheme for supplanting The Bank of Turkey, and obtaining for their own use the sole privilege of issuing notes or paper-money within the Turkish dominions, and of depriving the plaintiffs and the shareholders in The Bank of Turkey of the benefit of the concession granted to them as aforesaid; and with that view The Ottoman Bank and the directors thereof, have applied to the Turk

ish Government for a concession, to enable them, in conjunction with other persons, whose names are unknown to the plaintiffs, to establish a company for the purpose of carrying on banking business at Constantinople and in London: which company is intended to be formed with a joint-stock capital of 2,700,000l., in 135,000 shares, under the style of 'The Imperial Bank of Turkey'; and the Turkish Government has, at the instance of The Ottoman Bank, agreed to grant to them a concession for the purpose, together with the sole and exclusive privilege of issuing paper-money and banknotes, which are to be a legal tender within the Turkish dominions; and a concession, with such sole and exclusive privilege as aforesaid, has been already granted by the Government."

The Bill also alleged that the concession of the 15th of February 1859 was still in existence, and conferred rights of great value, which were vested in the plaintiffs; and that The Ottoman Bank had notice of this concession, and of the rights of the plaintiffs thereunder.

The Bill prayed that it might be declared that so long as the concession of the 15th of February 1859 was in existence, The Bank of Turkey was entitled to the exclusive privilege of issuing bank-notes or paper-money in the empire of the Sultan, and that the concession to The Ottoman Bank was inoperative as against the plaintiffs; and that the defendants, The Ottoman Bank, and their directors, servants and agents, might be restrained by the order and injunction of the Court from issuing or causing to be issued any bank-notes or papermoney for circulation within the empire of the Sultan during the existence of the said concession of the 15th of February 1859, and from doing or causing to be done either alone or in conjunction with any other person or persons, any act, deed, matter or thing, whereby or by reason or means whereof The Bank of Turkey or the plaintiffs and other persons entitled to the benefit of the said concession of the 15th of February 1859, might be prevented or hindered from having the full benefit thereof, and of the said exclusive privilege thereby granted.

To this Bill The Ottoman Bank and the directors put in separate demurrers for want of equity.

Sir H. Cairns (Mr. Wickens with him), for the demurrer of The Ottoman Bank, contended that the Court had no jurisdiction, as one of the parties to the contract was a foreign Sovereign, who was not and never had been within the jurisdiction of the Court; that the plaintiffs were not entitled to prevent other persons from carrying out that which they had confessed themselves unable to perform; that the plaintiffs could only proceed against The Ottoman Bank through the Sultan, as there was no privity between the plaintiffs and The Ottoman Bank; that the subject-matter of the suit was a matter inter regalia, being the jus moneta of a foreign Sovereign in his own dominions; that the plaintiffs, even if he was here, could not proceed against him to determine his rights in that respect in this Court.

The Solicitor General and Mr. Giffard (Mr. Wickens with them), for the directors, submitted that the subject-matter was entirely a matter of state polity, and must be governed by the laws of Turkey; that this Court would not interfere unless the whole subject-matter of the suit was within its jurisdiction; that the plaintiffs, in fact, asked the Court, having no jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit, to lay hold upon persons in this country to restrain them from doing that in Turkey which they were authorized to do by the Turkish Government: and on these points they cited-The Duke of Brunswick v. the King of Hanover, 6 Beav. 1; s. c. 13 Law J. Rep. (N.s.) Chanc. 107.

The Emperor of Austria v. Day, 2 Giff. 628, 678; s. c. 30 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 690.

Mr. Rolt and Mr. Druce, in support of the Bill, contended that the grant of a similar concession to other parties did not annul the first concession, and that, until annulled, it must be held binding; that the Court had jurisdiction to restrain the breach of negative covenants, even though there might be no jurisdiction to compel specific performance of the affirmative covenants on this point they cited

Lumley v. Wagner, 1 De Gex, M. & G. 604; s. c. 5 De Gex & Sm. 485; 21 Law J. Rep. (N.S.) Chanc. 898. Messageries Impériales v. Baines, 11 W. R. 322.

WOOD, V.C. (without calling for a reply). -I confess I cannot entertain any doubt upon this Bill. I think it is quite clear that an engagement such as this, entered into with a foreign Government, upon which alone the plaintiffs' rights stand, is not an engagement to which this Court can give any effect, or against the breach of which it can give any relief. From beginning to end the Bill states, no doubt consistently with the fact, that this grant upon which they stand is the act of a foreign Government; a foreign Government has entered into a concession which alone has given to the plaintiffs the rights which they now claim.

The case raised by the Bill is this, that this Court, acting upon that jurisdiction which it always exercises over contracts, and which authorizes the Court to say, that one individual having contracted with another shall not do anything in derogation of that contract, is to say, that a third person, with knowledge of the contract between the two, shall not assist the second to defeat his own engagements; upon those principles the Court is now asked to act, where the engagement is with the sovereign power of a foreign country. Unless the Court is prepared to hold that this is a contract which can be enforced by this Court the Bill must fail, inasmuch as all the rights of the plaintiffs stand upon the contract and it seems to me that it is quite impossible, where a Sovereign chooses to act in derogation of rights granted by his first sovereign act, that I can interfere to prevent the derogation of those rights; and if I cannot interfere with the principal, how can I interfere with the accessory, namely, the person endeavouring to defeat the right which the sovereign power has granted by the first concession? Now, that this grant is a grant operating through the medium of the sovereign power, and for sovereign and state purposes, there can be no question. An attempt was made in the argument to draw a distinction between the act of a Sovereign in his legislative capacity and as an individual doing something for his own benefit. The act of what is called the legislature, where the legislature exists in any sense of the term, binds the general interests of the country. The fact that the Sovereign has

the control of the money current in his kingdom only amounts to this, that it is for the benefit of the country that the right of ascertaining what shall be the current coin of the country should be vested in the Sovereign; but this, like every other right which he holds quà Sovereign, must be exercised for the benefit of the community, not for the private benefit of the Sovereign, of which this Court can take cognizance. Here is simply a grant of a right by the Sovereign that the plaintiffs shall have the sole right of issuing notes, as part of the current coin of his realm, during a certain number of years. That is, in fact,

the foundation of the Bill; because the plaintiffs stand upon the grant, as being a grant of a right emanating from the sovereign authority.

Now, what is the breach that is alleged? In the 34th paragraph of the Bill it is stated that the concession to The Ottoman Bank had been already granted, and that this concession conferred the same privileges as were conferred by the grant to the plaintiffs. I do not think it is necessary to inquire whether the first grant has been annulled or not. A second grant, inconsistent with the first, has been made by the same sovereign power. Now, suppose there was an Act of Parliament granting to the Bank of England the right of issuing bank-notes which should be a legal tender throughout the country, and suppose another Act of Parliament was passed which granted the same privilege to some other company, this Court could not possibly interfere if such a case ever occurred in England. It has been argued, by the plaintiffs, that this demurrer must be overruled, unless persons are to be protected in breaking the law when they do so with the assistance of foreign authority and under the grant of a foreign Sovereign; but persons who depend upon the grant of a foreign Sovereign cannot obtain the aid of this Court against the act of that foreign Sovereign because a grant is made by him that is inconsistent with the first grant; for the act of a foreign Sovereign overrides everything. When I read the 34th paragraph of the Bill which first speaks of the impropriety of the defendants (I do not call it fraud), in applying to the Turkish Government for a concession, I was reminded

of those cases in which the Court has been asked to restrain persons from applying for an Act of Parliament which was contrary and inconsistent with some right vested in the plaintiffs. But the Court cannot interfere to prevent persons from applying to the legislature, the sovereign power, to grant anything whatsoever, and cannot prevent their applying for a power similar to that which has been already granted to others. I could not have restrained these defendants, in the first instance, before the grant was made from applying to the Sultan of Turkey, any more than I could restrain them from applying to our own legislature for an Act of Parliament; nor when the grant is made can I interfere to prevent them from using a second grant made by the same sovereign authority. I cannot conceive where applications of this description would end if they were once acceded to. Take, for instance, grants for railroads, because the principle does not depend upon this power of directing the currency, this jus moneta, being the peculiar right of the Sovereign; but whatever else is within the right of the Sovereign would come within the same principle. Suppose the legislature of France or Belgium had made two inconsistent enactments. - had granted the right to make a railway from one foreign port to another, to an English railway company, and had afterwards granted a right to a second English railway company to make the same railway, how could I restrain that second English company from constructing the railway? I might go much further and take the case of a country like Turkey, or any other sovereign power which might choose to give to English merchants in general the sole right of trading to any port in their dominions; could the Attorney General of this country proceed against some Italian or Frenchman residing in this country, over whom the Court would have jurisdiction, to prevent his sending a ship to that country? It seems to me it is impossible to hold that this Court has jurisdiction to interfere with any step which the Ottoman Government might take, according to its own sole will and discretion. Therefore, I am bound to allow the demurrers.

Demurrer-Defence Act, 1860-Interest on Compensation for Lands required to be kept free from Buildings.

Under the Defence Act, 1860, certain lands were taken absolutely by the Secretary of State for War, and other lands were required to be kept free from buildings. The amount of compensation for both classes of land was agreed upon; and the plaintiffs, by their Bill, claimed interest at 51. per cent. on the amount paid as compensation for the lands required to be kept free from buildings from the date of the agreement to the time of payment:-Held, on demurrer, that the compensation paid for lands required to be kept clear of buildings was only a payment for damage, and did not carry interest.

The Bill in this case was filed, by the personal representatives of the late Lord Sherborne, against Sir G. C. Lewis, the Secretary of State for War. Under the provisions of the Defence Act, 1860 (23 & 24 Vict. c. 112), the Secretary for War required absolutely a portion of certain lands, of which Lord Sherborne was then tenant for life, and that the rest of such lands should be kept free from buildings and other obstructions, and two notices were served upon Lord Sherborne accordingly. The first of such notices was dated the 31st of December 1860, and to this was annexed a schedule, in which the lands required to be taken absolutely were described. The second notice was dated the 21st of June 1861, and to this was annexed a schedule, in which the lands required to be kept free from buildings and other obstructions were described.

By an agreement dated the 6th of August 1861 it was agreed between Lord Sherborne and the Secretary for War, that 10,000l. should be accepted as compensation in full for such lands and damage: of this sum 3,500l. was the compensation for the lands which were required to be kept free from buildings.

By section 31. of the Defence Act, 1860, it was enacted, that it should be lawful for the Secretary of State, at any time after the expiration of fourteen days from the

service of such notice as aforesaid in relation to any lands required to be taken by him, to enter upon and take possession of, and hold such lands or any of them, and to cause to be executed thereon all such works as such Secretary of State might think fit.

Section 32. was as follows: "Provided also, that in case possession be taken of any lands before payment of the compensation for the same, interest shall be payable upon the amount of such compensation until payment thereof after the rate of 5l. per cent. per annum from the time of taking possession as aforesaid, and such interest shall go and be applied as the income of the lands would have gone and been applied if possession

had not been so taken."

Under these circumstances, a question arose whether interest was payable by the Secretary for War upon the compensation for the lands which were required "to be kept free from buildings."

On the 7th of May 1862 the Secretary for War paid into the Bank of England 3,500l., without interest, but with the additional sum of 307. as an equivalent for the expenses (under the 20th and 21st sections of the act).

The 1st, 7th, 10th, 11th, 20th, 21st, 24th, 30th, 31st, 32nd and 34th sections of the Defence Act, 1860, were set out in the Bill.

Lord Sherborne died in October 1862, and the plaintiffs, his personal representatives, prayed that it might be declared that the defendant, the Secretary for War, ought to pay to the plaintiffs interest upon the compensation monies of 3,500l., from the 6th day of August 1861, the date of his assent to the said agreement, up to the 7th day of May 1862, when such sum of 3,500l. was paid into the Bank of England, and that such interest should be computed at the rate of 51. per cent., and that the defendant might be ordered to pay the said interest.

To this Bill the defendant demurred for want of equity.

The Solicitor General and Mr. Wickens, in support of the demurrer, contended that the question could only be decided by reference to the act. In the act a distinction was made between the case of lands absolutely taken and lands required to be kept