Recognizing how the situation has improved is not to suggest that further steps are not needed to eradicate political violence from Haitian life. As I noted to this Committee on October 12, there have been some two dozen murders committed in Haiti since October, 1994, which may fall in the category of political or revenge killings, the most prominent of which was the murder of Mireille Bertin on March 28, 1995. Recognizing the importance of eradicating political violence from Haitian life, the U.S. Government has, over the past year, maintained an intense dialogue with President Aristide regarding the Bertin investigation, other potentially political murders, possible connections among these killings, and the possible involvement of individuals in official positions with such activities.

President Clinton, Vice President Gore, Secretary of Defense Perry, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Lake, Deputy Secretary of State Talbott, Ambassador Albright, Ambassador Swing, and other representatives of State, Justice, and Defense have all, on various occasions reviewed these issues with President Aristide. In these discussions, we have urged that acts of political violence be investigated and prosecuted aggressively. We have urged that anyone implicated in such activity be relieved of all official responsibilities. We have urged that a new, professional police and justice establishments be created, untainted by any association with past acts of political violence.

President Aristide instantly accepted our offer to have the FBI investigate the Bertin murder. He subsequently sought to broaden the scope of the FBI's efforts to cover other high profile, possibly political cases, dating from the coup period. He accepted our counterproposal that he form a new investigative unit to investigate all such crimes, including the Bertin case. He agreed that this investigative unit should be made up of ICITAP trained graduates from the Police Academy, that it should be supported by professional investigators from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, the French Gendarmerie, and the United States, with forensic and other technical support from the FBI.

He

President Aristide provided the principal political impetus for a complete renovation of Haiti's police and justice system. He joined legislators from across the political spectrum to push the new police law through the Parliament. dismantled the Army. Early in 1995, he replaced his Justice Minister with another, more ready to work cooperatively with the international community on a thorough reform of the police and judiciary. He worked with us to ensure that the 5,000 new police by far the largest and best paid source of new employment in a country with over 50% unemployment recruited in a competitive and apolitical process.

would be

Our dialogue with the Government of Haiti on these matters is by no means concluded. We will continue to press for an

3

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aggressive investigation of the Bertin, and other possibly political murders. We will continue to urge that the Haitian Government separate individuals who may be implicated in these acts from any connection with the police or judicial establishment, even before the investigation is complete. will continue to urge that appointments to senior positions in the Haitian National Police be based upon merit, and competence, not patronage and political loyalty. We will continue, in other words, to urge that the Government of Haiti sustain the reforms in Haiti's police and justice system which it has set in train.

Assistant Secretary Gelbard will address issues related to our training of the new Haitian National Police. As he will note, we have made clear that we will not support a force which harbors criminals within its ranks. This includes, obviously and especially, anyone implicated in political violence. We have, over the past 15 months, made major strides in ridding Haiti's security establishment of such individuals. We will remain vigilant, and we remain optimistic that our efforts can have continued effect.

We have worked closely with the Congress in helping Haiti create a new police force, establish the rule of law, and deal with the problem of political violence. Department representatives have met with Members or staff over 30 times since January 1995, and 11 times since October. I raised the Bertin case in my October 12 testimony to this Committee. On November 2, State and all other agencies concerned provided detailed and extensive information on this same subject to the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

I understand that you may have some question as to why we did not furnish this Committee on October 12 with the same information we gave to the Intelligence Committee two weeks later. On October 12, I informed this Committee that the Government of Haiti had just set up a Special Investigative Unit to pursue the Bertin and other possibly politically motivated killings. Prior to that event, the FBI had treated this inquiry as an ongoing criminal investigation, and shared only such information as it deemed necessary and advisable with Embassy, CIA, and DOD personnel in Port-au-Prince. It was following the creation of the Special Haitian Investigators Unit, and thus later in October, that the FBI representatives in Washington met with State and other relevant agency representatives to share the results of their investigation, as we prepared to turn this material over to this new Haitian investigative unit, and to respond to inquiries from the House Select Committee on Intelligence.

Mr. Chairman, in eight weeks the peacekeeping operation of the UN in Haiti will be completed. Our troops will come home. Their orderly, safe, and timely departure is, I know, a priority we all share.

We have learned through experience that the most difficult part of any peacekeeping operation is often its conclusion, not its initiation. Essential to the successful and timely conclusion of this particular operation is the deployment, on schedule, of Haiti's new police force, in order that something is in place to replace departing U.S. and other international military forces, and assume responsibility for security in Haiti when the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force terminates in February. Over 1,500 Police cadets remain in training today. We seek your cooperation in assuring the funding

necessary to allow these cadets to complete their training over the next eight weeks.

OPENING STATEMENT BY

DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR WILLIAM E. PERRY

FOR TESTIMONY BEFORE

THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, my name is William E. Perry, and I am a Deputy Assistant Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation arrived in Port-Au-Prince, Haiti, during the early morning hours of March 29, 1995, to initiate an investigation into the murders of Mireille Durocher Bertin and Eugene Baillergeau, Jr. As the Committee knows, Madam Bertin was a prominent, politically active Haitian attorney, and an outspoken critic of President JeanBertrand Aristide. Baillergeau was Bertin's client and had been driving her to a meeting, called on his behalf, concerning a claim which he had made for alleged damage to his personal aircraft.

At approximately 3:30 p.m. in the afternoon of March 28, 1995, both were slain by 9mm and 5.56mm gunfire from at least two assailants as their car sat in heavy traffic on Martin Luther King Blvd. in Port-Au-Prince. Members of the multi

national peace keeping forces (MNF) and members of the Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) responded to the site and attempted to preserve the scene of the crime until the arrival of the FBI's Evidence Response Team.

Upon arrival in Haiti, liaison was immediately

established with Haitian Government officials and with the U.S. Embassy. Since we were conducting a law-enforcement investigation in a foreign culture, with a foreign language, and with no contacts of our own, we met regularly in Port-Au-Prince with representatives of the Embassy, the U.S. military, and other relevant U.S. agencies in order to obtain assistance and advice and generally to apprise them of the course of our investigation. Discussion included investigative strategies, problems experienced, and certain investigative information developed on

the murders.

We did not provide this information as an intelligencegathering or intelligence-dissemination effort: We were not in Haiti to do either and we did not. Rather, we provided information to these agencies in Port-Au-Prince in order to obtain their cooperation and assistance and thus to enhance our ability to achieve our investigative goals.

Outside of Port-Au-Prince, the FBI's level of

information sharing with other agencies was much different.